Radical social constructivism and its equivalencies of cultural constructivism, deconstructivism, feminist discourse, post-structuralism, post-modernism and the like have become, in my opinion, a serious blight on the American intellectual landscape. The argument, which I will shall refer to in general terms as post-modernism, is, as I will show, logically fallacious and with only reasonably close inspection falls under its own nihilistic weight. In essence, the post-modernist position is that truth is only relative and has no general application given that said truth is a mere construction created by a given social context. As Fox (1996) points out, such a statement even under the most cursory inspection is paradoxical and falls prey to the same problem as that of our ancient Cretan friend (whom you will remember told us that all Cretans are liars). Since truth is only relative and subject to various prejudices, the statement that all truths are relative and have no generalizability is itself simultaneously relative and absolute and as such offers us no reason to accept it. Relativism makes no distinction (because for such folks there is none) between objective (i.e., verifiable) knowledge and superstition (astrology, creationism, flat-earthers to name but a few, come to mind) and is deeply flawed as an epistemology. It is, by definition, a direct attack on science, scientific method, and critical rationality. This view would offer us no way to distinguish between superstition and verifiable knowledge and as such is both nonsensical and intellectually dangerous.

Post-modern thought has continued to gain prominence within certain circles of academia (e.g., certain aspects of feminist discourse, literary criticism, some advocates of mutliculturalism, etc.) and increasing influence within some subsets of the psychological community. For example, with reference to the latter, Pritlleltensky (1997) in his discussion of the assumptions of various models of therapy appeared to feel forced to elevate post-modernism to the status of a model of therapy in the absence of any empirically based evidence to support it.

Phillips (1995), in his review of the wide range of constructivist thought, pointed out, few believe that we come into the world with our "cognitive data banks fully packed with empirical knowledge, or with pre-embedded epistemological criteria or methodological rules" (p.5). Conversely, few believe in Locke’s "tabula rasa" notion, i.e. that knowledge is existent, ready formed and written upon us as passive recipients. Most would agree with the evolutionary notion that humans are born with some inherited cognitive (e.g. language ability) and epistemological capacities (Phillips, 1995). As such, one can safely say the "knowledge" and its criteria, methods of inquiry, etc. are by definition "constructed". This observation is trivially true and few, if any, scientists would disagree. It is at this point, however, where the divergence between post-modernists and science begins. Kvale (1992) states that post-modernism attempts a "diverse diagnoses and interpretations of the current culture, a depiction of a multitude of interrelated phenomena" (p.32). Perhaps, but the question then becomes by what method and criteria is such interpretation judged.

In its essence, post-modernism and its related concepts of constructivism (radical and social), post-structuralism, and deconstructivism can be characterized by a non belief in: (a) the objective world and (b) attempts at meta narratives explanations (e.g., the universal theories/explanations generated by science). Kvale (1992) states that in postmodern thought there is no foundation for a universal and objective reality . For the postmodernist, there is no pure, uninterpreted datum; all facts embody theory. Thus in the absence of objectivity, reality is purely a function of social and, by definition, linguistic construction (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988; Kvale, 1992). Kvale (1992) further states "there exists no standard method for measuring and comparing knowledge within different language games and paradigms; they are inconmmensurable" (p.35). He further states that ". . . a postmodern world is characterized by a continual change of perspectives, with no underlying common frame of reference, but rather a manifold of changing horizons. Language does not copy reality. Rather language constitutes reality, each language constructing specific aspects of reality in its own way. The focus is on the linguistic and social construction of reality, on interpretation and negotiation of the meaning of the lived world" (p.35, italics added for emphasis). Lest the inherent nihilism is missed by the reader, Kvale (1992) makes clear his bleak world view. "What is left is a liberating nihilism, a living with the here and now, a weariness and playful irony." He further states "The absurd is not met with despair; rather it is a living with what is, a making the best of it, a relief from the burden of finding yourself as the goal of life; what remains is a happy nihilism" (p.38). A depressing thought.

