Edmund Runggaldier is well-known throughout the world for his work in Christian philosophy. To say that Edmund Runggaldier works in Christian philosophy, however, understates the breadth of his philosophical interests. In English alone, he has published papers on sortal continuity, on intentionality in Aristotle and Brentano, and on Carnap and other topics in analytic philosophy. He has edited books that cut a broad swath in philosophy generally. I take my theme from the broad swath in which there are many convergences of Professor Runggaldier’s views and my own.

In this well-deserved Festschrift for Professor Runggaldier, I want to pursue some of the interests that he and I share. Most concern the reality of everyday objects. Although it may seem obvious that everyday objects—you, me, automobiles, computers, roses—are real, many philosophers deem them not to be objects at all, but just collections of particles.

There is a venerable tradition in philosophy of clever arguments for unbelievable theses being countered by quick-and-dirty refutations. For example, when Zeno argued that there was no motion, Diogenes was said to walk around the room, thus disproving
Zeno. When Berkeley argued that there was no material substance, but only ideas, Dr. Johnson famously kicked a stone and said, “I hereby refute you.”

Today, clever philosophers are still advancing arguments with incredible conclusions. For example, Peter van Inwagen says, “My position vis-à-vis tables and other inanimate objects is simply that there are none. Tables are not defective objects or second-class citizens of the world; they are just not there at all.” (Van Inwagen 1990, 99-100) Now, I would like to pull a Dr. Johnson and say, “Then, what is that thing in the dining room supporting your knife and fork?” But van Inwagen has a ready response: Strictly speaking, nothing; there are just some simples (or particles) arranged tablewise (and knife-and-forkwise). Of course, in ordinary life, we say that there’s a table there. But we must sharply separate what we need to say to get along in the world and what we should say in the philosophy room when we do ‘serious metaphysics.’

This is precisely the view of philosophy that I reject. So, I believe, does Edmund Runggaldier. We think that serious metaphysics should help make sense of what we all know and need to know in order to get along in the world. The territory that interests me here contains things of familiar kinds—cats, keys, and credit cards, etc. I believe that they are irreducibly real. These things exist and cannot be reduced to things of other kinds, like sums of atoms. They belong in the ontology, the inventory of what exists. Any complete account of what there is must mention them as such—as cats, keys and credit cards. Ordinary objects are a diverse lot. They include any objects that can get lost or stolen, any objects that you can encounter or interact with. Almost everybody has to contend with dirty dishes and drivers licenses.
Hence, I’ve developed a view that allows these ordinary things, as such, a place at the ontological table. I use the term ‘ontological’ to signal that I am talking about reality, genuine reality with metaphysical heft; I’m not just talking about concepts or sentences that we accept as true. When I say that ordinary objects have ontological significance, I imply that if an inventory of what exists mentions electrons but not elephants and elevators, it is incomplete.

Let me come clean about my own convictions. I believe that the things that we encounter and interact with—the parts of reality that include persons and their inventions—are no less ontologically significant than the microphysical parts of reality. Although philosophy can be technical and abstract, there should always be a thread that can be followed back to something that somebody might care about outside the “philosophy room.” That’s the pragmatic side of my approach. The ontological side stems from a Platonic conviction that the things that are valuable are real and not reducible to unfamiliar, microphysical entities. So, I want to present an ontological account of ordinary objects.

My plan is this: After characterizing my ontological view of ordinary objects, I want to consider some objections that have been raised against it. Consideration of these objections will lead us to ask how we ought to evaluate a philosophical theory.

1. The Constitution View

What is the relation between, say, the chair you are sitting on and the particles that make it up now? My answer is: constitution. Constitution is a relation of unity that

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1 A number of prominent philosophers in recent years have endorsed some form of constitution-without-identity. The following are just a sample: (Doepke1982); (Lowe
holds between spatially coincident objects of different kinds: E.g., between pieces of paper and dollar bills, between the sum of cells in your body and your body, between a sum of threads and a tapestry—things of basically different kinds that are spatially coincident.\(^2\) Constitution, unlike identity, is time-bound. (But I’ll usually omit the time-index.) If a few threads come loose from the tapestry and are replaced, the tapestry will continue to exist but be constituted by a different sum of threads.

