We left positing the existence of three competitions which together are intended to give us the Repeated Name Penalty, Principle C effects, and Principle B effects. Here’s our present way of formulating this set up.

1. **Reinhart’s competition**  
   (aka, Roelofsen’s Coreference rule; derives Principle C)  
   i. alternatives = (anaphor, variable bound from an A position)  
   ii. \(\text{choose}(\text{anaphor, variable bound from an A position}) = \text{the variable if it achieves the same meaning in context.}\)

2. **Be Small!**  
   (derives the Repeated Name penalty)  
   i. alternatives = (anaphoric definite description, pronoun)  
   ii. \(\text{choose}(\text{anaphoric definite description, pronoun}) = \text{the smaller if it achieves the same anaphoric reference to X.}\)

3. **Be Clear!**  
   (derives Principle B)  
   i. alternatives = (pronoun, reflexive)  
   ii. \(\text{choose}(\text{pronoun, reflexive}) = \text{the least ambiguous one when they produce the same meaning.}\)

These Principles are meant to play out in the way sketched below. Consider first the competition in (2).

2. a. **The woman** amused **the woman**.  
   b. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **the woman**\(_1\).  

In (2a), the two DPs are coreferent, and in (2b), the first binds the second. Reinhart’s Competition chooses (2b) of these two. For this reason, (2a) is not a way this sentence can be interpreted. Consider next (3).

3. a. **The woman** amused **her**.  
   b. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **her**.  

Reinhart’s competition applies here too, and chooses (3b). For this reason, (3a) is not a way this sentence can be interpreted. Now consider:

4. a. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **the woman**\(_1\).  
   b. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **her**.  

Reinhart’s competition doesn’t pick a winner from this pair, but the Be Small! does. It picks (4b). For this reason, (4a) is not an interpretation this sentence can get. Finally, consider:

5. a. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **her**.  
   b. **The woman**\(_1\) amused **herself**.  

This contest is evaluated by Be Clear! (5) is one of three interpretations that the form shown in (6) has.

6. a. **The woman** amused **her**.  
   b. = **The woman**\(_1\) amused **her**.  
   c. = **The woman** amused **her** (*≠ the woman*).

Be Clear! compares (6) with (7).

7. a. **The woman** amused **herself**.  
   b. = **The woman**\(_1\) amused **herself**.  
   c. ≠ **The woman** amused **herself** (*≠ the woman*).

We think that (7) has only the interpretation in (7a), and not, say, the meaning in (7b), because the sloppy reading for sentences like these seems to be overwhelmingly preferred.
(8) The woman amused herself and so did the girl.
   a. = The woman amused herself and the girl amused herself too.
   b. ≠ The woman amused herself and the girl amused the woman too.

Be Clear! applies to (5), then, because the two meanings assigned to the sentences are the same, and (5b) expresses that meaning less ambiguously than (5a). In this case “less ambiguous” can be evaluated simply: (6) is ambiguous and (7) is unambiguous.

The Reinhart and Reuland binding theory preserves a competition view of the relationship between reflexives and pronouns, but it’s decidedly not pragmatic. It brings up some interesting issues as well, including how to think about the meanings of reflexive and pronominal anaphora and how to capture the locality condition on the competition.

Let’s start with this locality condition. On the Dowty inspired view of the competition, the reason Be Clear! allows binding in (10a) and disallows binding in (10b) comes from the same reason that (9b) is grammatical but (9a) isn’t.

(9) a. * Mary₂ is sad that Bill likes herself₁.
   b. Mary₂ likes herself₁.
(10) a. Mary₂ is sad that Bill likes her₁.
   b. * Mary₂ likes her₁.

To get the competition started, something needs to determine the contrast between (9a) and (9b). The idea that Reinhart and Reuland pursue is that the locality condition is essentially co-argumenthood. They have a very nuanced view of this way of thinking, so we need to look at it from a couple of angles. First, let’s lay out a way of defining “co-argumenthood.” They want this notion to be relativized to what they call a predicate. In the simple case, we can think of a predicate as a verb, adjective or noun. The simple description that R&R give makes use of the θ-role terminology: two DPs are co-arguments if their θ-roles come from the same term. But all three DPs in (11) are taken to be co-arguments, and it’s not obvious that they all get their θ-roles from the same term.

