The political geography of campaign advertising in U.S. House elections

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Abstract

The extent to which elections are useful instruments of accountability is closely related to the ability of citizens to acquire and utilize information about candidates running in those contests. In this paper, I examine the visibility of campaigns for the United States House of Representatives by analyzing how candidates, political parties and interest groups strategically allocate campaign advertising in media markets and congressional districts across the United States. I show that this allocation is based not only on the competitiveness of the campaign, but also according to the cost and reach of the media markets that dominate congressional districts. Overall, the findings indicate the importance of political geographic considerations for understanding the substantial variation in advertising aired both across and within congressional districts during House campaigns.

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Introduction

Campaigns and elections provide citizens with a mechanism to hold their elected officials accountable by disseminating information about the incumbent’s record and the qualifications of candidates competing for office. Citizens acquire knowledge about candidates during the...
campaign from news coverage, campaign advertisements, and discussions with friends and family, and they tend to make reasonable choices based on that information (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991). However, the extent to which elections are useful instruments of accountability is closely related to the ability of citizens to acquire and utilize information about candidates and elected officials running in those contests. If citizens are not presented with a sufficient amount of information about competing candidates, then they may be less able to evaluate these candidates and to make reasonable choices between them. In other words, elections are only as useful as their campaigns are visible.

In this paper, I examine the visibility of campaigns for the United States House of Representatives by considering the extent to which campaign advertising varies both across and within congressional districts and media markets. Particularly, I analyze how candidates, political parties and interest groups strategically allocate campaign advertising in media markets and congressional districts across the United States. I show that this allocation is based not only on the competitiveness of the campaign, but also according to the cost and reach of the media markets that dominate congressional districts. Because campaign advertisements are targeted in such a strategic way, many citizens never see a campaign advertisement for their House campaign while other citizens may see hours of commercials.

In the following section, I examine the role of local campaigns in House elections. I then suggest ways in which candidates, political parties, and interest groups strategically allocate campaign advertisements. This discussion culminates in a set of hypotheses that I test with the 2000 Wisconsin Advertising Project’s dataset on campaign advertisements. I conclude the paper by suggesting the implications of these findings for understanding geographic variations in the presence of congressional advertising both across and within congressional districts and media markets.

Local campaigns and television advertising

Though national factors have traditionally played a role in campaigns for the United States House of Representatives, House elections have become increasingly centered around local campaigns (Herrera & Yawn, 1999). While party identification is still a major factor in House elections, voters also appear to be increasingly influenced by the local nature of campaigns rather than national factors (Erikson & Wright, 2001; Jacobson, 1990). Since citizens base their congressional votes on local campaigns, it is important to understand how they come across information about the candidates running in their district, particularly given the increasingly candidate-centered nature of congressional campaigns (Herrnson, 2000).

Citizens are often indicted for their lack of knowledge about politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The information deficit is particularly notable when it comes to House campaigns where only a small minority of the electorate can recall the names of the two major party candidates (Herrnson, 2000). Incumbent success rates are extremely high in House elections largely because citizens tend to know little about challengers in these contests. Yet, citizens may learn about House candidates through campaign communications. In particular, voters may gain knowledge about House candidates from local television news or newspapers covering the election (Clarke & Evans, 1983). But, the local media tend to devote far less attention to House races than they do to campaigns for the Senate or other statewide offices (Goldenberg & Traugott, 1984). If the media devote less coverage to House campaigns, then
citizens may rely more heavily on campaign advertising for information about competing candidates.

Regardless of whether media coverage of a House campaign is sparse, citizens in that district are likely to obtain information from campaign advertisements in addition to the information they receive from coverage of the campaign. For instance, news coverage of presidential campaigns tends to be overwhelming; yet, citizens who see campaign advertisements in presidential elections can recall more information about the candidates than those who were not exposed (Just, Crigler, & Wallach, 1990; Patterson & McClure, 1976; West, 2001). Campaign advertising also has a sizeable impact on voter information in Senate contests. Citizens exposed to advertising in Senate contests are more likely to recall the names and issue positions of the candidates, even when controlling for news coverage of the campaign (Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; West, 1994). Potentially, campaign advertisements may be more important for voters in House elections where press coverage is less prevalent and citizens know less about the candidates before the campaign begins.