Integral to my notion of constitution is the notion of primary kinds. Every material object is of some primary kind essentially: An object could not continue to exist without having its primary-kind property.\(^3\) Teacher is not a primary kind; you could cease to be a teacher and still exist. But person is a primary kind: You could not cease to be an person and continue to exist. God could not have created you without creating a person. Like person, barn and boat are primary kinds. Suppose that a barn is dismantled and the planks are used to build a boat. The object that was a barn no longer exists; a new object—a boat—exists and is constituted by the same sum of planks that previously constituted the barn. A thing’s primary kind determines what sorts of changes it can undergo and still exist and what sorts of changes will result in the thing’s ceasing to

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1983) (Thomson 1998); (Koslicki 2004); (Yablo 1987); (Rea 1998); (Johnston 1992); (Oderberg 1996); (Sosa 1997); (Burke 1994); (Simons 1987); (Wiggins 1968). My construal of constitution differs from those of all the above.

\(^2\) For a discussion of whether or not spatial coincidence, when joined with the causal efficacy of ordinary things, leads to intolerable causal overdetermination, see Chapter Five of (Baker 2007).

\(^3\) To borrow some paraphrases about essential properties from Chisholm, if \(x\) has the property of being a horse essentially, then ‘\(x\) is such that, if it were not a horse, it would not exist’; or ‘God couldn’t have created \(x\) without making it such that it is a horse’; or ‘\(x\) is such that in every possible world in which it exists it is a horse.’ (Chisholm 1976, 25-6).
exist altogether—in philosophical jargon, a thing’s primary kind determines its *de re* persistence conditions.⁴

The basic idea of constitution, then, is this: when things of certain primary kinds are in certain circumstances, a thing of another primary kind—a new thing, with different persistence conditions and different causal powers—comes to exist.⁵ When a yellow triangular piece of metal with the letters Y-I-E-L-D painted on it is in circumstances governed by laws and conventions of certain sorts, a new thing—a traffic sign—comes into existence. A traffic sign is a different kind of thing from, say, the triangular piece of scrap metal in your garage, even if your child had painted Y-I-E-L-D on it for a school play. Although a traffic sign may be constituted by a piece of metal, a traffic sign is a different kind of thing, with different causal powers, from a piece of metal that doesn’t constitute anything.

⁴ My view thus follows Aristotle both in its essentialism and in its appeal to kinds. So far, I believe that Professor Runnaldier would agree with me. At least he would in 1998 when he published “Sortal Continuity of Material Things.” (Runnaldier 1998) However, my view of constitution differs from his in that I take constitution to be a relation between things of different kinds (e.g., pieces of metal and traffic signs), but he takes constitution to be a relation between a “objects proper” and some “compositional stuff...an object in a much looser sense.” I agree with Runnaldier that mereological sums are not (identical to) proper objects, but I think that they constitute proper objects. Nevertheless, I agree that where there is a statue made of copper, there are not two objects there. (Baker 2007, 169-172).

⁵ For detailed discussion, see Chapter Eight of (Baker 2007). Consider a quantity of orange juice and a quantity of vodka. Call the orange juice and the vodka, considered together, the sum of the orange juice and the vodka. Now pour one into the other, and voilà, a new thing—a party drink, a screwdriver—comes into existence. It is not as if two things became one, but a sum of two things came to constitute one thing, a screwdriver. Now if you distil the screwdriver, you can separate the vodka and the orange juice back out; and the screwdriver goes out of existence. The sum of the vodka and orange juice existed before, during and after the party drink existed. Therefore, since identity is necessary, the sum of the vodka and orange juice are not identical to the party drink.
Primary kinds are not just “given” from the beginning of time. Some kinds of things, like human beings, evolve over time; and some, like MRI machines, are invented by human beings. But MRI machines and other human artifacts are fundamentally different kinds of things from natural objects (like turtles and trees), and the difference is that MRI machines have an intended function—a kind of essence—that turtles and trees and other kinds of natural objects do not have. Admittedly, something’s being an MRI machine depends on our practices and conventions. But people are part of nature and contribute to reality, just as molecules do.\(^6\) Ontologically—not just causally—some parts of reality depend on our activities and purposes. I call such objects ‘intention-dependent’ objects or ‘ID’ objects. (I am not at all sure the Professor Runggaldier would agree with me about ID objects.) An ID object could not exist in a world without other beings with beliefs, desires and intentions. Artifacts and artworks are paradigmatically ID objects, and they too bear constitution relations, just as natural objects do. The circumstances required for the existence of ID objects (like voting machines or statues) presuppose that there are people with intentions. The circumstances required for the existence of non-ID objects (like turtles or trees) do not presuppose that there are people with intentions. But all objects—both those that presuppose intentionality and those that do not—all objects that we know of are constituted.