(11) Mary showed Sam to Sally.

The to is an obligatory marker of the θ-role that Sally gets. And many modern theories of argument structure sever the subject argument from the verb that it is a subject for. That is perhaps clearer in cases like (12).

(12) Mary opened the door.
The syntactically complex picture of the decomposition of open in (16) comes from the availability of a restitutive reading in:

(17) Satoshi opened the door again.

which shows us that there is a syntactic phrase within this example that is a state description. (See von Stechow (1995).) I show you this detail because from it we learn that being the argument of the state description within this vP does not prevent being a co-argument of the eventuality that the subject is an argument of. I’ve tried to navigate this by making the state description a part of that eventuality. This is a way of expressing the directness of the relation between the eventuality that brings the state about and the state. (See Chierchia 2004 and Kratzer 2005.)

Satoshi pressed me about this claim after class, when I first made it last week. He pointed out that there could be problems about individuating eventualities if an action event, like a becoming something, is also a state, like open. If that is insurmountable, then the denotation I’ve given for the process of opening shouldn’t make the resultant open state a part of the process of becoming open. Instead, it should keep them separate parts of a larger eventuality. It’s the idea that the process and the resultant state can be understood as a single eventuality that is responsible for capturing the direct causation like meaning here. That is what distinguishes the two sentences in (18).

(18) a. Satoshi made the door open.
Satoshi caused the door to be open.

b. Satoshi opened the door.

(18a) is true if the state of affairs it describes involves Satoshi pushing a button that sends a radio signal to a robot in the house down the street that pushes the door open. I believe that (18b) is not the right way of describing that state of affairs. Chierchia’s suggestion is that the difference traces back to the difficulty of understanding the robot scenario as one event, and that this is what is required of open, but not required of cause to open. A way of enforcing that which avoids Satoshi’s object would be something along the lines of (19).

(19) [Mary opened the door] = λe ∃e’ agent(e’,Mary) ∧ e’ < e ∧ ∃s < e open(s, the_door)

This says that there are eventualities that can have parts that are of fundamentally different kinds. I don’t think countenancing individuals that have mixed parts like this is problematic. It is parallel to:

(20) The Kaiju’s color and its motion are equally alarming.

This definition of co-argumenthood (Brian endorses calling them "event-mates") will make the DPs in (21) co-arguments, but the DPs in (22) won’t be.

(21) Mary laughed herself silly
(22) Mary considers herself smart.

I think this will also make the complement to the preposition in (23) a co-argument with the direct object, but not (24) (though remember Michael’s worries from last week).

(23) Mary climbed over Joe.
(24) Mary put it on Joe.

The locative describes the event in (23), but it describes the object in (24).

A serious problem for the direction that Reinhart and Reuland (1993) take in defining co-argument are cases of raising, like (25).

(25) The strongest woman seemed to herself to be a phonologist.

If we accept the standard analysis of these constructions, the woman is an argument of phonologist, in the embedded clause. With the exception of the meaning associated with the finite/non-finite contrast, (25) is equivalent to (26).

(26) It seemed to herself that the strongest woman is a phonologist.

And yet, it’s clear that (25) is grammatical.
Before tackling how this case fits the definition of co-argument that I’m floating here, let’s work out the details of how binding is possible in (25). Because the binder is not in a \( \theta \)-marked position, the semantics works out in a slightly complex way. Let’s fix our assumptions about the syntax of indices. I’ll assume that reflexive pronouns and pronouns both are essentially definite description with \( \phi \) features.

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda P. \exists x P(x) = 1 : \lambda y. P(y) = 1 \\
\lambda x \; \text{sing}(x) = 1 \land \text{fem}(x) = 1 \\
\lambda x \; \text{fem}(x) = 1 \land \lambda x \; \text{sing}(x) = 1
\end{align*}
\]

Let’s assume that an index is another kind of feature; it too is a predicate. When a pronominal has an index, we have (28).

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda P. \exists x P(x) = 1 : \lambda y. P(y) = 1 \\
\lambda x \; \text{sing}(x) = 1 \land \text{fem}(x) = 1 \land x = g(n)
\end{align*}
\]

Okay, with this now consider how (25) will be put together.

