

Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality

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Abstract: The standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis's can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.

I. Introduction

There are several options available when a philosophical account appears susceptible to counterexamples. One option is to reject the account. Another option is to bite the bullet, and grant that the account yields counterintuitive results. A third option is to argue that any apparent counterintuitive consequences are merely apparent; understood appropriately, the alleged "counterexamples" are not counterexamples at all.

The third option can be pursued in various ways. One move is to restrict the scope of the account in order to exclude counterintuitive cases. Another move is to claim that there are several different concepts in play, and the account in question successfully tracks one of these concepts. Finally, one may argue that our intuitions about alleged counterexamples are inconsistent or untrustworthy, and therefore should not carry any weight.

Each of these moves has been deployed in defense of Lewis's (1983*b*) account of intrinsicality. I will argue that, in this context, none of these moves are legitimate. While I focus on Lewis's original proposal, my criticisms apply *mutatis mutandis* to any account that is not sensitive to fine-grained or hyperintensional distinctions among properties.¹ Only a hyperintensional framework has the structure required for an adequate account of intrinsicality.

¹ This includes the accounts proposed by Langton and Lewis (1998), Vallyntyne (1997), and Weatherston (2001), as well as other accounts that depart from the Lewisian counterpart theoretic framework. See also footnotes (5) and (31).

II. Intrinsicity

So as not to prejudge the issue, let's begin with an intuitive gloss on intrinsicity: an intrinsic property is one an object has in virtue of itself alone.² It is this intuitive notion that we want to capture.

The notion of intrinsicity is interesting in its own right. But it is also needed in many other areas of philosophy. We invoke the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in distinguishing intrinsic from instrumental value; characterizing internalism and externalism about mental content, epistemic justification, meaning, motivational reasons, etc.; distinguishing real change from "Cambridge" change; characterizing the relationship between mental properties and physical ones; individuating acts and events; and so on.³ Some philosophers have expressed misgivings about the notion of intrinsicity and have argued that we ought to give up on the concept altogether.⁴ But given the central role this distinction plays in a great number of philosophical debates, such a sweeping judgment seems imprudent.

III. The Duplication Account

In what follows, I'll be working within the standard Lewisian framework. I assume there is a privileged set of perfectly natural properties that carve nature at the joints, I assume that we can quantify over possibilia, and I assume that possible individuals are world-bound.⁵

² Dunn: "[A]n *intrinsic* property of an object is a property that the object has by virtue of itself, depending on no other thing." (1990, 178) Francescotti: "An intrinsic property is a property that is *internal* in the sense that whether an object has it depends entirely upon what the object is like *in itself*." (1999, 590) Humberstone: "[T]he idea of an intrinsic property is the idea of a property a thing has in and of itself." (1996, 229) Lewis: "A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else is... The intrinsic properties of something may depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else." ([1983a] 1999, 111) Vallentyne: "Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing's having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time) and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like." (1997, 209) Weatherston: "It is a platitude that a property *F* is intrinsic *iff* whether an object is *F* does not depend on the way the rest of the world is." (2001, 369) Yablo: "You know what an intrinsic property is: it's a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself." (1999, 479)

³ For more on the uses of intrinsicity, see Francescotti (1999), Humberstone (1996), Lewis (1983b), Sider (1996), Vallentyne (1997), *inter alia*.

⁴ See Dennett (1988, 67), for example.

⁵ Each of these assumptions may be dropped without affecting the central claims of this paper. All that is required is a notion of duplication. While assuming the Lewisian counterpart-theoretic framework serves to streamline the discussion, the same points may be made even if we accept transworld identity (see footnote (31)).

According to Lewis's (1983*b*) account of intrinsicity, a property *P* is *intrinsic iff* for any two possible duplicates, either both have *P* or both lack it. Lewis then analyzes duplication in terms of natural properties: two objects are *duplicates iff* they share all their perfectly natural properties, and their parts can be put into correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have the same perfectly natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations (see Lewis 1983*b* and 1986*a*, 61). Let us call this account of intrinsicity *The Duplication Account*.

IV. Two Worries

Two standard worries arise with respect to the Duplication Account.⁶

The first concerns identity properties.⁷ An identity property is the property of being a particular individual. *Being David Lewis* is an identity property, as are the properties *being me* and *being you*.⁸ There are two kinds of identity properties. One kind corresponds to the singleton set of a world-bound individual; the other kind corresponds to the set containing a world-bound individual *p* and all of *p*'s counterparts.⁹ Both cause trouble for the Duplication Account. For simplicity, I will focus on the former.¹⁰ Consider the identity property *being me*. Intuitively, *being me* is intrinsic; whether or not I instantiate it has nothing to do with what other things there are or how they are. Likewise,

⁶ A worry specific to the Langton and Lewis (1998) account of intrinsicity, which has to do with the way their account treats certain sorts of disjunctive properties, has generated a flurry of discussion in the literature. Since the focus of this paper is the Duplication Account, which is immune from this worry, I will not address it. I direct those interested to some of the relevant literature: Hawthorne (2001), Langton and Lewis (2001), Lewis (2001), Marshall and Parsons (2001), Sider (2001), Weatherson (2001), Witmer *et al.* (2005).

⁷ The term comes from Sider (1996).

⁸ Identity properties are a species of haecceitistic properties, but not all haecceitistic properties are identity properties. For example, *being five feet from Abraham Lincoln* is a haecceitistic property, but it is not an identity property. *Being Abraham Lincoln* is both a haecceitistic property and an identity property.

⁹ If, following Lewis (1986*a*), we take the counterpart relation to be context sensitive, then there will be a number of different identity properties associated with every possible individual.