Gergen (1985, 1991; Gergen & Kaye, 1992) has been particularly vocal in both his critique of rational-empirical thought and as an exponent of so called post-modern paradigm shift. Gergen and Kaye (1992) conclude in reference to a non-correspondence between language and the ‘real world’ (authors’ quotes) that "in the case of writing, each style or genre of literature operates according to local rules or conventions, and these conventions will largely determine the way we understand the putative objects of representation. Scientific writing, then, furnishes no more accurate (authors’ italics) picture of reality than fiction" (p.173). These authors conclude that both fiction and science are simply guided by cultural conventions and as such determine the character of the reality each view, i.e., science and fiction, seeks to depict. Thus, one could legitimately conclude that the narrative of intelligently designed canals on Mars, for example, is no less true than astronomy’s geologically based explanation. According to Gergen and Kaye (1992), since knowledge is socially constructed, the data based empirical observations of astronomy is simply a ‘local truth’ and therefore carries authority only within the scientific community.

Gergen (1985) states "constructionism asks one to suspend belief that commonly accepted categories of understandings receive their warrant through observation. Thus it invites one to challenge the objective basis of conventional knowledge" (p. 267). Interestingly, Gergen (1985) states "accounts of social construction cannot themselves be warranted empirically. . . .the success of such accounts depends primarily on the analyst’s capacity to invite, compel, stimulate, or delight the audience, and not criteria of veracity" (p.272). This is a stunning statement and is but one the petards upon which post-modernism needs to be hoisted and hung. Gergen’s statement is a clarion call to pre-Enlightenment thought. The Popperian canon of refutability upon which science and rational-empirical thought are built is cast aside in favor of that which is "compelling, stimulating and/or delightful". Such criteria are exactly those used by the jury in the Salem Witch trials, for example, (with "delightful" being an exception, at least for the defendants) for which the jury later apologized (Crews, 1997). For Gergen (1985) and post-modernists, empirical data and the conclusions thus derived must be subject to "the pragmatic implications of such conclusions within society more generally" (Gergen, p. 273). One might suggest that it was these "pragmatic implications within society" that created significant difficulty for Gallileo. A pragmatic point not lost upon René Descartes who sought in vain to appease the Catholic Church (he repudiated Galileo) but whose writings were banned anyway.

The agenda of post-modernist thought is not simply an intellectual alternative to a rational-empiricist conceptualization of the world but carries with it an ideological and political agenda. Kvale (1992) states as much when he says "The game of scientific language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency and truth is thus established" (p.39). One might suggest that his "equation": (a) not confuse correlation with causality; and (b) might do with a little empirical testing.

Ideologically based critique is quite pervasive within much of the post-modernist challenge of the scientific (i.e., logico-mathematical model) method of explanation. Sandra Harding (1986,1991) is one of the most influential of the post-modernists feminist critics of science. Harding has gained much notoriety (or celebrity, depending on one’s circle of friends) with her now (in)famous assertion that Newton’s Principia Mathematica Philosophae Naturalis could be considered a "rape manual" by which male oriented science seeks to dominate Mother Nature (1986, p.113). The ideologically frame of the post-modern critique of science and reason as suggested by Harding (1986, 1991), Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1990), Longino (1990) appear to be in the basic form of:

"(1) science is dominated by men; (2) it is hierarchical; (3) populations should be represented in the various sciences proportionately by race, sex, and ethnicity; (4) one can give meaningful analyses and criticisms of a technical subject though completely ignorant of it; (5) abstract argument supersedes particular results; (6) there exist non-Western and feminine ways to do science that are root and branch different in which science is done now; (7) Utopia cannot merely be agreed upon in principle but can actually be achieved" (Gross, 1996, p. 81).

The ideological salvo directed to science and reason is of course not restricted to post-modern feminist critics. Bruno Latour (1985) among said critics seems quite highly regarded by other post-modernist writers. In general it would seem for Latour that scientific statements: "(1) are often made from ulterior motives; (2) often have downright poor and incomplete justification; (3) are subject to inevitable vagaries of meaning and understanding because of changing historical and cultural contexts" (Fishman,1996, p. 89).

Longino (1990) suggests that there can and certainly by implication, there should be, such a thing as feminist science which is an entirely different notion than women scientists who may or may not be, feminists. She suggests that since science occurs in a given value laden context, the foundation of logical positivism and the hypotheses which are generated by this foundation are deeply flawed. For Longino, hypotheses are of course language and contain assumptions which are not related to the data and therefore are not testable via the process of data collection. Thus in Longino’s view, since science can not even in principle be value free, the notion of a feminist science duly informed by the social and cultural values of feminism is not only not oxymoronic but needed (Gross & Levitt, 1994). Longino’s criticism does not take the "male hierarchical, Western centered" form of Harding (1986,1991), or necessarily "the capitalist, power oriented servant of the rich" form of Kvale (1992). Her critique discusses the important subtlety of context of scientific justification which I will address in the latter part of this article.