My assumptions about the semantics are that the predicates which build up a sentence relate situations to entities and propositions. The situations that they are descriptions of become parts of worlds when propositions are formed, which I’ll assume happens at the highest TP projection. I’ve also assumed that \( \text{seem} \) is a three place relation, and that \( \text{to} \) is semantically vacuous. There are other, maybe better, ways of expressing the denotation of \( \text{seem} \). What’s required by my proposal is that \( \text{herself} \) be related by some predicate to the situation that \( \text{seem} \) describes, so any analysis of \( \text{seem} \) that preserves that property will work for us/me.

As you can see, (29) doesn’t provide predicates that relate \( \text{the strongest woman} \) and \( \text{herself} \) to the same situation, and so this should violate the co-argument requirement on reflexives and their antecedents. But I believe the event-based view of co-argumenthood that I’ve sketched does lead to the expectation that (25) should be grammatical. The reason is that the NPs inside DPs probably also contain an event variable, and when that is incorporated into the semantics co-argumenthood becomes possible. If we incorporate that information into (29), we get (30).
The strongest woman seems to Mary to be a phonologist.

a. = It seems to Mary that the strongest woman according to Mary is a phonologist.
b. = It seems to Mary that the strongest woman according to the speaker is a phonologist.

The paraphrase I’ve given in (31a) is the one in which the referent of the strongest woman is the one that seems the strongest to Mary; that is, strongest woman is evaluated with respect to the worlds containing the situation variables in the embedded infinitival. By contrast, in (31b), the strongest woman picks out an individual that the speaker regards as satisfying strongest woman. It is evaluated with respect to the worlds containing the seem situation. (25) is predicted to have only the latter of these two meanings. This is evidence that strongest woman has a situation variable in its denotation.

This might have consequences for examples like (32) as well.

(32) Mary didn’t recognize the description of herself.

This could get a representation like (33).

---

1 I’ve made the situation variable in the NP a free variable that is then magically made a part of the relevant world. The magic should be removed, and there are several ways of doing that. I don’t think there are problems introduced if ignore this part of the interpretation.
(33) TP
\[ \lambda w \ \text{AGENT}(e < w, \text{Mary}) \land \text{RECOGNIZE}(e < w, (\forall y \ \text{FEM}(y) \land \text{SING}(y) \land y = \text{Mary})) \land z \text{ is the result of } e' \]

DP
\[ \lambda x \ \lambda e \ \sim [\text{AGENT}(e, x) \land \text{RECOGNIZE}(e, (\forall y \ \text{FEM}(y) \land \text{SING}(y) \land y = x)) \land z \text{ is the result of } e'] \]

vP
\[ \lambda x \ \lambda e \ \sim [\text{AGENT}(e, x) \land \text{RECOGNIZE}(e, (\forall y \ \text{FEM}(y) \land \text{SING}(y) \land y = x)) \land z \text{ is the result of } e'] \]

vP
\[ \lambda x \ \lambda e \ \sim [\text{AGENT}(e, x) \land \text{RECOGNIZE}(e, (\forall y \ \text{FEM}(y) \land \text{SING}(y) \land y = x)) \land z \text{ is the result of } e'] \]

The definition of co-argument doesn’t make herself a co-argument with Mary in this example. herself is an argument of describe, and so related to the describe situation, while Mary is an argument of agent, and so related to the recognize situation. But, notice that the nominalization of describe refers to an entity that is the result of the describing situation. It has a similar relationship to the describe situation that silly does to the dance situation. Imagine that this allows one to conceive of the entity that results from the describe situation as part of an eventuality that includes them both. The description entity is related by recognize to the recognize situation. A popular way of thinking about what that relation involves includes putting the entity into the situation. The situations that “recognize the description” describes are situations that contain the description. This transitive chain of inclusion relations allows one to understand this sentence to be about a recognizing situation that contains the result of a describing situation. The describing situation and its result are parts of a larger situation, and the causes the describing situation to be part of the recognizing situation.

To use this notion to capture the locality condition on where reflexives can find their antecedents, Reinhart and Reuland (1993) suggest this:

(34) a. A predicate is i-reflexive iff two or more of its arguments are i-coindexed.

b. A predicate formed of P is i-reflexive-marked iff either P is lexically reflexive with respect to an i-indexed argument, or one of P’s i-indexed arguments is a self anaphor.