While citizens may gather knowledge about candidates when that information is presented to them through campaign advertisements, the extent to which citizens are exposed to these advertisements varies drastically both across and within the 435 congressional districts and 210 media markets in the United States. In the following section, I discuss how candidates, political parties, and interest groups strategically allocate campaign advertisements in different media markets and congressional districts across the United States.

Advertising strategy in House campaigns

In their efforts to influence the course of congressional campaigns, candidates, parties, and interest groups are conscious to make the most efficient use of a limited resource—money. Campaign advertisements are expensive to produce and place on the air. In fact, more than one-third of the average House campaign’s budget is spent on campaign advertising (Herrnson, 2000; West, 2001). Accordingly, candidates and organizations operate very strategically when buying time for their commercials and advertising strategies may vary drastically depending on both the political context and geographic nature of the congressional district. In this section, I begin by describing how advertising strategies may be affected by the overlap of congressional districts and media markets. I then discuss how these strategies may vary depending on the political context of the district.

District—market geography

The geographic nature of congressional districts is particularly important in House campaigns due to the widely varying relationships between media market and congressional district boundaries. Specifically, the boundaries of 435 congressional districts often overlap incongruently with the 210 media markets in the United States.¹ The manner in which district and market boundaries overlap can have a tremendous impact on local congressional coverage (Schaffner & Sellers, 2003; Vinson, 2002). In addition, this overlap may affect how candidates, parties and interest groups allocate their campaign advertising in congressional

¹ Media market boundaries are defined by the Nielsen Corporation and can be located in the 2000 Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook (Vol. 1).
elections. In fact, citizens living in areas where congressional district and media market boundaries overlap more closely are likely to recall more information about the House candidates and the campaigns are more likely to be competitive (Campbell, Alford, & Henry, 1984; Levy & Squire, 2000). This suggests that campaigns, and particularly campaign advertising, may be more visible in markets that reach a larger share of citizens in a congressional district.

Three geographic considerations may be particularly important for candidates and organizations considering their advertising strategies in House elections—the cost, reach, and partisanship of a media market. First, cost is a concern because candidates and organizations want to reach the largest number of citizens while expending the least amount of money possible. The cost of airing an advertisement tends to depend on the size of the media market as television stations can charge more for advertisements that reach a larger population. When advertising time becomes more expensive, candidates, parties, and interest groups become less willing or able to purchase that time and more likely to expend their resources elsewhere (Goldenberg & Traugott, 1984; Herrnson, 2000).

A second consideration that is balanced with cost is reach; that is, what share of a district’s voters will have an opportunity to see an advertisement. The key concept in determining reach is market dominance—the percentage of a district that a media market dominates (Schaffner & Sellers, 2003). As this percentage increases, candidates and organizations will find advertising in that market increasingly valuable for reaching potential voters. Market dominance is an important consideration due to variations in how districts overlap with media markets. For example, 212 districts are completely dominated by a single market. In this case, candidates and organizations have a simple decision—purchase time in that market if it is affordable to do so since the market reaches all of the citizens in the district. In other cases, multiple markets dominate different parts of the congressional district. When candidates and organizations are faced with choosing among multiple markets, they may be more likely to buy time in markets that dominate a larger share of the congressional district, allowing them to send their messages to more potential voters in that district.

Finally, candidates and political organizations may also consider the partisan balance of a market when deciding whether to purchase advertising time in that market. If two markets dominate equal shares of a House member’s district, candidates may choose to advertise more heavily in the market that has more partisan balance. If a market is overwhelmingly Republican or Democratic, then candidates, parties and organizations may see that area as already decided for or against their cause. As a result, they may be less likely to spend money on advertisements in that market. A similar dynamic is evident in presidential elections as candidates, parties and interest groups tend to focus more resources in states that are “in play” while devoting fewer resources to other regions (Althaus, Nardulli, & Shaw, 2002; Brams & Davis, 1974).

