

## LOCKE ON THE SUSPENSION OF DESIRE

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1. In the first edition of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Locke claims that human beings have freedom of action - that is, that some of their actions are free - but that they do not have freedom of will - that is, that none of their volitions are free. Volitions themselves are actions for Locke; they are operations of the will and hence acts of willing. And volitions give rise to other actions: an action that follows and is caused by a volition is thereby a voluntary action. But volitions are not subject to the will; they cannot be caused by acts of willing and so cannot themselves be voluntary actions.

2. This doctrine, that acts of willing cannot be voluntary, is one of Locke's reasons for thinking that they are not free. (He also has a reason for holding this doctrine, and a second reason for thinking that acts of willing cannot be free, both of which I'll be considering later on.) Locke follows not only the scholastics but also Descartes and Hobbes in holding that being voluntary is a prerequisite for being free. But unlike Descartes and Hobbes, though not unlike the scholastics, Locke does not make voluntariness sufficient for freedom.<sup>1</sup> In addition to being voluntary, a free action must be one its agent can avoid - avoid, that is, merely by willing, whether by willing not to do it or by willing to do something else that is incompatible with doing it.

3. The view that freedom requires avoidability, that a free agent is one who could have acted otherwise than he does, is characteristic of those philosophers we now call libertarians. But Locke is not a libertarian in our sense of the word. For that sort of libertarian is an incompatibilist: he holds that free actions are logically precluded from being determined, at least fully, by antecedent causes. Locke, however, holds that everything that happens, including free human actions, is causally determined.<sup>2</sup> So Locke is a compatibilist with respect to freedom and determination, just as Hobbes is. (Libertarians often hold as well that acts of willing are no less free than voluntary actions are, and indeed that no action is free unless the volition that causes it is free.)

4. Locke's treatment of human freedom occurs in Chapter xxi of Book II of the *Essay*. This same chapter contains an extensive discussion of motivation, of 'what it is that determines the will'. Locke's starting premise is that the will is not self-determining, that it is caused to operate by something other than itself.<sup>3</sup> This premise is just a corollary of his determinism, according to which everything that happens has a cause outside itself. What then are the causes of our volitions? In the first edition Locke's answer is that it is our judgments of the good and evil consequences of the actions we consider that determine our wills. What causes one's will to operate, what produces a volition to perform or not perform a given action, is one's judgment of the pleasure and pain that is likely to result if that action is performed. Since judgments are products of our faculty of understanding, Locke sometimes says that the will is determined by 'dictates of the understanding'.

5. Soon after publishing this first edition, however, Locke came to question this view of motivation, and in the second edition he lays out a different view - what he calls his 'second thoughts' on the subject. Here it is not judgments of the understanding but 'present uneasinesses' that determine the will to action. An uneasiness is a feeling or sensation, a species of pain: it is the unpleasant feeling that either constitutes or else always accompanies desire (Locke seems unable to decide between these two). Of course Locke is aware that desires, even if not themselves operations of the understanding, nonetheless presuppose them. I cannot want an ice cream cone unless I know what ice cream cones are, think of them as good, and believe that one is available to me, or at least logically possible for me to attain. But Locke's point is that such cognitive factors, though necessary for desires to occur, do not by themselves suffice to produce them. Our experience is full of examples of *akrasia* - cases in which an agent knows full well what it would be best for him to do, and yet, lacking the desire to do it, does something else that he does want to do, or wants to do more. The existence of such cases, indeed, is one of the things that led Locke to abandon his original view of motivation. He cites, on the one hand, the indolent pauper, whose will, 'as long as he is content with [his situation] and finds no uneasiness in it, ... is never determined to any action that shall bring him out of it'; and, on the other, the drunkard who acknowledges the disadvantages of his condition, 'yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups, ... drives him to the tavern'. And he quotes the famous words of Ovid's *Medea*: 'I see the better way and approve it, but I follow the worse' (2-5 II.xxi.35: 253-54).

