



I'm going to direct our attention in this seminar to a couple of processes where a certain kind of "competition" has been suggested to arise. I'm interested in the processes, but also in the notion of competition that is being used in these places. In general terms, this competition is between two syntactic ways of making an anaphor. This arises in contexts where the form an anaphor has is ambiguous. There will be two different ways an anaphor can be constructed and have the particular form we see. In these situations, as we'll see, there are analyses which claim that the two different possible sources for the anaphor compete. There is a preference, these analyses claim, for one source that is relinquished to the other source only under duress.

There are two domains where this sort of arrangement has been claimed to exist. One is ellipsis. The other is in pronouns when they get semantically interpreted as variables. At present, I'm thinking that we'll spend the first half of the seminar examining the ellipsis case and turn to the pronouns in the second half of the seminar. Today, I'll sketch what these cases look like.

## 1 Pronouns

Elbourne (2005, 2001) articulates a view, first broached (I suppose) in Postal (1969), that personal pronouns have the very same shape and semantics that definite descriptions have. As a rough first pass, that thesis would have personal pronouns like *she* and definite descriptions like *the woman* look like (1).



Elbourne argued that sometimes personal pronouns could look exactly like (1a). They get pronounced differently because the NP part can elide, as we know from examples like (2).

- (2) Sally likes some mosquitos, but I don't like any.  
= Sally likes some mosquitos but I don't like any mosquitos.

This ellipsis can strand just about anything that sits in the Determiner position. Two salient exceptions are *a* and *the*.

- (3) a. \* Jill's eaten many mosquitos, but I've eaten just a.  
b. \* Jill's looking for a mosquito, but I've eaten the.

An account for this gap could be that the rules of expressing *a* and *the* morphologically render (3) as (4).

- (4) a. Jill's eaten many mosquitos, but I've eaten just one.  
b. Jill's looking for a mosquito, but I've eaten it.


Elbourne argued that taking this view could explain the "formal link" problem that arises in the study of "d-type" (aka "e-type") pronouns.

- (5) Where *him* varies with values given to *woman* and refers to her husband:  
a. Every woman who has a husband talks to him.  
b. \* Every woman who is married talks to him.

Suppose we make the pronoun shown in (1b) only able to vary with the values given to some other DP when it is c-commanded by that DP. Then the ability of *him* to vary with *husband* in (5a) is mysterious. Compare, now, (6).

- (6) a. Every woman who has a husband talks to the husband.  
 b. ?? Every woman who is married talks to the husband.

There is the same degradation in (6) that we see in (5). (It's magnified in (5) – we should understand that.) This could be explained if another way that *him* could look is (7).



All three of these DPs are very similar. And yet there is a difference in how DPs with a fully pronounced NP and ones without behave. Perhaps most famous is the different ways in which they invoke disjoint reference effects. We have contrasts like that in (8).

- (8) a. \* A woman said I should talk to the woman.  
 b. A woman said I should talk to her.

Only in (8b) may the object of *talk to* refer to the same individual that *a woman* does. A way of thinking of this contrast that we owe to Reinhart (1983) is that these two forms — *the woman* and *her* — compete in these sorts of examples. There is a preference for expressing what both of these sentences could express with (8b). This point of view embraces a narrative like this:

When a DP is understood as bound, there is a variety of forms this bound DP may take, and there is a ranking among these forms. When a better form is blocked, the next best may take its place.

Another place where we might see a similar sort of competition is among the forms that function as the trace of movement. The present view of traces is that they are unpronounced copies of the thing that moved. When it's a DP that has moved, then, a trace is simply that DP, although there's some magic needed to get the meaning right.

- (9) Which woman has Sally said you talked to *which woman*?  
 ↑

The magic is commonly thought to be a rule that converts the unspoken copy into a definite description that varies in the appropriate way. So we could rewrite (9) as (10).

