Sophie Horowitz

UMass Amherst
Department of Philosophy
352 Bartlett Hall, Hicks Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9269

email: shorowitz at
Here is my CV.
I'm an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UMass Amherst. I work on epistemology. More specifically, I am interested in higher-order evidence, permissivism, and formal and informal ways of understanding epistemic value. I am also interested in ethics and practical rationality.

Before coming to UMass, I taught for two years at Rice University. Before that, I was a graduate student at MIT. My dissertation focused on the relationship between epistemic rationality and truth. And before that, I went to Swarthmore College and studied philosophy and studio art.


The Truth Problem for Permissivism. Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy. [penultimate] [abstract]

Predictably Misleading Evidence. In preparation for Matthias Skipper Rasmussen and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, OUP. [penultimate] [abstract]

Accuracy and Educated Guesses. [2019] In Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. [penultimate] [abstract] *Winner of the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology.

Epistemic Utility and the "Jamesian Goals". [2017] In Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, OUP. [draft] [abstract]

Uniqueness: A New Argument [2016] (with Sinan Dogramaci). Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. 130-147. [pdf] [abstract]

Respecting All the Evidence [2015] (with Paulina Sliwa). Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. [pdf] [abstract]

Expecting the Unexpected [2015] (with Tom Dougherty and Paulina Sliwa), Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321, special issue on transformative experience. [pdf] [abstract]

Epistemic Akrasia [2014]. Noûs 48 (4):718-744. [pdf] [abstract]

Immoderately Rational [2013]. Philosophical Studies 167(1):1-16. [pdf] [abstract]

Book Reviews and Symposia

Symposium piece on Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme. [draft]

Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality & Reflection. Mind 125 (498): 565-569. [pdf]

In Progress

A Guessing Argument for Conditionalization [abstract]

Conditionalization and Group Punishment [abstract]

Dumb and Dumber [abstract]

Temporary Moral Status [abstract]

Teaching Stuff

Here are some example papers I created, along with a scavenger hunt. I also had the students grade these using my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these. Comments welcome.

[good paper]
[bad paper]
[scavenger hunt]
[another "good" paper, annotated]

Here is a recent version of my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these too. [rubrics]


Phil 164: Medical Ethics. I teach this all the time. [recent syllabus]

Phil 700: Proseminar in Philosophy, with Alejandro Pérez Carballo. F16, F19.

Phil 542: Higher Order Evidence. S18. [syllabus]

Phil 542: Epistemology: Who Cares? S17. [syllabus]

Phil 342: Introduction to Epistemology. S17, S20. [syllabus]

Phil 742: Testimony, Authority, and Well-Being. S18. [syllabus]

Phil 303: Theory of Knowledge. (Rice University.) F15, S15. [syllabus]

Phil 503: Seminar on Epistemic Value and Normativity. (Rice University.) S15. [syllabus]

Phil 304: Metaphysics. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]

Phil 100: Problems of Philosophy. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]