The ultimate test of a semantical theory is its ability to accommodate our pretheoretical beliefs about language. Since our intuitive beliefs may not be sufficiently precise and consistent to be handled by a single coherent theory, we may have to give up some pretheoretical beliefs in return for a theory compatible with other (presumably, more fundamental) pretheoretical beliefs. Recent Millian theories of proper names, for example, are said to be more successful in their application to modal contexts (e.g., ‘Aristotle might not have been a philosopher’) than in their application to epistemic contexts (e.g., ‘Sally believes that Aristotle was a philosopher’). But there has been no systematic exploration of the consequences of applying such theories to epistemic contexts; in particular, it has not been recognized that a large number of counterintuitive results of Millian theories fall into a single category—a category I call ‘underprivileged access’—which arises from certain tensions between assent to a sentence and belief in the proposition expressed. And when the epistemic intuitions violated by Millian theories are seen to be of a piece, they appear to be much more fundamental than when they are taken to be relatively independent of each other.

Kripke and Donnellan are largely responsible for the broad acceptance of Millian views of proper names. On these views, proper names in typical uses have no connotation or predicative element; the sole semantical function of proper names is to introduce their referents into the discourse. The following remark of Kripke’s catches the flavor of the Millian view: Given that Cicero and Tully are the same person, if Mill is completely right, not only should ‘Cicero was lazy’ have the same truth value as ‘Tully was lazy’, but the two sentences should express the same proposition, have the same content. Similarly, ‘Cicero admired Tully’, ‘Tully admired Cicero’, ‘Cicero admired Cicero’ and ‘Tully admired Tully’, should be four ways of saying the same thing.

Kaplan has developed a similar view of demonstratives: demonstratives are directly referential in that they designate their referents
without intervention of Fregean senses as meaning. Both Kaplan and Kripke distinguish between a term's being used rigidly and its being used referentially. Although all referential uses of terms are rigid, the converse does not hold: a use of a definite description, e.g., 'the square root of 9', is rigid but not referential since its referent is determined by its satisfying the associated condition. It is with referential uses of terms—i.e., rigid uses which directly refer, without mediation of associated properties—that we are concerned here. (In III, I extend the argument to other views.) I use the term 'Millian' in an extended way to apply not only to views of proper names like Kripke's but also to views of demonstratives like Kaplan's. A view is Millian, in my usage, if it allows the semantical role of names and/or demonstratives to be exhausted by their designating their referents.

On Millian views, the propositions expressed by sentences containing names or demonstratives in their typical uses are singular propositions: they have as constituents the very objects referred to by the sentences expressing them. The application of these Millian theories of reference to epistemic contexts entails that belief, in some cases, is to be construed as a relation between a believer and a singular proposition.

When we apply a Millian theory to a belief context, it turns out that there is an important sense in which we can neither say what we believe nor be aware of what we believe, on pain of inconsistency. This is a result of a paradoxical disparity between what a person would sincerely and comprehendingly say that she believes (in direct discourse), and what beliefs others may correctly attribute to that person (in indirect discourse, construed broadly to include propositional contexts following cognitive or linguistic verbs). The effect of such tension between direct and indirect discourse is that we can truly be said to have beliefs that we sincerely deny having. Hence, if Millian theories are correct, then the intuitive connection between assent and belief is lost, and we have a peculiar kind of underprivileged access to our own beliefs.

To uncover the underprivileged access induced by Millian theories, consider the following bit of fiction:

Eva B. had an extremely wealthy uncle, who never gave a clue as to who was going to inherit his millions. When his will was opened after his death, everyone, and especially the hopeful Eva, was surprised to learn that he had divided his estate equally between his beloved nurse, Ethel, and his beloved Cabbs. Although no one present knew of anyone's being called 'Cabbs', the uncle left diaries in which he spoke of Cabbs and the pleasure that she had given him. The uncle reported in
his diary a mixture of truths and falsehoods but no definite description of Cabbs.

