Lecture Notes: Nov. 18

Econ. 103, Fall 2002, Prof. Nancy Folbre

  

Chapter 12, The Economics of Information

Key concepts: free rider problem, "fair bet," credibility or signaling problems, adverse selection

Free rider problem–a common element in this and the previous chapter–relates to tragedy of the commons; an incentive problem in which too little of a good/service is produced (or protected) because nonpayers cannot be excluded from using it.

The efficiency of the invisible hand presumes perfect information.

But information is never perfect.

Also, it is almost always costly.

People should gather information as long as the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs.

Sometimes they take short cuts, engaging in "statistical discrimination"--they attribute to people or things the characteristics that are "average" for people or things with similar characteristics. E.g., if you are a woman, you have a higher likelihood of taking time out from career to raise a family; if you are an adolescent male, you have a higher likelihood of crashing a car; if you are a Toyota, you have a higher likelihood of not breaking down.

"Middlemen" or services like EBay provide a valuable service of making information available.

Asymmetric information--there's a difference between what buyers and sellers know.

The market for used cars is a good example of a "lemon" problem: cars that are less reliable are the ones most likely to end up in a used car lot. The used car dealer may have this information, but no incentive to share it.

Credibility and signaling--efficiency can be improved by improving trust

Buying things involves taking risks--the expected value of a gamble is the sum of the possible outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities. A fair gamble is one whose expected value is zero. The Massachusetts lottery is NOT a fair gamble. It is designed to raise revenue. About 30 cents on every dollar goes to the state, and they are now planning to cut this on the theory that most people who buy lottery tickets won't notice or won't care. It's like a tax on ignorance.

Adverse selection--those most likely to buy insurance are those most likely to need it. Another example of adverse selection--blood donation:

Information costs are particularly high in the "care sector" of the economy.

Care work--involves personal and emotional interaction to meet people's individual needs

child care, elder care, health, education

the "consumers" are often dependents

they can't always express their needs

they often have little money of their own

both the quantity and quality of output is difficult to measure

many of these services are part of the public sector--paid for by taxpayers

intrinsic motivation, as well as extrinsic rewards, have a big impact on the supply of care work

a signaling or credibility problem: how do you know someone really cares?

Excerpt from The Invisible Heart:

Conventional yardsticks of success are particularly misleading in the paid care sector of our economy, the sector that provides health care, elder care, child care, education, and social services. Government surveys don't officially recognize this category, but with a bit of pushing and pulling, official numbers can be used to construct a category called "professional care services" (using the standard industrial classifications of Hospitals, Health Services except Hospitals, Educational Services, and Social Services). Employment in this category has increased steadily over time, and it now accounts for one fifth of the total paid labor force, about the same as employment in the combined sectors of manufacturing, mechanical, and construction industries. Hospitals and schools should now count as much in forming our image of wage employment as factories and construction sites.

Professional care services are disproportionately provided by women. In 1998, women accounted for about 46% of the paid labor force over age 16, but 76% of those employed in Hospitals, 79% in Other Health Services, 69% in Educational Services, and 82% in Social Services. The ways in which these care industries are structured--including incentives for cutting costs and methods of setting pay and measuring performance--have especially important implications for women workers. They also have obvious implications for the welfare of those being cared for.

In the last thirty years, the overall costs of care have gone up relative to the costs of other goods and services, for a number of reasons in addition to those discussed in the preceding chapter, such as the difficulty of automating this type of work. Changing demographics have increased the relative size of our elderly population. Technological changes in health have created marvelous, but expensive, options for treating disease and prolonging life. The increasing importance of education has intensified demands for higher quality in primary and secondary schools and higher enrollment rates in colleges and universities. As more and more mothers have starting bringing home paychecks, families have begun purchasing substitutes for the care they once provided.

When costs go up, pressures tend to intensify. Managers, professionals, and policymakers in the care industries have struggled to devise ways of keeping costs down, often through major institutional restructuring. A good example is the growth of Health Maintenance Organizations, which have largely displaced conventional insurance as a means of financing health care. The growing cost of providing public assistance to our elderly population through Medicaid has changed the way in which nursing home care is financed and regulated. Continued shortages in the availability of high quality child care have contributed to demands for more public subsidies Dissatisfaction with schools has led to proposals that we dismantle our public education system and simply provide parents with vouchers that enable them to spend a certain amount of money purchasing educational services on the open market, an issue that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

The pressure to cut care costs creates new openings for private, profit-oriented providers that focus on the financial bottom line. Public and nonprofit institutions must compete with these providers, even though they are bound by different rules. Private hospitals, for instance, don't need to provide emergency room care for the indigent, or learning opportunities for interns and resident physicians. Public hospitals do. Private schools can refuse to admit any student whom they fear might bring down their average test scores, or expel any student who is a troublemaker. Public schools don't enjoy such privileges.