Constitution is an engine of novelty. It brings into being new objects of new primary kinds. For example, a world with the same kinds of atoms that make up

\(^6\) It is a profound error to take a distinction between what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent as foundational for metaphysics. See (Baker 2007), Chapter One.
organisms (e.g., hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and sulfur)\textsuperscript{7} but with different environments may lack organisms, and a world without organisms is ontologically different from a world with organisms. A similar point can be made about inventions: the world before MRI machines or nuclear weapons was ontologically different from the world now. So, constitution makes an ontological difference.\textsuperscript{8}

Although constitution is not identity, it \textit{is} a relation of unity. This lectern is not identical to any sum of atoms; but it is constituted by a sum of atoms. Scrape off a few atoms and the lectern still exists. The constitution relation makes for a unity that is not identity. The constituted object (the lectern) and the constituting object (a sum of atoms) share many exemplifications of properties by what I call ‘having properties derivatively’. The intuitive idea is simple: If x constitutes y at t, then some of x’s properties at t have their source in y, and some of y’s properties at t have their source in x.

For example, my driver’s license is constituted by a piece of plastic: My driver’s license has the property of being rectangular only because it is constituted by something that could have been rectangular even if it had constituted nothing. And the piece of plastic has the property of easing the way through airport security only because it constitutes something that would have eased the way through airport security (a valid drivers’ license) no matter what constituted it. So, we have a drivers’ license constituted by a piece of plastic. The “source” of its property of easing the way through airport security is in the constituted license. The “source” of its property of being rectangular is in the constituting piece of plastic.

\textsuperscript{7} Atoms of these kinds make up amino acid molecules. See http://www.biology.arizona.edu/biochemistry/problem_sets/aa/aa.html (accessed March 1, 2007).

\textsuperscript{8} For greater detail, see (Baker 2000) and (Baker 2002).
I’ll say that the driver’s license has the property of easing the way through airport security *nonderivatively*, and the property of being rectangular *derivatively*; the piece of plastic that constitutes my driver’s license has the property of being rectangular nonderivatively, and of easing the way through airport security derivatively. I have defined these terms rigorously on the elsewhere.\(^9\) Not all properties may be had derivatively, but I’ll skip the details here.\(^{10}\) Enough properties can be had derivatively to see how property exemplifications may be shared and how constitution can be a relation of unity.

Even primary-kind properties may be had derivatively. Something may have a primary-kind property without having that property as *its* primary-kind property. There are two ways to fall under a primary-kind sortal: to be essentially of that kind or to be contingently related by constitution to something that is essentially of that kind. (Wasserman 2004). Since *chair* is a primary kind, your chair is a chair essentially, but the sum of particles that make it up is only a chair contingently, in virtue of constituting the chair now. The sum of particles is not a chair unless there is something that is a chair essentially that it constitutes. If the chair is smashed and no longer exists, the sum of particles that once constituted the chair still exists, but no longer constitutes a chair. So,

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\(^{10}\) Several classes of properties are excluded from being had derivatively: They are not shared. The excluded classes contain: (1) Properties expressed in English by locutions using ‘essentially’, ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘primary kind’ and the like (e.g., being a pencil essentially). (2) Properties of being constituted by x, or being identical to x (e.g., constituting a pencil). (3) Properties rooted outside the times at which they are had (e.g., having been quarried in 1500). (4) Certain combinations of properties (e.g., being a granite monument). I later define parthood—ordinary parthood—in terms of constitution as well as of mereology. So, the property of having part P at t is excluded since it is defined in terms of constitution. The property of having P as a part at t may not be had derivatively.
something (e.g., a sum of particles) may have a primary-kind property contingently when suitably related to something (e.g., a chair) that has it essentially. The chair is a chair nonderivatively, but the sum of particles is a chair derivatively—in virtue of constituting something that is a chair nonderivatively.

