Should a Christian be a Mind-Body Dualist? -- No

Through the ages, Christians have almost automatically been Mind-Body dualists. The Bible portrays us as spiritual beings, and one obvious way to be a spiritual being is to be (or to have) an immaterial soul. Since it is also evident that we have bodies, Christians naturally have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two substances—a material body and a nonmaterial soul. Despite the historical weight of this position, I do not think that it is required either by Scripture or by Christian doctrine as it has developed through the ages. So, I want to argue that there is a Christian alternative to Mind-Body Dualism, and that the reasons in favor of the alternative outweigh those in favor of Mind-Body Dualism.

The version of Mind-Body Dualism that has attracted Christians is Substance Dualism. Substance Dualism is the thesis that there are two kinds of finite substances: material (e.g., bodies) and nonmaterial (e.g., souls). On this view, we human persons are fundamentally, at least in part, nonmaterial substances. A Substance Dualist holds either that a human person is identical to an nonmaterial soul or is identical to a composite of a nonmaterial soul and a material body.

From Plato on, a soul or mind has been conceived as something that can exist apart from any material substance at all. Recently, philosophers have proposed a modification to this idea, so that a mind may be thought of as an emergent substance—perhaps not able to exist apart from any bodies, but made of a different sort of “stuff” from ordinary material objects. The “stuff” that the nonmaterial soul is supposedly made of is undetectable—or at least it has not been detected—by physics. Nor (in contrast to, say, “dark matter”) is there any theoretical need for physics to postulate such nonmaterial “stuff.” On both the Platonistic conception and the revised conception, the soul or mind is a nonmaterial substance unlike substances that make up the rest of the created world. According to all versions of Substance Dualism, a mind is a unique kind of substance, fundamentally different from ordinary material substances. When I speak

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of Mind-Body Dualism, I have in mind Substance Dualism in either its traditional or revised form.

Mind-Body Dualism is a philosophical thesis about the nature of human persons. I deny Mind-Body Dualism, because I do not think that it is the correct account of the nature of human persons. I shall argue that human persons are material beings. But notice two things: First, my denial that human persons have nonmaterial souls is perfectly compatible with the view that God is an immaterial being. Although I deny Mind-Body Dualism, I do not deny all dualism. In particular, I do not deny a dualism between the natural and the supernatural realms. My materialism pertains only to the natural world. Like most Christians, I think of God as an immaterial being. Second, the fact that Mind-Body Dualism is a philosophical thesis about human persons is important. Christianity has almost no specifically philosophical commitments. When Christians seek a philosophical outlook congenial to their faith, the door is open to a wide variety of positions. Mind-Body Dualism is one position compatible with Christian faith, but it is not the only such position.

One reason that Christians have been attracted to Mind-Body Dualism is that Mind-Body Dualism has seemed to be the only alternative to taking persons to be identical to animals. People have assumed that there are only two possibilities: We are just like all the other animals, or we differ from the other animals by having nonmaterial souls. The overlooked possibility here is that we differ from the other animals, but not by having nonmaterial souls. This is the possibility that I shall explore. We, like the other animals, are material beings; but unlike the other animals, we are essentially persons. To be a spiritual being does not require having any nonmaterial soul. One and the same thing—a human person—is both a material being and a spiritual being.

I want to show here that there is a kind of materialism that is congenial to Christian believers and that, on balance, this materialism is preferable to Mind-Body Dualism. On my view—I call it ‘the Constitution View’—something is a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a person is a human person in virtue of being constituted by a human body (or human animal). So, I need to explain what I
mean by a ‘first-person perspective’, and what I mean by ‘constitution’ when I say that a person is constituted by a human body. Let’s start with the first-person perspective.

