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Research interests My main research interests lie in philosophical methodology and the prospects of ameliorative (or "guidance-directed") epistemology, on an individual as well as on a social level. Below are some of the research projects I have been involved in recently. SIMULATION IN SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY Years: 2009-2012 Hosts: Rutgers University and University of Copenhagen Description: In June of 2009, I joined the Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) as a post doc in a research project hosted by Rutgers University and University of Copenhagen. In the project, we try to incorporate and adapt simulation models from the social sciences for the purpose of experimentally approximating the epistemic value of various social practices. We will be particularly interested in the practices and features that are typically taken to be central to liberal democracies, such as free speech and disagreement. EPISTEMIC AGENCY Years: 2007-2009 Host: UMass Amherst Description: My Ph.D. project at UMass Amherst concerns the notion of epistemic agency, or what epistemic agents can do to attain their goals. More specifically, I identify a series of problems with traditional conceptions of epistemic agency - primarily pertaining to doxastic voluntarism and certain overoptimistic assumptions about reflective cognition - in light of experimental research in cognitive psychology. Then, I outline a more empirically plausible theory of epistemic agency by (a) providing an account of what constitutes a significant truth (i.e., a truth worthy of pursuit), (b) identifying the relevant actions of epistemic agency with the choices we make in allocating our limited epistemic resources in the pursuit of significant truth, and, finally, (c) survey some relevant experimental research with implications for how such allocations can be made wisely. CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS Years: 2004-2008 Hosts: Gothenburg University and UMass Amherst Description: My Ph.D. project at Gothenburg University concerned the viability of the primary method in contemporary philosophy, i.e., conceptual analysis. Starting out by tracing the roots of this methodology to Platonic philosophy, I (a) investigate the extent to which such a methodology makes sense when divorced from Platonic philosophy, and (b) develop a framework for what I refer to as constructive analysis, more in keeping with recent cognitive scientific research on categorization. I also show how this kind of analysis can be applied to the concept of justification in a manner that furthers the epistemological goal of providing intellectual guidance.