¹⁰ The second kind of identity properties raises similar problems for the Duplication Account. Suppose, for example, that under some intuitive counterpart relation, anything born to counterparts of my parents around the time that I was actually born is a counterpart of me. Then, I may have a counterpart that is quite different from me: this counterpart might be handicapped, or might differ in gender, or might grow up to be a famous football player. Since it is a counterpart of me, it instantiates the identity property *being me* (using the "counterpart" notion of an identity property). But it will have duplicates – a famous football player created in a vat, say – that are not my counterparts, and so do not instantiate *being me*. Therefore, the Duplication Account will classify *being me* as extrinsic.

being David Lewis seems intrinsic, and so does *being you*. But since identity properties divide duplicates, the Duplication Account classifies them as extrinsic. That seems mistaken.^{11,12} (I am not yet claiming that it *is* mistaken, just that it seems that way.)

The second worry concerns necessary properties. Necessary properties are properties shared by all possible individuals; *a fortiori* they are shared by all duplicates. According to the Duplication Account, all necessary properties are intrinsic. Again, that seems mistaken. Suppose, for example, that for every possible amount of mass, there is some possible object that instantiates that amount of mass. There is no upper bound on mass, so every possible individual instantiates the property *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass*.¹³ Intuitively, this property is extrinsic, but not according to the Duplication Account.¹⁴

¹¹ Francescotti (1999) takes this sort of “implausible result” to show that no account of intrinsicity in terms of duplication can succeed (Francescotti 1999, 593). I agree, but there is more to say. The reason no such account can succeed is because no such account can discriminate between hyperintensional properties. But it is not duplication *per se* that is the source of the problem, since any account that cannot recognize hyperintensional distinctions is subject to the same counterexamples.

¹² Yablo (1999) is more cautious. He argues that, given certain other metaphysical commitments, one may want to allow for some identity properties to turn out extrinsic. But he writes: “I didn’t say that *all* identity properties – all properties of the form *being x* – had to be extrinsic. Such a claim would not be plausible, and it has rarely been defended in philosophy.” The trouble with the Duplication Account, he says, is that it does not allow for *any* intrinsic identity properties: “A theory of intrinsicness should not predict right out of the starting gate that there is no such thing as intrinsic identity.” (1999, 487)

¹³ *Being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass* is, in the words of Marshall and Parsons (2001), “a silly property that only a metaphysician would ever think of.” But, as Marshall and Parsons say, “if the aim of the game was to deal only with non-silly properties,” then the task of providing an account of intrinsicity would be long ago completed. (2001, 349) An adequate account of intrinsicity must apply to the silly properties as well as the non-silly ones.

¹⁴ See also Francescotti (1999) and Yablo (1999). Yablo puts the objection this way: “The problem is that (absolutely) essential extrinsic properties, despite making clear intuitive sense, are threatening to come out impossible” on the Duplication Account. (1999, 486) Francescotti notes that not all intrinsic properties are essential and not all essential properties are intrinsic, but the Duplication Account (as well as other accounts of intrinsicity, including Vallentyne (1997) and Langton and Lewis (1998)) cannot distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic essential properties. To those who insist that all essential properties are intuitively intrinsic because they do not “depend” on anything for their instantiation, and *a fortiori* they do not depend on anything extrinsic, Francescotti replies: “When it comes to essential relations to distinct individuals, rather than saying there is no dependence on what the rest of the world is like because there is no room for variation, it seems more accurate to say that because there is no room for variation, there is a dependence on what the rest of the world is like, and a dependence of the strongest possible sort – i.e. a necessary dependence.” (Francescotti 1999, 597) Another way to put the point: just as there may be intrinsic and extrinsic qualitative properties, quantitative properties, contingent properties,

These worries have a common source: our intuitions about intrinsicity are fine-grained, but the Duplication Account is not. Consider two different ways of thinking about properties. A rough way to individuate properties is *intensionally* – by their possible instances. On an intensional conception of properties, properties that are cointensive – have the same instances across possible worlds – are identical. A more fine-grained way to individuate properties is *hyperintensionally*. On a hyperintensional conception, cointensive properties may be distinct.

The worries above arise because cointensive properties may intuitively diverge with respect to their intrinsicity. But on the Duplication Account, cointensive properties cannot diverge in this way. Here's why. The Duplication Account says that a property is intrinsic when it doesn't divide duplicates. A set of duplicates is a set of possible individuals. So if two properties correspond to the same set of possible individuals, then they are alike with respect to whether they divide duplicates. Thus, for the Duplication Account, cointensive properties are alike with respect to their intrinsicity. So even if one is open to the possibility of distinct cointensive properties (as Lewis is¹⁵), the Duplication Account cannot capture differences in intrinsicity between them.

How might one defend the Duplication Account from these worries? Each of the three moves discussed in the Introduction has been offered on behalf of the Duplication Account. In what follows, I examine each response in turn, and argue that none succeeds.

V. The Qualitative Response

Call the first response to these worries the “Qualitative Response.” According to the Qualitative Response, Lewis's account applies only to qualitative properties. The properties put forth as counterexamples are non-qualitative, and so fall outside the scope of Lewis's analysis. It is no surprise that, when misapplied, his account delivers counterintuitive results. But counterexamples that arise from misapplications do not count against correct applications.

Let's begin with the worry involving identity properties. In “Defining ‘Intrinsic’,” Langton and Lewis appeal to the Qualitative Response in defending their account against counterexamples involving identity properties (as well as other haecceitistic properties):

haecceitistic properties, and so on, there may be intrinsic and extrinsic essential or necessary properties. *Prima facie*, an account that conflates this distinction is not an adequate account.

¹⁵ See Lewis (1986a, 56).

A first qualification is that the proposed definition, and likewise all that follows, is to be understood as restricted to pure, or qualitative, properties – as opposed to impure, or haecceitistic, properties... Our proposal is offered as a way of distinguishing amongst the pure, or qualitative properties, those which are intrinsic, and those which are extrinsic. Impure properties are set aside as falling outside the scope of the present discussion. (Langton and Lewis [1998] 1999, 335)

The same response can be made in defending the Duplication Account: since identity properties like *being me* are impure, or non-qualitative, they fall outside the scope of Lewis’s analysis. Therefore, the response goes, identity properties are not counterexamples to the Duplication Account.