The Idea of a First-Person Perspective

The first-person perspective is a very peculiar ability that all and only persons have. It is the ability to think of oneself without the use of any name, description or demonstrative; it is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, from the inside, as it were. Linguistic evidence of a first-person perspective comes from use of first-person pronouns embedded in sentences with linguistic or psychological verbs—e.g., “I wonder how I will die,” or “I promise that I will stick with you.” If I wonder how I will die, or I promise that I’ll stick with you, then I am thinking of myself as myself; I am not thinking of myself in any third-person way (e.g., not as LB, nor as the person who is thinking, nor as her, nor as the only person in the room) at all. Anything that can wonder how it will die ipso facto has a first-person perspective and thus is a person.

A being may be conscious without having a first-person perspective. Nonhuman primates and other higher animals are conscious, and they have psychological states like believing, fearing and desiring. They have points of view (e.g., “danger in that direction”), but they cannot conceive of themselves as the subjects of such thoughts. They can not conceive of themselves from the first-person. (We have every reason to think that they do not wonder how they will die.) So, having psychological states like beliefs and desires, and having a point of view are necessary but not sufficient conditions for being a person. A sufficient condition for being a person—whether human, divine, ape, or silicon-based—is having a first-person perspective. So, what makes something a person is not the “stuff” it is made of. It does not matter whether something is made of organic material or silicon or, in the case of God, no material “stuff” at all. If a being has a first-person perspective, it is a person.

Persons, defined by first-person perspectives, are a genuine novelty in the world. What one thinks from a first-person perspective cannot be adequately translated into third-person terms. To wonder how I will die is not the same as wondering how LB will die, even though I am LB. This is so, because I could wonder how I will die even if I had
amnesia and didn’t know my name. A being with a first-person perspective not only can have thoughts about herself, but she can also conceive of herself as the subject of such thoughts. I not only wonder how I’ll die, but I realize that the bearer of that thought is myself.

*Person* is an ontological kind whose defining characteristic is a capacity for a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective is the basis of all self-consciousness. It makes possible an inner life, a life of thoughts that one realizes are her own. The appearance of first-person perspectives in a world makes an ontological difference in that world: A world populated with beings with inner lives is ontologically richer than a world populated with no beings with inner lives. But what is ontologically distinctive about being a person—namely, the capacity for a first-person perspective—does not have to be secured by a nonmaterial substance like a soul.

**The Idea of Constitution**

If something is a person in virtue of having a capacity for a first-person perspective, what distinguishes human persons from other logically possible persons (God, Martians, perhaps computers)? The answer is that human persons are constituted by human bodies (i.e., human animals), rather than, say, by Martian green-slime bodies.

Constitution is a very general relation that we are all familiar with (though probably not under that label). A river at any moment is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules. But the river is not identical to the aggregate of water molecules that constitutes it at that moment. Since one and the same river—call it ‘R’—is constituted by different aggregates of molecules at different times, the river is not identical to any of the aggregates of water molecules that make it up. So, constitution is not identity. Another way to see that constitution is not identity is to notice that even if an aggregate of molecules, \( A_1 \), actually constitutes \( R \) at \( t_1 \), \( R \) might have been constituted by a different aggregate of molecules, \( A_2 \), at \( t_1 \). So, constitution is a relation that is in some ways similar to identity, but is not actually identity. If the relation between a person and her body is constitution, then a person is not identical to her body. The relation is more like the relation between the river and the aggregates of molecules.
The answer to the question—What most fundamentally is x?—is what I call ‘x’s primary kind.’ Each thing has its primary-kind property essentially. If x constitutes y, then x and y are of different primary kinds. If x constitutes y, then what “the thing” is determined by y’s primary-kind. For example, if a human body constitutes a person, then what there is a person-constituted-by-a human-body. So you—a person constituted by a human body—are most fundamentally a person. Person is your primary kind. If parts of your body were replaced by bionic parts until you were no longer human, you would still be a person. You are a person as long as you exist. If you ceased to have a first-person perspective, then you would cease to exist—even if your body was still there.

