Publications
ÒWhy
Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence,Ó Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming
In ÔDoes Four-Dimensionalism Explain
Coincidence?Õ Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the
four-dimensionalist or perdurantist explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist
or endurantist
explanation. I argue that MoyerÕs
formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the
perdurantistÕs advantage. A more
satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that
Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantistÕs treatment of this puzzle is
clearly preferable.
ÒIntrinsicality
and Hyperintensionality,Ó Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
The standard
counterexamples to David LewisÕs account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of
properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the
account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways.
This paper argues that, in this context, none of these moves are legitimate.
Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of LewisÕs can succeed,
for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional
distinctions among properties.
ÒThree
Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics,Ó Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
forthcoming
The Argument from Temporary
Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of
presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides
a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this
argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this
version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the
Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one
theory of persistence over another.
ÒArmstrong on
Quantities and Resemblance,Ó Philosophical Studies (2007) 136: 385-404
Resemblances obtain not only between objects but
between properties. Resemblances
of the latter sort – in particular, resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of David
ArmstrongÕs well-known theory of universals. This paper examines ArmstrongÕs efforts to account for such resemblances, and explores several ways
one might extend the theory in order to account for quantity. I argue that none succeed.
Teaching
Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of
Modality (fall
2009)
Philosophy 551: Constitution
& Composition (fall 2008)
Philosophy 551: Metaphysics of
Properties (spring
2008)
Philosophy H160: Honors Introduction
to Ethics (spring
2009, fall 2007)
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352
Bartlett Hall á University of Massachusetts á 130 Hicks Way á Amherst, MA
01003-9269 á
phone:
(201) 679-9956 á email:
mayae@philos.umass.edu