(Reinhart and Reuland 1993, (11), p. 662)

We can take “predicate” in this formulation to be the \( \lambda e \) expressions that we’ve seen above, and “arguments” we can understand to be the phrases that are related to the situation variable bound by this \( \lambda \). A predicate is reflexive marked if one of those DPs is a reflexive. It is also reflexive marked if its meaning is inherently reflexive. An inherently reflexive predicate is one whose meaning identifies two of its arguments. This is what is happening in Tom’s example from last week (= (35)) as well as (36).

(35) Mary put the hat on.

(36) Mary dressed.
In Dutch, Norwegian, and other languages these predicates come with a non-"self anaphor" pronoun, and the clause concerning inherent reflexives is in here for that reason alone.

We can now provide a way of capturing the place where reflexives are found, and thereby kick off how the reflexive/pronoun competition works. A first approximation is (37).

(37) Principle A
An i-reflexive-marked predicate must be an i-reflexive predicate.

This works straightforwardly in simple transitive cases.

(38) The student voted for herself.

There is language in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) that suggests that they take coindexing to produce a bound variable reading. I will assume that interpretation, which means that (38) will get the interpretation in (39).

(39) The student λt voted for herself.

An i-reflexive-predicate, then, always involves bound variable anaphora.

The mirroring that we see between Principles B and A is captured in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) by raising the condition in (37) to a biconditional.

(40) Principle B
An i-reflexive predicate must be i-reflexive-marked.

The ungrammaticality of (41) arises because voted for is i-reflexive without being i-reflexive marked.

(41) The student voted for her.

The competition between pronouns and reflexives when it comes to expressing a bound variable reading is captured in this framework grammatically. It derives from the fact that the same condition – a relationship between reflexive predicates and the morphology exponing reflexivity – references what is the argument position of those predicates. It is a theory about the morphology/syntax interface. I teased you last week with the idea that the competition between pronouns and reflexives shows up in the cross-linguistic picture as well. I tried to illustrate that trend with German examples, but there was a question about my examples. So let me improve them. Let me report the results of my fieldwork (with one German speaker).

Context: Ava, Beth and Claire went voting yesterday. Ava voted for Beth, Beth for Claire, and Claire for herself. Later, Dorothy asks Claire whether she voted, and Claire replies: I did, but...

(42) nur ich habe für mich gestimmt. (only I voted for me)

This context is one that gives (42) its bound variable interpretation. My consultant reports that this is possible but not an easy interpretation. In the same context, the English sentence is, to my ear, clearly impossible. So there is the contrast that I described last week, but not as strong as expected. Compare this to what happens with third person pronouns.

context: Ava, Beth and Claire went voting yesterday. Ava voted for Beth, Beth for Claire, and Claire for herself. Later, Dorothy asks Alex whether Claire voted, and Alex replies: yes, but...

(43) nur sie hat für sie gestimmt. Only she has for her voted 'Only she voted for her.'

My consultant finds this sentence more natural with an alternative subject pronoun: die. He reports that he prefers focus marking on die, rather than sie. But in either case, the bound variable reading is not present here. For that reading, he wants to use the reflexive form:

(44) nur die stimmt für sich. she votes for herself 'She is voting for herself.'

These, then, are the examples which I meant to illustrate that where a competing reflexive form is not available, the expected Principle B effects do not arise.

This is what's expected on the view that Principle B effects arise because of Be Clear!. For Reinhart and Reuland, this would emerge from parametrizing how i-reflexive marking happens. Maybe something like (45).

(45) New Principle B
If there is a way of i-reflexive marking an i-reflexive predicate, then it is required.

Perhaps in this way, the Be Clear! model and Reinhart and Reuland's model make the same cross-linguistic predictions.

Note that this framework still requires the Reinhart Competition to do the same work that it was doing in the model with left with last week. Their Principle B does not prevent coreference in (46).

(46) The student voted for her.
In (46), there is no i-reflexive-marked predicate and so there is no requirement that there be a reflexive. The Reinhart Competition will mark (46) ungrammatical in contexts where it has the same meaning as (41), however, and this will leave only (41) as a winning loser. As in last week’s model, we need to understand how to combine Reinhart’s competition with the other principles so that the desired outcome is derived. (Here, for instance, we don’t want Principle B to mean that (46) is grammatical but understood to be different in meaning than (41).)