Whether we are talking about rivers, human persons, or countless other constituted things, the basic idea is this: When certain things of certain kinds (aggregates of water molecules, human organisms) are in certain circumstances (different ones for different kinds of things), then new entities of different kinds come into existence. The circumstances in which an aggregate of water molecules comes to constitute a river have to do with the relation of the water molecules to each other; they form a stream. The circumstances in which a human organism comes to constitute a human person have to do with development of a first-person perspective. In each case, new things of new kinds, with new kinds of causal powers, come into being. Since constitution is the vehicle, so to speak, by which new kinds of things come into existence in the natural world, it is obvious that constitution is not identity. Indeed, this conception is relentlessly anti-reductive.

Although not identity, constitution is a relation of real unity. If x constitutes y at a time, then x and y are not separate things. A person and her body have lots of properties in common: the property of having toenails, and the property of being responsible for certain of her actions. But notice: the person has the property of having toenails, only because she is constituted by something that could have had toenails even if it had constituted nothing. And her body is responsible for her actions only because it constitutes something that would have been responsible no matter what constituted it.

So, I’ll say that the person has the property of having toenails derivatively, and her body has the property of being responsible for certain of her actions derivatively; the
body has the property of having toenails nonderivatively, and the person has the property of being responsible for certain of her actions nonderivatively. If \( x \) constitutes \( y \), then some of \( x \)'s properties have their source (so to speak) in \( y \), and some of \( y \)'s properties have their source in \( x \). The unity of the object \( x \)-constituted-by-\( y \) is shown by the fact that \( x \) and \( y \) borrow properties from each other. The idea of having properties derivatively accounts for the otherwise strange fact that if \( x \) constitutes \( y \) at \( t \), \( x \) and \( y \) share so many properties even though \( x \neq y \).

To summarize this discussion of the idea of constitution: Constitution is a very general relation throughout the natural order. Although it is a relation of real unity, it is short of identity. (Identity is necessary; constitution is contingent.) Constitution is a relation that accounts for the appearance of genuinely new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers. If \( F \) and \( G \) are primary kinds and \( F_\text{s} \) constitutes \( G_\text{s} \), then an inventory of the contents of the world that includes \( F_\text{s} \) but leaves out \( G_\text{s} \) is incomplete. \( G_\text{s} \) are not reducible to \( F_\text{s} \).

**Human Persons**

Putting together the ideas of a first-person perspective and of constitution, we get this:

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\text{(HP)} \text{ An entity } x \text{ is a human person at } t \text{ if and only if (i) } x \text{ has a capacity for a first-person perspective at } t \text{ and (ii) } x \text{ is constituted by a human body at } t. 
\]

An entity \( x \) is a person in virtue of satisfying (i) and \( x \) is a human (rather than a divine or Martian) person in virtue of satisfying (ii). If \( x \) is a person constituted by a human body at \( t \), then \( x \) is essentially a person. That is, there could be no time at which \( x \) existed without being a person. But \( x \) is not essentially a *human* person. An entity \( x \) is a human person only if \( x \) is constituted by a human body, and it is possible that \( x \) is constituted by a human body at one time but constituted by a nonhuman body (a bionic body, a resurrection body) at another time. Even though it is possible that we come to have different bodies, anything that begins to exist as a human person (i.e., that begins to exist constituted by a human body) is essentially embodied.
In (HP), I mean ‘capacity’ in a very narrow sense. An object x has a capacity for a first-person perspective at t if and only if x has the relevant structural properties required for a first-person perspective, and either (i) x manifests a first-person perspective at t or has manifested a first-person perspective at some time prior to t or (ii) x is in an environment at t conducive to development and maintenance of a first-person perspective. For human persons, the relevant structural properties for a first-person perspective are those of a normal brain of an infant. We may never know the exact moment when a person comes into being. On the other end of earthly existence, this understanding of human persons allows that a person can go into a coma without ceasing to exist. If x has manifested a first-person perspective before going into a coma (and hence was a person), then x continues to exist (and hence continues to be a person) as long as x’s brain still has the physical endowment to support a first-person perspective.