- (10) Which woman has Sally said you talked to *the woman*?  
 ↑

Now, sometimes this lower copy can be pronounced, and when it is, it is always (I think) pronounced as a personal pronoun. In some languages/contexts, then, (10) can come out as:

- (11) Which woman has Sally said you talked to *her*?  
 ↑

These pronouns are called “resumptive.”

A way that has been analyzed is in Elbourne's terms. The lower copy has an unpronounced NP part, but a pronounced Determiner — and this comes out as a personal pronoun. In some cases there is evidence that this is the right analysis because the NP content of the resumptive pronoun can have something in it we can detect. Aoun, Choueiri, and Hornstein (2001) report for Lebanese Arabic, for instance, that when movement could have moved from where the resumptive pronoun is (measured by islands), a pronoun within the moved term can be semantically valued in the position of the pronoun. An illustrative example from their paper is (12).

- (12) təlmiiz-a<sub>1</sub> lkəsleen ma baddna nɣabbi [wala mʕallme]<sub>1</sub> ʔənnə  
 student-her<sub>1</sub> the-bad NEG want.1P tell.1P [no teacher]<sub>1</sub> that  
 huwwe zaʕbar b-l-faḥṣ  
 he cheated.3SM in-the-exam  
 ‘her bad student, we don't want to tell any teacher that he cheated on the exam.’

(Aoun et al. 2001, (25b): 381)

The phrase ‘təlmiiz-a<sub>1</sub> lkəsleen’ (*her bad student*) contains a pronoun that is bound to a lower quantifier (‘wala mʕallme’ (*no teacher*)). This is made possible by the phrase ‘təlmiiz-a<sub>1</sub> lkəsleen’ (*her bad student*) being related to the resumptive pronoun ‘huwwe’ (*he*) through movement. Interestingly, when the resumptive pronoun is separated from the moved term by an island, this effect disappears.

- (13) \* təlmiiz-a<sub>1</sub> l-kəsleen ma ḥkiina maʕ [wa mʕallme]<sub>1</sub> ʔabl-ma  
 student-her the-bad neg talked.1P with no teacher before  
 huwwe yuuṣal  
 he arrive.3SM  
 ‘her bad student, we didn't talk to any teacher before he arrived.’

(Aoun et al. 2001, (27b): 381)

A companion fact about resumptive pronouns, in Lebanese Arabic, is that they can be full DPs! When they are, though, they must be epithets. We find examples like (14).

- (14) kəll muttahame saʔalto ʔəza ha-l-maʒduube nħabasit  
 each suspect.SF asked.2P whether this-the-idiot.SF imprisoned.3SF  
 ‘each suspect, you asked whether this idiot was imprisoned.’  
 (Aoun et al. 2001, (6): 373)

And, interestingly, when the moved phrase is quantificational, this seems to be sensitive to islands. In (14), there is an island that separates the binder from the bound epithet. If that island is removed (apparently), an epithet is no longer possible, and the English pronoun stratagem is forced.

- (15) kəll muttahame ʔrəfto ʔənno ha-l-maʒduube hħabasit  
 each suspect.SF know.2P that this-the-idiot.SF imprisoned.3SF  
 ‘Each suspect, you know that this idiot was imprisoned.’  
 (Aoun et al. 2001, (5a): 372)

So in these examples too, we’re seeing something that could be expressed in terms of a competition:

̄A bound DPs can have a variety of forms, and they are ranked. When something prevents the best form, the next best becomes available.

## 2 Sluicing

Ross (1969) named the construction illustrated by the second sentence of (16), “sluicing.”

- (16) Sally met someone nice. I wonder who.

I believe everyone agrees that there is some form of anaphora involved in sluicing. It seems clear that the meaning of *I wonder who* depends on the meaning of *Sally met someone nice*. The individual associated with *who* — the individuals that are unknown in my wondering — are individuals that Sally met. The same sentence, however, gets a different interpretation in (17).

- (17) Sally kissed someone nice. I wonder who.