Thus, I expect candidates, parties, and interest groups to consider the cost of advertising in a particular market, the size of the potential electorate they can reach by running ads in that market, and the extent to which those citizens might be influenced by the advertisements. However, this strategic behavior is also likely to be mediated by the expected competitiveness of an election. I discuss this possibility below.

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2 Market population correlates with the average cost of an advertisement at .98.
Political context

For this paper, the political context of a congressional district refers to the perceived competitiveness of the House campaign in the district. Very few House elections are competitive in any given election cycle and uncompetitive campaigns tend to draw candidates who lack the resources to mount a serious challenge (and campaigns with candidates who lack resources tend to be uncompetitive). In fact, 23 House campaigns in 2000 did not even include a challenger and 354 of the remaining 412 elections were won with more than 55% of the vote. Because of the enormous cost of airing campaign advertisements in most markets, uncompetitive campaigns may see very few, if any, advertisements. Political parties and interest groups tend to focus their advertising on House campaigns that are expected to be competitive (Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). Furthermore, challengers in uncompetitive House campaigns have a difficult time raising money from individuals, interest groups, and political parties (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981). As a result, even candidates may run fewer advertisements in House elections that are not competitive. Therefore, I expect that citizens are far more likely to see campaign advertisements if they live in a House district that is expected to be competitive.

In addition to simply increasing the amount of advertising in a campaign, the competitiveness of a race may also affect the influence of factors such as cost, reach and market partisanship on the decisions made by candidates and political organizations. In uncompetitive campaigns, the allocation of resources may be less consequential as the outcome is unlikely to be affected by such decisions. However, in competitive contests, these factors are critical as political actors attempt to maximize their resources. For example, cost may be a far more important consideration affecting the allocation of advertising spending in a competitive House campaign as candidates, parties and interest groups attempt to allocate their resources as efficiently as possible. Political strategists are also likely to be far more conscious of the reach of different markets in a congressional district in a competitive campaign since contacting the most potential voters will be essential to achieving victory.

In sum, I expect that political context and district—market geography will impact how advertising is allocated in congressional campaigns. Furthermore, the impact of district—market geography will be contingent on whether a campaign is competitive, with those factors playing a more important role in competitive versus uncompetitive campaigns. These general expectations are summarized in a series of more specific hypotheses listed below.

1) Campaign advertising is more likely to be allocated to more competitive races.
2) Campaign advertising is more likely to be allocated to less expensive markets, particularly when the campaign is more competitive.
3) Campaign advertising is more likely to be allocated to markets that reach a larger share of the district, particularly when the campaign is more competitive.
4) Campaign advertising is more likely to be allocated to markets where partisanship is more evenly divided, particularly when the campaign is more competitive.

In the following section, I describe the data I use to test these hypotheses. I then present the results from my analysis and conclude the paper by discussing the implications of the findings.

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3 A number of factors may contribute to making a particular House election more or less competitive (incumbency, quality of challenger, scandals, etc.).
Data and methodology

To investigate variations in House campaign advertisements, I use the Wisconsin Advertising Project data (Goldstein, Franz, & Ridout, 2002). These data include information about every advertisement aired on network or cable television in the top 70 media markets during the 2000 campaign. A list of these markets is presented in Appendix 1. For the purpose of this paper, I use only a subset of the dataset—the 240,490 ads aired by candidates, political parties, and party affiliated interest groups during general election campaigns for the U.S. House. The dataset indicates the market in which each advertisement appeared and the state and district of the House campaign that they were intended to influence. In addition, the data also indicate whether the advertisement was sponsored by the Democratic or Republican candidate, the DNC or RNC, or by a Democratic or Republican affiliated interest group.

The unit of analysis is a district—market dyad—a pairing of a media market and congressional district (Schaffner & Sellers, 2003). A single market may be in more than one dyad, since that market may geographically cover parts of multiple congressional districts. Similarly, a single district may be in more than one dyad, since that district may geographically cover parts of several markets. This analysis includes 526 of the 923 district—market dyads in the United States—the remaining dyads fell outside of the top 70 markets included in the advertising dataset. The use of dyads is particularly functional for this examination because it allows me to account for variations in the district—market geography variables across and within districts.

