

human rights, including her avowal of sympathy for the spirit although not the letter of the U.N. Declaration, her conception of moral agents as free and rational and her occasional references to the unjust treatment of women in the West let alone elsewhere, suggest that she would find the prescribed relations between the sexes in the Islamic tradition and especially the institution of Purdah, morally defective, or at least morally unenlightened. Underlying her conception of moral inquiry and partial compliance theory is a general moral position best described as rational humanism. De facto rational humanism has become widespread in the Western tradition today, although its de jure position is still nominally Judaeo-Christian. But de facto rational humanism is far from being widespread in the Islamic tradition. Its presence and influence in other traditions is a matter for empirical inquiry. Although she does not acknowledge it, Held is faced with a choice. Either she must maintain that rational humanism is the most enlightened moral position and the less it is influential in any tradition the less morally enlightened that tradition, or she must accept the relativism I have provisionally ascribed to her and concede that moral inquiry and partial compliance theory must be confined within the framework of a particular tradition of culture and civilisation.

I would expect her to choose the first alternative. That rational humanism is the most enlightened moral position might be defended on the grounds that it incorporates the most informed understanding of the human situation. It is compatible with religious faith, although not with any form of compulsory religious affiliation. The issues connected with moral diversity and the existence of different traditions of culture and civilisation should have been directly confronted in the early chapters in which Held explains and defends her idea of moral inquiry and partial compliance theory. By confining her discussion to the contrast between ideal and partial compliance theory, she leaves undone an important part of what she needs to do. The moral principles of an ideal society, if they are to be intelligible, must have their roots in some tradition of culture and civilisation, which in the case of Rawls is the Western. But this having been said, what she has written is a valuable contribution to critical moral thinking. While her treatment of the seven social domains is necessarily brief, she has wise and perceptive things to say about each of them. Her book deserves to be read not only by professional philosophers and their students but by the wider educated public.

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J.F.M. HUNTER. *Understanding Wittgenstein: Studies of Philosophical Investigations*. New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1985. Pp. xiii + 248. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-85224-497-5.

In contrast to Hunter's earlier *Essays After Wittgenstein* (1973), which offers his own development of themes that concerned Wittgenstein, *Understanding Wittgenstein* focuses in detail on particular passages, and suggests and evaluates various lines of interpretation. Each of the twenty-seven chapters, which range in length from four to twenty pages, deals specifically with a paragraph or a group of paragraphs from the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein said that the work of the philosopher is to assemble reminders for a particular purpose, and much of Hunter's new book consists of just such reminders. Hunter not only cites textual evidence for his interpretations, but also offers a useful array of examples. For example, one may know what water is without knowing the difference between watering horses and watering milk, or between crying and eyes watering. However, Hunter sometimes overexplains his reminders as he does when he gives an elaborate description of differences between 'He understands English' and 'He salutes officers' (157).

Hunter makes a number of sensible points. His discussion of 'says' and 'means,' which he takes to illustrate a procedure of pairing two grammars, is helpful (206-7). Or again: Hunter usefully gathers passages suggesting that Wittgenstein is a behaviorist, then argues that he is not. And Hunter's comments on a false picture of psychological states at the end are illuminating. Still, throughout, he uses vocabulary — like that of essential and nonessential properties — uncharacteristic of Wittgenstein.

The book reads as if an intelligent person sat down to puzzle out the *Investigations* on his own. Hunter gives no evidence of acquaintance with the controversies attending Wittgenstein scholarship; for example, he mentions the so-called private language argument only once, and then only to say that it is *not* 'the unifying thread in the sections of the *Philosophical Investigations* dealing with pain' (127).

I have two main criticisms. First, Hunter gives too much attention to obviously obtuse interpretations before finally rejecting them. This flaw is a result, I think, of the way that Hunter aims to lead the reader along, down to the end of the blindest of alleys, in order to share the philosophical discovery. For example, he quotes the famous beetle-in-the-box passage (PI, par. 293) without the crucial last sentence, and proceeds to discuss various interpretations; after the discussion, he brings in the last sentence as if to say, 'Here's something else to consider,' and delivers the interpretation he favors. (98-104).