The animal that constitutes a person has developed from zygote to embryo to fetus. Then, when that organism develops the capacity for a first-person perspective, a new being comes into existence—a person constituted by the organism. The organism does not go out of existence, any more than the piece of marble that constitutes Michelangelo’s David went out of existence when Michelangelo finished his piece. The statue is constituted by the piece of marble, but is not identical to it. Similarly, the person is constituted by the body, but is not identical to it. But to say that the person is not identical to the body does not mean that the person is identical to the body-plus-some-other-thing (like a soul). David is not identical to a piece-of-marble-plus-some-other-thing. If x constitutes y and x is wholly material, then y is wholly material. The human body (= human animal) is wholly material and the human body constitutes the human person. Therefore, the human person is wholly material. A human person is as material as Michelangelo’s David is.

Let me illustrate two ways in which a human person and the body that constitutes her are a unity. First, my body has good digestion nonderivatively; I have good digestion derivatively, in virtue of being constituted by a body that has good digestion independently of its constitution relations. But it is still the case that I do have good digestion. On the other hand, I have a right to sit in a certain seat at the opera nonderivatively; and my body has a right to be there derivatively in virtue of the fact that
my body constitutes me, and I have the right to sit there regardless of any properties of my body. If x has a property derivatively, then x does have the property. Second, I am a person nonderivatively, and my body is a person derivatively. That is, my body is a person solely in virtue of constituting me, and I am a person independently of my constitution relations to my body. Thus, the idea of having a property derivatively explains two things about the unity produced by constitution: (1) the fact that my body and I, though nonidentical, have so many properties in common, and (2) the fact that I am a person and my body (now) is a person (now) does not imply that where I am there are two persons. My body is not a separate or different person from me.

Underlying the Constitution View is the idea that what something is most fundamentally is often determined by what it can do—its abilities and capacities—rather than by what it is made of. This is obvious in the case of artifacts: What makes something a clock has to do with its telling time, no matter what it is made of. Similarly, according to the Constitution View, what makes something a person has to do with its having a first-person perspective, no matter what it is made of. The traditional field of answers to the question “In virtue of what is something a person?” (a body? a brain? a mind? some combination of these?) is misleading. A person is a basic kind of thing, and one is a person not in virtue of what one is made of, but in virtue of what one can do.

**Why a Christian Should Endorse the Constitution View of Human Persons**

I shall set out a simple, valid argument to prefer the Constitution View of human persons to Mind-Body Dualism, and then I shall defend each premise. Here is the argument:

1. The Constitution View of human persons is preferable to Mind-Body Dualism unless there is some overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism.

2. There is no overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism.

**Premise 1:** The Constitution View of human persons is preferable to Mind-Body Dualism unless there is some overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism.

The basic reason to accept Premise 1 can be expressed as a slogan: “Don’t introduce a bifurcation unless you need to.” Christians already have the bifurcation between Nature and Grace, between the Creator and the created. But Nature itself is a unified whole with its own integrity, and human persons are a part of Nature. We make better sense of the integrity of the world if we do not bifurcate Nature. The Constitution View, an anti-reductive materialism, construes Nature as an integrated whole.

A second reason to accept Premise 1 is that the Constitution View of human persons fits into a comprehensive metaphysical view of natural world. Since constitution is a very general relation in the world, and not specific to persons and their bodies, there is no special pleading for human persons. So, on this score, the Constitution View is less ad hoc than Mind-Body Dualism.

A third reason to accept Premise 1 is that the Constitution View by-passes all the well-known problems of interactions between nonmaterial and material substances. After 350 years, mind-body interactions remain as mysterious as they were in Descartes’s time. Although I reject “scientism” root and branch, empirical investigation of the natural world has produced an amazing body of knowledge with no end in sight. Nonmaterial substance simply does not fit in with what we know about the natural world. Thus postulation of a nonmaterial substance, which seems closed to empirical investigation, should be a last resort.