Here, the individuals associated with *who* are ones that Sally kissed. Surely it’s no accident that these differences in the meaning of the second sentence of (16) and (17) derive from the differences in the meanings of the first sentences.

So: what is the anaphor in sluices? Ross thought that it was an ellipsis: there is a syntactic representation of an indirect question in these sluices that is just not completely spoken. One step towards that conclusion can be taken with the observation that the complement of *wonder* in (16) is most likely a CP, and not a DP. *wonder* does not normally select DP objects.

- (18) \* I wonder the answer.

*compare:*

I wonder what the answer is.

So this line of thinking leads us to (19), where “ $\Delta$ ” represents the elided portion of the interrogative.

- (19) I wonder [<sub>CP</sub> who [<sub>TP</sub>  $\Delta$  ]]

We’re left with the task of figuring out what  $\Delta$  is.

One possibility is that it is something like a personal pronoun, but with the banal property of being silent. Personal pronouns belong to a class of anaphors that Hankamer and Sag (1976) called “deep anaphors.” We can think of deep anaphors as referring expressions. They contain material whose denotation allows them to refer. For personal pronouns, that material can be thought of as a referential index. The procedure that interprets these indices is responsible for the anaphoric nature of personal pronouns. Hankamer and Sag distinguished these sorts of anaphors from “surface anaphors,” which are a kind of repetition. Although this isn’t a phenomenon that Hankamer and Sag discussed, a good example of a surface anaphor is deaccented material. I’ll put deaccented material in a shaded font. The contrast in (20) shows that deaccenting requires an antecedent.

- (20) a. Sally ate some mosquitos and then Bernhard ate some mosquitos.  
 b. \* Sally ate some mosquitos and then Bernhard ate some natto.

A flat intonation, then, is a kind of anaphor. The notion of “repetition” involved here is semantic, not morphological or syntactic. This can be seen by considering (21).

- (21) Sally ate some mosquitos and then Bernhard did something weird.

We want the deaccenting to arise when the semantic content of something is being repeated.

A popular way of expressing the antecedence conditions on deaccenting is with Roger Schwarzschild’s “givenness” requirement.

## (22) GIVENNESS

An utterance  $U$  is *given* iff it has a salient antecedent  $A$ , and modulo  $\exists$ -type shifting,  $A$  entails the result of replacing  $F$ -marked parts of  $U$  with existentially bound variables. (Schwarzschild 1999, (22): 149)

The “ $\exists$ -type shifting” part is there in case either  $A$  or  $U$  are not of the right type to be in an entailment relationship. Informally, what  $\exists$ -type shifting does, it take an open formula, existentially close its open arguments, and thereby bring it into a type allows it to have a truth value. These expressions can then be put into an entailment relationship. If we restrict our attention to relations between sentences, we won’t need to avail ourselves of “ $\exists$ -type shifting.” The part about  $F$ -marked parts is there to allow us to compare an utterance and possible antecedent that contain focus marked ( $F$ -marked) bits. So, for instance, we can let  $U$  be (24), and the deaccenting is licensed by the presence of (23) if we can ignore the  $F$ -marked *slow*.

(23) Sally ate a large mosquito.

(24) She ate a *slow<sub>F</sub>* mosquito.

According to Schwarzschild’s recipe, we get to replace *slow* with an existentially bound variable, and see if that expression is entailed. So (24) will satisfy GIVENNESS if (25) is true.

(25)  $\llbracket$ Sally ate a large mosquito $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket \exists P$  she ate a  $P$  mosquito $\rrbracket$

If *she* refers to the same individual that *Sally* does, (25) is, indeed, true. Similarly, the contrast in (20) is accounted for, since (26a) is true, but (26b) isn’t.

(26) a.  $\llbracket$ Sally ate some mosquitos $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket \exists x$   $x$  ate some mosquitos $\rrbracket$

b.  $\llbracket$ Sally ate some mosquitos $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket \exists x$   $x$  ate some natto $\rrbracket$

We have to understand “entails” oddly for (21) to work, since (27) isn’t true.