The idea of having properties derivatively solves the problem of ‘too many Fs’—too many persons, too many minds. If I am a person nonderivatively, and my body is a person derivatively (in virtue of constituting me), then there is just one person where I am—I nonderivatively, my body derivatively. I am a person nonderivatively; my body is a person derivatively, in virtue of constituting me. Since this body and I share a single exemplification of the property of being a person, my body and I are the same person. When this body becomes a corpse, it will still exist but no longer will it constitute a person. This body then will no longer be a person derivatively.

This idea of unity can be sharpened by extending John Perry’s definition of ‘the same F’ to the constitution-relation. Constitution is like identity in some ways, and like separate existence in other ways. With respect to being the same F at t, constitution is similar to identity. Where I am, there is only one person—even though I am not identical to my body—because my body is a person derivatively. My body’s being a person is wholly parasitic on my being a person.

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11 Many properties (unrelated to this discussion) may be had essentially by some things and nonessentially by other things. A planet has the property of having a closed orbit essentially; a comet that has a closed orbit has that property nonessentially. (This assumes that planets are planets essentially; otherwise it is only a de dicto necessity that planets have closed orbits.)

12 For an account of counting, based on Aristotle’s notion of accidental sameness, congenial to constitution-without-identity, see (Brower and Rea 2005). Brower and Rea’s construal of constitution is significantly different from mine. They take constitution to be
Roughly, (omitting reference to times), x has F \textit{nondervatively} iff x’s having F does not depend on x’s constitution relations, and x has F \textit{derivatively} iff x’s having F depends on x’s having constitution relations with something that has F nondervatively. Now call the distinction between having a property nondervatively and having it derivatively the ‘Key Distinction.’ The Key Distinction is coherent and clearly defined. (Baker 2007, 167-68) It shows how things in constitution relations share so many properties even though they are not identical, and hence it gives substance to the idea of unity-without-identity.  

To sum up the Constitution View: There are three distinct ways that material objects, x and y, may be related at any time t: (i) x and y are identical, or (ii) x constitutes, or is constituted by, y at t, or (iii) x and y exist separately at t (i.e., they have different spatial locations at t). Although identity is necessary, nonidentity divides into two contingent relations—constitution and separate existence. Making room in a mereological notion; I do not. I take sameness of parts at a time to \textit{follow from} constitution, not to be constitutive of the idea of constitution itself. 

\[13\] The Constitution View allows us to be nonreductionists and to take seriously the existence of all manner of things. To take seriously the existence of something, I believe, is to be able to distinguish between the thing’s changing a property and its going out of existence altogether. One reviewer of my new book misunderstood this point and complained about “Baker’s tendency to assume that, unless one believes Fs are essentially F$s, one does not take the existence of F$s seriously.” He pointed out that children are not essentially children, yet we take their existence seriously. Of course. Indeed, I made the analogous point about puppies. We can distinguish between the puppy’s losing a property (growing up) and going out of existence altogether (being run over by a truck); puppies have ontological significance in virtue of being dogs. In general, things have ontological significance in virtue of their primary kinds, of which they are essentially. We take puppies seriously in virtue of their being dogs essentially; we take children seriously in virtue of their being persons essentially. My view does not imply that we believe that puppies are essentially puppies or that children are essentially children in order to take puppies or children seriously. My point, which the reviewer missed, was that reductionists can’t distinguish between losing a property (like being a puppy) and going out of existence altogether.
metaphysics for two ways to be nonidentical is like making room in logic for two ways for a proposition to be untrue. Surprising, maybe; but not incoherent.

2. Objections and the Key Distinction

The Key Distinction between having a property nonderivatively and having a property derivatively is a technical distinction that critics frequently either ignore or dismiss. One critic simply refuses to acknowledge the Key Distinction by taking ‘I am an animal derivatively’ to mean ‘I am not an animal.’ (Olson 2008) But this is like insisting that the sentence ‘this proposition is untrue’ means ‘this proposition is false’. In three-valued logic, a proposition can be untrue without being false; there is a third truth-value—neither true nor false. Just as three-valued logic allows a proposition to fail to be false without failing to be untrue, so too on my view, an object may fail to have a property nonderivatively (i.e., independently of constitution relations) without failing to have the property altogether: the object it may have the property derivatively.