As Held (1995, 1996) notes in her critique of post-modernism in psychotherapy, the essence and at its most basic, post-modernist thought is anti-realist at its core i.e., the only reality is that which is socially constructed. As such, reality should be constructed on certain pragmatic lines (i.e., ethical/egalitarian notions), there can be no hierarchy of knowledge since there are only local truths. From this perspective, science, the scientific method, and critical rationality hold no special authority or privilege.

All ideas occur in a given social/historical context. It is therefore important to understand the historical context that has given rise to post-modern thought prior to its critique. I would suggest two basic hypotheses regarding the current antithesis towards science and critical rationality by post-modernist thinkers: (1) the dogmatic view of science initiated by Sir Francis Bacon; and (2) the failure of science not only to deliver on utopian and egalitarian promises but in many instance to have been an instrument of oppression.

Frying Bacon

Perhaps much of the blame for the misunderstanding of science can be placed upon the head of Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626). A contemporary of Galileo and Descartes, Bacon was a radical empiricist who believed that nature could only be understood by direct objective observation. He was in vehement opposition to religious authority on matters of nature or on any other issue for that matter. However, his belief in science had a semi-religious and undeniable dogmatic quality. As Popper (1994) notes, Bacon simply replaced the omnipotence of God with the omnipotence of Nature. The task of science, in his view, was to determine the nature of all things. For Bacon, Nature was an open book and all that was required to learn her secrets in their entirety was an open mind (Popper, 1994).

Specifically, Bacon was vehemently opposed to theorizing as for him it carried with it embedded prejudices which could only contaminate observation. In the same way that religions writings dictated the way the world should be, so too did he believe that theorizing leads to similar and equally unacceptable biases. For Bacon, to obtain true knowledge, one must be free of such contamination, observe carefully, and write down one’s observations without distortion. In so doing, true knowledge will be revealed. As Popper (1994) states in regards to Bacon: "pure untainted observation is good, and pure observation cannot err; speculation and theories are bad, and they make us misread the Book of Nature--that is misinterpret our observations" (p. 84). Thus, in reference to understanding Nature, Bacon would agree with Locke’s tabula rasa notion, which is to say Nature will write its fixed truth on the blank slate of the unbiased human observer. This dogmatic perspective had considerable influence on the development of science and in some respects continues to this day.

Failure to Deliver Utopia and Maintain Egalitarianism

The scientific revolution of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Harvey, Halley, Boyle, and Leibniz was based on methodology which was capable of expanding and modifying our discoveries. Their methodology set aside the metaphysical assumptions of the previous centuries. As such, physics and mathematics became dominant methods of thought seeking to eliminate the crude prejudices and superstitions of the times (Gross & Levitt, 1994). As science and its challenge to societal beliefs in various natural phenomena evolved during the Enlightenment so did the critique of the social order. Wealth, rank etc. were seen as not the result of superior genetic inheritance and therefore proof of social perfection but rather as a function of various socially derived opportunities (Gross & Levitt, 1994). Thus, the ills of society were seen to be a function of the maldistribution of wealth, power, and prestige. Egalitarianism was implicit in the thinking of the scholars of the Englightenment.

The empirical rigor of the natural sciences was emulated in the strategies of critical political thought. No where was this more true than at the outset of the French Revolution. Science became a defiant weapon against the existing political and religious powers of the time. Simon de Laplace provides a interesting example of this defiance in his famous response to religious leaders regarding the absence of God in his explanation of the cosmos, when he simply said "I did not find the hypothesis necessary" (Gross & Levitt, 1994, p.20).

However, the abject failure of the French Revolution to bring about utopia brought with it a deep criticism and distrust of science. With the onset of the 19th century came the "Romantic" period of art and literature with its emphasis on vitalism and the importance of the intuitive over rational knowing. The work of such Romantic period writers such as Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Goethe reveal a deep discomfort with the rational. "Each accuses science, especially in its schematic mathematicized form, of blindness, or worse, a stubborn refusal to see" (Gross & Levitt, 1994, p.21). Of course, it is in the latter part of the Romantic period that the work of Freud and Jung emerged, i.e. that human behavior is not purely or even primarily governed by the rational but by irrational unconscious impulses. Interestingly, we see in a number of current post-modernist writings (e.g. Kvale, 1992; Longino, 1990) and in multiculturalist writings of Duran and Duran (1995), a connection and sympathy with a broad range of psychoanalytic/Jungian thought. The fit between post-modernism and psychoanalysis seems quite natural given Freud’s rejection of the scientific method and the non-falsifiability of his basic principles. Psychoanalysis, in the absence of scientific validation, is simply a form of "deconstructionist literary criticism" by the analyst of the client’s world view.