The dependent variable in this analysis is the seconds of campaign advertisements run by candidates, parties and interest groups in each dyad. Of the 526 dyads in this analysis, roughly two-thirds (361) witnessed no House campaign advertisements during the 2000 campaign. On the other hand, 337,950 s of commercials ran in the Lexington market targeting the Kentucky 6th District election, one of the most competitive in the nation in 2000. These statistics appear to indicate that candidates, parties and interest groups carefully target their advertising, choosing to air no commercials in many districts and markets while saturating the airwaves in other areas.

I employ four independent variables and three interaction terms to understand how candidates and organizations target their advertisements. The first set of variables capture the factors dealing with district—market geography. The variable for cost is the average price of a second of advertising in each market during the 2000 campaign. The average cost of advertising in the 70 markets was $34.83 per second, but cost varied widely from $6.72 per second in Mobile to $98.27 in New York. The variable for reach is the percentage of the congressional district dominated by the media market in that dyad. The average reach in a dyad was 61% and 203

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4 More information about the WiscAds dataset is available online at [http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising](http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising).

5 In an analysis not presented here, I examined the strategies of each group separately and found no significant differences in the allocation of campaign advertisements across groups.

6 This measure of length was almost perfectly correlated with the total number of ads run by each group (.99), but length provides more information since advertisements in the dataset ranged in length from 10 to 60 s. Using the number rather than length of advertisements did not change the results.

7 Of course, the cost of an advertisement depends on the time slot purchased as well as whether the purchase was from a network or a cable station. I simply take the average figure from each market.

8 To create these measures, I used Congressional Districts in the 1990s. This publication lists for each congressional district the percentage of that district that overlaps with local media markets. These figures capture how much each market geographically covers the district.
districts in this analysis were completely dominated by a single market. Finally, market partisanship is coded as the absolute difference between the percentage of the vote won by Al Gore and George Bush in each market. This value increased as one party’s presidential candidate did increasingly better than his opponent in that market. Therefore, a smaller value indicates a more politically balanced market and as the value increases, I expect fewer advertisements in that market.

Candidates and organizations should be more willing and more able to run advertisements when the campaign is more competitive. Thus, I use a dummy variable that categorizes the competitiveness of each campaign according to the Cook Political Report. The dummy variable codes 46 seats as competitive because the Cook Political Report classified these campaigns as “leaning” toward one of the parties or “toss up” seats that both parties had roughly equal chances of capturing. A zero on this variable includes races that were not likely to change hands after the 2000 elections. I expect campaign advertising to focus heavily on the “toss up” and “leaning” seats rather than the less competitive contests that comprise the baseline category. In addition, I include interaction variables between the competitiveness dummy variable and each of the district—market geography variables mentioned above. These variables will capture whether cost, reach and market partisanship are more important factors driving advertising strategies in competitive versus uncompetitive campaigns.

Results

Table 1 presents the OLS coefficients from the model of advertising allocation strategies for House elections. The results in this table indicate the importance of political context and district—market geography in determining the placement of campaign advertisements. In fact, the adjusted $R^2$-square value of .67 indicates that this model explains two-thirds of the variance in the allocation of campaign advertisements. I discuss the effects of each of the independent variables below.

The coefficients for competitiveness, cost, and reach are all significant in the model, as are the interaction terms between competitiveness and the measures for cost and reach. The two variables lacking statistical significance are those dealing with the partisanship of the market. Thus, when controlling for the cost and reach of a market, the partisanship of the market does not play a significant role in determining advertising allocation. It is not entirely surprising to find that cost and reach are more important in the allocation of advertisements. Since candidates, parties and interest groups have limited resources, their primary consideration will be reaching the most voters with the least amount of money. This may be especially true for House

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9 Using alternative classifications of competitiveness did not change the substantive findings in any way.
10 I also tested a dummy variable indicating whether an incumbent was running in the House election. However, the presence of an incumbent is closely related to the competitiveness of a House campaign so the coefficient for that variable was not strong.
11 The Wisconsin Advertising Project data encompass only the 70 largest markets in the United States. Accordingly, I tested my models with the Heckman selection model to account for the bias toward large markets. The findings from the Heckman model were nearly identical to those presented in Table 1. I also used robust standard errors to control for clustering around both media markets and congressional districts, but those corrections did not change the significance levels presented in Table 1.
elections since few citizens have enough information to hold strong opinions about either candidate before the campaign.\textsuperscript{12}