There is a whole battery of objections—the many-minds objection, the counting objection, the too-many-thoughts objection (Olson, 2001; Zimmerman 2002), to name a few—that are all answerable in terms of the Key Distinction. Even though I believe that I have answered the objections, they keep popping up, Whac-a-Mole style. Here I want to try again.

I’ll focus on a couple of examples. First: It is a consequence of my view that I am a person nonderivatively (indeed, essentially), and that this body is a person derivatively as long as it constitutes me. A recent critic has noted: “Whenever I think ‘I am not the body’, my body thinks ‘I am not the body’. But the body is mistaken. How do I know that I am not the one making this mistake?” The critic goes on to attribute to
me—correctly—the view that “whenever my body says and thinks ‘I’, it does not refer to itself, but to me” (the person). (Johansson 2009, 368) But how, he goes on to ask, “can something be a person if it cannot perform the fairly elementary task of thinking and speaking about itself in the first person?”

In fact, a human infant is a person who cannot perform the fairly elementary task of thinking and speaking about itself in the first person. But more to the point: This question simply ignores the Key Distinction between nonderivative and derivative persons. The referent of ‘I’ is never a body considered apart from a person. ‘I’ always refers unambiguously to a nonderivative person—a person constituted by, but not identical to, a body. As we saw in the extension of ‘the same F’ to the constitution-relation, my body and I (though nonidentical) are the same person. So, the answer to the critic’s question, “How can something be a person if it cannot perform the fairly elementary task of thinking and speaking about itself in the first person?” is easy: I am a person nonderivatively (as long as I exist); my body is a person derivatively (as long as it constitutes me). There is no competition between my body and me. Since I am constituted by this body now, this body and I are the same person now. The word ‘I’ unambiguously refers to the entity who is a person nonderivatively—the person constituted by the body, but not to the body on its own. There is simply no mystery here.

Second example: A different critic found it “absurd” for me to say that the body that constitutes me is a person derivatively. (Kearns 2009) This is supposed to be absurd because it leads to rejection of (what he calls) “a very plausible principle”—namely, that

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14 If there is any ambiguity lurking, it is between the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of constitution. Since I am constituted by my body, but not identical to it, my utterance, “I am not my body,” is true if interpreted via the ‘is’ of identity, but false if interpreted via the ‘is’ of constitution.
if I am a person and my body is a person and I am not identical to my body, then there are two persons. The critic’s “very plausible principle” generalizes to this:

(VPP1) If x is a person and y is a person and \( x \) is not identical to \( y \), then there are two persons.

However, the use of the Key Distinction to extend the definition of ‘the same F’ to constitution-relations results in a modification of the critic’s “very plausible principle”: For \( x \) and \( y \) to be two persons, \( x \) and \( y \) must not be constitutionally related. As a result, the critic’s “very plausible principle” is modified to this:

(VPP2) If \( x \) is a person and \( y \) is a person and \( x \) is not the same person as \( y \), then there are two persons.

(VPP2) is likewise very plausible. It is based not just on intuition, but also on a definition that does significant philosophical work in a theory. So, (VPP2) has a good claim to be preferable to (VPP1). Indeed, (VPP2) is an elaboration of Aristotle’s notion of numerical sameness without identity of being.\(^{15}\)

So, both critics either ignored or dismissed the distinction between having a property nonderivatively and having a property derivatively, without raising a finger to argue against it. This leads me to ask: How should we evaluate a philosophical theory like mine? Should we base our verdicts on what strikes us as absurd or unattractive?

\(^{15}\) For discussion of Aristotle’s notion of sameness without identity, see (Matthews 1992). Matthews argues that Aristotle’s Theory of Kooky Objects should be interpreted as an ontological, not a linguistic, thesis.
3. How To Evaluate a Philosophical Theory

I don’t think so. Here, my pragmatic side comes to the fore. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. To evaluate a philosophical theory, a pragmatist like me would propose two questions: (i) Does the theory aim at a worthwhile goal? (ii) Does the theory accomplish what it set out to do as coherently and economically as possible?