The failure of the French Revolution to bring about utopia of course did not inhibit scientific development. To the contrary, in addition to the Romantic poets, the 19th century brought a great development of science and in its offspring, technology, and with it, so-called progress. As noted earlier, there has typically been a connection between a scientific world view and an egalitarianism. However, the science and technology that gave rise to the industrial revolution also further created class distinctions and worker abuses, e.g. the documented mistreatment of Chinese workers in the building of the American railroad system, the horrors of the mill worker’s life, or that of the Chicago slaughterhouse as detailed in the Upton Sinclair’sThe Jungle, and the historical and ongoing racism towards African Americans, to name the more obvious examples.

The notion of progress itself was not without issue. Progress, by no means held the same meaning for industrialists Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller as it did for their workers. From the workers’ perspective, the progress brought about by science and technology did not improve their lives nearly as much as promised. Also during this period (late 19th early 20th century), there were assaults on the science-egalitarian connection by the eugenics movement, and social Darwinists, etc. which, for the most part, science withstood.

The 1960’s was a significant era for an increased distrust in the political establishment and towards science which has always been closely associated with the establishment from which research grants emanate. The existence of racial and sex based inequality could not be denied and was forcefully challenged by a wide range of groups viewing themselves as oppressed. As stated by Gross and Levitt (1994) in reference to the 1960’s and its continued impact:

". . . there is lingering distrust of science and technology. This obviously derives from the long tradition of fear and loathing toward the nuclear arsenals of the world and the technocrats who created them. It was greatly intensified by the brutal spectacle of the war in Indochina, where all the technical ingenuity of the most scientifically advanced culture in the world seemed to have been conscripted to inflict butchery on a peasant culture. Finally, the misgivings of the environmental movement toward technology as such became common currency with the left, thereby widening still further the rift between the contemporary radicalism and the Englightenment tradition of science as the ultimate product of human wisdom and the staunch ally of liberation" (p.33).

Scientists participation in the development of nuclear and biological weapons, the Nazi-like Tuskeegee study on African-American men with syphilis are a few of the powerful examples of scientists’ immoral collaboration with and abuse by governmental power. Thus for its critics, not only had science failed to deliver on promises of utopia, but in the view of many, it had become aligned with the anti-egalitarianism of the dominant power structure.

While the definition and description of post-modernist thought is relatively complicated due to its shifting vagaries, its refutation is not. In critiquing post-modernism, I shall consider five basic points, which are: (1) the problem of language and reality; (2) the problem of rationality and coherence; (3) the method of science; (4) the difference between social context and context of justification; and (5) the issue of ethics and morality.

Language and Reality. As I noted earlier, at its core, post-modernism among other things is essentially anti-realist. This perspective poses a severe limitation in defense of post-modern thought. Philosopher John Searle (Levitt, 1996) points out that the anti-realist confuses the epistemological with the ontological. Ontological realism is a position virtually everyone takes automatically, while anti-realism is incoherent. Levitt (1996) states that "realism is not so much a formal doctrine as it is the unspoken ground of all discourse, all attempts at communication" (p.81). Any sincere declarative utterance is an attempt to give a true account of something assumed to be real. When I state that I drove my car to the store, I am not driving or visiting a symbolic representation or manifestation of "car" or "store". I am driving an actual 2000 pound vehicle through time and space to a place.

Thus, when the post-modernist says that science is just one of many narratives he or she is absolutely conceding that science, scientists, narratives, logical positivism, data, cars, and stores, etc., exist (i.e. are real). As such, the post-modernist is, malgre lui, as much an ontological realist as any logical positivist. This is not an insignificant point or a point to be lightly considered and dismissed. It speaks to the heart of the matter, i.e., that ontological reality is assumed in our language. Now, I am not saying that therefore we all share (or should share) the same epistemology or the same hierarchy of categories. Of course we do not. However, post-modernists and the like, when not pretending to be anti-realists, believe that the socially real is the really real while science is just "another narrative". Post-modernists are realists, albeit confused ones (Levitt, l996).