6. Locke did not, in his second version of Chapter xxi, make changes in the view of freedom he put forward in the first, at least not explicitly. He continued to affirm that human beings have freedom of action and lack freedom of volition; and his conception of a free action, as one that is not only voluntary and avoidable but also determined by antecedent causes, was left to stand. Certain features of his new account of motivation, however,

appear to have implications for these doctrines, even if Locke himself failed to see them. Some critics have charged that the new account conflicts with determinism, and that by accepting it Locke turns himself into a libertarian with respect to free action. Others claim that it undermines his denial that volitions are free. And still others maintain that even if the new picture of motivation is not incompatible with anything in Locke's original view of freedom, it substantially expands it by articulating a new conception of freedom and adopting it, not instead of but in addition to, the old one.

7. Adding weight to these critical claims are two facts. The first is that Locke himself eventually came to believe that his 'second thoughts' on motivation required him to grant that in some cases volitions are capable of being free actions. He added a note conceding this point to the *Essay*'s fifth edition. The other is that even in the second edition Locke makes a number of remarks about freedom in the course of laying out his revised view of motivation. These remarks are usually asides; and both their own import and their connection to the main topic are often not clear. But their very presence shows that Locke himself took his claims about motivation to have some relevance to questions about freedom.

8. In the rest of this paper I propose to explore the implications of Locke's second thoughts on motivation for his views about freedom - his compatibilism, the avoidability requirement for free action, and especially his denial that volitions can ever be free.

9. First I need to spell out the new account of motivation more fully. Locke contends that what prompts an agent to will, and specifies what it is that he wills, is always some uneasiness he is feeling at the time of his willing. But he notes that people often experience several different uneasinesses at once, each competing with the others, so to speak, to determine the will. Which of these is it, Locke asks, that wins the competition? Ordinarily, he answers, it is the strongest or 'most pressing' one of them. But then he adds that this is not always so. For we often have the 'power', he says, 'to *suspend* the execution and satisfaction of [our] desires' and so to keep the will from being determined by any them. The point of such suspension is to enable us 'to consider the objects' of the various desires, to 'examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others' - in short, to deliberate - and then to make a judgment 'of what we are going to do' (2-5 II.xxi.47: 263).

10. This doctrine of suspension, as I shall call it - the doctrine that we have the ability to suspend our desires so as to make room for deliberation - is not a consequence of Locke's central claim that only uneasiness immediately determines the will. It is rather an adjunct to it which he embraces on empirical grounds: it is a plain fact of experience that we have this ability. Nor is Locke the first philosopher to have observed this fact. Not only medieval thinkers such as Aquinas but more recent thinkers such as Cudworth had taken note of it. But the doctrine of suspension plays an especially important part in Locke's thinking, and it is this, more than anything else in his new view of motivation, that bears on his conception of freedom. Even during his initial statement of it, in Section 47 of Chapter xxi, he remarks that 'the liberty Man has' lies in the power of suspension, that this power is indeed 'the source of all liberty', and that in it 'consists that which is call'd [albeit 'improperly', he says] Free will'. And these are only the first of many comments throughout the rest of the chapter in which the power of suspension is linked to liberty.

11. It is important to appreciate the role the understanding plays when an agent suspends his desires. His purpose in doing so, Locke holds, is to allow him to deliberate about the various actions that are open to him (or that he takes to be open): to 'consider', 'examine', 'weigh', and 'contemplate' them, and then to make a judgment as to which of them is best to do. But the action he judges to be best is not performed until he wills to perform it; and he does not will to perform it until he feels a desire for the object of it - until, that is, the lack of that object causes an uneasiness in him. And yet Locke maintains that people often do perform the actions they judge to be best after deliberation, actions different from those they otherwise would have performed. He must be supposing, therefore, that deliberation is somehow effective in bringing such actions about. He must be assuming that the intellectual activities which occur in deliberation are able to cause the desires that immediately produce the volitions that in turn give rise to the actions in question.

12. And indeed Locke makes several remarks that indicate he does make this assumption. He is cautious at first, saying only that 'due and repeated contemplation' of some absent good is able to bring it 'nearer to our mind, [give] some relish to it, and [raise] in us some desire' for it; and more generally that 'by a due consideration and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby ... it may come to work upon the will and be pursued' (2-5 II.xxi.45: 262). But later in the chapter he is more explicit. 'Tis a mistake', he says, 'to think that men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in their actions into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most'. He cites bread and tobacco as examples of things that 'may be neglected, [even] where they are shown to be useful to health [sic], because of an indifferency or

disrelish to them'. But then, he continues, 'reason and consideration [may] at first recommend..., and begin... their trial; and use find... or custom make... them pleasant'. And 'that this is so in virtue too', he concludes, 'is very certain' (2-5 II.xxi.69: 280). Locke thinks this point has been neglected by other thinkers, so much so 'that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox if it be said that men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves'. And yet he claims that 'everyone's experience shows him [that] he can do' this (ibid).