The goal at which my theory aims is an ontological account of ordinary objects that is comprehensive, unified and nonreductive. The theory is comprehensive in that it applies to every material object that we might encounter. It is unified in that it deploys the same two basic ideas—constituent and primary kinds—to understand all kinds of material objects. It is nonreductive in that things of one primary kind (a mallet, say) are not reducible to things of a different primary kind (such as two wooden cylinders of different dimensions).

My goal of nonreduction may be challenged. Nonreduction is desirable because it allows for an ontologically robust account of things’ not just changing properties or being rearranged, but of going out of existence altogether. Suppose that you are a three-dimensionalist (like me), but that you have a reductive view according to which all medium-sized material objects were identical to (and hence reducible to) sums of particles. Now when the Twin Towers collapsed on 9/11, the sums of particles survived the collapse, but the towers did not. A three-dimensionalist reductionist cannot account for the difference between there being towers and there not being towers as an ontological difference. From a 3D-reductionist point of view, there is no ontological difference between particles-arranged-towerwise and the same particles-arranged-rubblewise. Arrangements are not items in the ontology; they are not objects at all.
Nor from a four-dimensionalist point of view, is there any ontological difference between a 4D worm whose last temporal part has the towers still standing, on the one hand, an a 4D worm whose last temporal part is just rubble, on the other hand.\textsuperscript{16} There is just a difference in the distribution of qualities. All 4D worms are ontologically on a par. We may pick out the worm that ends at the collapse of the tower, but that’s just a matter of our parochial interests. On a 4D view, there is no ontological content to a statement that a certain worm ends with the collapse of a tower.

Appeal to composition does not help.\textsuperscript{17} Composition by particles does not distinguish between an ordinary object (like one of the towers) and something that is not an ordinary object (like the fusion of the bottom half of one of the Twin Towers and the top half of the other.)\textsuperscript{18} So, composition does not obviate the need for constitution.

Unlike the reductive views, my view of constitution gives an ontological explanation of the towers’ going out of existence. *Tower* is a primary kind. The Twin Towers were towers essentially. So, when they collapsed and ceased to be towers, the objects that they were ceased to exist altogether. Since the constitution view can explain

\textsuperscript{16} The difference between a 4D worm that is the tower-worm and a 4D worm that is the tower-and-rubble worm is no more an *ontological* difference than is the difference between the 4D worm that is the first-half-of-the-tower’s existence and the 4D worm that is the second-half-of-the-tower’s existence. All four of these 4D worms are temporal parts of exactly the same sum of particles.

\textsuperscript{17} One critic suggested that we can skip constitution altogether and say something like this: “There were particles that composed the tower (and only the tower) before the attack on 9/11, and after the attack, those particles no longer composed the tower; they composed scattered objects or nothing at all.” (Kearns 2009), 534) But this is only an exercise in labeling; it makes no ontological distinction between worlds in which there are towers and worlds in which there is just rubble.

\textsuperscript{18} If we take the Twin Towers to be duplicates, and consider only qualitative properties of the particles and their relations to each other, the single tower and the two half-towers are compositionally indistinguishable.
object’s beginning and ceasing to exist altogether, I believe that its goal of nonreduction is worthwhile.

Does the Constitution View achieve this goal as economically as possible? Again, I would say yes. But for the Constitution View to achieve its goal, it needs the Key Distinction. To anyone who thinks that the Key Distinction is absurd, I would say this: The Key Distinction is coherent and earns its keep by contributing to a worthwhile goal that does not seem achievable without it. For a pragmatist, that’s good enough.

4. Conclusion

As I said at the beginning, I think that it is important for philosophy to keep in touch with things that we all care about. With that in mind, I have tried to develop an ontology of ordinary objects that we encounter and interact with—all day, every day. As the great American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce wisely urged, “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.” (Peirce 1958, 40) 19 I think that this is a sentiment with which Professor Runggaldier would agree.

5. References

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19 A predecessor of this paper was delivered at the Auburn Philosophy Conference on the Ontology of Ordinary Objects, February 27, 2010.