Rationality and Coherence. Joseph Carroll's (1996) recent book, Evolution and Literary Theory, provides an elegant and straightforward discussion of the incoherence of post-modernism in discussing evolutionary theory. Carroll logically refutes the two fundamental doctrines of post-modernist thought:(1)Textuality (language does not represent experience but constructs it according to its own internal principles) and; (2) Indeterminacy (language is fraught with gaps that render all text void of specific contingent and/or causal meaning). He observes that the chief problem with these principles is in fact, their short sighted anti-realism. As stated by Carroll "textuality and indeterminacy eliminate the two criteria of truth: the correspondence of propositions to their objects and the internal coherence of propositions" (p.4). Carrol observes that if there is no correspondence between literature and one’s experience of the world then there is no value to, or need of, literature or certainly literary scholarship. Such a conclusion would not be happily received in most English departments.

He concludes by noting the internal logic (i.e. the lack thereof) of postmodern thought thus renders its own principles incapable of validation, conveniently relieving its practitioners of all intellectual responsibility for their pronouncements. In adopting such a position, literary criticism (a wholly owned subsidiary of post-modernism) negates its own effort at legitimization. Simply stated, post-modernists are suggesting theory X (post-modernism) is a more useful way of understanding the world than theory Y (critical rationality) but can offer no compelling evidence (because there is no such thing as verifiable evidence, given that everything is textual and indeterminate) to accept theory X over theory Y. Given the logical inconsistency of its argument and no possibility of verifiability, on what basis should one accept this alternative explanation of the world? This latter point brings us to consider the scientific method itself.

The Method of Science. Bacon’s notion that the mind must be free of prejudice is deeply flawed. One of course can not purge one’s mind of all theories. To do so would leave one without a mind. I am in agreement with Kvale (1992) that we operate either consciously or unconsciously from some theory of the world. As such there is no such thing as pure observation. All observation is in the context of some theory (Popper, 1994). However, as Popper (1994) states "We discover the fact that one of the beliefs we held was a prejudice only after the advance of science has led us to discard it" (p.86).

Bacon’s basic concern, however, with observer bias is not without merit. There is a great deal of empirical evidence to support the notion that an individual with a particular set of beliefs (i.e. biases) will view the world in such a way as to continually confirm his or her beliefs. Kirsch’s (1990) work on placebo provides ample evidence for this point. The pseudo science of psychoanalysis and its notion of clinically based observation as method of verification provide a further historical evidence of this point. With regards to psychoanalysis, there seems to be no conceivable observation, no matter how seemingly contradictory, that could not confirm the analyst’s firmly held beliefs of the client. For example, how could a client, so inclined, disprove his latent hostility, homosexuality, etc.? Such attempts by the client would only provide further proof of the analyst’s beliefs. Bacon’s response to this problem was to dogmatically claim that observation must be absent of theoretical bias. One might surmise that Bacon would not have been impressed with Freud’s method of clinical observation.

Popper (1994) suggests a simple two part response to "Bacon’s problem". In order to claim a theory is supported by experimental evidence, the scientist must ask is there a test which, if done, would refute my theory? Refutability (i.e., falsifiablity or testability) is an essential element in claiming one’s theory has the character of scientific empircality. If one’s theory is refutable, then observation in support of the theory can be accepted only if there is a serious attempt at refuting the theory. In the natural sciences, Newton’s theory of gravity, Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, and Einstein’s theory of gravity all are highly refutable. In the social sciences, Sulloway’s (1996) theory of birth order and openness to scientific innovation is also highly refutable while psychoanalysis is not. Sulloway (1996) actually presents a chapter specifically detailing how one could refute his theory and what form such refutation would take. I have never read any such chapter in psychoanalytic writings.

What then can we say is the "scientific method"? As Popper (1994) points out, the scientific method is systematically learning from one’s mistakes based on critical discussion and examination of mistakes. A key element in the critical discussion is argument derived from experimental tests which of course are based on theoretical notions. It is this process of the scientific method that has been misunderstood by many of the post-modern critics as being objective in the Baconian sense of absolute and immutable. Science is not about discovering an absolute fixed truth regarding Nature. It is about approximations of truth, based on refutations and challenges of previously held notions. Individual scientists are not "objective" in the sense that a given scientist is detached from his or her observations and is simply reporting the data (quite the contrary for those of us who hold our particular theories dear). However, the process of science itself is objective in its critique, challenge and refutation of a given theory, i.e., in its application of the scientific method.