13. Locke is not contending, in these passages, that a man can always raise (or suppress) a desire for something merely by thinking about it. But he is maintaining that he can do this in some cases, and that even when 'use' and 'custom' are required as well, 'reason and consideration' play a causal role. And there is something paradoxical even in this limited claim, especially in view of Locke's own position regarding the inefficacy of the understanding in determining the will. For as we have seen, the central tenet of his new account of motivation is that no judgment of the understanding is by itself capable of moving the will. It is only by desire, an operation of our affective faculty, that volitions are produced. So if the understanding lacks the power to make the will operate, how is it able to raise a desire? The empirical evidence, despite Locke's allegations to the contrary, seems as unfavorable to our having this power as it does - by Locke's own insistence - to our having the other. So it is a problem for Locke that his position seems to require that reason be able not only to overcome passion but actually to create or originate it.

14. Before trying to resolve this problem, however, I want to raise another question about the doctrine of suspension. The question is, by what means or in what way does suspension occur; how does an act of suspension come about? One possibility is that the suspension of desire is something that merely occurs in our lives on occasion, or is imposed upon us by causes outside ourselves. Locke never specifically rejects this alternative; but it is unlikely that he would have accepted it, for he regularly speaks of suspension not as something that happens to us but as something we do, an action we perform. Is then suspending desire an action we perform voluntarily? If it is, then it must be produced by a volition, and this in turn requires a preceding uneasiness, a desire to suspend our other desires, or a desire for the state that we think will result from this action. But then what is the source of this further desire? What accounts for the fact that it arises just when it does, just when our other desires are pushing us to do something less rational or less beneficial than it would be best for us to do? We could of course claim that the desire arises in response to a judgment about our current predicament, but then what accounts for this judgment? Is it too an action we perform voluntarily, in response to another antecedent uneasiness? If we answer yes we threaten ourselves with an infinite regress; but if not, we seem to be left with a mystery.

15. Locke, however, has a different response to these questions, one that enables him to avoid the difficulties that I have just been describing. His response is, in effect, that each of us is always uneasy in just the way that is required for us to suspend our desires before acting. For in addition to all the particular uneasinesses that dominate our lives - those caused by the 'ordinary necessities' of living and by the pressures of fashion and social convention - each of us has a constant and abiding concern for true happiness. That we have this concern, indeed, is a 'necessity of our nature', a feature of our God-given human endowment. To be sure, Locke holds that every pleasure makes us happy in some measure: it constitutes part of our happiness, and if it did not and if we did not perceive it to do so, we would not desire it. (That is why the drunkard does not pursue the pleasure of health: he does not perceive it to be a component of his happiness when it comes time to go to the tavern.) But true happiness is composed of pleasures that are weighty, intense, and long-lasting. And to achieve these it is often necessary for us to set aside particular desires for particular objects and act instead on our general desire for true happiness. It is just this that the power of suspension enables us to do.

16. Locke does not think, of course, that suspending our desires is all that is needed to achieve true happiness. We must actually engage in the deliberation that the state of suspension makes possible, actually carry out the examination of alternatives and make a judgment in favor of one of them, to raise the desire which will cause us to will and perform the action required to lead us to our goal. Indeed he says that 'the inclination and tendency of [our] nature to happiness [sc. in general] is an obligation and motive to [us] to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so necessarily puts [us] upon caution, deliberation, and wariness in the direction of [our] particular actions, which are the means to obtain it'. And again, even more explicitly, 'whatever necessity determines [us] to the pursuit of real bliss, the same necessity, with the same force, establishes suspence, deliberation, and scrutiny of each successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness and mislead us from it. This', he concludes, 'is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings' such as ourselves (2-5 II.xxi.52: 267).