Because Reinhart and Reuland’s model doesn’t express a competition that is tailored to pronouns it lumps together things that Be Clear! doesn’t. On Reinhart and Reuland, (47) is a Principle B violation.

(47) The woman$_1$ voted for the woman$_1$.

Be Clear! is not violated by this representation. It is ruled out in last week’s model by Be Small! This difference between the two set ups is possibly testable. In Reinhart and Reuland’s model, a language that doesn’t have a means for i-reflexive marking a predicate will be a language in which sentences like (47) are not Principle B violations. If (47) violates anything, it’ll be Be Small!. That means in such languages, it should be possible to express (47) in any situation where Be Small! isn’t operative. By contrast, in languages where it is possible to i-reflexive-mark a transitive predicate, the effects of Be Small! in this context will interact with Principle B. We’ve been looking at cases where Be Small! is satisfied when a pronoun has been chosen, and we know how this effect plays out. But another place where Be Small! is satisfied is when an epithet is chosen. So another context to look at is (48).

(48) Trump$_1$ voted for the narcissist$_1$.

This should be grammatical in a language that doesn’t have a way of i-reflexive-marking its predicates, but ungrammatical in languages which do. Interestingly, the model we left with last week – I’m going to call this Brian’s model for reasons that will be clear immediately – predicts that (48) will be grammatical in both kinds of languages. Because Be Clear! is restricted to competitions involving pronouns and reflexives, it won’t apply to (48). It satisfies the Reinhart Competition, and so the only competition left is Be Small!, which it satisfies. If (48) is ungrammatical in English, then we should see this as evidence that either Reinhart and Reuland are on the right track, or that we need to liberalize Be Clear! so that it makes reflexives compete with more terms.

When (41) is semantically distinguishable from (46), we should expect coreference to become available. That’s claimed to be the case in Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993).

![Diagram](image-url)

(49) context: I know what John and Mary have in common, and it has to do with their feelings about John.

a. Mary voted for him and John voted for him too.

b. Only JOHN is likely to vote for him.

Principle A says nothing about which of two arguments needs to be the self-form. It would be equally happy with (50).

(50) I believe [herself$_1$ to have amused her$_1$].

In (50), herself reflexive marks amuse, and so this will satisfy Principle A. If we continue to assume that coindexing arguments makes one bind the other, then (50) should get a meaning in which herself binds her, and in this way satisfy Principles A and B. Reinhart and Reuland suggest that what blocks (50) is something independent of binding theory. They suggest it comes from a theory that determines how Argument Movement works.

Argument movement, on the conception they require, creates a discontinuous argument called a “chain.” If we were to express this in the trace theory of movement, we’d have something like this:

(51) chain=(the student,$t$)

The chain is the argument of happy, in this example. There are a variety of constraints on chains that determine where Argument movement can happen. One of those constraints is responsible for gating the relationship between θ-roles and arguments. The language used to describe this relationship is a little unfortunate:
(53) No less than 1 and no more than n θ-roles can be assigned to one referring expression.

What the value of “n” is depends on the theory; on one common view it is 1. In (51), the student is a referring expression. To get this condition to work properly in a context where Argument Movement has occurred, chains can be used.

(54) No less than 1 and no more than n θ-roles can be assigned to a well-formed chain.

A chain must contain exactly one referring expression in it.

By “referring expression” nothing having to do with reference is involved, since expressions like no student also count. The language in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) makes me think that what the authors have in mind is something like this:

(55) A schmeferring expression \( =_{def} \) a DP with an NP that is semantically contentful.

This definition is intended to distinguish quantificational DPs, definite and indefinite descriptions, and pronouns on the one hand from traces, PRO, reflexives and the se-anaphors found throughout Indo-European on the other. When we look at Argument Movement chains, what we find is that the trace (or traces) are always c-commanded by the schmeferring expression. If we build this into our condition on chains, we have (56).

(56) A chain must contain exactly one schmeferring expression, and that schmeferring expression must c-command all other members of the chain.

The suggestion about (50) is that this condition on chains is violated. This could be achieved if we could believe (57).

(57) If two DPs are coindexed they must form a chain.

(50) violates (56), if herself is not a schmeferring expression and her is. By contrast, (38) does satisfy (56) under those same assumptions.

(38) The student voted for herself.