Even if these three reasons provide good support for Premise 1, as I think that they do, still Premise 1 is no good without Premise 2.

**Premise 2:** There is no overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism.

There are two kinds of support for Premise 2, philosophical and religious. First, the philosophical: One motivation for Mind-Body Dualism is that it takes persons
seriously in a way that reductive materialism just does not. But this motivation is equally a motivation for the Constitution View. Dualism has nothing over the Constitution View in terms of taking persons seriously. For example:

(1) Persons qua persons have ontological significance. According to the Constitution View, the property of being a person is not just a property of nonpersonal things. Anything that is a person either constitutes or is identical to something that is essentially a person—i.e., to something that could not exist without being a person. Any time the property of having a first-person perspective is instantiated, something (a person) has it essentially.

(2) Human persons do not have the bodies that they actually have necessarily. It is logically possible that a person have a different body from the one that she in fact has. The Constitution View admits the logical possibility of waking up in a different body—as did Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s story “The Metamorphosis.” (Neither proponents of the Constitution View nor mind-body dualists have any idea how such a thing could happen.) Slightly more realistically, a person would change bodies if her organic parts were replaced one-by-one with synthetic parts until the organism no longer existed, but the person (defined by a particular first-person perspective) continued to exist.

(3) With respect to questions of survival, we care about identity, not just qualitative similarity. I want to know if I will be around, not just if some future person (or persons!) psychologically similar to me will be around. According to the Constitution View, there is a fact of the matter about whether a particular future person is I. A future person is I if and only if she has my first-person perspective. As a “criterion of personal identity,” this condition is circular; but that is not surprising. All it means is that there is no way to define what a person is in nonpersonal terms. Personhood is irreducible to anything else.

So, I see no overriding philosophical reason to accept Mind-Body Dualism—especially in light of the availability of the Constitution View. But perhaps there is some overriding religious reason that ought to pull the Christian to dualism. For example, someone might claim that the Bible gives overriding reason to accept Mind-Body Dualism.
A thorough discussion of Biblical reasons to be a dualist is by John W. Cooper.\textsuperscript{20} Although I cannot do justice to the rich arguments here, I will give a summary assessment: The arguments that Cooper presents in favor of soul-body dualism do not tell against the Constitution View. For example, he points out several things that must obtain if the Christian doctrine of Life after Death is true—e.g., “The being that I am must continue to exist [after physical death],” and “I must somehow be aware of myself as the same person who formerly lived on earth.” Then, as if in conclusion, he says, “All this must be possible without my bodily organism.” Notice that on the Constitution View, all this is “possible without my bodily organism.” Thus, Cooper’s “unpacking of biblical teaching” here gives no reason at all to accept Mind-Body Dualism over the Constitution View. The Constitution View does not allow that we cannot exist unembodied; it does allow that we cannot exist without the bodies that constitute us now.

Cooper’s main argument for soul-body dualism (as he calls it) is from the doctrine of an intermediate state between death and a general resurrection. Cooper argues that “the doctrine of the intermediate state [between death and the general resurrection] logically requires the possibility that persons can exist without earthly bodies.”\textsuperscript{21} Again, this is no problem for the Constitution View, which entails the logical possibility of our existing without earthly bodies. (To say that we can exist without earthly bodies is not to say that we can exist without any kind of bodies.) Moreover, there is no reason to think that the intermediate state must be a disembodied state. For all that we know, persons in the intermediate state are constituted by intermediate-state bodies. So, Cooper’s arguments provide no reason to prefer Mind-Body Dualism to the Constitution View.