Stated more bluntly, while one may hold his or her particular theory dear, one’s colleagues will not be so predisposed and seek to displace it with another (their) theory. For Popper (1994), three words sum up the entire procedure of rational science: "problems-theories-criticism" (p. 101). The problem for post-modernists is that while they have identified some problems, and have developed a theory, they have no interest in rational criticism (i.e., the scientific method). As such their argument becomes a case of special pleading, i.e., they way things should be based on some ideological a priori belief.

Science and context. Koertge (1996) presents a simplified sketch of the scientific method which is: (1) The context of discovery involving the choice of problem and formulation of hypotheses leading to; (2) The context of justification which involves tests of refutability and theory revision which results in; (3) The context of application involving the application of science in social context.

With respect to the context of discovery there can be no question that the scientist operates within, and is influenced by, his or her social context. The choice of a research question has a number of influences, parameters, and restrictions e.g. feasibility, cost, availability of instruments, to name but a few. In the broadest sense, post-modernists are correct in saying these influences are political. As such, they argue rather than deny the political why not opt for clearly politically progressive values and choices in what to investigate? Longino (1990) state as much by saying, "I am suggesting that a feminist science practice admits its political considerations as relevant constraints on reasoning". . . ."if faced with a conflict between (political) commitments and a particular model of brain-behavior, we allow the political commitments to guide the choice" (p.191). Many feminist and other post-modernists writers (e.g., Harding, 1986, Latour,1985, Feyerabend, 1995) would consider (or dismiss) the acceptability of scientific data within the frame of political expediency. A stunningly dangerous strategy.

As history has made clear, the inadequacy of such a strategy should be patently obvious to the reader and completely unacceptable. The Church’s rejection of Copernicus, Galileo, and Darwin did more to damage itself then said theories would have. Stalinist insistence upon Lysenkoism (among other things) crippled agricultural development in the Soviet Union. On the positive side, Nazi insistence that Einstein’s theory of relativity was "Jewish science" and therefore not to be considered fortunately hampered their research efforts. Those who, today, would deny the study of biological, cognitive, and gender differences will ultimately do more harm to those whom they would protect than scientific data ever would (Koertege, 1996). As stated earlier, no scientist would deny the effect of social context on what is studied, however, the self-correcting process of science is the most effective method of challenging those biases we have (Gross & Levitt, 1994).

The context of justification is based on empirical tests of refutability and ought not to be confused with the context of discovery in which the notion of social influence can not denied. It is in this context, however, that post-modernists such as Latour and Woolgar (1986), Harding, (1986), actually suggest that this process is socially constructed and not written in nature (Cole, 1996). For example, Latour and Woolgar (1986) attempt to show that the discovery of the chemical sequence of thyrotropin releasing factor was socially constructed. In their view, since science is not constrained by nature, this particular chemical structure could very well have been different and the field of neuroendocrinology would have progressed at least as well if not better. Harding (1986) makes similar claims regarding "feminist science". Simply stated, there is not one example in post-modernist literature to substantiate such a claim..

Interestingly, such a claim is imminently testable yet said critics have failed show that social influences effect the actual the knowledge produced and entered into the core of a given discipline. The empirical test for such a claim is relatively straightforward. As Cole (1996) notes, one simply needs to demonstrate that specific social influences (i.e., independent variables) have had identifiable effects on the cognitive content of some aspect of science (i.e., the dependent variable). This issue is separate from the accepted fact that social influences could and have delayed, derailed, or suppressed a particular investigation. However, these influences have not affected the actual cognitive content of the scientific work. For example, to date there is simply no evidence that there is an equivalent or better explanation of genetic coding than DNA. However, if DNA, as an explanatory principle, is replaced it can only be done be empirical evidence not as the result of social convention. This is also why there is can be no such modifier for science as "feminist", "Afrocentric", "Jewish", or "white male". There is only science. There can not be a "feminist" theory of gravity which is at once contradictory yet true as the Newtonian or Einsteinian theory of gravity. That a scientist who is a woman, African-American, Indian may choose to investigate a different problem as a function of ethnic, gender and/or cultural influences than might the ubiquitous white male is trivially obvious. The product of that investigation, however, must be a function of the scientific method and will be so evaluated as true by that method.

