

virtues cannot be separated from a foundation in the natural law (p. 176). After some pages by P. Hall on the old and the new law, Thomas Kobusch, writing on grace, notes that a philosophical order lies at the basis of the organization of the I-II.

Entering the second part of the book one encounters an essay by S. F. Brown on the historical background of the questions about the supernatural virtue of faith, while R. Cessario has some beautiful pages on hope. Thomas understands supernatural charity as friendship with God (E. Schockenhoff). As for the moral virtues a study by J. F. Keenan highlights the central role of prudence in moral life and its connection with the natural law. In his contribution about sins against justice M. Rhonheimer deals at length with the death penalty. The virtue of courage and the assistant virtues are examined in a classic way by R. E. Houser: the treatise on magnificence "is a finely sculpted arcade in Aquinas's intellectual cathedral" (p. 314). It pertains to the perfection of the moral good that one is moved to the good also by the sense appetite (p. 317). D. Fritz understands Thomas's theory of being tempered as having the habit of being moderately pleased as one is drawn to the use and enjoyment of food, drink, and sexual relations (p. 324), an incomplete way of stating what St. Thomas really held. In his essay on charisms and other spiritual gifts, S. Thomas Bonino points out that charisms are given to some so that they may help others. His discussion of the active and contemplative lives is excellent.

In the third part, Thomas F. O'Meara surveys the position of twentieth-century Dominicans with regard to the *Summa theologica* II. After 1930 important changes have taken place: historical research, biblical orientation, awareness of one's own time and history go hand in hand. R. Gallagher speaks of the casuist crisis but hopes for a recuperation through contact with Aquinas. C. G. Kossel recalls the role of D. O. Lottin and Jacques Maritain. Thomas S. Hibbs discusses developments in the last thirty years: proportionalism, the debate on the natural law, the retrieval of the virtues: John Finnis and German G. Grisez produce an unstable mixture of Thomistic and Kantian elements (p. 417). The proportionalists want to connect Thomas with utilitarianism. A last contribution by F. G. Lawrence discusses B. Lonergan's relation to Aquinas but is out of tune with the general character of the volume. The texts are followed by an index of thirty-five pages. The volume presents the ethics of Aquinas in an appealing way. Before the eyes of the reader the figure of Aquinas takes shape as a source of an incredibly profound, well-argued, and balanced ethics, arising as a lighthouse above the waves of turbulent and sometimes misty opinions of the history of moral thought. The book is admirably well organized, most major themes are treated; it is written in a modern and easy to understand language; and the scientific level of most papers is high. Especially noteworthy is that scholars of so many universities in the country and abroad have contributed to it, a guarantee of a promising future of Thomistic studies.—Leo J. Elders, *Institute of Philosophy "Rolduc," Kerkrade, The Netherlands.*

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RECK, Erich H., editor. *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. xv + 470 pp. Cloth, \$65.00—This anthology consists of fifteen philosophical and historical essays by different authors on the works of Frege and Wittgenstein and the relationship between the two. (The title is not meant to imply "and everything in between.") The essays are divided into four parts: (i) historical background and general themes, (ii) Frege's philosophy, (iii) ties between Frege's work and Wittgenstein's, and (iv) Wittgenstein's early thought.

The lead essay, by the editor, gives a thorough biographical treatment of the interactions between Frege and Wittgenstein—their in-face encounters and correspondence—providing a historical backdrop for the volume. Next, Gottfried Gabriel explores what Frege's philosophy took from Hermann Lotze, and, generally, what his work shared with the neo-Kantian tradition. Steven Gerrard ends part 1 by attempting to bring the "early" and "later" Wittgensteins closer together by presenting a revised reading of the dialectic of the *Tractatus* in line with the "New Wittgenstein" movement of Cora Diamond, James Conant, and others.

Frege's conception of truth looms large in part 2. Hans Sluga outlines seven chronological phases in Frege's thinking about truth, culminating in the bold conjecture that some of the argumentation in his 1918 "The Thought" was directed at Wittgenstein. Sanford Shieh addresses whether Frege's understanding of truth precludes him from employing semantic methods in explaining and justifying his logic, contrasting his reading with those of Michael Dummett and Thomas Ricketts. Marco Ruffino investigates Frege's understanding of value-ranges as logical objects and argues that Frege's identification of the truth-values with value-ranges, understood as a conjecture to be tested within his system of logic, is not inconsistent with his Platonism. Joan Weiner, in turn, tackles the difficult §32 of *Grundgesetze*, rejecting the standard interpretation that it is part of an inductive, metatheoretic proof that all signs of his logical language have a reference, and reading it instead as a series of "elucidations" designed to aid in the recognition of the referentiality of the primitive expressions.

Warren Goldfarb begins part 3 by challenging interpretations of the *Tractatus* that take it to be centrally concerned with remedying certain tensions within Frege's philosophy, as he questions the sophistication of Wittgenstein's understanding of Frege. Next, Danielle MacBeth summarizes what she sees as a fundamental divergence between Frege's inference-based theory of meaning and Wittgenstein's picture theory and suggests that it accounts for their smaller disagreements over judgment, identity, logical connectives, and the like. Thomas Ricketts focuses more narrowly on Wittgenstein's objections to Frege's understanding of truth-functional connectives and the judgment stroke, tracing them to the understanding of the sense of a sentence Wittgenstein developed in response to difficulties in Russell's theory of representation. Cora Diamond closes part 3 by placing Wittgenstein's discussion of truth and representation within a distinctly pre-Tarskian framework established in part by Frege and Russell and challenges the interpretation of the *Tractatus* as presenting a sophisticated correspondence theory.