One worry with this response is that it seems somewhat arbitrary. Our only motivation for restricting the account to qualitative properties seems to be the desire to avoid counterexamples. Consider an analogy. Jaegwon Kim (1982) proposed an account of intrinsicity according to which a property *P* is intrinsic *iff* a lonely object – an object that is the only inhabitant of a world – may have *P*. Lewis (1983a) objects that Kim’s account incorrectly classifies the extrinsic property *being lonely* as intrinsic, and concludes that Kim’s account is untenable. Now suppose a defender of Kim’s account responds thus: the account is not intended to apply to “lonely” properties, or properties an object has if and only if it is unaccompanied. Since “lonely” properties fall outside the scope of Kim’s account, they cannot be raised as counterexamples. The trouble is that this response seems unmotivated: the only reason to exclude lonely properties is that the success of Kim’s account requires it.

A deeper worry with the Qualitative Response is the difficulty of spelling out the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties. The standard strategy is to characterize the qualitative properties as those that globally supervene on the perfectly natural properties and relations.¹⁶ (The difference between strong and weak global supervenience won’t matter for our purposes.¹⁷) But if this is how we define “qualitative,” the Qualitative Response does not work.

We can spell this out in two different ways, depending on whether we allow for duplicate worlds. (Lewis himself remained neutral on whether there are duplicate worlds (Lewis 1986a, 87).) Let’s first assume that there are no duplicate

¹⁶ See, for example, Bricker (2007, fn. 24), Langton and Lewis ([1998] 1999, 131), Lewis (1986a, 62-63), McDaniel (2007, 250), and Teller ([1985] 1999, 18).

¹⁷ A *strongly globally supervenes* on B *iff* for any worlds w_1 and w_2 , every B-preserving isomorphism between w_1 and w_2 is an A-preserving isomorphism. A *weakly globally supervenes* on B *iff* for any worlds w_1 and w_2 , if there is a B-preserving isomorphism between w_1 and w_2 , then there is an A-preserving isomorphism. See Sider (1999).

worlds. Let's also assume, as we ordinarily think, that our world is a non-symmetrical world.¹⁸ If no distinct worlds are duplicates, then no distinct worlds are alike with respect to their perfectly natural properties and relations. It follows that my identity property, *being me*, supervenes on the perfectly natural: any world with the same distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations as the actual world has the same distribution of the property *being me* (since the only world with the same distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations as the actual world is the actual world). Since *being me* supervenes on the perfectly natural, it is qualitative; since it is qualitative, it falls within the scope of the Duplication Account, which counterintuitively classifies it as extrinsic. But the Qualitative Response was supposed to safeguard the Duplication Account from these kinds of counterexamples by saying that identity properties are non-qualitative, and thus are not classified by the Duplication Account.

Next, assume that there are duplicate worlds. Suppose that the actual world has exactly one duplicate, w_1 , and that my duplicate at w_1 instantiates *being me₁*. *Being me* and *being me₁* seem intrinsic, and so does the disjunction of the two. But *being me or being me₁* supervenes on the perfectly natural: any two worlds with the same distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations will have the same distribution of the property *being me or being me₁*. Since *being me or being me₁* supervenes on the perfectly natural, it is qualitative; since it is qualitative, it falls within the scope of the Duplication Account, which counterintuitively classifies it as extrinsic. Again, the Qualitative Response was supposed to safeguard the Duplication Account from these kinds of counterexamples by saying that identity properties (and disjunctions thereof) are non-qualitative, and thus are not classified by the Duplication Account.¹⁹ In sum, we cannot take the qualitative properties to be those that supervene on the perfectly natural ones if we want the Qualitative Response to address the worries that face the Duplication Account.

¹⁸ A non-symmetrical world is a world where the only one-one function that maps the domain of the world to itself in a way that preserves the perfectly natural properties and relations is the identity map.

¹⁹ Are there any identity properties that do not globally supervene on the perfectly natural, and so are non-qualitative on this characterization? If we understand "qualitative" in terms of strong global supervenience, then yes. The identity properties of objects at symmetrical worlds – worlds where there are multiple one-one mappings from the domain of the world onto itself that preserve the perfectly natural properties and relations – will not strongly globally supervene on the perfectly natural. But the identity properties of objects that are not located at symmetrical worlds will still strongly globally supervene on the perfectly natural properties, and so are still qualitative.

So how should we distinguish the qualitative from the non-qualitative? The intuitive distinction is clear enough: properties such as *having a beard* are qualitative, properties such as *being David Lewis* are non-qualitative. Perhaps we could simply posit the distinction as primitive. But if we do this, the Qualitative Response loses its appeal. If one must posit a primitive distinction in order to get Lewis's account to apply to the right properties, one might as well take the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction as primitive, and be done with it.²⁰

Moreover, this version of the Qualitative Response seems to require a conception of properties that allows for cointensive properties to be distinct. Assume, for simplicity, that there are no duplicate worlds. Consider the property *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*, and let's suppose this property is cointensive with *being me*. The former property is intuitively extrinsic, the latter is intuitively intrinsic. But on the Duplication Account, both are extrinsic. The Qualitative Response attempts to avoid this counterintuitive result by restricting the Duplication Account to qualitative properties like *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*. But this restriction is intelligible only if one believes that cointensive properties – such as *being me* and *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* – may be distinct. Yet this concession begins to undermine the appeal of the Duplication Account. Once one is willing to grant that properties are individuated hyperintensionally, why would one desire an account of intrinsicality that cannot recognize hyperintensional distinctions?

Finally, let's consider the worry involving necessary properties. Suppose we characterize qualitative properties as those that globally supervene on the perfectly natural. All necessary properties supervene on the perfectly natural properties, so all necessary properties are qualitative. Consider the necessary property *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass*. Since this property is qualitative, it falls within the scope of the Duplication Account, which counterintuitively classifies it as intrinsic. So, given this characterization of qualitative properties, the Qualitative Response does not succeed in blocking these kinds of counterexamples to the Duplication Account.