Other kinds of Biblical evidence—such as the language used in discussions of anthropology in Bible in the Old and New Testaments—may be adduced for one position or another. But that’s the problem. The Bible is not a philosophical text; its language does not point unambiguously to any philosophical position.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, given the kind of document that I think that the Bible is, I do not think that it can fruitfully be mined for philosophical theories; the best that we can do is to formulate philosophical theories that try to be faithful to Scripture as a whole, not to “proof texts.” Biblical evidence for Mind-Body Dualism as opposed to the Constitution View is inconclusive, as we should expect, given the kind of document that the Bible is.
Christian doctrine may provide another motivation for a Christian to be a mind-body dualist. Again, I think that the Constitution View does as well as Mind-Body Dualism in making sense of Christian doctrine. Let me all too briefly mention two doctrines. First, consider the doctrine of Christ as being one Person with two natures, “of one substance (homoousios) with the Father as regarding his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood.”23 Christ is fully human and fully divine. The Mind-Body Dualist would have to say that Christ consists of three substances—one infinite and two finite. On Mind-Body dualism, Christ is immaterial in his divine nature, and partly material and partly immaterial in his human nature. By contrast, on the Constitution View, Christ is immaterial in his divine nature and material in his human nature. The Mind-Body Dualist’s construal seems to me clumsier than the Constitutionalist’s construal; in any case, there is no overriding reason here to accept Mind-Body Dualism.

Another doctrine that might motivate a Christian to be a Mind-Body Dualist is the resurrection of the dead.24 The doctrine entails bodily resurrection. According to the Constitution View, we are essentially embodied; so, if the Constitution View is correct, there is an obvious explanation of why life after death would be embodied life (since, according to the Constitution View, we cannot exist unembodied). Mind-Body Dualism would provide no obvious explanation of why resurrection should be bodily (since, according to Mind-Body Dualism we can exist unembodied). So, I don’t think that the doctrine of resurrection gives overriding reason to endorse Mind-Body Dualism.

Finally, consider the idea that we are made in the image of God. A Mind-Body Dualist might say that since God is immaterial, He made us in his image by giving us an immaterial part, a soul. But a proponent of the Constitution View could say with equal justice that since God is self-conscious, He made us in his image by giving us self-consciousness (i.e., first-person perspectives). Being made in the image of God does not favor Mind-Body Dualism any more than it favors the Constitution View.

I conclude that Premise 2 is true: There is no overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism over the Constitution View. Since, by Premise 1, the Constitution View is preferable to Mind-Body Dualism unless
there is some overriding reason—either philosophical or religious—to accept Mind-Body Dualism, a Christian should endorse the Constitution View of human persons.

Conclusion

What the Constitution View of persons shows is that there is a way to be a materialist about human persons and still be an orthodox Christian. Like the Constitution View, Mind-Body Dualism also conceives of human persons as distinct from organisms since according to Mind-Body Dualists, human persons “have two parts linked together, body and soul.” What the Constitution View offers is a materialistic way to conceive of human persons as distinct from organisms.

Christian tradition is largely dualistic. I take tradition seriously and depart from it only when I think that the Christian community has made a mistake, and when I have an explanation for how Christians could have made that mistake. Although I think that Mind-Body Dualism is consistent with Christian doctrine, I also think that Mind-Body Dualism is a philosophical mistake. It is easy to see how Christians could have made this mistake if they assumed that the only way to distinguish us sufficiently from organisms is by postulating nonmaterial souls. But the Constitution View shows that the dichotomy—either we are identical to animals or we have immaterial souls—is a false one. The Constitution View offers a third way. Since the Constitution View is also consistent with Christian doctrine, and since the Constitution View fits in better with what we know about the natural world, I think that, on balance, it is a better philosophical bet than Mind-Body Dualism.\(^{26}\)

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1. Thomas Aquinas did not think of a soul as a substance; rather, a rational soul was the form of the human body. However, since he thought that the rational soul was “subsistent” and could exist apart from any body, I count him as a mind-body dualist.


Gallup’s experiments with chimpanzees suggest the possibility of a kind of intermediate stage between dogs (that have intentional states but no first-person perspectives) and human persons (that have first-person perspectives). In my opinion—for details see Persons and Bodies, pp. 62-4—Gallup’s chimpanzees fall short of full-blown first-person perspectives. See Gordon Gallup, Jr., “Self-Recognition in Primates: A Comparative Approach to Bidirectional Properties of Consciousness,” American Psychologist 32 (1977): 329-38.