Unbeknownst to those present at the opening of the will, Eva was Cabbs; for ‘Cabbs’ was the nickname that the uncle has given her as an infant and young child. Before the fortuitous identity of Eva and Cabbs was discovered, Eva comprehendingly and sincerely assented to the sentences ‘Cabbs is Cabbs’ and ‘Cabbs is a very lucky person’, but regretfully dissented from ‘I am Cabbs’ and ‘I am a very lucky person’. Indeed, when she was told by her lawyer that she was Cabbs, she shrieked for joy, “I am Cabbs and a very lucky person indeed!” Now Adam B., Eva’s brother, was just as startled on hearing the will as his sister. Although something of a wastrel, he had had some hope that he would be favored by his uncle. Before the infuriating identity of Eva and Cabbs was discovered, Adam comprehendingly and sincerely assented to the sentences ‘Cabbs is Cabbs’ and ‘Cabbs is a very lucky person’, but heartily dissented from ‘Eva is Cabbs’ and ‘Eva is a very lucky person’. (In fact, he had always pitied her—until he found out that she was Cabbs.) On being told the bitter news, he moaned, “Eva is Cabbs, and a very lucky person indeed.”

It is surprisingly difficult for a Millian to give a coherent account of Eva’s and Adam’s beliefs before and after the discovery of the identity of Eva and Cabbs. It seems to me, in contrast to the Millian, that the semantical function of a name in a belief context (such as ‘S believes that N is F’, where ‘N’ and ‘F’ are replaced by a proper name and a predicate, respectively) always goes beyond merely introducing its referent. The strategy here, however, is to assume that the Millian view is correct, and then show the ways in which it leads to grossly underprivileged access. Perhaps it will be thought that a Millian need not apply his view to the story of Adam and Eva, on the ground that the names and demonstratives are not used in the story in their typical Millian way. For example, if ‘Cabbs’ were used simply as an abbreviation of a description, then the propositions expressed by sentences containing ‘Cabbs’ would not be singular. In that case, ‘Cabbs’ would determine the referent via satisfaction conditions of the definite description and hence would not determine her directly; its semantical function would go beyond merely introducing Cabbs. Thus, it might be felt, the story does not provide an adequate testing ground for a Millian view. This circumvention is not available to the Millian, however.

There is no obvious definite description for the name ‘Cabbs’ to abbreviate. ‘The heir’ can not supply a connotation for ‘Cabbs’ since there are two heirs. ‘The heir not identical to Ethel’ is no better; not only does it contain another name, ‘Ethel’, but also Cabbs might not have been the other heir: Say that the uncle had changed his will and had left his millions to Adam. In that counterfactual situation, ‘Cabbs’
would still designate Eva and not the-heir-not-identical-to-Ethel. 'Cabbs' as used in the story of Adam and Eva seems to conform to the Millian intuition that names are not connotative; if ever a name has no function other than to refer, 'Cabbs' has no function other than to refer to the person standing in the appropriate causal relationship to the use of the name by the uncle. Thus, the Millian view should be applicable to the story of Adam and Eva if it is applicable to any epistemic context.

Anyone who espouses a Millian theory, yet still insists that the names and/or demonstratives are not used in a Millian way in the story of Adam and Eva, is invited to supply his own example in which names and demonstratives are used in a Millian way; arguments analogous to the ones given below will apply. If the Millian were to hold that any demonstrative or name which generated untoward consequences was ipso facto not functioning in a Millian way, we should then conclude that names and demonstratives never function in a Millian way in belief contexts. But of course, that is the position I urge: in an epistemic context, a name or demonstrative does not signal a singular proposition toward which one has a propositional attitude.