To better understand the interactive effects of the cost and reach variables with regard to competitiveness, I examine the predicted effects of these variables in Figs. 1 and 2. These figures indicate the effects of cost and reach for both competitive and uncompetitive campaigns by examining the amount of advertising the model predicts across the middle 50% of values for both variables. First, it is important to note that more advertising was allocated to competitive campaigns than uncompetitive campaigns in both figures. This pattern confirms the conventional wisdom that candidates and organizations target a handful of winnable House seats while essentially ignoring most other campaigns (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981). As a result, citizens are far more likely to encounter campaign advertisements when their congressional contest is more competitive.

Fig. 1 illustrates the dramatic interactive effects for the percentage of the district that a market reached. When a market dominated 25% of an uncompetitive congressional district, a predicted 759.15 s of advertising was allocated to that market. When the reach of the market increased to 100%, the allocation of advertising only increased to 6231.04 s. On the other hand, the effect was far more pronounced in competitive congressional districts. In these campaigns, moving from 25% reach (28,144.07 s) to 100% reach (120,772.70 s) resulted in over 90,000 s of additional advertising. Thus, campaigns appear to be more drawn to advertising in markets that allow them to reach a greater share of citizens in the district and they are particularly sensitive to this consideration in competitive congressional campaigns.

In addition to reach, candidates, parties and interest groups also appear to pay a great deal of attention to the cost of advertising in a particular market. Fig. 2 presents the comparison of advertisements aired in competitive and uncompetitive campaigns depending on

\textsuperscript{12} The null finding for this variable may also be due to the imprecise nature of its measurement. The measure is constructed using the presidential vote in the entire market rather than the presidential vote in the portion of the market that dominates the congressional district. Furthermore, the measure of presidential vote indicates the distribution of Democratic and Republican voters, but gives little indication of how many citizens in that market may be undecided or persuadable. Unfortunately, this was the best measure available for this analysis.
the cost of a second of advertising in the market. In uncompetitive races, campaigns aired 5165.84 s of advertising when the cost averaged $15 per second. When the cost of advertising increased to $50 per second, the amount of advertising allocated to that market declined to just 2046.38 s. The difference was much larger for competitive races. In competitive campaigns, 103,667.80 s of advertising was allocated to markets costing just $15 per second while 49,885.35 s were allocated in markets costing $50 per second. Thus, candidates, parties and interest groups are conscious of the costs of advertising in markets and choose less expensive markets for their advertisements when possible. This effect is particularly pronounced for competitive races, where the allocation of resources

Fig. 1. Predicted effects of market reach on advertising in competitive and uncompetitive campaigns. Based on the model presented in Table 1.

Fig. 2. Predicted effects of cost on advertising in competitive and uncompetitive campaigns. Based on the model presented in Table 1.
becomes much more critical to the success of a campaign. As a result, citizens living in expensive markets are substantially less likely to see campaign advertisements than those in more affordable markets.

The findings in this analysis indicate that candidates, parties and interest groups allocate campaign advertisements very strategically in House campaigns. In particular, these actors take into account the competitiveness of the campaign, the cost of advertising in a market, and the percentage of the district that they can reach with advertisements in that market. That the level of campaign advertising varies across congressional districts is hardly surprising given that so many House elections lack any noticeable campaign. Yet, this analysis suggests that campaign advertising can also vary a great deal within a congressional district.

Kentucky’s 4th Congressional District provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. Fig. 3 shows the 4th District and the four media markets that divide it. The Charleston-Huntington (WV) and Cincinnati (OH) markets dominate larger percentages of the district than the Louisville and Lexington markets (33% and 34% compared to 20% and 13%, respectively). Accordingly, candidates, parties and interest groups ran a large number of advertisements in the Charleston-Huntington and Cincinnati markets while running no commercials in the Louisville and Lexington markets. In addition, cost also played a factor in the allocation of advertisements in this district. More than twice as many advertisements aired in Charleston-Huntington compared with the Cincinnati market, most likely because advertising time was more than twice as affordable in the former compared to the latter.