²⁰ One might argue that if there are independent reasons to posit a primitive distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties, then it's no cost to use this distinction in analyzing intrinsicality. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this dialectical move.) Indeed, I think there *are* independent reasons to posit such a distinction. But this line of response is ineffective as a defense of the Duplication Account. For one thing, the Duplication Account does not yield the correct results even when restricted to qualitative properties (as I go on to argue). And even if it did, it would not be an account of intrinsicality – it would only be an account of intrinsicality *for qualitative properties*.

And, as before, even if we instead adopt a primitive distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties that aligns with an intuitive classification, the Qualitative Response fails as a defense of the Duplication Account. Some necessary properties – such as *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass* – are intuitively qualitative, and so they still fall within the scope of the Duplication Account. So no matter how we get the distinction between the qualitative and non-qualitative properties, the Qualitative Response is not a plausible defense of the Duplication Account.²¹

VI. The Many Notions Response

Like the Qualitative Response, the Many Notions Response restricts the scope of the analysis. But it does so in a different way. Advocates of this response claim that there are multiple notions of intrinsicity, all of which are interesting and important, and Lewis's account successfully tracks one of these notions.

Let's use Sider's (1996) version of the Many Notions Response as an example.²² Sider claims that we have two notions of intrinsicity: *qualitative*

²¹ One might try to analyze *qualitative* in the following way: a property *P* is qualitative iff specifying *P* need not refer to any specific individual, time, or place (see Francescotti 1999, 592). Whatever one thinks of this analysis, it won't help the Duplication Account: properties such as *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass* are still qualitative. Thus they fall within the scope of the Duplication Account, which counterintuitively classifies them as intrinsic.

²² The idea that there are multiple notions of intrinsicity has been endorsed by several philosophers, although generally not in defense of the Duplication Account. Consider, for instance, the proposals of Vallentyne (1997) and Humberstone (1996). Vallentyne distinguishes between a *broad sense* and a *narrow sense* of intrinsicity. According to Vallentyne, a property is intrinsic in the broad sense iff "having it is appropriately independent of the existence of other objects"; and it is intrinsic in the narrow sense iff "it is intrinsic in the broad sense and is a *qualitative property*." (1997, 215) (To his credit, Vallentyne notes that he has no account of the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties to offer.)

Humberstone (1996) considers three ways to construe the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction; after dismissing the first way, he argues that the second and third construals each correspond to some intuitive notion of intrinsicity. One of these is the "pure qualitative" sense of intrinsicity (which, Humberstone claims, is captured by the Duplication Account) while the other is the "interior" conception. Humberstone writes: "The purely qualitative properties of an object are all to be numbered amongst its interior properties, along with some others, such as... being identical with a particular object." (1996, 241) So it seems that Humberstone's "interior" properties are the same as those that Vallentyne calls "intrinsic in the narrow sense"; and Humberstone's "pure qualitative" properties are the same as those that Vallentyne calls "intrinsic in the broad sense."

These proposals are implausible for much the same reason that Sider's version of the Many Notions Response is implausible. The basic idea is this: there is no reason to think that either Vallentyne's notion of "intrinsicity in the narrow sense" or Humberstone's "pure qualitative" sense of intrinsicity corresponds to *any* notion of intrinsicity. As their descriptions attest, these notions merely pick out a proper subset of the set of intrinsic properties: an "intrinsic qualitative property" is simply an intrinsic property that is also qualitative. (Likewise, there may

intrinsicity and *non-qualitative intrinsicity*. A qualitative intrinsic property is one that an object has wholly in virtue of the *way* it is, while a non-qualitative intrinsic property is one that an object has wholly in virtue of *what* it is.²³ How is this distinction supposed to overcome the worry involving identity properties? Consider the property corresponding to my singleton set: *being me*. According to our non-qualitative notion of intrinsicity, says Sider, *being me* is intrinsic; whereas according to our qualitative notion of intrinsicity, *being me* is extrinsic. So, says Sider, when we assess the intrinsicity of a given property, our judgments shift depending on the notion of intrinsic we employ. And since Lewis's account is intended as an account of qualitative intrinsicity, the fact that identity properties seem intrinsic according to our non-qualitative notion of intrinsicity does not tell against the analysis.

It cannot always be legitimate to appeal to the Many Notions Response, however. If it were, even an implausible account of intrinsicity could deflect counterexamples by claiming there are different notions in play. Again, consider Kim's (1982) proposal. Kim's account (a property *P* is intrinsic *iff* a lonely object may have *P*) had the counterintuitive result that *being lonely* is intrinsic. But if the Many Notions Response were always legitimate, then a defender of the account could respond thus: we have two notions of intrinsicity, *lonely intrinsicity* and *non-lonely intrinsicity*, and Kim's account is only intended to capture *lonely intrinsicity*. According to our notion of lonely intrinsicity, *being lonely* is intrinsic, since it is a property an object may have when unaccompanied by any other contingent things; so the property *being lonely* is not a counterexample to the analysis.

It should not be this easy to defend an account against counterexamples. Sider acknowledges that there must be constraints on when the Many Notions Response is legitimate. According to Sider, it is legitimate to invoke the Many Notions Response in defense of an account of intrinsicity only when the account in question provides a characterization that "(i) does the work we require of it, and (ii) fits the intuitive gloss we use to pick out intrinsicity in the first place." (Sider 1996, 5)

be intrinsic *essential* properties, or intrinsic *quantitative* properties, or what have you, and there is no reason to think that each of these categories corresponds to a different notion of intrinsicity.) It is the "broad" or "interior" sense of intrinsicity that captures the notion we are after. (Vallentyne attempts to give an account of the broad sense of intrinsicity, but his account runs into troubles as described by Francescotti (1999, 596).)