I am assuming here the classical conception of identity, according to which if a = b, then necessarily, a = b.

Here and elsewhere I’ll omit reference to times.

Some philosophers have held that the idea of unity without identity is incoherent. In Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), I give a completely general definition of ‘constitution’ that is coherent. Moreover, since the Christian Trinity is supposed to be three Persons in one Being, a Christian who believes in the Trinity is in no position to claim that the general idea of unity without identity is incoherent.

For a technical account of ‘having properties derivatively,’ see Persons and Bodies, Ch. 2. Not all properties are subject to being had derivatively: Excluded properties are (a) properties expressed in English using ‘essentially’ or ‘primary-kind property’ or variants thereof; (b) properties expressed in English using ‘is identical to’ or ‘constitutes’ or ‘exists’ or variants thereof; (c) properties rooted outside the times at which they are had; (d) properties that are the conjunctions of two or more properties that either entail or are entailed by two or more primary-kind properties.

There is much more to be said about the idea of constitution. See Persons and Bodies, especially Ch. 2 and “Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution,” New Directions in Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1999): 144-165.

Note that this is a completely general claim. It is not “property dualism.”

I put it this way because of the Incarnation. I want to allow for saying that the Second Person of the Trinity essentially has a human nature, but is not essentially embodied. The Second Person of the Trinity, with human as well as divine nature, existed as an immaterial being before He came to be constituted by the body of Jesus of Nazareth. Since the Second Person of the Trinity did not begin to exist at all, He did not begin to exist as a human person (a la (HP)). His being fully human does not require that He be essentially embodied. (I don’t know whether this is the right thing to say, but I do not want to rule it out by my account of human persons.)

The relevant structural properties for a first-person perspective are nonderivative properties of a brain, and hence are nonderivative properties of the human animal. But the capacity for a first-person perspective, is a nonderivative property not of the human animal but of the person. So, when a human animal has the requisite structural properties, a new being comes into existence—a person—at the moment that the animal manifests a first-person perspective, or is in the requisite environmental and organismic circumstances.


Someone may ask: If a human person is not identical to a body or to a soul or to a body-plus-a-soul, what is she identical to? This question is a red herring. A person is identical to herself and not another thing.

For details, see Persons and Bodies, Ch. 2.

The expression ‘having a property independently of constitution relations’ is a technical locution, defined in Persons and Bodies on p. 48. It is not a causal term.

As I mentioned earlier, not every property is subject to being had derivatively. E.g., ‘being a person essentially’ or ‘being identical to a person’ is always had nonderivatively (if at all).

For details, see Persons and Bodies, pp. 173-5. Also see my “Materialism With a Human Face,” in Body, Soul and Survival, Kevin Corcoran, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
For an illuminating discussion of philosophical arguments for Substance Dualism, see Ch. 5 of William Hasker’s *The Emergent Self* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Hasker has searching criticisms of arguments by Swinburne and Talliaferro. Hasker’s own “unity-of-consciousness” argument for dualism relies on a Principle of Reducibility that I think ought to be rejected for reasons unrelated to issues concerning persons. I regret that discussion of the Principle of Reducibility here would take us too far afield.


Cooper, p. 179.

See Cooper, Chapters 2-8.

Definition of the Union of the Divine and Human Natures in the Person of Christ, Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D., Act V; quoted in *The Book of Common Prayer*, p. 864. I should note that the definition also says “truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body.” It is not obvious that we should take “reasonable soul and body” to imply two substances since the definition also says “of one substance with us as regards his manhood” rather than “of two substances with us as regards his manhood.”

For a fuller discussion of how the Constitution View can handle the idea of the resurrection of the dead, see “Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection,” *Faith and Philosophy*, forthcoming.


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