In part 4, Ian Proops explores Wittgenstein's account of logical entailment as an internal relation between the structures of propositions as well as his criticisms of Frege and Russell on this topic. Juliet Floyd takes on Wittgenstein's early understanding of numbers and arithmetic, focusing on his understanding of operations and variables and alleging that it has a rarely appreciated centrality and importance. In his contribution, Matthew Ostrow connects Wittgenstein's claim that his work is an attempt to find a "liberating word" to help one attain release from philosophical puzzlement with certain dialectical moves present throughout the *Tractatus*. The volume culminates in James Conant's lengthy and long-awaited piece, "The Method of the *Tractatus*," which portrays Wittgenstein's method as derived from his understanding of philosophy as consisting both of elucidations (*Erläuterungen*) and of nonsense (*Unsinn*), placing it against the backdrop of similar struggles for Frege. Given its depth and comprehensiveness, this last essay is especially sure to be received as an essential read in the Wittgenstein literature.

Although they differ in quality and originality, together, these essays comprise an important contribution to the exploration of early analytic philosophy as a branch of the history of philosophy. It is a relatively recent phenomenon that the appropriate distance has been achieved to attempt to understand these thinkers on their own terms. The historical approach of this volume is admirable. This is not to say, however, that the thoughts presented here on truth, nonsense, and the like would have no insights to offer contemporary philosophers. There is some redundancy both among the essays in the volume and between them and previous works by the same authors; those on Wittgenstein are a tad slanted toward "The New Wittgenstein" interpretation, and, somewhat naturally, the volume puts disproportional stress on Frege as an influence on Wittgenstein vis-à-vis Russell and others, but these are small faults compared to its strong points.—Kevin C. Klement, *University of Massachusetts*.

RESCHER, Nicholas. *Minding Matter: And Other Essays in Philosophical Inquiry*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001. xii + 146 pp. Cloth, \$60.00; paper, \$21.95—All but three of the nine essays in this collection are reprinted from elsewhere, with varying degrees of modification. This volume is the thirteenth in the author's series of similar collections dating back to 1969. The three new essays are entitled, "The Rise and Fall of Analytic Philosophy," "Perspectives on Nature in American Thought," and "Nomic Hierarchies and Problems of Relativism."

There is no one theme or set of themes that holds this collection together as a unit. As a result, each essay is a more or less freestanding discussion. Other main topics from the earlier essays are the author's notion of conceptual idealism (that is, that the notion of what is real unavoidably always contains mind-invoking terms); the state of philosophy during and at the end of the twentieth century; the question of whether reasoning about values is circular; the burdens of human choice; and the

problem of deliberations becoming gridlocked in a democratic political society. As a result this reviewer can elaborate on only a few points striking his interests.

Rescher argues trenchantly that analytic philosophy collapsed of its own internal weight because it could not deliver on its own basic promises and purposes. Its motivating claim was that traditional, and especially metaphysical, philosophical questions and teachings were actual vacuous pseudoissues caused by the sirens of human language. The questions were not to be answered but rather simply dissolved in nothingness by the sharp tools of logic and language dissection advocated by the analytic philosophers. But unfortunately half a century of such efforts always left some residue of substantive philosophical concepts and questions still standing, no matter how long and how firm grained the analyses became.

On the positive side, the analytic philosophers have bequeathed posterity a plethora of different logical and linguistic methods of analysis which have lived on as an enduring part of the philosophical milieu. But Rescher also sees this as a potential obstacle, since by the end of the twentieth century both the substantive concepts and the methods of analysis in the house of philosophy have become so "fragmented" (an oft-used term—perhaps "pulverized" would fit better) that the impetus to continue may be threatened by the sheer complexities of both content and method.

But when he looks beyond the analytic tradition, Rescher sees another current emerging as the twentieth century ended, namely, the beginnings of a reemergence of holistic and systematic philosophy which is reminiscent of more traditional times. It is not clear precisely what he specifically has in mind here since no historical examples are given; perhaps Rescher's own work over the years could be a case point. The lack of specific cases is related to another feature of the new systematization claimed by the author, namely, that it is a group-generated development and not the product of a single prominent philosopher as in the past. But if so, it is difficult to see how holistic thinking in terms of systems could survive a group's tendency toward fragmentation, which is lamented so often elsewhere in these essays.

Another topic worth pointing to is Rescher's careful delineation of a common thought pattern, ranging between ultimate aims and particular rulings, which is to be found in both rationality and morality. The borderlands between facts and values, between science and ethics, are vividly and helpfully illuminated by the author's analysis. He even goes a step further (toward systematization?) when he suggests (pp. 86–8) that Peirce's pragmatic realism is fertile ground here, because of its incorporation of praxis, for an integral account of facts and values, a project which Peirce himself, for whatever reason, never explicitly developed.

If Rescher were to pursue this idea further, however, he would counter a systematic tension which arises from his notion of conceptual idealism in the title essay. For Peirce the real is what it is independent of what any one thinks about it. For Rescher's conceptual idealism must begin with one's own mind (since that is the only one of which one has direct awareness). To avoid the Cartesian egocentric predicament