Considerations of cost and reach appeared to weigh heavily on advertising strategies in the 4th Congressional District. And this district was not particularly competitive in 2000, so the allocation of resources was not as strategic as it would have been in a competitive contest. This example not only illustrates how district—market geography can influence strategic behavior, but it also suggests the consequences of these dynamics. In fact, the amount of information to which voters were exposed varied a great deal within the 4th District.

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Fig. 3. Kentucky’s 4th Congressional District and overlapping media markets.
Citizens in the 4th District who lived in areas dominated by the Louisville or Lexington markets would not have seen any campaign advertisements for the House campaign. On the other hand, citizens in the Cincinnati and Charleston-Huntington markets would potentially be exposed to a large number of campaign advertisements, with those in the latter market having access to the most commercials. If campaign advertisements are effective in informing citizens about the candidates, then voters may have had different amounts of information about the House campaign depending on where they lived in the 4th District.

**Conclusion**

The findings in this paper demonstrate the strategic allocation of campaign advertisements in U.S. House elections. Candidates, parties, and interest groups buy advertising time for competitive House campaigns and allocate those advertisements in markets that are less expensive but cover larger shares of the targeted districts. In essence, these elite actors follow a very simple strategy— influence the largest number of voters in competitive districts with the least amount of money possible. But what are the consequences of these strategic decisions?

Elections provide one of the primary mechanisms through which citizens exert control over their elected officials. However, elections are only useful to the extent that the campaigns associated with them provide citizens with information about the behavior of incumbents in office or the qualifications of candidates wishing to become the next Representative for that district. Otherwise, citizens cast uninformed votes, or may not vote at all. The findings in this paper suggest that some citizens will be exposed to a great deal of campaign advertising for their House campaigns while others will see no commercials at all. Accordingly, some citizens will have more information about the candidates competing in their congressional district than others. Political scholars have traditionally demonstrated that information inequalities are biased against citizens from lower social classes (Converse, 1964; Downs, 1957). My findings indicate that there may also be a geographic bias with regard to political information as citizens living in some districts and markets will find it more difficult to acquire information about House candidates than those in other areas. This, no doubt, also means that the ability of citizens to make a reasoned choice between House candidates may differ both across and within congressional districts and media markets.

Candidates use campaigns to provide citizens with information about themselves and their opponents, but my findings indicate that campaign advertising is strategically allocated in a way that concentrates advertisements in some areas while ignoring others. When citizens live in areas that candidates ignore, they are likely to learn less about the candidates during the campaign. These voters may cope with this disadvantage by relying more heavily on information shortcuts such as party affiliation or name recognition and incumbency (Popkin, 1991). On the other hand, citizens with less information about the candidates may choose to abstain from voting in that contest. Yet, these alternatives seem to deprive citizens of their political influence. Indeed, we often assume that citizens have more power in our political system when they are better informed about candidates and elected officials. My findings seem to suggest that one’s relative political power in House elections is at least partially a function of the congressional district and media market in which they live. In sum, campaigns can inform and empower citizens, but only where those campaigns are visible.
Appendix 1. Media markets included in analysis

Albany-Schenectady-Troy
Albuquerque
Atlanta
Austi
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Charleston-Huntington
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus
Dallas-Fort Worth
Denver
Des Moines
Detroit
Flint-Saginaw-Bay City
Fresno-Visalia
Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo-Battle Creek
Green Bay-Appleton
Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville
Hartford-New Haven
Houston
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Lexington
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Mobile-Pensacola
Nashville
New Orleans
New York
Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourne
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Portland-Poland Springs
Providence-New Bedford
Appendix 1 (continued)

Raleigh-Durham
Richmond
Roanoke-Lynchburg
Sacramento-Stockton
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
Seattle-Tacoma
Spokane
St. Louis
Tampa-St. Petersburg
Toledo
Tulsa
Washington, DC
West Palm Beach-Fort Pierce-Vero Beach
Wichita-Hutchinson
Wilkes-Barre-Scranton

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