on my shelves, the small plants, etc., "as a unity, all at once and not as a succession of discrete experiences." (p. 126). Hasker doubts that any physical entity is in the state that I am in when I am aware of my visual field. The problem, as he sees it, is that "a person's being aware of a complex fact cannot consist in the actions of parts of the person, each of which does not possess this awareness." (p. 129)

Here I think that Hasker "proves too much." Presumably, a dog's experience at t of his visual field is a unified experience of the bone, the water dish, the fence, etc. Hence, either dogs have immaterial souls or a composite physical entity can be aware of a complex fact, and its being so aware can consist in the actions of its parts. No one who thinks dogs are wholly physical entities will find the Unity-of-Consciousness argument persuasive. (Hasker, however, takes animals to have souls. (p. 193))

Chapters Three-Five converge on "single conclusion:" Rationality pertains to "the human person as a whole" (Ch. 3); choices in virtue of which we're agents must be "ascribed to the person in a holistic sense" (Ch. 4); "the subject of conscious experience must be a unity of a sort that is inconsistent with its being a whole consisting of physical parts." (Ch. 5) This conclusion leads to the central question of the book: "But what is this self?" (p. 146)

This question is answered in Chapter Seven, which develops Hasker's own view, Emergent Dualism. (Chapter 6 is a critical evaluation of problematic versions of Dualism: Cartesian, Swinburne-style, Thomistic, and Chapter 8 is an interesting survey of scenarios for postmortem life.)

Hasker takes care to discuss how he understands emergence. As I understand it, his view is that when "higher-level" properties emerge, they alter the laws according to which lower-level elements interact. (p. 176) Applied to consciousness, his conclusion is that consciousness is emergent in the sense that (in Searle's words) "consciousness could cause things that could not be explained by the causal behavior of the neurons." (p. 177) We can understand how consciousness could cause things that could not be explained by the causal behavior of neurons, says Hasker, if "consciousness should happen to be endowed with libertarian freedom."

As I understand Hasker's use of the idea of emergence, micro-elements, governed by standard physical laws, generate new emergent properties—properties with new causal powers—and the emergence of these properties produces new emergent laws that govern the interactions of micro-elements from then on in situations in which the new emergent properties manifest themselves. (pp. 171-8) (Emergence, I think, will have to be a brute fact of nature, not to be explained in terms of any laws: The new emergent laws cannot be implicated in explaining the emergence of the new properties, on pain of vicious circularity. The new emergent laws cannot explain the emergence of the new properties or else physics would have discovered the emergent properties by now.)

Property dualism, however, is not sufficient for Emergent Dualism. The Unity-of-Consciousness argument, says Hasker, shows that what is needed is "an emergent individual, a new individual entity, which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system." (p. 190) Although Hasker does not discuss substance emergence and its relation to property emergence, the mind is taken to be a substance produced by the human brain and not a separate element added to the brain from outside." (p. 189) The mind can be usefully compared to a magnetic field: a real,
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