(27)  $\llbracket$ Sally ate some mosquitos $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket \exists x$   $x$  did something weird $\rrbracket$

Schwarzschild says that entailment must hold not just between  $A$  and the appropriately manipulated  $U$ , but between  $A$  and some background set of propositions, and the appropriately manipulated  $U$ . It’ll be useful to separate out these two ingredients, so I’ll make that explicit in GIVENNESS’.

## (28) GIVENNESS’

An utterance  $U$  is *given* iff there is a salient antecedent  $A$  and background  $\mathcal{B}$ , and modulo  $\exists$ -type shifting,  $A + \mathcal{B}$  entails the result of replacing  $F$ -marked parts of  $U$  with existentially bound variables.  $\mathcal{B}$  is a set of propositions whose truth is assumed by the conversants.

Now we don’t consider (27), but instead (29).

(29)  $\llbracket$ Sally ate some mosquitos $\rrbracket + \llbracket$ eating mosquitos is a weird thing to do $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket \exists x$   $x$  did something weird. $\rrbracket$

I will take these two phenomena to be canonical instances of the two types of anaphors that Hankamer and Sag lay out. Personal pronouns are deep anaphors and deaccenting is surface anaphora. So, which is  $\Delta$ ?

Hankamer and Sag developed a series of diagnostics intended to distinguish surface from deep anaphora. Some of these are not easily deployed in the case of Sluicing. One of these — perhaps the most convincing — is what Grinder and Postal (1971) called the “missing antecedent” effect. I have not figured out how to construct examples that reveal whether this effect can be found for Sluicing. The missing antecedent effect can be witnessed in (30).

(30) I didn’t eat a mosquito, but she did  $\Delta$ , and it tasted good.

The *it* in this example can refer to the mosquito that she ate. That would emerge if  $\llbracket \Delta \rrbracket$  were the same as  $\llbracket$ eat a mosquito $\rrbracket$ , and that would make it a surface anaphor. Deep anaphors don’t seem to do that, as we can see by comparing (30) with (31).

(31) I didn’t eat a mosquito, but she did that, and it tasted good.

The difference in these examples is not a difference in grammaticality. It’s more like the difference in Barbara Partee’s famous examples in (32).

(32) a. I dropped ten marbles and found all of them, except for one. It is probably under the sofa.

b. I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. It is probably under the sofa.

The example in (30) turns on the indefinite in the first clause being under negation, thereby disqualifying it from setting up the antecedent for *it*. But if an indefinite has narrow scope relative to negation in the antecedent to a sluice, it will remain within the scope of that negation in the sluice. We can see that by looking at (33).

(33) She didn’t feed a mosquito to one of her bats, but I won’t divulge which bat.

a. I won’t divulge which bat she didn’t feed any mosquito to.

b. I won’t divulge which bat she didn’t feed a certain mosquito to.

This disables this test, and that's a shame, as we'll see. The missing antecedent effect would give us a view of what  $\Delta$  is made up of, and that would help us with the dilemma we're about to see.

There are other things that Hankamer and Sag argued distinguish deep and surface anaphora. One of them is being able to contain a trace of movement. This does seem possible for de-accented material, and for elided VPs.

- (34) a. Which mosquito<sub>1</sub> did Sally serve  $t_1$  her guests and which mosquito did Jill<sub>F</sub> serve  $t_1$  her guests?  
 b. Which mosquito<sub>1</sub> did Sally serve  $t_1$  her guests and which mosquito did Jill<sub>F</sub>  $\Delta$ ?

But a pronoun like *that*, doesn't have this ability.

- (35) \* Which mosquito<sub>1</sub> did Sally serve  $t_1$  her guests and which mosquito did Jill do that?

A last measure for distinguishing surface and deep anaphora concerns what the antecedent can be. In a typical instance of personal pronouns, a linguistic expression can be used to introduce an entity into the discussion, and the pronoun can then refer to that individual. We have collections of sentences like those in (36).

