INTERLUDE: RELATIVISM

Let us at this stage of the argument about subjectivism take a brief rest and look round a special view or assemblage of views which has been built on the site of moral disagreements between societies. This is relativism, the anthropologist's heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy. In its vulgar and unregenerate form (which I shall consider, since it is both the most distinctive and the most influential form) it consists of three propositions: that 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning) 'right for a given society'; that 'right for a given society' is to be understood in a functionalist sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society. A view with a long history, it was popular with some liberal colonialists, notably British administrators in places (such as West Africa) in which white men held no land. In that historical role, it may have had, like some other muddled doctrines, a beneficent influence, though modern African nationalism may well deplore its tribalist and conservative implications.

Whatever its results, the view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third proposition, about what is right and wrong in one's dealings with other societies, which uses a nonrelative sense of 'right' not allowed for in the first proposition. The claim that human sacrifice, for instance, was 'right for' the Ashanti comes to be taken as saying that human sacrifice was right among the Ashanti, and this in turn as saying that human sacrifice among the Ashanti was right; i.e., we had no business to interfere with it. But this last is certainly not the sort of claim allowed by the theory. The most the theory can allow is the claim that it was right for (i.e., functionally valuable for) our society not to interfere with Ashanti society, and, first, this is certainly not all that was meant, and, second, is very dubiously true.

Apart from its logically unhappy attachment of a nonrelative morality of toleration or non-interference to a view of morality as relative, the theory suffers in its functionalist aspects from some notorious weaknesses of functionalism in general, notably difficulties that surround the identification of 'a society'. If 'society' is regarded as a cultural unit, identified in part through its values, then many of the functionalist propositions will cease to be empirical propositions and become bare tautologies: it is tediously a necessary condition of the survival of a group with certain values that the group should retain those values. At the other extreme, the survival of a society could be understood as the survival of certain persons and their having descendants, in which case many functionalist propositions about the necessity of cultural survival will be false. When in Great Britain some Welsh nationalists speak of the survival of the Welsh language as a condition of the survival of Welsh society, they manage sometimes to convey an impression that it is a condition of the survival of Welsh people, as though the forgetting of Welsh were literally lethal.

In between these two extremes is the genuinely inter-
MORALITY

esting territory, a province of informative social
science, where there is room for such claims as that a
given practice or belief is integrally connected with
much more of a society's fabric than may appear on the
surface, that it is not an excrescence, so that discoura­
gement or modification of this may lead to much larger
social change than might have been expected; or, again,
that a certain set of values or institutions may be such
that if they are lost, or seriously changed, the people in
the society, while they may physically survive, will do
so only in a deracinated and hopeless condition. Such
propositions, if established, would of course be of first
importance in deciding what to do; but they cannot
take over the work of deciding what to do.

Here, and throughout the questions of conflict of
values between societies, we need (and rarely get) some
mildly realistic picture of what decisions might be being
made by whom, of situations to which the considera­
tions might be practically relevant. Of various
paradigms that come to mind, one is that of conflict, such
as the confrontation of other societies with Nazi Ger­
many. Another is that of control, where (to eliminate
further complications of the most obvious case, coloni­
alism) one might take such a case as that of the rela­
tions of the central government of Ghana to residual
elements of traditional Ashanti society. In neither case
would functionalist propositions in themselves provide
any answers at all. Still less will they where a major
issue is whether a given group should be realistically or
desirably regarded as 'a society' in a relevant sense, or
whether its values and its future are to be integrally
related to those of a larger group - as with the case of
blacks in the United States.

INTERLUDE: RELATIVISM

The central confusion of relativism is to try to con­
jure out of the fact that societies have differing atti­
dudes and values an a priori nonrelative principle to
determine the attitude of one society to another; this
is impossible. If we are going to say that there are ulti­
mate moral disagreements between societies, we must
include, in the matters they can disagree about, their
attitudes to other moral outlooks. It is also true, how­
ever, that there are inherent features of morality that
tend to make it difficult to regard a morality as applying
only to a group. The element of universalization which
is present in any morality, but which applies under
tribal morality perhaps only to members of the tribe,
progressively comes to range over persons as such. Less
formally, it is essential (as was remarked earlier) to mor­
ality and its role in any society that certain sorts of
reactions and motivations should be strongly interna­
lized, and these cannot merely evaporate because one is
confronted with human beings in another society. Just
as de gustibus non disputandum is not a maxim which
applies to morality, neither is 'when in Rome do as the
Romans do', which is at best a principle of etiquette.

Nor is it just a case of doing as the Romans do, but
of putting up with it. Here it would be a platitude to
point out that of course someone who gains wider ex­
erience of the world may rightly come to regard some
moral reaction of his to unfamiliar conduct as parochial
and will seek to modify or discount it. There are many
important distinctions to be made here between the
kinds of thoughts appropriate to such a process in dif­
ferent cases: sometimes he may cease to regard a cer­
tain issue as a moral matter at all, sometimes he may
come to see that what abroad looked the same as some­
thing he would have deplored at home was actually, in morally relevant respects, a very different thing. (Perhaps – though one can scarcely believe it – there were some missionaries or others who saw the men in a polygamous society in the light of seedy bigamists at home.) But it would be a particular moral view, and one both psychologically and morally implausible, to insist that these adaptive reactions were the only correct ones, that confronted with practices which are found and felt as inhuman, for instance, there is an a priori demand of acceptance. In the fascinating book by Bernal de Diaz, who went with Cortez to Mexico, there is an account of what they all felt when they came upon the sacrificial temples. This morally unpretentious collection of bravos was genuinely horrified by the Aztec practices. It would surely be absurd to regard this reaction as merely parochial or self-righteous. It rather indicated something which their conduct did not always indicate, that they regarded the Indians as men rather than as wild animals.

It is fair to press this sort of case, and in general the cases of actual confrontation. 'Every society has its own standards' may be, even if confused, a sometimes useful maxim of social study; as a maxim of social study it is also painless. But what, after all, is one supposed to do if confronted with a human sacrifice? – not a real question for many of us, perhaps, but a real question for Cortez. 'It wasn't their business,' it may be said; 'they had no right to be there anyway.' Perhaps – though this, once more, is necessarily a nonrelative moral judgement itself. But even if they had no right to be there, it is a matter for real moral argument what would follow from that. For if a burglar comes across the owner of the house trying to murder somebody, is he morally obliged not to interfere because he is trespassing?

None of this is to deny the obvious facts that many have interfered with other societies when they should not have done; have interfered without understanding; and have interfered often with a brutality greater than that of anything they were trying to stop. I am saying only that it cannot be a consequence of the nature of morality itself that no society ought ever to interfere with another, or that individuals from one society confronted with the practices of another ought, if rational, to react with acceptance. To draw these consequences is the characteristic (and inconsistent) step of vulgar relativism.