Second, and more important, many of his interpretations seem somewhat superficial or flatfooted. Consider two of Hunter's discussions — the one of par. 185 and the one of par. 296 (and par. 304). Hunter's discussion of par. 185 illustrates the liability of his procedure of ignoring everything else writ-

ten on Wittgenstein. Par. 185 depicts a student who continues a series by adding 2 past 1000 and writes '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.' Hunter, who refers to the example as 'this most curious and bewildering example,' discusses this paragraph at a level that has been rendered superfluous by Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Hunter says: 'Characteristically, there is no specification of what the general problem is in the stretch of the *Philosophical Investigations* in which this passage occurs ...' (78). Whether Kripke's interpretation is right or not, we no longer have to grope around trying to find a problem to attribute to Wittgenstein in the passage.

What Hunter does say is that here Wittgenstein's 'main point is that a rule does not itself spell out what to do — we must learn how to apply it — and if there were rules telling us how to apply the rule, the application of these rules would not be contained in them, but would have to be learned' (79). That Hunter does not see the depth of Wittgenstein's concern is indicated by his taking it as unproblematic that 9, 19, and 29 uniquely identify a natural number series whose next member is 39. Hunter's whole discussion is skewed by his assumption that Wittgenstein is asking what a 'harrided mathematics instructor' should do if he were actually to encounter such a 'deviant student,' one who perhaps lacked our 'happy genetic adaptation.' Although Hunter does not dismiss Wittgenstein's example as 'merely a fine point of pedagogical practice,' he (mis)locates 'its importance ... in what it may show about the nature of mathematical competence' (81).

With regard to par. 296, Hunter says, 'If there is any suspicion remaining that Wittgenstein denies that there is pain as well as pain-behavior, it is put to rest in par. 304, where he says there could be no greater difference than that between pain-behavior accompanied and not accompanied by pain' (106-7). The relevant part of par. 304 is this: "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?" — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? In light Wittgenstein's use of an interlocator, this should not be construed as anything as straightforward (and pedestrian) as a claim.

Moreover, Hunter interprets Wittgenstein as retaining an 'object and name' model of sensation words, just not 'the typical one.' If I understand Wittgenstein correctly — especially in par. 304 — he wants to dispel the grammatical illusion which leads us to suppose that the purpose of an expression of pain is to convey a thought about pain. This illusion is abetted by misconstruing the grammar of the expression of pain on *any* model of 'object and name,' it is not just some particular version of the model that is defective. Also, Hunter rides roughshod over the first-person/third-person distinction when he takes Wittgenstein's question in par. 296 — 'Only whom are you informing of this [that "there is something ... accompanying my cry of pain"]', and on what occasion?' — as if the question concerned *third-person* utterances of 'He is in pain.'

Finally, I should say a word about Hunter's presentation. Hunter tends to advance the various possible interpretations and the supporting evidence for them in lists — (1), (2), (3); (a), (b), (c); (i), (ii), (iii) and so on. He ends up with

lists within lists, somewhat in the style of lecture notes. As a result, his is a book more to be consulted when one is puzzled about particular passages, rather than a book to be read straight through.

Understanding Wittgenstein is not an introduction to Wittgenstein, but rather a companion to the *Investigations*; it will be of most use to beginners who find themselves baffled by the *Investigations*.

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DOUGLAS KELLNER. *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1985. Pp. x + 505. US\$38.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-05176-9); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-520-05295-1).

Herbert Marcuse is most famous for his theoretical mentorship of the student New Left in the late 1960's, whose actions in the universities sparked a worldwide movement against U.S. armed intervention in Vietnam and, more generally, a near revolutionary repudiation of the repressive kitsch and consumerism of capitalist civilization itself. But Marcuse's critical presence in Western thought runs deeper and broader than this extraordinary influence on the most significant social upheaval in the West since 1945. His purely scholarly credentials as synthesizer of Marx and Freud, radical interpreter of Hegel, leading critical voice of the Frankfurt school, pathbreaking philosopher of art and, above all, sociocultural analyst and visionary of striking erudition and range, make him one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.

Yet Marcuse has had precious little attention paid to his work by contemporary departmental philosophy. We can consult, for example, the touchstone *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and find not even a cross-reference to Marcuse. Moreover his most definitive books, *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*, are seldom studied in philosophy courses, though their originality and critical substance is not less than, say, Robert Nozick's apologetics for the protection of unlimited wealth or John Rawls' ponderous elaboration of liberal abstractions, which have together dominated social and political philosophy curricula for a decade. It is often suggested that Marcuse's work is neglected because of its 'prolix' or 'convoluted' style, but a familiarity with the Heideggerian phenomenology in which he was trained,