Even within the private sector, competitive pressures are mounting. Globalization is reducing barriers to trade and capital mobility. Companies can locate in countries where they needn't provide health benefits for their workers and aren't required to pay taxes to help finance schools and hospitals (more about this in Chapter 9). The introduction of competitive discipline can help reduce the escalation of costs in care services. But it can also reduce the quality of services in ways that people may be slow to recognize, and even slower to act upon. Much depends on how we measure, monitor, and defend quality.

Hands-on Health

Much of the cultural history of nursing revolves around ideals of empathetic care, and nursing organizations have for year tried to fend off the growing impersonality of our health care delivery system. They have not been successful, in part because hand-holding has been considered a luxury--as though emotional well-being is subjective--just a transitory state of mind. Evidence suggests, however, that emotions have significant effects on physical health. The most striking examples come from studies of the placebo effect--the seemingly inexplicable fact that patients often benefit just as much from a sugar pill or fake surgery as from bona fide treatment. It seems that the expectation of being treated, the feeling that you safe in someone else's hands, has measurably beneficial effects.

Emotional support is a therapeutic force. Journalist Margaret Talbot describes a study on postoperative pain at Massachusetts General Hospital in which patients were randomly divided into two groups. One group was visited the night before surgery by a doctor (an anesthetist) who treated the patient brusquely. The other group was visited the night before by the same doctor, who made an effort to be warm and sympathetic and held the patient's hands as he sat on their beds. Those in the second group not only required less pain-killing medication after the surgery; but they were also discharged significantly earlier from the hospital. "The placebo effect can occur," as one doctor put it, "when conditions are optimal for hope, faith, trust, and love."

"Optimal conditions" do not include situations where patients lack a personal (much less long-term) relationship with their health care provider. Nor do they include situations in which doctors are under financial pressure to meet a quota of patients per hour or stay under a per-patiet limit of diagnostic costs. Yet these situations are increasingly characteristic of health care today. Most health care is provided either by insurance companies, who face increasing pressure to cut costs, or by emergency rooms (the only form of health care that most uninsured folks can afford). In both cases, medical decisions are often supervised by individuals who are not in personal contact with patients, and whose job it is to limit spending.

Health care is costly, and we need to figure out ways to keep those costs down. But in the tug of war between costs and care, it is care that seems to be losing. Unlike traditional fee-for-service insurance programs, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) charge their members a fixed amount of money in advance. In return, they agree to meet the subscribers' medical needs. Not all aspects of this incentive structure are bad. Unlike fee-for-service insurers, HMOs have much to gain by encouraging regular health check-ups, good nutrition, and exercise. By improving the overall health of the subscribers, such measures can reduce the incidence, and therefore the cost, of treating serious medical problems.

Unfortunately, the HMO system also creates some unhealthy incentives. Many HMOs provide only limited treatment for mental illness, because it is more difficult to classify than physical illness. Many HMOs discourage their doctors from offering expensive diagnostic procedures or hospitalization. As of July 1999, less than half of all states had laws allowing patients to appeal such decisions. Most of the touted cost savings that HMOs offer derive from lower hospitalization rates than other kinds of programs. Another tactic for saving money is to exclude unhealthy people from membership. It was hoped that, as many elderly people receiving Medicare moved into HMOs, their health care costs would decline. But HMOs realized that the elderly were driving up their costs; in the last few years, many have eliminated coverage for seniors on Medicare. The greater the competitive pressure, the more irresistible the temptations to offload costs.

A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that several measures of the quality of care are significantly lower in for-profit than non-profit HMOs.

The authors offer a poignant example of the limitations of standardized measures of quality. A national committee monitors HMOs, collecting data on the percentage of women patients who receive regular mammograms. Hence, administrators have an incentive to encourage doctors to increase mammography rates. Unfortunately, they have no incentive to encourage physicians to take as much time as they need to perform clinical breast examinations, patient education, or other activities that the committee does not monitor.