Assuming, then, that the uses of the names and demonstratives in the story are Millian, it is semantically indifferent which of the co-referring names and demonstratives is used to introduce the referent. On that assumption, exactly one proposition is expressed by all of the following:

(1) Eva is Eva
(2) Eva is Cabbs
(3) I am Eva [assented to by Eva]
(4) I am Cabbs [assented to by Eva]

And exactly one proposition is expressed by the following:

(5) Eva is lucky
(6) Cabbs is lucky
(7) I am lucky [assented to by Eva]

On the basis of the story, it is natural to attribute to Eva and Adam certain beliefs before the discovery of the identity of Eva and Cabbs. Among them are these:

(8) Adam believes that Eva is Eva
(9) Adam believes that Eva is not Cabbs
(10) Adam believes that Eva is not lucky
(11) Adam believes that Cabbs is lucky
(12) Eva believes that Cabbs is lucky
(13) Eva believes that she is not lucky
Eva believes that she is Eva
Eva believes that she is not Cabbs

The difficulty of giving a satisfactory account of the story is now apparent. Since (1) and (2) express the very same proposition on a Millian view, we attribute to Adam contradictory beliefs via (8) and (9); since (5) and (6) express the very same proposition, we attribute to Adam further contradictory beliefs via (10) and (11). Since (6) and (7) express the very same proposition on the Millian view, we attribute to Eva contradictory beliefs via (12) and (13); and since (3) and (4) express the very same proposition, we attribute to Eva further contradictory beliefs via (14) and (15). In each pair, we are attributing belief directly in a proposition and its negation.

What is jarring about attributing contradictions in these circumstances is that neither Adam nor Eva has done anything logically or linguistically unsound. Neither is engaged in any kind of self-deception. They simply lack information: Adam is ignorant of the identity of Cabbs and Eva, and Eva is ignorant of the identity of Cabbs and herself. But they are both competent speakers of English, and they are rational in that they conform to the following principle: for any proposition $p$, if $S$ realizes that he has come to believe $p$ and not-$p$, then he will give up at least one of the beliefs.

The Millian has only two options here, both of which lead to underprivileged access. He can either accept that we have directly contradictory beliefs without any conceptual, logical or psychological impropriety, or he can hold that what we sincerely and comprehendingly say we believe is not actually what we believe. ('Comprehendingly' is used to guarantee linguistic competence: the speaker uses words in conformity with the appropriate conventions of the community, makes no slips of the tongue, etc.) In the case of Adam and Eva, the choices are either to hold that Adam and Eva have systematically contradictory beliefs, or to hold that their appropriate assent to (1) - (7) does not warrant the attributions in (8) - (15). Let us examine each option in turn.

II

At first, it might be thought that the Millian may simply concede that Adam and Eva really do have directly contradictory beliefs that they are unaware of having. In this case, we would have to say that our beliefs are likely to be infested with contradictions; for any belief that we would express by using a name or demonstrative would be liable to contradict other beliefs we had. The underprivileged access of this
position is manifest: we would routinely believe contradictions which resist detection despite our most strenuous efforts to weed them out.

But to accept wholesale contradictions among our beliefs in this way not only would preclude any kind of logic of rational belief, but also it would seem to rule out a coherent account of the nature of belief. A belief is defined at least partly by the functional role it plays in the life of the believer. To believe \( p \) is to be in a state which is related to one's other mental states, as well as to sensory input and to behavior. So it seems to be partly definitive of a belief that Eva is not lucky that the believer not also believe that Eva is lucky. But on the Millian view, 'Cabbs is lucky' expresses the very singular proposition expressed by 'Eva is lucky'. So if belief is a relation between a person and a singular proposition, Adam's belief that Cabbs is lucky is also a belief that Eva is lucky. Thus, we must attribute to Adam both the belief that Eva is not lucky and the belief that Eva is lucky. This kind of consideration may lead us to conclude that singular propositions cannot give the complete content of one's belief. In any case, belief as defined by functional role is not compatible with the view that what we believe are contradictory singular propositions.