²³ Sider (1996, 4). Clearly, Sider has in mind the intuitive qualitative/non-qualitative distinction, not the distinction characterized in terms of global supervenience on perfectly natural properties and relations.

Does the Duplication Account do the work we require? Although it has counterintuitive results, it's plausible that the account can play a useful philosophical role in many contexts. But the same can be said of Kim's account.²⁴ Does the Duplication Account fit the intuitive gloss we use to pick out intrinsicity? Again, although it has counterintuitive results, it's plausible that the account captures our intuitive judgments in many cases. But here, too, the same can be said of Kim's account.²⁵

So even with Sider's two constraints, the Many Notions Response makes it too easy for an account to evade counterexamples. If the Many Notions Response is to be a legitimate defense of the Duplication Account, its advocates need to offer substantive reasons for thinking both (1) that we have qualitative and non-qualitative notions of intrinsicity, and (2) that the qualitative notion corresponds to the Duplication Account.

Advocates of the Many Notions Response haven't provided such reasons. Moreover, it's unclear that they could. First, there don't seem to be any substantive reasons to think that there are multiple notions of intrinsicity. Second, the Duplication Account doesn't seem to capture any intuitive notion of intrinsicity – and in particular, it doesn't seem to capture a qualitative notion of intrinsicity.

Let's consider these in reverse order, and begin with the question of whether the Duplication Account captures a qualitative notion of intrinsicity. Suppose advocates of the Many Notions Response could make a case that there are qualitative and non-qualitative notions of intrinsicity. Recall that Sider claims that the Duplication Account captures our qualitative notion of intrinsicity, where a qualitative intrinsic property is one an object has in virtue of the way it is alone and a qualitative extrinsic property is one an object has at least partly in virtue of the way other things are. Now consider the property *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass*. An object instantiates this property at least partly in virtue of the way other things are (there are possible

²⁴ And even if the Duplication Account is not able to do the work we require, there is an easy solution, says Sider. We can “simply introduce a disjunctive notion – a property is intrinsic in the broader sense *iff* it is intrinsic as defined by [the Duplication Account] or it is an identity property” and use this disjunctive notion whenever the Duplication Account isn't quite adequate (Sider 1996, 6). Obviously, this move is available to a defender of Kim's account, too.

²⁵ Sider says that the Duplication Account satisfies criterion (ii) because “the intuitive glosses of ‘intrinsic’ are capable of qualitative and non-qualitative interpretation;” since the Duplication Account captures the qualitative interpretation, it fits an intuitive gloss on intrinsicity. (Sider 1996, 6) A defender of Kim's account can make a parallel move. He may say that our intuitive glosses of intrinsic are capable of lonely and non-lonely interpretation; since Kim's account tracks our lonely notion of intrinsicity, his account fits an intuitive gloss on intrinsicity.

objects that are more massive than it); so, *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass* should be qualitative extrinsic. But the Duplication Account classifies this property as intrinsic. So, even if one could make a plausible case for there being qualitative and non-qualitative notions of intrinsicity in the manner that Sider suggests, the Duplication Account does not track the qualitative notion of intrinsicity.

In fact, there are reasons to think that the Duplication Account does not track any uniform notion of intrinsicity, qualitative or otherwise. Consider the identity property *being me*, which the Duplication Account classifies as extrinsic. If the Duplication Account captures an intuitive notion of intrinsicity, then there must be some intuitive sense in which *being me* is extrinsic.

Is there any intuitive sense of intrinsicity according to which *being me* is extrinsic? Recall our intuitive gloss on intrinsicity: an intrinsic property is one an object has purely in virtue of itself alone. Given this, it seems that *being me* is clearly intrinsic. Indeed, once we notice this, it's natural to wonder how we could have thought otherwise. Perhaps this happens when we forget that our informal notion of a property is quite separate from the formal apparatus of possible worlds. When one is familiar with the device of identifying properties with sets of possibilities, and realizes that *being me* is cointensive with a purely descriptive property like *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*, then it is easy to slip into thinking that *being me* is intuitively extrinsic. But once we step back from this metaphysically loaded picture, the belief is hard to maintain. Intuitively, *being me* is intrinsic: it's a property I have purely in virtue of myself alone, and not in virtue of anything else.

Now, there are things one can say to push our intuitions on these matters one way or another. The important point is that any defense of the Duplication Account that hinges on the claim that there is an intuitive sense in which identity properties like *being me* are extrinsic, or necessary properties like *being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass* are intrinsic, is on shaky ground. And this defense is particularly dubious in light of the fact that the ways in which its advocates informally introduce the notions of intrinsicity, qualitative intrinsicity, and so on, do not support these results.

Next, let's turn to the question of whether there are substantive reasons to support the claim that we have multiple notions of intrinsicity. The qualitative notion of intrinsicity is supposed to be an intensional notion; i.e. one that applies to properties individuated intensionally. Otherwise, it wouldn't be captured by the Duplication Account. But what about the non-qualitative notion

of intrinsicity, which is supposed to capture the intuition that *being me* is intrinsic? Is this notion intensional or hyperintensional?

First, suppose we take non-qualitative intrinsicity to be an intensional notion. For simplicity, assume there are no duplicate worlds (although nothing hangs on this).²⁶ Suppose *being me* is cointensive with *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*. Since our non-qualitative notion of intrinsicity classifies *being me* as intrinsic, then – since it’s an intensional notion – it must also classify *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* as intrinsic. But there is no intuitive sense in which *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* is intrinsic.²⁷ So, if non-qualitative intrinsicity is an intensional notion, it cannot correspond to an intuitive notion of intrinsicity, and cannot play a role in this defense of the Duplication Account.