"Let's face it," says one health care economist, "people went into the for-profit managed care business to make bucks." A law suit filed against six large managed care companies in June 2000 charged them with failing to disclose to members that rewards were offered to doctors and other employees who denied payments for care and limited hospital admissions.

Hospitals have dramatically reduced the length of stays by sending patients home more quickly than ever before, shifting care costs to family members and friends. New portable technologies make it easier to do things like administer intravenous medication at home, which is great. But many family members are now assuming these responsibilities without pay--about 26 million people in 1997, each working an average of 18 hours a week. Measures of cost-effectiveness do not take into account these hidden costs. Nor have the health effects been closely scrutinized. Forced cutbacks in hospital stays created so much bad publicity that Congress passed legislation in 1996 prohibiting so-called "drive-through" deliveries, and requiring insurance companies to reimburse at least two days of hospital care for a normal childbirth. Even Congressional Republicans voted recently in favor of a Patient Bill of Rights albeit in an effort to forestall stronger regulation by Democrats.

These well-publicized issues, however, are less troubling than is the less visible deterioration in the emotional dimensions of care. As a recent New York Times article put it, critics say "hit and run" nursing has replaced Florence Nightingale." Bedside nurses have been replaced by unlicensed "care technicians." A survey of over 7,500 nurses released in 1996 reported that 73% felt they had less time than previously to comfort and educate patients. A research report that analyzed over 18 million patient discharge records from hospitals between 1994 and 1997 found a 9% increase in the average number of patients for which each full-time registered nurse was responsible--from one to every 56.9 to one for every 62.3.

Cutbacks in reimbursements to nurses and to aides who help provide care in patients' homes have reduced the emotional quality of care there, as well. Reflecting on her interviews with workers, Deborah Stone concluded "The more I talked with people, the more I saw how financial tightening and the ratcheting up of managerial scrutiny are changing the moral world of care giving, along with the quantity and quality of care."

Elder and Child Care

Anxiety about quality also runs high in market-provided elder and child care, the rapidly growing industries that care for the two dependent ends of our age distribution. Nearly all nursing homes are privately run, though most are subsidized with public dollars. Few ordinary elders can afford to pay the roughly $40,000 a year price tag on their own. More than two-thirds of all nursing home residents are indigent and rely on Medicaid to pay their expenses.

They have no choice about where or how they will be cared for; nor are they well-protected by the government. Complaints about abusive treatment are often ignored. According to Consumer Reports, about 40% of nursing homes repeatedly fail to pass the most basic health and safety inspections. In 1999, the government's General Accounting Office echoed these concerns.

Nursing home profits depend largely on the difference between revenues paid by the government and the costs of providing care. When subsidies remain low--or fail to increase along with prices--the pressure to cut costs is powerful. Wages for workers in elder care are extremely low, and turnover rates are high. Working conditions are difficult. Chronic understaffing contributes to stress and burnout. Injury rates are high. Reform advocates argue that the federal government needs to set staffing ratios, making no aide responsible for more than five residents at a time. To date, only 18 states have adopted minimum ratios.

Perhaps recognizing the difficulties facing families who are "comparison shopping" among nursing homes, the Medicare Office offers a service on the World Wide Web entitled Nursing Home Compare ( At this site you can obtain a list of nursing homes in your local area, as well as obtain some standardized measures of their performance. An elderly neighbor of mine moved to a local nursing home a couple of years ago and I decided to check it out. I learned that her nursing home had only 3 deficiencies out of a range of health deficiencies in the state of 0-39. The average number of health deficiencies in nursing homes in the United States is 5.

Extending my quest to ascertain exactly what a deficiency was, I learned that the nursing home in question, among other things, failed to 1) hire only people who have no legal history of abusing, neglecting, or mistreating residents; or 2) report and investigate any acts or reports of abuse, neglect, or mistreatment of residents. I also learned that only 5% of the residents of the home had bed sores (compared to a 15% average for the country as a whole) and only 28% had behavioral symptoms such as wandering, aggressive verbal or physical behavior, or inappropriate social actions, compared to 37% for the nation as a whole.

Better these measures than no measures at all. Still, apart from being downright depressing, they are rather limited, saying nothing about more profound dimensions of care. I can't help but wonder about the emotional and social environment there. Researcher Susan Eaton describes the things companies "can't bill for, but that make all the difference if you're living in a nursing home: time to listen to somebody's story, time to hold their hand, time to comfort somebody who is feeling troubled. And you can't exactly put that on your bill; imagine finding ‘holding hands' on the bill. You have to have a ‘treatment,' you have to have some formal procedure."