Consider the other option: A Millian may avoid these difficulties by holding that Eva and Adam do not actually have contradictory beliefs; rather, he may hold, they mischaracterize their epistemic situations. In this case, their sincere and comprehending assent to the various sentences containing names and demonstratives is not good evidence that they in fact have the beliefs that we attributed to them in (8) - (15). So if Eva says, “Cabbs is lucky but I am not,” we do not take her to believe that Cabbs (who is herself) is lucky but she is not. Or when Adam says, “Eva is not Cabbs,” we do not attribute to him the belief that Eva (= Cabbs) is not Cabbs. By refraining from disquotation in the normal way, a Millian need not attribute to Adam and Eva contradictory beliefs. On the other hand, an attribution of belief may be correct even if the person to whom the belief is attributed would not recognize it, or even if the person would vigorously dissent from the sentence expressing it. On this view, 'S believes that \( a \) is \( F \)', where \( 'a' \) is replaced by a name or demonstrative, may be true even if \( S \) sincerely assents to '\( a \) is not \( F \)'. So Adam may believe that Eva is lucky, even though he sincerely ascerts to 'Eva is not lucky'. The effect is simply to sever the connection between belief in singular propositions and sincere assent to sentences expressing them. This version of a Millian view, too, is one of underprivileged access, since our own beliefs seem available to us to no greater degree than the variety of sentences we sincerely and comprehendingly assent to. Still, it is worth pointing out some of the ways that underprivileged access presents itself:
A. One consequence of underprivileged access is that belief is deprived of its role in intuitive explanations of behavior. Ordinarily, in order for a person's belief to bear on his behavior, it must be belief conceived of from the believer’s point of view. But by deeming irrelevant the believer’s sincere and comprehending assent for certain attributions of belief, the believer’s point of view is systematically ignored in situations like Adam’s and Eva’s. We may suppose that after Adam discovers the identity of Eva and Cabbs, his attitude and behavior toward his sister change. We can not explain any part of the change by citing a change in Adam’s beliefs: for on a Millian theory, there was no change in his beliefs. On the Millian view that saves Adam and Eva from contradiction by disconnecting a person’s beliefs from the sentences he assents to, Adam never had a belief that Eva was not Cabbs. There was a single belief all along: that Eva is Eva, alternatively expressed as the belief that Eva is Cabbs. Hence, when belief is construed as a relation between a believer and a singular proposition on the Millian view, a change in belief can play no part in any explanation of Adam’s change in attitude and behavior. The Millian theory exacts an exorbitant toll: whenever it applies, many of our ordinary explanations of behavior become incoherent.

B. A second consequence is that this view makes incomprehensible many important concepts—especially those governing canons of evidence and testimony used in courts of law. If we did not routinely connect sincere assent and belief, we should not even have the concepts of lying, slander, perjury, confession, or reliable witness; and we should have only the most attenuated notions (at about the level we apply to dogs) of loyalty, betrayal, treachery. In addition, consider what a Millian would be led to hold in the following story, assuming again that the names have Millian occurrence:

Suppose that Martin Bormann, infamous Nazi war criminal and object of a worldwide manhunt for many years, is sitting in Argentina affirming (for unknown reasons) various propositions. He is heard to say, sincerely, “Martin Bormann is Martin Bormann.” On a Millian theory, Bormann expressed the very same proposition that he would have expressed if he had said, “I am Martin Bormann,” just as (1) and (3) express the same proposition. If it is correct to report Bormann’s utterance by claiming that Bormann said that Bormann was Bormann (and it seems to be), then an informer with no independent evidence that the man he overheard was in fact Bormann, could have Bormann arrested and then truly swear: “He said that he was Martin Bormann.” For, on a Millian view, if Bormann says that Bormann is Bormann, he thereby says that he is Bormann. So the accuser commits no perjury. Moreover, if there is no semantic distinction between Bormann’s sincerely assenting to ‘Bormann is Bormann’ and to ‘I am Bormann’, it
would seem that the accuser could say truly, “He confessed to being Bormann.” But surely, no court of law ought to take assent to a tautology to be a confession.

Again: after the discovery that Eva was Cabbs, the scornful Adam could truly say, on a Millian view, “You said that you were Cabbs all along.” But surely, intuitively, Eva neither said nor believed that she was Cabbs all along.