- (36) a. Sally stepped onto the bus. She sat in the back.  
 b. A woman stepped onto the bus. She sat in the back.

But non-linguistic means can be employed to introduce an entity into the conversation too, and pronouns don't seem to care. We have scenarios like (37).

- (37) *A man looks at Sally, and says:*  
 a. You are a mosquito eater.  
*Paul and Mary are sitting at a table, looking at Sally as she walks towards them. Paul says to Mary:*  
 b. She's a mosquito eater.

Ellipsis was the canonical form of surface anaphora for Hankamer and Sag, and they suggested that a linguistic signal is required for ellipsis. It's certainly true, I think, that situations parallel to (37) don't support VP Ellipsis easily.

- (38) *A man watching Sally eating a mosquito says:*  
 a. ?? You shouldn't  $\Delta$ .  
 b. You shouldn't do that.

*Paul and Mary are sitting at a table watching watching Sally walk towards them. Paul says:*

- c. ?? I hope she doesn't  $\Delta$ .  
 d. I hope she doesn't come here.

This isn't entirely expected on the sketch of the antecedence conditions on surface anaphora that we've adopted from Schwarzschild. The scenarios in which these sentences are uttered might reasonably be thought to furnish a background that contains enough to be the antecedent for the ellipsis. In (38a), for instance, the situation that Sally and her male companion are in should allow the background to include *Sally is eating a mosquito*. The way I formulated GIVENNESS, would allow the  $\Delta$  to be  $\llbracket$ eat a mosquito $\rrbracket$ :

- (39)  $\emptyset+$   $\llbracket$ Sally is eating a mosquito $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket$  $\exists M$  you  $M$  eat a mosquito $\rrbracket$   
 where  $M$  ranges over *should, shouldn't, did, didn't, etc.*, and *you* refers to the individual that *Sally* refers to.

On the other hand, there are examples in which it appears that a linguistic trigger for the antecedent is not required for ellipsis. One that Hankamer and Sag discuss is:

- (40) Sag approaching Hankamer carrying a knife and a crazy look in his eye. Hankamer cries:  
 a. For heaven's sake, don't  $\Delta$ .

It's conceivable that this scenario puts into the Background *Sag will stab me*, and this would be sufficient to make *stab me* Given.

Unlike Hankamer and Sag, I've taken de-accented material to be the canonical type of surface anaphora, and I don't know that its sensitivity to a linguistic trigger has been extensively studied. How do you feel about these examples?

- (41) Sag approaching Hankamer with a raised knife. Hankamer shrugs and says:  
 a. At least booze<sub>F</sub> won't kill me.  
 b. \* At least booze<sub>F</sub> won't  $\Delta$ .

Givenness allows deaccenting of *kill me* in (41a), as (42) shows.

- (42)  $\emptyset+$   $\llbracket$ Hankamer will kill me $\rrbracket$  entails  $\llbracket$  $\exists x$   $x$  won't kill me. $\rrbracket$

(I worry that " $\exists x x$  won't kill me" is a little too easy an entailment.) If there is a contrast in (41), and it represents a generalization, then the need for a linguistic trigger is not a property of surface anaphora, but is a feature of ellipsis.

These considerations, then, have led us to the conclusions in (43).

- (43) a. Ellipsis requires linguistic material to give it an antecedent, and  
b. Ellipsis can contain a trace of movement

A way of understanding why Ellipsis can contain a trace is to allow it to be a garden variety phrase, with normal terminals within it. Movement will be able to affect the phrases in the ellipsis, then, in just the same way that it would be able to affect phrases in a spoken term. So, we might picture a sluice having the shape in (44).

- (44) which mosquito did Jill<sub>F</sub> [<sub>VP</sub> eat t ]?  
↑

Giving syntactic content to the ellipsis also makes it easy to account for the morphological form of the wh-phrase that moves out of it. For instance, the Case this wh-phrase bears is appropriate for the site we would imagine it moving from in these examples. Ross noted this, and cited the German examples in (45).

