Sophie Horowitz
UMass Amherst
Department of Philosophy
E325 South College, 150 Hicks Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9269
email: shorowitz at umass.edu
Here is my CV.
I'm an Associate Professor of Philosophy at UMass Amherst. I work on epistemology. More specifically, I am interested in higher-order evidence, permissivism, and accuracy. I am also interested in ethics and practical rationality.
Before coming to UMass, I taught for two years at Rice University. Before that, I was a graduate student at MIT. My dissertation focused on the relationship between epistemic rationality and truth. And before that, I went to Swarthmore College and studied philosophy and studio art.
Publications/Forthcoming
Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom. (with Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield.) Forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. [PhilPapers] [abstract]
Higher-Order Evidence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/higher-order-evidence/.
Shrinking Three Arguments for Conditionalization. [2021] Philosophical Perspectives 35(1): 303-319. [PhilPapers] [abstract]
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily. [2022] (with David Builes and Miriam Schoenfield.) Noûs 56(1): 3-20. [penultimate] [abstract]
The Truth Problem for Permissivism. [2019] The Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262. [penultimate] [abstract]
Predictably Misleading Evidence. [2019] In Matthias Skipper Rasmussen and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, OUP. [penultimate] [abstract]
Accuracy and Educated Guesses. [2019] In Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. [penultimate] [abstract] *Winner of the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology.
Epistemic Utility and the "Jamesian Goals". [2017] In Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, OUP. [draft] [abstract]
Uniqueness: A New Argument [2016] (with Sinan Dogramaci). Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. 130-147. [pdf] [abstract]
Respecting All the Evidence [2015] (with Paulina Sliwa). Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. [pdf] [abstract]
Expecting the Unexpected [2015] (with Tom Dougherty and Paulina Sliwa), Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321, special issue on transformative experience. [pdf] [abstract]
Epistemic Akrasia [2014]. Noûs 48 (4):718-744. [pdf] [abstract]
Immoderately Rational [2013]. Philosophical Studies 167(1):1-16. [pdf] [abstract]
Book Reviews and Symposia
Symposium piece on Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme. [draft]
Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality & Reflection. Mind 125 (498): 565-569. [pdf]
In Progress
Learning to Guess Right [abstract]
Dumb and Dumber [abstract]
Teaching Stuff
Here are some example papers I created, along with a scavenger hunt. I also had the students grade these using my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these. Comments welcome.
[good paper]
[bad paper]
[scavenger hunt]
[another "good" paper, annotated]
Here is a recent version of my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these too. [rubrics]
Courses
Phil 164: Medical Ethics. I teach this all the time. [recent syllabus]
Phil 700: Proseminar in Philosophy (cotaught). F16, F19, F20.
Phil 542: Higher Order Evidence. S18. [syllabus]
Phil 542: Epistemology: Who Cares? S17. [syllabus]
Phil 342: Introduction to Epistemology. S17, S20. [syllabus]
Phil 742: Testimony, Authority, and Well-Being. S18. [syllabus]
Phil 303: Theory of Knowledge. (Rice University.) F15, S15. [syllabus]
Phil 503: Seminar on Epistemic Value and Normativity. (Rice University.) S15. [syllabus]
Phil 304: Metaphysics. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]
Phil 100: Problems of Philosophy. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]
Before coming to UMass, I taught for two years at Rice University. Before that, I was a graduate student at MIT. My dissertation focused on the relationship between epistemic rationality and truth. And before that, I went to Swarthmore College and studied philosophy and studio art.
Publications/Forthcoming
Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom. (with Sinan Dogramaci and Miriam Schoenfield.) Forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. [PhilPapers] [abstract]
Higher-Order Evidence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/higher-order-evidence/.
Shrinking Three Arguments for Conditionalization. [2021] Philosophical Perspectives 35(1): 303-319. [PhilPapers] [abstract]
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily. [2022] (with David Builes and Miriam Schoenfield.) Noûs 56(1): 3-20. [penultimate] [abstract]
The Truth Problem for Permissivism. [2019] The Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262. [penultimate] [abstract]
Predictably Misleading Evidence. [2019] In Matthias Skipper Rasmussen and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, OUP. [penultimate] [abstract]
Accuracy and Educated Guesses. [2019] In Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. [penultimate] [abstract] *Winner of the 2015 Marc Sanders Prize in Epistemology.
Epistemic Utility and the "Jamesian Goals". [2017] In Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, OUP. [draft] [abstract]
Uniqueness: A New Argument [2016] (with Sinan Dogramaci). Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. 130-147. [pdf] [abstract]
Respecting All the Evidence [2015] (with Paulina Sliwa). Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. [pdf] [abstract]
Expecting the Unexpected [2015] (with Tom Dougherty and Paulina Sliwa), Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321, special issue on transformative experience. [pdf] [abstract]
Epistemic Akrasia [2014]. Noûs 48 (4):718-744. [pdf] [abstract]
Immoderately Rational [2013]. Philosophical Studies 167(1):1-16. [pdf] [abstract]
Book Reviews and Symposia
Symposium piece on Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Episteme. [draft]
Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, Rationality & Reflection. Mind 125 (498): 565-569. [pdf]
In Progress
Learning to Guess Right [abstract]
Dumb and Dumber [abstract]
Teaching Stuff
Here are some example papers I created, along with a scavenger hunt. I also had the students grade these using my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these. Comments welcome.
[good paper]
[bad paper]
[scavenger hunt]
[another "good" paper, annotated]
Here is a recent version of my rubrics. Please feel free to borrow these too. [rubrics]
Courses
Phil 164: Medical Ethics. I teach this all the time. [recent syllabus]
Phil 700: Proseminar in Philosophy (cotaught). F16, F19, F20.
Phil 542: Higher Order Evidence. S18. [syllabus]
Phil 542: Epistemology: Who Cares? S17. [syllabus]
Phil 342: Introduction to Epistemology. S17, S20. [syllabus]
Phil 742: Testimony, Authority, and Well-Being. S18. [syllabus]
Phil 303: Theory of Knowledge. (Rice University.) F15, S15. [syllabus]
Phil 503: Seminar on Epistemic Value and Normativity. (Rice University.) S15. [syllabus]
Phil 304: Metaphysics. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]
Phil 100: Problems of Philosophy. (Rice University.) S16. [syllabus]