C. Another counterintuitive result is that a Millian view, in order both to avoid attributing contradictions and to avoid being self-contradictory, must countenance infinite regresses of ignorance. In order to avoid attributing contradictions, the Millian view entails that we lack access not only to what we believe, but to what we believe that we believe, to what we doubt that we believe, and so on. Recall that

(16) Eva is not Eva

and

(17) Eva is not Cabbs

express the same proposition on the Millian view. Since Adam does not believe that he believes (16), he can not believe that he believes (17), on pain of contradiction.

Moreover, in order to avoid derivation of a contradiction within the Millian theory itself, the Millian must countenance a further regress of ignorance. (1) and (2), together with the truism

(18) Whoever believes \( p \) believes \( p \)

yield

(19) Whoever believes that Eva is Eva believes that Eva is Cabbs.

Now suppose that there is someone—call her Pearl—who denies (19). Pearl is inclined to take Adam and Eva at their word, so she thinks that people may believe that Eva is Eva without believing that Eva is Cabbs. But on the Millian view, there can be no such person as Pearl—any more than there can be a barber who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves. For if there were such a person as Pearl, we could attribute doubt to her by

(20) Pearl doubts that whoever believes that Eva is Eva believes that Eva is Cabbs.
But since Pearl may be assumed to be rational, we also have

(21) It is not the case that Pearl doubts that whoever believes that Eva is Eva believes that Eva is Eva.

But since (1) and (2) express the same proposition, (21) expresses what

(22) It is not the case that Pearl doubts that anyone who believes that Eva is Eva believes that Eva is Cabbs

expresses. But (20) and (22) are contradictory. And the contradiction is not in Pearl's beliefs, but in the theory which permits derivation of contradictory attributions. To avoid the contradiction, the Millian must reject one of the steps. The only step that can be rejected, without giving up a Millian view, is (20). Thus, there can be no one who doubts (19). Moreover, there can not even be a person who mistakenly believes that she doubts (19); for the same argument can be applied ad infinitum.

D. More generally, there are difficulties even in reporting what a person says in indirect discourse if we disconnect belief in singular propositions from assent to the sentences expressing them. It is natural to report what Adam says in assenting to 'Eva is not Cabbs' by this: Adam says that Eva is not Cabbs. But if we report Adam's assent in this natural way, we will have to hold that Adam says just the opposite of what he believes. And we will have to hold that he does this systematically (yet innocently): he says sincerely that Eva is not lucky when he believes that Eva is lucky, and so on. This suggests that, where 'N' is replaced by a proper name, the conditions under which sincere assent to a single sentence in direct discourse, '... N...', can be correctly reported by 'S says that ... N...' may be quite different from the condition under which the same sincere assent can be correctly reported by 'S believes that ... N...'. It appears that, on this view, a theory of says-that would be relatively independent of a theory of believes-that. Thus, belief in singular propositions seems to preclude a unified account of epistemic and linguistic contexts.

The Millian may reply that a unified account of linguistic and epistemic contexts could be maintained if we simply refrain from reporting what one says when one assents to sentences containing names or demonstratives in what I have called the natural way. But, given that we do report what people say in the natural way, this reply has the effect of making most reports of what we say false. E.g., if a Millian assimilates saying-that and believing-that, then 'Adam says that Eva is not Cabbs' no more correctly reports Adam's sincere assent to 'Eva is not Cabbs' than does 'Adam believes that Eva is not Cabbs'. And we have already seen that, for a Millian, who does not want to attribute
contradictory beliefs to Adam, Adam's saying "Eva is not Cabbs" is no
evidence that he believes that Eva is not Cabbs—since he believes that
Eva is Eva. So in order to save a unified account of saying and believing,
the Millian will have to deny that Adam says that Eva is not Cabbs. This
is surely too high a price to pay to save the theory.

