Hi! Welcome to my small corner of the
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some time, and it’s taken me awhile to find my way back to philosophy. But this webpage will be updated soon(ish)!
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Review of The Metaphysics of Quantity, by J. Wolff,
Mind, forthcoming
Parthood and
Naturalness, Philosophical Studies,
forthcoming
Is
part of
a perfectly natural, or fundamental, relation? Philosophers have been hesitant
to take a stand on this issue. One reason for this hesitancy is the worry that, if parthood is perfectly natural, then the
perfectly natural properties and relations are not suitably ''independent'' of one another. (Roughly, the
perfectly natural properties are not suitably independent if there are
necessary connections among them.) In this paper, I argue that parthood is a
perfectly natural relation. In so doing, I argue that this ''independence'' worry is unfounded. I conclude by
noting some consequences of the naturalness of parthood.
No Work for a Theory
of Universals, with C. J. G. Meacham, eds. B. Loewer
& J. Schaffer, Blackwell Companion to
David Lewis (Blackwell, 2015): 116-137
Several
variants of Lewis's Best System account of lawhood
have been proposed that avoid its commitment to perfectly natural
properties. There has been little discussion of
the relative merits of these proposals, and little discussion of how one might
extend this strategy to provide
natural property-free variants of Lewis's other accounts, such as his accounts of
duplication, intrinsicality, causation, counterfactuals, and reference. We undertake these projects in this paper. We begin by providing a framework for
classifying and assessing the variants of the Best System account. We then evaluate these proposals, and
identify the most promising candidates.
We go on to develop a proposal for systematically modifying Lewis's
other accounts so that they, too, avoid commitment to perfectly natural
properties. We conclude by briefly
considering a different route one might take to developing natural
property-free versions of Lewis's other accounts, drawing on recent work by
Williams.
Intrinsic Explanations
and Numerical Representations, ed. R. Francescotti,
Companion to Intrinsic Properties (de
Gruyter, 2014): 271-290
In
Science Without Numbers (1980), Hartry Field defends a theory of quantity that, he claims,
is able to provide both i)
an intrinsic explanation of the structure of space, spacetime, and other
quantitative properties, and ii) an
intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations of quantities
(distances, lengths, mass, temperature, etc.) are appropriate or acceptable
while others are not. But several
philosophers have argued otherwise. In
this paper I focus on arguments from Ellis and Milne to the effect that one
cannot provide an account of quantity in ''purely
intrinsic''
terms. I show, first, that these arguments
are confused. Second, I show that Field's treatment of quantity can
provide an intrinsic explanation of the structure of quantitative properties;
what it cannot do is provide an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical
representations are more appropriate than others. Third, I show that one could provide an
intrinsic explanation of this sort if one modified Field's account in certain ways.
Quantitative
Properties, Philosophy Compass (2013)
8: 633-645
Two grams mass, three coulombs charge, five
inches long – these are examples of quantitative properties. Quantitative
properties have certain structural features that other sorts of properties
lack. What are the metaphysical
underpinnings of quantitative structure?
This paper considers several accounts of quantity, and assesses the
merits of each.
Fundamental Properties
of Fundamental Properties, eds. K. Bennett & D. Zimmerman, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 8
(Oxford, 2013): 78-104
Since the publication of David Lewis's
''New Work for a Theory of Universals,'' the distinction between properties
that are fundamental – or perfectly
natural – and those that are not has become a staple of mainstream
metaphysics. Plausible candidates for
perfect naturalness include the quantitative properties posited by fundamental
physics. This paper argues for two
claims: (1) the most satisfying account of quantitative properties employs
higher-order relations, and (2) these relations must be perfectly natural, for
otherwise the perfectly natural properties cannot play the roles in
metaphysical theorizing as envisaged by Lewis.
Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2011) 82: 314-336
The
standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two sorts
of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the
account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways.
This paper argues that, in this context, none of these moves are legitimate.
Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis's
can succeed, for an adequate account
of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional
distinctions among properties.
Review of Real Essentialism, by D. Oderberg, Mind
(2010) 119: 1210-1212
Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2010)
88: 721-729
In 'Does Four-Dimensionalism
Explain Coincidence?' Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the
four-dimensionalist or perdurantist explanation of
coincidence to the three-dimensionalist or endurantist
explanation. I argue that Moyer's
formulations of perdurantism and endurantism
lead him to overlook the perdurantist's
advantage. A more satisfactory
formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not
consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this
puzzle is clearly preferable.
Three Arguments from
Temporary Intrinsics, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (2010) 81: 605-619
The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show
that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument,
which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument
conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of
the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument
from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling
reason to favor one theory of persistence over another.
Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance, Philosophical Studies (2007) 136:
385-404
Resemblances
obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular,
resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of David Armstrong's well-known
theory of universals. In this paper I
examine Armstrong's
efforts to account for such resemblances, and explore several ways one might
extend the theory in order to account for quantity. I argue that none succeed.
Some of the papers posted here include typographical corrections or
clarifications made after publication, and so may diverge slightly from their
official versions.
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