17. So Locke's position here is that human beings are naturally provided with a constant and 'unalterable' desire for real happiness, and that this desire constitutes a constant and unalterable spur to the will, a source of motivation over and above that which is made up of the sundry particular uneasinesses that fill our daily lives. This desire leads agents to suspend their particular uneasinesses and to think about what they are going to do - that

is, it determines their will to do so, and it is the ensuing volition that actually produces suspension and deliberation. No doubt this desire is often weak, too weak to be effective in determining the will. But sometimes it must be strong enough to overcome the particular uneasinesses contending to 'set the will on work', since suspension does occur. Locke does not, unfortunately, give any account of the factors or circumstances which might serve to strengthen or weaken this source of motivation on particular occasions.

18. This, then, is the answer to the second question I raised about Locke's view above. It turns out that the same answer, or at least one closely related to it, will take care of the first question as well. The second question was: How does a voluntary action of suspension come about, on Locke's theory, in an agent who is about to perform an (external or overt) action? The answer, as we have just seen, is that it is a fact of our nature that we often have the necessary means of doing this, that the means are present and available to us, and that they actually operate on certain occasions. The first question was: How does a judgment of the understanding as to what is best to do produce a desire to do it, that is, an affective state inclining us to do it? And the answer to this is again that it is a fact of our nature that our desires - our passions and affections - are responsive to rational considerations - our thoughts and judgments; that is, that the former can be shaped and influenced and even created by the latter. Thus in one passage Locke states that 'it is a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination', which result is always a judgment of the understanding (2-5 II.xxi.47: 264). And again, in an even more explicit statement added in the fifth edition, he says that 'every man is put under a necessity by his constitution as an intelligent being to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do' (5 II.xxi.48: 264). It must be remembered that the relation of judgment to willing is not direct for Locke, but is mediated by desire: a judgment produces a volition by producing a desire, and it is the desire that operates immediately upon the will. But the connection between judgment and volition is nonetheless causal, and it is one that is established in us by nature.

19. We are now in position to consider the implications of Locke's doctrine of suspension for his view of freedom in the *Essay's* second edition. There are three of these to consider. The first is (A) that the doctrine of suspension entails at least the possibility of free volitions. It may or may not entail their actual existence; that is a further question that has to be examined. Second, (B) the doctrine of suspension in no way conflicts with Locke's determinism. Hence the fact that he affirms it provides no grounds for holding that he has abandoned either determinism or compatibilism, and thus joined the ranks of the libertarians. And third, (C) the doctrine of suspension does not include a new conception of freedom, or a new sense of the word 'free', either one that replaces the sense or concept Locke used in the first edition, or one that merely supplements it. I shall expand on each of these three implications in turn.

20. First, (A) that the doctrine of suspension entails at least the possibility of free volitions. Locke's claim, in the first edition, that volitions are never free was founded on the assumption that, to be free, a volition would have to satisfy the same two conditions that he had set for free actions generally: it would have to be voluntary and it would have to be avoidable. He then produced two arguments: (1) an argument designed to show that, at least in normal circumstances, volitions are unavoidable - that is, that in normal circumstances an agent has no choice but to perform one; and (2) an argument to the conclusion that volitions cannot be voluntary. The former argument, in the form of a constructive dilemma, appears in Section 23 of Chapter xxi. The latter, which is a *reductio ad absurdum* via an infinite regress, is given in Section 25. I have argued elsewhere that neither of these arguments succeeds: the dilemma argument is unsound, and the regress argument requires both a premise that Locke cannot accept and a premise that his adversaries cannot accept.<sup>4</sup> But that aside, the question now before us concerns the impact on these arguments of the doctrine of suspension. For if they are undercut by it, then Locke's reasons for denying free volitions are destroyed, and at least the possibility that some acts of willing are free is open.

21. Both of these arguments indeed are undercut by the doctrine of suspension. (1) The dilemma argument requires the premise that, in normal circumstances - that is, in cases in which a prospective action has been 'proposed to an agent, as something to be done' (is on his current agenda, so to speak) - in order for the action in question not to be done, the agent must will that it not be done. This premise is false in any case; but the point here is that it is straightforwardly incompatible with the doctrine of suspension. For according to this doctrine, an agent can block the performance of an impending action - see to it that it is not done - merely by suspending the desire that would otherwise determine his will to perform it. He does not, in other words, have to will that the action not be done in order for it not to be done. So, with his essential premise gone, Locke cannot reach the conclusion that, even in normal circumstances, certain volitions are unavoidable. Indeed, the doctrine of suspension maintains that, at least in most cases, such volitions are avoidable.