(50) I believe [herself to have amused her].

This same reasoning is applied to cases like (58).

(58) The woman showed herself to her.

This satisfies Principle A, because one of the arguments of the event description containing show is a self-anaphor. But the chain condition is not satisfied, if her is understood as a schmeferring expression. Replacing her with herself restores grammaticality because herself is not a schmeferring expression.

Without amendment, this will prevent all pronouns from being bound; it won’t distinguish (58) from (59).

(59) The woman said that I would vote for her.

This calls for a change to (57). Argument Movement is subject to locality conditions, one of which would prevent it spanning the two coindexed points in (60):

(60) * The woman was said that she was voted for t1.

We could build this into the definition of chain and capture the ungrammaticality of such cases.

(61) Two DPs can form a chain only if they are local. If two DPs are coindexed and can form a chain, they must form a chain.

(61) will prevent a chain from forming in (60), and the θ-role that vote for assigns won’t find a schmeferring expression to bear it. This causes (60) to be ungrammatical. (61) will also allow no chain to be formed in (59), and thereby allow it to avoid (61)’s requirements.

This seems like an improbable place for a solution to (50). Partly because I am skeptical about chains and the way of thinking about the relationship between θ-roles and arguments that they embrace. But also because one should expect reflexives to be able to be in the same position that traces are, on this view. Reflexives are, like traces, not schmeferring expressions so the θ-role they seem to get is actually assigned to their antecedent. That means, I think, that (62) should have the same meaning as (63).

(62) The butter melted itself.

(63) The butter melted.

I’m also skeptical about finding a coherent definition of schmeferring that works. The definition I’ve given – and I’m following ideas presented in the beginning of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) – requires that herself differs from her in having contentful ϕ features in what we can assume is the NP position. We know about the semantic presence of those features in the case of her because they introduce a presupposition that is used to allow her to refer. The presence of those features can be felt in cases where her is a bound variable as well.

(64) Every student here said that she is happy.
The gender features of she allow this sentence to have a value only if the domain, student here, is female. In this respect, this sentence has a different meaning than (65).

(65) Every female student here, said that she is happy.

Precisely the same effect arises with herself.

(66) Every student here, considers herself happy.

We should conclude that herself is no different than her with respect to having φ-features. Elsewhere in the paper, reflexives are allowed to be schmeferring expressions for the purposes of θ-role assignment. We’ll come to those cases in a moment.

I suggest that we abandon the chain condition and its role in their system. We don’t quite need it for the two cases we’ve seen it applied to, I believe, if we decide to revert to Be Clear!.

The woman showed herself to her.

(58) I believe herself to have amused the student.

The pronoun in (58) is more ambiguous than necessary; herself in place of her would better signal the meaning that is intended. And (50) could also arise by way of Be Clear!.

There are obviously cases where a reflexive is found and no corresponding reflexive predicate arises. Some cases are in (67).

(67) a. Mary is happy because pictures of herself have been widely circulated.
  b. Mary’s letter is misleading because pictures of herself suggest something else.
  c. Mary’s letter demands that no one but herself should be paid.
  d. Mary put it on herself.
  e. Mary considers herself competent.

Reinhart and Reuland (1993) decide, like Pollard and Sag (1992), that not all reflexives are self-anaphors. They are not all subject to Principle A, therefore. This seems obviously true of first and second person reflexives.

(68) a. Apart from myself, everyone seems to understand the binding theory.
  b. Apart from yourself, no one seems to understand consonant harmony.

Both Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Pollard and Sag (1992) suggest that this other homophonous reflexive could be a “logophor.” Very loosely, logophors seek antecedents by way of a calculus that involves finding an argument whose point of view is somehow represented in the sentence. That calculus requires neither c-command nor locality.

Let us adopt the working hypothesis that reflexives in English are capable of finding an antecedent whose point of view is represented in some fashion or another. There is some reason to believe that the way in which anaphora is expressed in the examples of (67) differs from the way found with co-arguments. In general, the report is that simple co-argument cases of reflexive use force, or strongly encourage, sloppy identity.

(69) Mary amuses herself because everyone does.

= Mary amuses Mary because everyone amuses themselves.

≠ Mary amuses Mary because everyone amuses Mary.

But in the contexts of (67), the strict reading seems more readily available.