- (45) a.

We can see something similar from the English example in (46).

- (46) Sally talked to someone about her mosquitos, but I can't recall to whom.

This is called "form matching." The material that has moved out of an ellipsis has a form that matches that defined by its antecedent.

Now form matching is related to (43a). To the extent that form matching is true, it seems to require that the ellipsis matches exactly the syntactic form of the antecedent. What we expect, then, is that the remnant of an ellipsis should match its "correlate" in form. We would need a much stronger antecedent condition than we've seen operative for de-accenting. We'd need something like (47).

- (47) A phrase can be unspoken (i.e., elided) just in case it is syntactically and lexically the same as some spoken phrase.

For (47) to be correct, we'll have to have a sophisticated view of what the lexical items look like. We'll have to make sure that pronouns, for instance, can exist with neither an index nor  $\phi$ -features, for otherwise simple cases of sloppy identity would run counter to (48).

- (48) a. Jerry<sub>1</sub> will visit his<sub>1</sub> parents and Sally<sub>2</sub> will  $\Delta$  too.  
 $\Delta$  = visit her<sub>2</sub> parents  
b. Jerry<sub>1</sub> knows which article he<sub>1</sub> should read, and Sally<sub>2</sub> which book  $\Delta$ .  
 $\Delta$  = she<sub>2</sub> should read

Similarly, the morphology on verbs can (sometimes) not be part of the lexical material that antecedent and ellipsis match. (See Potsdam 1997.)

- (49) Sally hasn't eaten yet, but she will  $\Delta$ .  
 $\Delta$  = eat

That appears to be true even when the morphology is category changing:

- (50) David Begelman is a great laughter, and when he does  $\Delta$ , his eyes crinkle at you ...

(from Hardt 1993, (111): 34)

(see Fu, Roeper, and Borer 2001 for discussion.)

These are examples for which an account exists (or easy to conceive of) that preserves (47). There are others where this isn't the case. One of these is "Vehicle Change," from Fiengo and May (1994).

- (51) a. Sally visited Sam's father, because Sam wouldn't  $\Delta$ .  
 $\Delta$  = visit his father

$\Delta \neq$  visit Sam's father

- b. \* Sally liked Sam because Sam didn't  $\Delta$ .  
 $\Delta$  = like him

- (52) Sally said someone had visited Sam's father but that Sam would never find out who  $\Delta$ .  
 $\Delta$  = had visited his father

We return to this case — it might be part of the second class of examples I want to look at in this seminar.

Another place where we seem to violate (47) is in what Chung, Ladusaw, and McCloskey (1995) call "sprouting."

- (53) Sally will eat, but I don't know what Sally will eat t.  
↑

In Sprouting, there is no overt correlate, and yet there is still a remnant. We'd have to see the absent object of *eat* in the antecedent as being identical to the trace in the ellipsis.

One consequence of form matching is that it predicts that the form of the remnant can only match the pied-pipable phrases containing the correlate. So we get the pattern in (54).

- (54) a. She talked to someone but I don't know whom.  
 b. She talked to someone but I don't know to whom.  
 c. She talked to someone's daughter, but I don't know whose daughter.  
 d. ? She talked to someone's daughter, but I don't know to whose daughter.

compare:

- e. ? I asked to whose daughter she had spoken.  
 f. \* She visited someone but I don't know visited whom.

compare:

- g. \* I asked visited whom she had.

Merchant claimed that this generalization holds up cross-linguistically, and he does an admirable job of canvassing languages to support this. One place he concentrates his attention is with pied-piping of prepositions. In many languages, prepositions must pied pipe; the preferred option in English of stranding them does not hold. And in many of these languages, Merchant shows, this has an effect on what the remnant of a sluice can look like. In Greek, for instance, prepositions cannot be stranded and, as expected, the remnant must include the preposition.