22. (2) The conclusion of the regress argument is that volitions cannot be free because they cannot be voluntary. This argument requires the premise that free or voluntary actions or volitions can only be produced by

volitions that are themselves free or voluntary. Locke had already explicitly declared against this premise in the first edition of the *Essay* (at 1 II.xxi.33: 256n-58n); the same declaration is repeated in the later editions (at 2-5 II.xxi.50: 266); and there is nothing in the doctrine of suspension that should or even might lead him to retract this declaration. So again, the doctrine of suspension leaves open the possibility of free volitions - although in this case, that possibility was already open according to Locke's declaration, if not according to the regress argument.

23. But now the further question arises: Does the doctrine of suspension *entail* that free volitions actually exist? There are two cases to consider: (a) that of an agent's volition to suspend his desires, and (b) that of his volition, after a period of suspension and deliberation, to proceed with some action. There is surely no reason to think that the volition in case (a) must be free. As for case (b), whether that volition is free or not depends on whether it is voluntary (there being no doubt that the agent is capable of not performing it - if only by suspending all his desires again). It could not be voluntary if that requires that it be produced directly by another volition: that would violate Locke's principle that only desires or uneasinesses move the will directly. But suppose, as is altogether plausible, that an agent, having suspended his desires on a particular occasion, and having deliberated and judged that such and such is the best thing to do, then wills to lift the suspension, so to speak, in order that the corresponding desire be raised and left to do its work of determining the will. Suppose, that is, that he wills to do this, as opposed to just allowing it to happen, as presumably it would do, nature having been left to take its course. Would not this volition to lift the suspension, so that the volition to perform the action judged best might be produced, suffice to render the latter voluntary? The first volition here would not be a volition simply to perform the second; it would rather be a volition to do that (namely, lift the suspension) which is the necessary means to the occurrence of the second volition, or to perform the second volition by performing the first. But that might be enough for the second volition to qualify as voluntary.

24. Whether it is enough or not is a question that, as Locke would say, I leave to be considered. But it might be thought that this question is rendered moot by Locke's admission, in the fifth edition of the *Essay*, that 'yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing', the case namely in which he 'suspend[s] the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed till he has examined whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or no' (5 II.xxi.56: 270). But the question is not what Locke thought about the conclusion here, but what the logical relation is between it and the doctrine of suspension. And this question is not mooted by Locke's admission.

25. Second, (B) that the doctrine of suspension provides no basis for the claim that Locke becomes a libertarian in the second edition of the *Essay*. To think otherwise one would have to suppose that either an action performed after a suspension of desire, or the volition to perform it, or the volition to suspend - one or all of these - takes place without being caused to do so, or at least without being fully caused. But, as I hope my account of it has shown, the doctrine of suspension provides no ground at all for any of these suppositions: if anything it supports their contraries. And yet some commentators have made this claim, the claim that Locke, by acknowledging the power of suspension, makes himself a libertarian. One such commentator is Peter Schouls in his book *Reasoned Freedom*.<sup>5</sup> Schouls first claims that freedom - and by freedom he means libertarian freedom - 'is possible only if action on all initially experienced desires - i.e., on all natural desires - is suspended' (p. 144); and then goes on to argue that for Locke, 'the complex act that includes suspension of natural desires, examination of these desires and their potential consequences, contemplation of true good, judgment of the suspended desires in terms of the good contemplated, and submission to the outcome of that judgment ... [is not] to be explained through the kind of uneasiness that would make these acts [of suspension, examination, etc.] manifestations of the mechanism of nature' (p. 145). In my view, Locke's text provides no basis whatsoever for Schouls's position, but I shall not undertake to justify this view in the present paper.

26. And finally, (C) that the doctrine of suspension brings with it no new concept or sense of freedom. I've already shown, I think, that the compatibilist, two-condition sense or conception of Locke's first edition is not replaced in the second edition by an incompatibilist, libertarian one. It should also be clear that the newly-allowed for free volitions, if there are any, are free in the same old sense as well. But what are we to make of Locke's remarks, quoted earlier, that the power of suspension is 'the source of all liberty', and that free will (although improperly so-called) 'consists' in this power? These might well be taken to suggest the view, common among Arminians and Jesuits in Locke's time, that an action or volition is free if and only if it is voluntary and the volition which produces it is likewise free. But if these remarks suggest this view, they certainly do not entail it; and there is otherwise no evidence that Locke even dreamed of endorsing it. Indeed his sarcastic reference to just such a view (at II.xxi.22: 244-45) leaves no doubt of his hostility towards it.