E. A final consequence of divorcing sincere assent from belief is
that the idea of sincere assent itself becomes problematic. If Adam's
assent to 'Eva is not Cabbs' is to be sincere, he must at least believe that
what he is saying is true. Sincerity, unlike belief in singular proposi-
tions, seems to require consideration of the believer's point of view; the
way in which the believer characterizes what he is saying or doing is
crucial to whether or not he is sincere. But the Millian view seems to
block such characterization by the believer. For example, on the Millian
view, the belief which grounds Adam's sincerity in assenting to 'Eva is
not Cabbs' can not be a belief that Eva is not Cabbs, or even a belief that
he believes that Eva is not Cabbs (see C. above)—no matter what Adam
says. Being deprived of the intuitive way of understanding sincerity of
assent, then, what sense can a Millian give to the requirement that one
believes that what one is saying is true?

Perhaps a Millian will take a linguistic turn: Eva's sincerity in
assenting to 'I am not Cabbs' is grounded in the fact that she believes
that the sentence expresses a true proposition; but in some relevant
sense she is mistaken about what proposition she is in fact expressing. It
might then be held that Eva's ignorance is wholly linguistic. What she
fails to realize is

(23) That proposition expressed by 'I am not Cabbs' (when
asserted to by Eva) is identical with that proposition
expressed by 'Eva is not Eva'.

But such a linguistic turn does not seem helpful for a number of
reasons:

(i) Intuitively, Eva's not being aware that she is Cabbs does not
seem to be on a par with other, more obviously linguistic, confusions.
(Compare: 'Call the doctor to find an anecdote to the poison'.) And if
we want a unified semantics for demonstratives, we must treat all
demonstratives similarly; but the linguistic turn is even less plausible in
the cases of other demonstratives, with regard to which all the prob-
lems of underprivileged access reappear. 'Now is 4:00' and 'That
[demonstrating a chocolate pie] is dessert' do not seem to be "about"
language in any straightforward way.

(ii) The linguistic move seems to require criteria for knowing-
what-proposition-is-expressed by a given sentence on a given occasion.
But these seem as elusive and unforthcoming as general criteria for
knowing-who-someone-is. We cannot require, for example, acquaintance with a proposition under some canonical designation. There do not seem to be canonical designations for singular propositions, at least partly because singular propositions have objects as constituents, not objects-designated-canonically. E.g., when ‘Holland’ and ‘The Netherlands’ are both taken as Millian names, ‘Holland is in Europe’ and ‘The Netherlands is in Europe’ express the same singular proposition. But there are no apparent grounds for taking either (nor, for that matter, for taking some third expression of that proposition) as canonical. Does one know-what-proposition-is-expressed by ‘I am Eva’ (uttered by Eva) if one is not aware that the same proposition may be expressed by ‘Cabbs is Eva’? Surely, there are no general answers to such questions. Moreover, for any singular proposition which a person is said to believe, there will always be an expression of it (in the preferred language of the believer) from which the believer will sincerely dissent. At a costume party, Adam will fail to realize that ‘She [with a demonstration of Eva in a clown suit] is not lucky’ expresses the same singular proposition as ‘Eva is not lucky’. In the absence of clear criteria for knowing-what-proposition-is-expressed by a given sentence on some occasion, Eva’s mistake can not be understood as failure to know what proposition she is expressing when she says, “I am not Cabbs.”

(iii) It seems that the same difficulties we encountered earlier continue to dog us after the linguistic ascent. Since (23) is equivalent to

(24) That proposition expressed by ‘Eva is not Eva’ is identical with that proposition expressed by ‘Eva is not Eva’,

and Eva certainly believes the proposition expressed by (24), she thereby believes the proposition expressed by (23). Therefore, Eva’s assent to ‘I am not Cabbs’ cannot be explained by any failure to realize that (23). We continue to be bedeviled by underprivileged access. Furthermore, it seems that the regress arguments (discussed in C. above) could be generated vis-à-vis (23). So semantic ascent seems unavailing to the Millian.

It is thus not clear that a Millian theory has room for an adequate notion of sincere assent. But even if it does, if a Millian view is correct, much of what we say, as well as what we believe, must remain hidden from us.

