Publications
ÒIntrinsicality
and Hyperintensionality,Ó Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
The
standard counterexamples to David LewisÕs account of intrinsicality involve two
sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents
of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of
ways. This paper argues that, in this context, none of these moves are
legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of
LewisÕs can succeed, for an adequate
account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions
among properties.
ÒThree
Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics,Ó Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
The Argument from Temporary
Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of
presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides
a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism.
However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge
theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more
successful than its predecessors.
I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics
gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another.
ÒArmstrong on
Quantities and Resemblance,Ó Philosophical
Studies (2007) 136: 385-404
Resemblances obtain not only between objects
but between properties. Resemblances
of the latter sort – in particular, resemblances between quantitative
properties – prove to be the downfall of David ArmstrongÕs well-known theory of
universals. This paper examines
ArmstrongÕs efforts to
account for such resemblances, and explores several ways one might extend the
theory in order to account for quantity. All of them fail.
Teaching
Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of
Modality (fall 2009)
Philosophy 551: Constitution
& Composition (fall 2008)
Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of
Properties (spring 2008)
Philosophy H160: Honors Introduction
to Ethics (spring 2009, fall 2007)
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352
Bartlett Hall á University of Massachusetts á 130 Hicks Way á Amherst, MA
01003-9269 á
phone:
(201) 679-9956 á email:
mayae@philos.umass.edu