27. What then is the import of these remarks, and of the many others that succeed them in the sections after Section 47 in the *Essay*? A proper answer to this question would require a detailed examination of each of them in

turn, and I have not room for that in this paper. So let me just say, summarily and dogmatically, what I think Locke's position is. Freedom, I think Locke thinks, is a power granted us by God for a certain purpose, namely, that we might achieve rationality and thence moral rectitude in our actions. There are other things that we can do with this power - sin, for example - but its proper goal is rational action. (He sometimes comes close actually to saying this: 'the very end of our freedom', he declares in one passage, is that 'we be determined in willing by [our] own thought and judgment what is best for us to do' - he means 'thought and judgment after due examination' (5 II.xxi.48: 264).) But we can only use our freedom for this proper purpose if we rise above the sundry uneasinesses of everyday life, and this we do by exercising our power to suspend them. So it is in this sense that the power of suspension is the 'source', not of our *liberty* but of the *proper use* of it; or that, as Locke later puts it, it is the 'hinge' upon which turns, not again our liberty itself but the right use of it (2-5 II.xxi. 52: 266). Locke then is speaking carelessly when he says that the power of suspension is the source of all *liberty* and that free will *consists* therein.

28. There is, to be sure, a venerable conception of freedom according to which being free is identified with being rational: this is the conception we find, for example, in Spinoza. And there is no doubt that rationality is a virtue for Locke: it is perhaps the chief virtue he thinks we ought to strive for in this life, and a 'perfection of our nature' that we are able sometimes to achieve rationality in our action.<sup>6</sup> Still, it is one thing to make freedom lead to rationality, or to make rationality presuppose freedom, both of which I think Locke does, and quite another to identify the two, which I think he does not do. (Here again I differ from Schouls, who claims that an action is not free for Locke unless it is rational - as well as being unaffected by the 'mechanism of nature'. Would Schouls say then that sins are not free actions for Locke?)

29. There is much more to be said, obviously, about the relation between freedom and rationality, in Locke and in general. I hope to say some of it in a future paper devoted specifically to this topic.<sup>7</sup>

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1. For Locke's position, see *Essay* II.xxi.10-12: 238-40. For Descartes's position, see Letter to [Mesland] 2 February 1644 (AT IV: 116; CSM III: 234): '... I call free in the general sense whatever is voluntary'; cf. *Principles* I 37 (AT VIIIa: 18; CSM I: 204) and *Replies* III (AT VII: 191; CSM II: 134). For Hobbes's position, see *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* XXVIII (EW V: 365): 'I do indeed take all voluntary acts to be free, and all free acts to be voluntary'.
2. Locke states this position explicitly at *Essay* IV.x.3 and 4: 620: '... bare nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles'; and '... what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too.'
3. See *Essay* I II.xxi.29: 248n.: '... the Will, or Preference, is determined by something without it self'. It is true that this statement occurs only in the first edition, and does not appear in the later ones. But there is no reason to think that Locke repudiates the position it expresses in these later editions. Indeed, he continues to ask in them, as he did in the first edition, 'what is it determines the will?': see **2-5** II.xxi.29: 249.
4. 'Locke on the Freedom of the Will', in *Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context*, ed. G.A.J. Rogers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 101-21.
5. Peter A. Schouls, *Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and the Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
6. This is the 'second perfection' that Gideon Yaffe discusses in his contribution to the Symposium for which this paper was originally written, although my way of characterizing this perfection is different from his. Yaffe also discusses this matter, along with many other aspects of Locke's theory of action, in his book, *Liberty Worth the Name*, forthcoming from \*\*\*\*\* University Press.
7. This is a revised version of a paper published in the *Locke Newsletter* 29 (1998), which in turn was based on my contribution to a Symposium on 'Locke on Free Will' presented at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in March 1998. I owe thanks to my fellow-symposiasts, Tito Magri and Gideon Yaffe, not only for their helpful comments on my paper but for the light cast by their own papers on this subject.

## NOTES