Second, suppose we take non-qualitative intrinsicity to be a hyperintensional notion; i.e. one that applies to properties individuated hyperintensionally. Then, cointensive properties may diverge with respect to whether they are non-qualitative intrinsic. Even though *being me* is cointensive with *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*, one may say, the latter property is non-qualitative extrinsic while the former is non-qualitative intrinsic. Once one is willing to grant that we have a hyperintensional notion of intrinsicity, however, it’s unclear why one would believe we also have the intensional notion of “qualitative intrinsicity.” The intuitions captured by this intensional notion are captured by the hyperintensional notion as well; and the hyperintensional notion captures intuitions that the intensional notion cannot accommodate. So the hyperintensional notion is *strictly better* at capturing our intuitive judgments. Given this, the only reason to insist on both notions is to defend the claim that the Duplication Account captures some intuitive sense of intrinsicity. But that is clearly question-begging, since whether the Duplication Account really does capture an intuitive notion of intrinsicity is one of the points at issue.

Here’s another way to put the problem. Advocates of the Many Notions Response often turn to identity properties to support their case that there are multiple notions of intrinsicity. They agree that there is some sense in which identity properties like *being me* are intrinsic, even though the Duplication

²⁶ To accommodate duplicate worlds, change the example in the following way. Suppose there is only one duplicate of the actual world, and at this world my duplicate instantiates the identity property *being me₁*. Replace *being me* with *being me or being me₁*, and run the example.

²⁷ Fine (1994, 7) makes a similar observation with respect to different notions of *essence*.

Account classifies them as extrinsic. So, they say, we must have two intuitive notions of intrinsicity: one which delivers the result that *being me* is intrinsic, and one which delivers the result given by the Duplication Account.

But that is not sufficient to show that there are different notions of intrinsicity. Examples involving identity properties provide us with cases where the non-qualitative notion of intrinsicity captures some intuitions that the qualitative notion does not. So, these examples show that there is a need for something like a non-qualitative notion of intrinsicity. But they do not show that there is a need for a qualitative notion of intrinsicity as well. In order to do that, we need a case where the qualitative notion of intrinsicity captures some intuition that the non-qualitative notion does not. And such cases are hard to find.

In sum, the Many Notions Response holds little promise as a defense against the worry about identity properties or the worry about necessary properties. Proponents of the Many Notions Response have not provided substantive reasons for believing that we have multiple notions of intrinsicity. And even if one could make a plausible case for there being qualitative and non-qualitative notions of intrinsicity in the manner that Sider suggests, the Duplication Account does not track our qualitative notion.²⁸

(One might try to spin the Many Notions Response in an alternate way, according to which we have two notions of *property*. This variation encounters problems as well, although the problems vary depending on which notions of property we employ. If the two notions of property are qualitative and non-qualitative, then this response effectively collapses into the Qualitative Response, which we've already seen is untenable. If the two notions are intensional and hyperintensional, then many of the same objections to the original Many Notions Response apply here as well: there is no evidence that we have a notion of intrinsicity that applies to intensional properties in addition to one that applies to hyperintensional properties, and even if there were, there's still no reason to think that the Duplication Account tracks any uniform and intuitive notion of intrinsicity.)

²⁸ One might argue that the Duplication Account tracks a useful theoretic notion, and the properties that cause trouble for it aren't ones we're generally concerned with. But even if that were so, this is not a reason to think the notion it tracks deserves the name *intrinsic*. Once again, one may say the same of Kim's analysis of intrinsicity – in fact, Lewis *has* said the same: “Kim has come tantalizingly close,” for his analysis correctly classifies “almost any extrinsic property that a sensible person would ever mention.” (Lewis [1983a] 1999, 115) If “tantalizingly close” is not close enough for Kim, then it is not close enough for Lewis.

I submit that the best explanation for our intuitive assessments is not that we have qualitative and non-qualitative notions of intrinsicity, but that “intrinsic” applies to properties individuated hyperintensionally. Conflict arises when we attempt to account for our intuitive judgments of intrinsicity within a framework that conflates intuitively distinct properties. This is not evidence that we have multiple notions of intrinsicity or anything else; it is evidence that an intensional conception of intrinsicity lacks the structure necessary to capture our intuitive judgments. *Being me* seems intrinsic and *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* does not; and unless we employ a framework that allows for a distinction between the two, our intuitive judgments will continue to clash with whatever account of intrinsicity we propose.²⁹

VII. The Spoils to the Victor Response

Finally, consider the “Spoils to the Victor Response.” According to this response, the alleged counterexamples to the Duplication Account rest on inconsistent intuitions. No account can be expected to accommodate inconsistent intuitions, so these “counterexamples” have no force.

The Spoils to the Victor Response generally begins with the observation that a property is either intrinsic or extrinsic. If property *P* is identical to *Q*, then *P* cannot be intrinsic if *Q* is not intrinsic, or vice versa. If *P* is intuitively intrinsic and *Q* is intuitively extrinsic, and *P* and *Q* are identical, then one of our intuitive assessments is mistaken – which one? Lewis writes, “When common sense falls into indecision or controversy... then theory may safely say what it likes. Such cases can be left as spoils to the victor.” (Lewis [1973] 1986*b*, 194) So it is with *intrinsic*, says the proponent of this response. If identical properties differ in their apparent intrinsicity, then we can claim whichever result is compatible with our theory. *To the victor go the spoils.*

Several people have employed the Spoils to the Victor Response in defense of the Duplication Account. Sider writes that an intuitively extrinsic property like “*being such that Socrates is either wise or not wise* is identical to *being round or not round*; since the latter seems intrinsic, the former is as well.” (Sider 1996, 11)

²⁹ A good example of how to argue for the bifurcation of some concept *x* is set by Ned Hall (2004). Hall argues that we have two notions of causation, and that a counterfactual analysis of causation tracks only one of these notions. He begins by arguing that there are cases where our causal intuitions conflict, and he then provides substantive reasons for thinking that there are multiple notions of causation in play. Finally, he argues that a counterfactual analysis of causation captures one uniform notion of causation – *dependence* – and that a different sort of analysis captures another uniform notion of causation – *production*. Unless a similar argument can be made for bifurcating the concept of *intrinsicity*, it would be unwise to doubt that the concept is univocal.

