Fundamental Properties
of Fundamental Properties, draft (forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics)
Since the
publication of David Lewis's "New Work for a Theory of Universals,"
the distinction between properties that are fundamental – or perfectly natural
– and those that are not has become a staple of mainstream
metaphysics. Plausible candidates
for perfect naturalness include the quantitative properties posited by
fundamental physics, such as two grams mass and three coulombs charge.
This paper argues for two claims: (1) the most satisfying account of
quantitative properties employs higher-order relations, and (2) these relations
must be perfectly natural, for otherwise the perfectly natural properties
cannot play the roles in metaphysical theorizing as envisaged by Lewis.
Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
(2011) 82: 314-336
The
standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two
sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents
of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of
ways. This paper argues that, in this context, none of these moves are
legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of
Lewis's can succeed,
for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional
distinctions among properties.
Review of Real Essentialism, by D. Oderberg, Mind (2010) 119: 1210-1212
Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy (2010) 88: 721-729
In 'Does
Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?' Mark Moyer argues that there is no
reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist or perdurantist explanation of coincidence to the
three-dimensionalist or endurantist explanation.
I argue that Moyer's formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead
him to overlook the perdurantist's advantage. A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a
puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's
treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.
Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics, Philosophy &
Phenomenological Research (2010) 81: 605-619
The Argument
from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against
endurantism. I show that the two
standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the
argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying
objection to endurantism. However, the premises
of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so
this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the
Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one
theory of persistence over another.
Armstrong
on Quantities and Resemblance, Philosophical Studies (2007) 136: 385-404
Resemblances
obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular, resemblances between
quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of David Armstrong's well-known theory of universals. This paper examines Armstrong's efforts to
account for such resemblances, and explores several ways one might extend the
theory in order to account for quantity.
I argue that none succeed.
Some of the papers posted here include typographical
corrections or clarifications made after publication, and so may diverge
slightly from their official versions.
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