- (55) a. I Anna milise me kapjon, alla dhe ksero me pjon.  
 the Anna spoke with someone, but not I.know with whom  
 'Anna spoke with someone, but I don't know with whom.'  
 b. \* I Anna milise me kapjon, alla dhe ksero pjon.  
 the Anna spoke with someone, but not I.know whom  
 'Anna spoke with someone, but I don't know whom.'

(Merchant 2001, p. 94)

But there are also languages that seem to counter-exemplify this correlation. Spanish, according to Rodrigues, Nevins, and Vicente (2006), violates this generalization. Like Greek, Spanish does not allow for stranded prepositions.

- (56) \* Quién ha hablado Mauricio con  
 who has talked Mauricio with  
 'Who has Mauricio talked with?'

But unlike Greek, it does allow the remnant of a sluice to go without a preposition when its correlate comes with one.

- (57) ?? Mauricio ha hablado con alguien, pero no sé quién  
 Mauricio has talked with someone but not know who

'Mauricio has talked with someone but I don't know who.'

(Vicente 2008, (10): 3)

The solution Vicente (2008) offers is that the source of the ellipsis in these examples is not a question with a preposition, but is instead a kind of copular construction. It is:

- (58) Mauricio ha hablado con alguien, pero no sé quién es *pro*.  
 Mauricio has spoken with someone, but not know who is it  
 'Mauricio has spoken with someone, but I don't know who it is.'

The argument for this source of the sluice comes from deploying tests for the copula construction. So, for instance, a *wh*-phrase in the copular construction cannot be modified with *más* ('else').

- (59) \* Juan ha hablado con una chica rubia, pero no sé qué chica  
 Juan has spoken with a girl blonde, but not know which girl  
 más es *pro*.  
 else is it  
 'John talked with a blonde girl, but I don't know what other girl it is.'

And, lo and behold, if the preposition is not accompanying the remnant, it cannot support modification from *más*, though it can otherwise.

- (60) a. \* Juan ha hablado con una chica rubia, pero no sé qué  
 John has talked with a girl blonde but not know which  
 chica más.  
 girl else  
 'Juan has spoken with a blonde girl, but I don't know which other  
 girl.'  
 b. Juan ha hablado con una chica rubia, pero no sé con  
 John has talked with a girl blonde but not know with  
 qué chica más.  
 which girl else  
 'Juan has spoken with a blonde girl, but I don't know with which  
 other girl.'

If that's the right picture, then we have some interesting questions.

- (61) a. What makes Greek different from Spanish?  
 b. Why is it the copula construction that becomes available in Spanish?  
 c. What about (47)?

A narrative that these questions are often put into goes like this.

For any given antecedent, the antecedence conditions for ellipses allow a range of possible forms for the ellipsis. Those forms are ranked: When the best form fails, the next best becomes available. The forms allowed by the antecedent conditions are limited enough that sometimes no ellipsis is allowed.

### 3 Amalgams

This is an aside, perhaps. A note. Or it might be part of the course — I don't know.

Lakoff (1974) discusses two kinds of constructions he called “amalgams.” They're kinds of parentheticals which were brought to his attention by Avery Andrews and Larry Horn. He called them “Andrews amalgams” (= (62)) and “Horn amalgams” (= (63)) as a consequence.

(62) John invited you'll never guess how many people to his party.

(63) John is going to, I think it's Chicago on Sunday.

What makes an amalgam different from other kinds of parentheticals is the appearance that there is material shared by the two clauses that are combined. In (62), that material is (perhaps) *many people*, and in (63), it is *Chicago*. Notice how the Andrews amalgam has the form of a sluice and the Horn amalgam has the form of a copula. These are the only two forms that amalgams are known to be able to have. Is the reason for this related to our problem about sluicing? Kluck (2011) argues that amalgams are forms of ellipsis. We might dive into her book.

So, now: on with the show. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

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