Lewis stated in correspondence with Dunn (1990) that his account correctly classifies the intuitively extrinsic property *being a perfect duplicate of b* as intrinsic, because it “amounts to only an infinite conjunction of intrinsic properties, and hence is itself intrinsic.” (Dunn 1990, fn. 7)

Note that the moves Sider and Lewis suggest won’t work unless we assume an intensional conception of properties. If properties are individuated hyperintensionally, then the fact that *being such that Socrates is wise or not wise* is cointensive with *being round or not round* gives us no reason to think that these properties are alike with respect to their intrinsicity. So for the sake of argument, let’s grant that properties are individuated intensionally.

How does the Spoils to the Victor Response address the worry involving identity properties? Consider the property *being me*. Suppose *being me* and *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* are cointensive. Therefore, they are identical. But the former property seems intrinsic, and the latter property seems extrinsic. Our intuitions conflict, so we defer to theory: according to the Duplication Account, the property in question is extrinsic.

This move is problematic. If we allow this sort of move, it’s too easy to defend oneself from counterexamples. Again, let’s consider Kim’s (1982) account of intrinsicity (a property *P* is intrinsic iff a lonely object may have *P*) and Lewis’s (1983a) objection (*being lonely* is intrinsic on Kim’s account). We can apply the Spoils to the Victor Response to Kim’s account just as easily as we can apply it to the Duplication Account. A defender of Kim’s account could respond thus: It’s true that *being lonely* seems like an extrinsic property. But the set of all lonely objects is identical to the property *being x_1 or x_2 or x_3 or ... x_n* (where the *x*’s are lonely objects). Since the latter property is intrinsic, the former is as well. Therefore, Kim’s account correctly classifies *being lonely* as intrinsic.

And this is just the tip of the iceberg. We can *always* find some intuitively extrinsic property cointensive with an identity property *being x*. Simply tack on *and being located at world w* to *being x* (where *w* is the world at which *x* is located), and now we have an extrinsic property that picks out *x*’s singleton set. We can also do the trick the other way around – every extrinsic property corresponds to some intuitively intrinsic property. Take the extrinsic property *being five feet from a desk*, which is the set of all things that are five feet from a desk. We can pick out the same set by naming each one of the individuals in this set: *being a_1 or a_2 or a_3 or ... a_n* . Now we have an intrinsic property identical to *being five feet from a desk*.

So every set of possible individuals can be identified with both an intuitively intrinsic property and an intuitively extrinsic one.³⁰ If that's all we need to have a case of "spoils to the victor," then our intuitions place no constraints on an account of intrinsicity. While this defense frees the Duplication Account from intuitive objections, it does so by making our intuitions irrelevant. If we make this move, we have no reason to prefer the Duplication Account to one according to which all properties are intrinsic, or one according to which all properties are extrinsic, or one which assigns intrinsicity in an entirely arbitrary way. The price of this defense is too dear.

What about the worry involving necessary properties? The same problems arise here. Every necessary property is cointensive with both an intuitively intrinsic property and an intuitively extrinsic property. If the Spoils to the Victor strategy is legitimate, then our intuitions place no constraints on our account of intrinsicity, and we have no reason to prefer the Duplication Account to any other.

VIII. The Revised Spoils to the Victor Response

Perhaps we can amend the Spoils to the Victor Response to avoid this consequence. The quotes from Lewis and Sider above suggest an alternative. A set of possible individuals can sometimes be expressed in an intuitively non-qualitative way (*being such that Socrates is wise or not wise*) and an intuitively qualitative way (*being round or not round*). When our intuitions about the property's intrinsicity diverge depending on how we express it, we should adjudicate in favor of the intuitions evoked by the qualitative way.

Let's spell this out in more detail. First, note that this version of the Spoils to the Victor Response requires some sort of qualitative/non-qualitative distinction. And, as with the other responses, it's unclear how we should ground this distinction. But let's grant the distinction and see where the response leads. Second, note that we will want to draw the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction at the level of predicates, not properties. Here's why. Advocates of the Spoils to the Victor Response claim that our intuitions conflict: we judge *being me* as intrinsic and *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* as extrinsic, even though these two properties are identical. Of course, they cannot say that the non-qualitative property *being me* is identical to the qualitative property *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*, for

³⁰ One can make similar observations about disjunctive properties, dispositional properties, relational properties, and the like.

that would be contradictory – a property cannot be both qualitative and non-qualitative. Instead, they can say that the property corresponding to my singleton set can be expressed with both qualitative and non-qualitative predicates. Expressed by the non-qualitative predicate “being me,” my singleton set seems intrinsic; expressed by the qualitative predicate “having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things,” my singleton set seems extrinsic. Our intuitions conflict.

Here is how the revised version of the Spoils to the Victor Response resolves the conflict. When we can express a property with both qualitative and non-qualitative predicates, and our intuitions about the property’s intrinsicity diverge depending on which predicate we use, we should favor the intuitions evoked by the qualitative predicate. In the example above, my singleton set seems extrinsic when expressed by the qualitative predicate “having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things,” and intrinsic when expressed by the non-qualitative predicate “being me.” Since it’s the intuitions elicited by the qualitative predicate that should constrain theory, the Duplication Account correctly classifies the property *being me* as extrinsic. According to this response, Lewis’s objection to Kim’s account of intrinsicity goes through. The set of all lonely objects can be expressed using the qualitative predicate “being lonely” or the non-qualitative predicate “being a_1 or a_2 or a_3 or ... a_n ” where each “ a ” is the name of a lonely object. Using the former predicate, the property seems extrinsic; using the latter, it seems intrinsic. It’s the intuitions elicited by the qualitative predicate that our theory should respect, so *being lonely* should be extrinsic.