The context of application is outside the specific frame of science yet is of course part of a discussion of morality and ethics of which all scientists need consider. Issues of power, abuse, and misuse of science are legitimate considerations for society. Recent developments in cloning have raised significant questions on the societal impact of such scientific technology. Of course the most well known historical challenge in this realm has been in the development and use of nuclear weaponry. It should be noted that some of the leaders in this debate (as well as the debate on the environment) are the scientists themselves who created this weaponry (e.g., Robert Oppenheimer).

Those who believe in the existence of God employ a different form of argument than does the critical rationalist (i.e., The existence of God is taken as an article of faith.). However, post-modernist critique of science offers no special form of argument different than that employed by the logic of science. The post-modernist offers an explanation of the world yet offers no compelling evidence to accept such a world view over an empirically based consideration of science. Given that the form of argument is the same, accepting one view over the other must be based on internal logical consistency and the legitimacy (testability) of empirical evidence. Thus, the rejection of DNA as an explanation for genetic coding, must be done within the domain of molecular biology, not the domain of literary criticism. This is an epistemological error by post-modernists such as Kvale (1992), as discussed earlier, when he suggests that there is no standard method for measuring and comparing knowledge within different language systems and therefore one is faced with the Kuhnian notion of "incommensurability". This is nonsensical. As a function of understanding our world, we must always demand of any new theory or explanation that it moves beyond some less effective theory and as such be compared to the previous explanation. As Popper (1994) points out Ptolemy’s astronomy is far from incommensurable with Copernicus’, nor is Newton’s theory of gravity incommensurable with Einstein’s theory of relativity. I would suggest that the notion of incommensurability is, more often than not, a facade behind which some post-modernists would hide to avoid logical criticism of a given explanation.

With such limitations, one might legitimately ask, what value is there to post-modernism? The failure to deliver on utopian promises and the abuse of power and authority are of legitimate concern for any society and need be part of an ongoing discussion of ethics and morality. Post-modernist criticism of science has challenged Baconian dogma and to that extent has been useful in its observation that the contexts of discovery and application are socially influenced. As Cole (1996) observes the sociologist of science (or psychologist), if he or she could abandon the relativist polemic, should study how such social influences and empirically derived evidence interact in the evaluation and development of new knowledge.

At this point, if not before, the reader may ask "This may be all well and good for the natural sciences but, wither goest social science?" While the reporting of the motion of planets may be less susceptible to social influences (although this was not the case for Copernicus and Galileo) than the observation of between and within group differences on I.Q., the principles of the scientific method (i.e., problem, theory, refutation, and revision) for each domain remains the exactly the same. I.Q. testing is a perfect example of the interaction of social influences and science. I.Q. is a reified number that has come to have a powerful meaning within Western culture, at least. There is no question that in the early part of this century, I.Q. testing was quickly usurped (if not actually created by) by social Darwinists, eugenicists, etc. for clearly political and social engineering purposes e.g., for restricting immigration to the U.S. (Gould, 1981). The controversy surrounding I.Q. was only intensified with the publication of Murray and Hernstein’s (1994)The Bell Curve. However, the simple question "Do individual’s (or groups) differ in intelligence?" is legitimate and lends itself to empirical testing and theory revision. How social influences effect the reporting and use of scientific data is in itself an interesting question and is open to empirical investigation. The method of science, however even if complicated by an increase in socially determined variables, remains the same for research in psychology as it does for research in molecular biology.

Science continues to solve new problems and develop new theories based on empirical evidence. The results of which have generalizability (to a greater of lesser degree depending on empirically based predictions) across cultural contexts (i.e., the science of breeding genetics is a true for the cattle of the Masai tribesmen as it is for the cattle of the Texas rancher). That said, the antiscience brigades continue to grow both within the academy and in the popular culture itself. This is distressing and will only serve to create further distinctions within society between those who understand and those who do not understand the purpose and method of science. Given that society is increasingly based on scientific development such distinctions are ominous and do not bode well for the maintenance of a democratic society. The constant flirtation with the anti-realist nihilism of post-modernist thought ultimately can not serve well the ideal of a democratic society.

With its birth in 17th century Europe and its rise to prominence during the Enlightenment of the following century, science has provided humankind with its most accurate understanding of Nature. Even with its identifiable flaws and shortcomings, no other cultural institution in any society comes even close in the development of knowledge about the natural world as that provided by science.

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