

**A few thoughts on proxy counterfactuals and cross world identity.**  
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*Abstract:*

The following sentence is a paradigmatic example of a proxy counterfactual:

(1) If I were you, I would go to the beach

According to Lewis (1973), these conditionals quantify over worlds in which the counterparts of the speaker and the counterparts of the addressee are the same. Such an analysis is problematic in that it fails to predict a number of properties of the construction. In particular, Lakoff (1972) noted the contrast here illustrated by (1) and (2), which is not just an asymmetry between first and second person pronouns but more generally a subject/object asymmetry, cf. (3):

(2)# If I were you, you would go to the beach.

(3) If you were me, you would go to the beach.

I will first try to make clear what is going wrong with sentences such as (2), identifying relevant restrictions on the use of pronouns/names in proxy counterfactuals. Then I will consider different ways to account for these restrictions, concentrating on whether a rigid designation/Kripkean analysis of cross-world identity is better suited than a counterpart/Lewisian analysis to derive the patterns of acceptability illustrated in (1) - (3).