(70) a. Mary is happy because pictures of herself have been widely praised, and so is everyone else.

= Mary is happy because pictures of Mary have been widely praised, and everyone else is happy because pictures of Mary have been widely praised.

b. Mary thinks no one but herself should be paid because everyone else does.

= Mary thinks that no one but Mary should be paid because everyone else thinks that no one but Mary should be paid.

c. Mary put it on herself because no one else would.

= Mary put it on Mary because no one else would put it on Mary.

d. Mary considers herself competent because everyone else does.

= Mary considers Mary competent because everyone else considers Mary competent.

This pattern was discovered by Hestvik (1992). If the strict/sloppy contrast correlates with the difference between being a bound variable (=sloppy) and coreference (=strict), then what we see is that the reflexive in (69) prefers being a bound
variable, and this preference is relaxed for the reflexives in (67). Note that my event-based way of defining predicate predicts the contrast marked in (71).

(71)  a. Mary considers herself competent because everyone else does.
     = Mary considers Mary competent because everyone else considers Mary competent.
 b. Mary danced herself silly because everyone else did.
     ≠ Mary danced Mary silly because everyone else danced Mary silly.

A similar contrast is predicted in:

(72)  a. Mary crawled over herself, and Sally did too.
     b. Mary put this on herself and Sally did too.

That the kind of pronominal that reflexives are in these contexts has something to do with point of view – that is, that the antecedents the reflexives require are DPs which refer to entities whose point of view is at stake – predicts that they should not be able to have antecedents that don’t have point of views. (This is a point made by Isabelle Charnavel, see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016.) Can we determine whether that is correct?

(73)  a. The earth is in danger because pictures of itself do not adequately reveal climate change.
     compare: The earth is in danger because pictures of it do not adequately reveal climate change.
 b. The Binding Theory is dull when nothing but itself is considered.
     compare: The Binding Theory is dull when nothing but it is considered.

If reflexives are systematically ambiguous between being reflexive-predicate-markers and logophors, then we should ask why herself can’t be a logophor in (69). If that were possible, we should expect to have the same susceptibility to producing a strict reading that we find in (70). We should also expect to find that (74) has the same status as (67).

(74)  a. Mary\textsubscript{i} likes my pictures of herself\textsubscript{i}.
 b. Mary\textsubscript{i} is happy because you like herself\textsubscript{i}.

What Reinhart and Reuland (1993) suggest is that for a predicate to be reflexive-marked, it must have a subject. When a reflexive is an argument of a predicate that doesn’t have a subject, the reflexive cannot reflexive-mark it. In these contexts then, the reflexive cannot be a reflexive-marker and must be a logophor. When a reflexive is an argument of a predicate with a subject, then it can reflexive mark it, and, the authors stipulate, if it can reflexive mark the predicate it must.

I don’t see why this second injunction isn’t sufficient. We could seek something that produces (75).

(75)  a. alternatives = (logophor, reflexive-predicate-marker)
 b. choose(logophor, reflexive-predicate-marker) = reflexive-predicate-marker if grammatical.

Both this, and Reinhart and Reuland (1993)’s proposal correctly predicts the grammaticality of (76).

(76) Mary thinks that you should pay no one but herself.

(75) has a complicated interaction with Dowty’s competition.

(77) Be Clear!

a. alternatives = (pronoun, reflexive)
 b. choose(pronoun, reflexive) = the least ambiguous one when they produce the same meaning.

When a bound variable interpretation is intended, the reflexive wins the competition on the view that it is unambiguously interpreted as a bound variable. But on this view, reflexives are themselves ambiguous. Their form does not tell you whether it is a reflexive-marker or a logophor. We need (77) to know the outcome of (75). When (75) chooses the logophor, we want the competition in (77) to be called off:

(78) a. Mary is happy because pictures of her have been widely praised.
 b. Mary thinks that no one but her should be paid.
 c. Mary put it on her.

Of course, this same reasoning leads to the erroneous conclusion that (79) should be grammatical.

(79) Mary\textsubscript{i} considers her\textsubscript{i} competent.

This is a position in which logophors are found, and they, we decided, do not compete with the bound variable interpretation of pronouns. The unavailability of a bound variable pronoun here doesn’t emerge from this system. (This is another place where the Chain condition is invoked in Reinhart and Reuland 1993.)
References