III

The Millian claim that names and demonstratives have no descriptive content yields the most striking instances of underprivileged access because it implies that such sentences as (1)-(4) or (5)-(7) all express the
very same proposition. But problems of underprivileged access are not confined to Millian theories of names and demonstratives. Any semantical theory which countenances a posteriori necessity is liable to generate underprivileged access. For by separating what is metaphysically necessary from what is epistemically necessary, such theories allow a logically omniscient person who can state all the rules of the language to affirm contradictions and to deny necessary truths. For example, Putnam's (as well as Kripke's) view of terms designating natural kinds ('gold'), physical magnitudes ('one meter') and even artefacts ('pencil') also gives rise to the problem of underprivileged access. On such a view, these terms, like Millian names, are rigid designators; but unlike Millian names, they have descriptive content. Now suppose, as Putnam has held, that being H₂O is an essential property of water and that 'Water is H₂O' expresses a necessary truth.¹⁷ Then, if Adam assents to 'Water is not H₂O,' we are faced with the same two options that we had when Adam assented to 'Eva is not Cabbs': we either ascribe to Adam, who is logically and linguistically competent, a contradictory belief, or we refrain from disquotation in the normal way, thus divorcing assent from belief. And the whole train of consequences discussed in III is attendant upon either option. Thus, the perplexities of underprivileged access afflict a range of prominent semantical theories.

IV

The semantical problem, as I see it, is to provide a theory of terms such as names and demonstratives, and a view of the relation between direct and indirect discourse, which do justice to the pre-theoretical epistemic phenomena. The corresponding epistemological problem is to do justice to both the believer's point of view, as revealed by sincere and comprehending assent to various sentences, and the point of view of one who is attributing belief.¹⁸

Kripke has argued that there are deep difficulties rooted not just in our theories, but in our ordinary criteria for ascription of belief.¹⁹ Regardless of the puzzles generated by the phenomena of belief, my primary aim has been to exhibit the tensions as they arise specifically from Millian views, which have enjoyed such wide acceptance. In light of the difficulties of underprivileged access, it is fortunate that even where Millian views are most plausible—viz., in modal contexts—they are not the only "pictures;" Burge has argued that a Fregean view need not conflict with our intuitive beliefs about necessity and possibility.²⁰ Moreover, there are a variety of non-Millian views available—e.g., those of Castañeda, Burge, Ackerman²¹—which do not fall prey to the particular counterintuitive consequences discussed here; it remains to be seen how well the alternatives stand up under sustained scrutiny from
other directions. But given the pervasiveness of the underprivileged access that haunts the Millian, the alternative theories ought to be pursued with vigor.\textsuperscript{22}

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\textsuperscript{12} \textit{ibid.}, “Indicators and Quasi-Indicators,” \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly} 4(1967): 85-100.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ibid.}, “Speaking of Nothing,” \textit{The Philosophical Review} 83(1974): 3-32.


\textsuperscript{19} David Kaplan, \textit{Demonstratives} (UCLA, manuscript. 1977).