The picture in child care is less bleak. Most kids have parents to advocate for them, and most child care workers genuinely enjoy working with kids. Still, child care, like elder care, is difficult to monitor for quality. My favorite illustration of the problem is the teddy bear with the hidden video camera, a device invented to help parents maintain surveillance over stay-at-home nannies. Only slightly more affordable are Web sites linked to video-cams in child care centers, so that anxious parents are only one click a way from a view of what their toddlers are actually doing. As of December of 1999, some 150 child care centers across the country offered this feature. Most parents obviously cannot afford cybersupervision, but even those who do seldom have the time to carefully scrutinize what they see.

Some home providers and child care centers offer high quality care. Others do not. The workers who actually provide hands-on care earn less than parking lot attendants.

Lack of regulation allows the child care industry to draw from a reserve army of relatively unskilled labor--predominantly women, disproportionately women of color. Only nineteen states have preservice training requirements for teachers. Few states have any training qualifications for family child care providers. In general, hairdressers are required to meet much stricter standards. Fewer than half of all child care workers receive fully covered health insurance for themselves; coverage for their dependents is even more rare. Turnover rates are well over 30% per year in most big cities. It is hard for a young child to bond with a care giver in a revolving door.

Plenty of evidence suggests that high-quality center care can improve developmental outcomes for young children. But a recent comprehensive survey argues that the physical and emotional environments in many child care centers remain inadequate in many states because of poor regulation. Voluntary accreditation by the National Association for the Education of Young Children tends to improve quality: a California study, for instance, rated 61% of accredited centers as good in 1997, compared to only 26% of those seeking accreditation the previous year. Nationwide, however, only 5,000 out of the nation's 97,000 child care centers were accredited in that year.

Quality is even more unpredictable among home care providers. In the rush to expand child care slots to accommodate the exigencies of welfare reform, some states have provided child care vouchers that can be used virtually anywhere and are set at extremely low levels. Such policies discourage the development of high quality care, which costs more than public subsidies will cover.

Child care is a complicated business, with a mix of for-profit, family-based, and non-profit providers. We don't know much about how different institutional forms affect quality of care. What looks attractive to the parent is not necessarily what is best for the child--shiny new toys matter less than the skills and commitment of the workers providing care. Studies show that for-profit child care centers do not in general emphasize "curb-side appeal" at the expense of more difficult to monitor aspects of quality. However, for-profit child care centers that are part of national chains do appear to stoop to this strategy.

It is probably impossible to arrive at an exact measure of care quality. But it is not hard to think of ways to lessen the economic pressures that can undermine quality. Improving the training, wages, and working conditions of workers in care industries would be likely to reduce their turnover and encourage greater personal connection between caregivers and those for whom they care. Indeed, given greater opportunities to develop professional standards and some protections against employer retaliation against "whistle blowers," workers themselves could become leading watchdogs for care quality.

Competitive pressures can have perverse effects. This is why public provision of care services is sometimes preferable to private provision and why public regulation of care services is almost always necessary. But the difficulties of measuring success are not limited to the care sector. Nor can they be solved simply by reorganizing our care industries. We need to reevaluate--and substantially revise--the ways we measure and reward success in our economy as a whole.

Some multiple choice exercises:

The optimal amount of information to acquire before making a purchase is

a) zero
b)
as much as technically possible
c)
the amount where the total cost of acquiring the information equals the total benefit
d)
independent of the expenditure to be made
e)
the amount where the marginal cost of acquiring information equals the marginal benefit

the correct answer is e

Tom goes to the local stereo store to learn about high-end equipment. The salesperson spends an hour talking with Tom and demonstrating equipment. Tom then leaves and orders the system he liked from an Internet store and saves $250. Tom is a(n)

a) smart shopper
b) jerk
c) free rider
d) example of adverse selection
e) example of statistical discrimination

The correct answer is c). Note that a) may also be true, but you want to pick the one that shows you have actually learned something new.

Terri decides to play the lottery. She has 1% probability of winning $1000 and a 99% probability of winning zero. The expected value of her decision to play is

a) $1000
b) $100
c) $10
d) $1
e) 0

The correct answer is c),  $10.

The lemons model is used to explain

a) the market for citrus products
b) markets with asymmetric information
c) just the market for used cars
d) how not to buy a lemon in the first place
e) markets with symmetric information

The correct answer is b).