Maya Eddon


Publications

ÒWhy Four-Dimensionalism Explains CoincidenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming

In ÔDoes Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?Õ Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist or perdurantist explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist or endurantist explanation.  I argue that MoyerÕs formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the perdurantistÕs advantage.  A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantistÕs treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.

 

ÒIntrinsicality and HyperintensionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming

The standard counterexamples to David LewisÕs account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that, in this context, none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of LewisÕs can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.

 

ÒThree Arguments from Temporary IntrinsicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming

The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism.  I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force.  I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism.  However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors.  I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another.

 

ÒArmstrong on Quantities and ResemblancePhilosophical Studies (2007) 136: 385-404

Resemblances obtain not only between objects but between properties.  Resemblances of the latter sortin particular, resemblances between quantitative propertiesprove to be the downfall of David ArmstrongÕs well-known theory of universals.  This paper examines ArmstrongÕs efforts to account for such resemblances, and explores several ways one might extend the theory in order to account for quantity.  I argue that none succeed.

 

Teaching

Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of Modality (fall 2009)

 

Philosophy 551: Constitution & Composition (fall 2008)

 

Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of Properties (spring 2008)

 

Philosophy H160: Honors Introduction to Ethics (spring 2009, fall 2007)

 

CV

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352 Bartlett Hall á University of Massachusetts á 130 Hicks Way á Amherst, MA 01003-9269 á

phone: (201) 679-9956 á email: mayae@philos.umass.edu

 

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