NOTES

1For example, see Saul A. Kripke [23], especially 243, J. M. E. Moravcsik [26], and Diana Ackerman [1].
2Saul A. Kripke [20] and [21], Keith S. Donnellan [16] and [17]. For a recent discussion of the view, see Nathan Ucuzoglu Salmon’s [29]. The view of names is traceable to Mill’s System of Logic.
3Kripke [23]: 341. (Emphasis his.) For a similar illustration involving both names and demonstratives, see Donnellan [17]: 11.
4David Kaplan [19], especially 1-15; Saul A. Kripke [22], especially 11.
5Singular propositions may be construed in other ways, to which my arguments do not apply. For example, on Castañeda’s guise theory, a singular proposition is composed of a pair of guises related in a certain way; see H.-N. Castañeda [9].
6The investigation here cuts across issues of de re vs. de dicto belief. At least some of the beliefs to which the arguments here apply—those expressed by sentences containing names—would be characterized by Kripke as de dicto. See [23]: 242. (The same beliefs would be characterized by others as de re. See, e.g., Stephen E. Boer and William G. Lycan [4]. Other of the beliefs to which the arguments here apply—those expressed by sentences containing demonstratives—would be characterized by Kaplan as de re. See [19], fn. 36.2.
7The concern here is specifically with the way our beliefs may be hidden from us on a Millian view. Some claims of the ways we may be ignorant of our own beliefs seem to me more plausible, but in any case are not under discussion here. E.g., a person may not have fully mastered the concepts in terms of which she characterizes her own beliefs, in which case her beliefs may not be fully accessible to her. For discussions of this kind of inaccessibility, see Tyler Burge’s articles [5], and [8].
8It is worth noting that Kripke seems reluctant to attribute contradictory beliefs in such cases. See [23], e.g., 251; 254ff.
9Stephen Schiffer does draw this conclusion. See [30], especially 178-179, where Schiffer discusses its functional role as partly definitive of a belief.
10Since my argument is aimed at those who construe belief as a relation between a believer and a proposition, an inscriptionalist might be tempted to contend that on his view, Millian theories escape my criticism. An inscriptionalist may suppose that belief is simply a disposition to assent to sentences, and thus the propositional equivalence of such sentences as ‘Eva is lucky’ and ‘Gabbs is lucky’ does not force the counterintuitive ascriptions of belief upon us. This contention is to no avail, however. Not only are there difficulties with coupling an inscriptionalist view with a coherent semantics for belief contexts (cf. H.-N. Castañeda, [10]: 37 and Richard Feldman, [18]); but also, an inscriptionalist theory at best collapses into the first option. For Adam would assent to both ‘Eva is not lucky’ and ‘Gabbs is lucky’; and if belief just were such assent, we should ascribe to Adam contradictory beliefs.
11Boer’s and Lycan’s Principle C in [4] seems to license such a move. Also Kaplan’s brief remarks in [19], 86-87, suggest something similar.
12Tyler Burge urges: “As long as it is possible to believe that (1) [Whoever believes that D, believes that D] while not believing that (2) [Whoever believes that D, believes that D’], the substitution of D” for ‘D’ can not be justified as part of a logic governing belief
sentences." ([5]: 120) But what is to count as believing that (1) (or that (2))? Burge seems to take it that a person’s assent to (1) (and dissent from (2)) justifies attributing belief that (1); but in the context of the questions raised here, it is just this connection between assent and belief that is at issue.

13 For a detailed argument in support of this view, see my [3].

14 In [27], John Perry argues that a person’s belief in a singular proposition is, by itself, inadequate in the context of explaining action. We need, in addition, to take into account the believer’s point of view, via “belief states.” Perry acknowledges a series of papers by H.-N. Castañeda ([11], [12] and [13]) as a source of his reflections. For Castañeda’s explicit application of these views to action, see his [10], Ch. 6 and Ch. 10.

15 Herbert Heidelberger suggested this possibility.

16 This argument follows the line used by Benson Mates regarding nonsubstitutivity of synonyms. See [24], especially 125.

17 Hilary Putnam, [28]. For an incisive critique of Putnam’s (and Kripke’s) views concerning natural kinds, see D. H. Mellor, [25].

18 It may be thought that certain description theories generate underprivileged access as well. Suppose that the connotative element associated with a speaker’s use of a name N is supplied, not by the speaker himself, but by the linguistic community, and that in a certain community ‘N’ abbreviates ‘The 4.” On my construal, this is not a case of underprivileged access: a person who was unaware that ‘N’ abbreviates ‘the 4 would not be using ‘N’ comprehendingly; he would be linguistically incompetent in a way that a person who was unaware that Cabbs was Eva or that water is H2O is not. Underprivileged access arises from semantical theories that allow a logically and linguistically competent person unwittingly to endorse contradictions. (cf. Kripke, [23], fn. 24).

19 Kripke, [23].

20 Tyler Burge, [6].

21 H.-N. Castañeda, [14] and [15]; Tyler Burge, [7]; Diana Ackerman, [2].

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