The revised version of the Spoils to the Victor Response looks more promising. And it may well be what Sider and Lewis had in mind. But it runs into trouble as well. Consider identity properties. This response does well enough in cases where an identity property may be expressed with both a qualitative and a non-qualitative predicate. But not every identity property can be expressed with both a qualitative predicate and a non-qualitative predicate. And it’s in these cases that the Spoils to the Victor strategy breaks down.

The way in which it breaks down depends on whether we allow duplicate worlds. First, let’s assume there are duplicate worlds. Suppose the actual world has a duplicate, at which there exists a duplicate of me. Both my duplicate and I share the property *having-such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things*; but my duplicate does not instantiate *being me*. So, the property *having-such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* is not identical to the property *being me*. In fact, the property corresponding to my singleton set cannot be expressed by any purely qualitative predicate, for any qualitative

predicate that picks out me will also pick out my duplicate. Since my singleton set cannot be expressed with any qualitative property, advocates of the Spoils to the Victor Response cannot dismiss the intuition that *being me* is intrinsic.

Next, suppose we deny the existence of duplicate worlds. Consider a symmetrical world with just two things in it: Thing 1 and Thing 2. Thing 1 and Thing 2 are duplicates that bear the same relations to everything else. Both Thing 1 and Thing 2 share the property *having thing-ish features and thing-ish relations to other things*. But only Thing 1 has *being Thing 1*, and only Thing 2 has *being Thing 2*. The property corresponding to Thing 1's singleton set cannot be expressed with any qualitative predicate, since any qualitative predicate that picks out Thing 1 will also pick out Thing 2. Likewise for the property corresponding to Thing 2's singleton set. Again, the Spoils to the Victor strategy cannot be applied, and advocates of the Spoils to the Victor Response cannot dismiss the intuition that *being Thing 1* and *being Thing 2* are intrinsic. So this version of the Spoils to the Victor Response doesn't work either. Even if we grant an intensional conception of properties, and the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative predicates, the response fails to undermine our intuitions that identity properties are intrinsic.

What about the worry involving necessary properties? Here the revised Spoils to the Victor Response fares even worse. The set containing every possible individual can be expressed by many different qualitative predicates, some which suggest the set is intrinsic and others which suggest it is not. For example, "being such that there possibly exists something greater in mass" is a qualitative predicate that intuitively expresses an extrinsic property; while "being round or not round" is a qualitative predicate that intuitively expresses an intrinsic property. Since both predicates are qualitative, we cannot employ the revised Spoils to the Victor strategy to adjudicate between them.

IX. Individuating Properties Hyperintensionally

Although these responses do not succeed in defending the Duplication Account, they help pinpoint what is wrong with it.

All three responses acknowledge that *being me* seems intrinsic and *having such-and-such features and so-and-so relations to other things* does not – even though the two properties correspond to the same singleton set. *Prima facie*, this acknowledgment suggests that our intuitive notion of intrinsicity is sensitive to hyperintensional differences among properties. If this is so, then no account of

intrinsicity that is unable to accommodate the relevant hyperintensional differences will be able to accommodate our intuitive beliefs.

And that is the problem with the Duplication Account. While the account works well enough in cases where hyperintensional distinctions aren't relevant, it breaks down exactly where we would expect: in cases where properties that correspond to the same set of individuals fall on different sides of the intrinsic/extrinsic divide.³¹

The appeal of the Duplication Account lies, at least in part, in its promise of a reductive analysis of intrinsicity. Reductive analyses are a worthy goal, but an overriding desire for reduction has led philosophers to favor elegance over truth. In the end, we may discover that our intuitive notion of intrinsicity is not amenable to reduction.³² Whatever discomfort one may feel at the thought of taking *intrinsic* as primitive, it is worse to settle for an account that is false.³³

³¹ As noted in the Introduction, my central claims apply even to accounts of intrinsicity developed within a metaphysical framework quite different from the one assumed throughout the paper. In particular, not much rides on the Lewisian assumption that possible individuals are world-bound. To see this, let us suppose that possible individuals enjoy transworld identity. This assumption requires some modification of Lewis's setup. Rather than have properties correspond to sets of possible individuals, we have properties correspond to sets of ordered pairs, each pair consisting of an individual and a world. For example, the property *being me* corresponds to the set of ordered pairs $\{ \langle \text{me}, w_1 \rangle, \langle \text{me}, w_2 \rangle, \langle \text{me}, w_3 \rangle, \dots \}$ where each w_i is a world at which I exist.

Now let the property *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_i} be one that is instantiated only by me at w_i . Next, consider the property *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_1} or *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_2} or *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_3} or... Such a property seems uncontroversially extrinsic. But it picks out exactly the same set of ordered pairs as the property *being me*: $\{ \langle \text{me}, w_1 \rangle, \langle \text{me}, w_2 \rangle, \langle \text{me}, w_3 \rangle, \dots \}$. So these two properties are cointensive. Yet *being me* seems intrinsic, while *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_1} or *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_2} or *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* _{w_3} or... does not.

Adopting the Lewisian framework permitted me to make the simplifying assumption that *being me* and *having such-and-such-features and so-and-so-relations to other things* both pick out the set containing this particular world-bound individual, and thus are cointensive. But I have no stake in this particular example. My claim is that no matter what your background assumptions are, there will be some cointensive properties that fall on different sides of the intrinsic/extrinsic divide. The general moral still stands: intuitively, cointensive properties may diverge with respect to their intrinsicity. And an adequate account of intrinsicity must accommodate this.

³² Or at least not the sort of reduction tolerable to the Lewisian. After all, one might introduce a new primitive notion, such as *in virtue of*, and try to use this notion to analyze *intrinsic*: a property P is intrinsic iff for all x , x has P solely in virtue of the way x is in itself. As Lewis (2001) writes: "If we had a clear enough understanding of 'solely in virtue of,' we would need no further definition of 'intrinsic.'" (2001, 384) Witmer *et al.* (2005) and Trogdon (2009) argue that we *do* have a clear

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enough understanding of this notion, and both employ it in their respective analyses of intrinsicality.

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