

## On Knowing How to Take Aristotle's Kooky Objects Seriously

In several different passages Aristotle suggests that when, for example, Socrates becomes musical, a quite ephemeral object picked out by the expression, 'the musical man,' perishes. "This survives but that doesn't . . ." Aristotle writes in *Physics A7*; "the man survives . . . but the not-musical, or unmusical, doesn't survive, nor does the compound of the two, viz., the unmusical man." (190a17-21) Aristotle's idea seems to be that, whenever a concrete individual substance changes in any accidental way, several purely ephemeral objects – for example, seated Socrates and the seated man – go out of existence. At the same time, of course, several other equally ephemeral objects – including, perhaps, standing Socrates and the standing man – come into existence. These "accidental compounds," as Frank Lewis has called them,<sup>1</sup> or "kooky objects," as I have called them,<sup>2</sup> are, so to speak, the inevitable waste products of accidental change.

In some moods Aristotle goes out of his way to denigrate kooky objects, and their importance, as in *Metaphysics E2* at 1026b13-18. In other moods, however, Aristotle draws serious philosophical consequences from the idea that the masked man, for example, is only an accidental unity.<sup>3</sup> And sometimes Aristotle's mood on this matter seems to swing abruptly from disdain to serious interest. Thus, right after the *Metaphysics E2* passage just mentioned, Aristotle alludes to a serious philosophical puzzle about change that his "theory of kooky objects" or "TKO," as I shall call it, is equipped to handle.<sup>4</sup> So anyone who is serious about studying Aristotle needs to take a close look at his TKO.

In a stimulating and challenging paper, “Aristotle’s Theory of Descriptions,”<sup>5</sup> C.J.F. Williams claims that

Aristotle’s “kooky objects” are near relations of Russell’s “logical fictions.” (63)

Even from this brief quotation it should be obvious that Williams is someone who at least takes Aristotle’s TKO seriously. I shall try to show, however, that he takes it seriously in the wrong way.

My criticism of the Williams article follows on criticism offered long ago by Frank Lewis<sup>6</sup> and Nicholas White<sup>7</sup>. But my criticisms raise, I hope, a new and different sort of consideration. Appreciating that consideration should help us get clearer about the role of kooky objects in Aristotle’s thought.

In taking Aristotle’s TKO seriously Williams himself insists on re-interpreting it. He admits that his position on re-interpretation “may be said to presuppose a methodology which some interpreters of Aristotle will find controversial.” He explains his position this way:

. . . time and time again in philosophies of the past we find doctrines which, literally interpreted, seem to make claims about the nature of reality – what are still, I fear, often called “ontological” claims, but which in fact represent theses about the structure of our language. Clarity is to be obtained by reinterpreting these “ontological” doctrines as logical doctrines. (64)

It is not immediately obvious exactly what clarity Williams thinks we obtain by his re-interpretation. But at least this much is clear. Williams thinks that turning doctrines such as Aristotle's TKO into a theory about language, rather than a theory about things, will enable us to make philosophical headway in dealing with the puzzles and problems the theory was meant to solve. It is this claim that I shall contest. In the rest of my discussion I shall focus on the following thesis, which I take to formulate Williams's view:

(T) Although Aristotle does not actually present his account of accidental unities (his "TKO") as an account of the way singular referring phrases function in the language, it would have been better if he had done so.

To evaluate (T) we shall need, first, to get a little clearer about what Aristotle's TKO is.

### I.

Why might Aristotle have come to think that there are such things as kooky objects? There seem to be at least two plausible answers to that question. The first and more obvious one is that Aristotle's Greek, like modern English, has in it such referring phrases 'the musical man.' (I forgo amplifying this simple point.)

There is also a second line of thinking that might have encouraged Aristotle to countenance kooky objects. Aristotle moves back and forth so effortlessly between copulative and existential uses of the verb 'to be' that one can take him to accept what we could call "the Principle of Existential Addition." According to this principle, if Socrates

is seated, then there exists such a thing as *seated Socrates*. And if the dog is tired, then there exists such a thing as *the tired dog*.

What, then, is an accidental compound, or kooky object? Simply put, it is an individual substance plus at least one accident. The compound is to be understood as existing as long as, but only as long as, the substance exists and has that particular accident, or those particular accidents. Thus seated Socrates goes out of existence when Socrates stands up. And the blind man ceases to exist when the man in question regains his sight.

In explaining what I think Aristotle's concept of an accidental compound, or kooky object, is, I am deliberately running together what Frank Lewis calls the "Core Theory" and the "Extended Theory." (He can tell me later why my amalgam is a travesty.)

I have taken as my inspiration for the sketch of Aristotle's TKO to follow a passage Frank Lewis has called our attention to from Z1 – a passage which goes this way:

These things [namely, the walking thing, the seated thing, the healthy thing] seem more like beings [than do walking, being seated, and being healthy], since [*dioti*] there is something definite that underlies them (and this is the particular substance) . . . [1028a25-8]<sup>8</sup>

What I am drawing from this passage is principally the idea that there is an individual substance underlying each kooky object and that it is because of this [*dioti*] that kooky objects have the existence they have.

My account of Aristotle's TKO begins this way:

(1) Fa is an accidental compound iff: a is an individual substance such that

- (i) a is accidentally F; and
- (ii) it is simply because a is F that the entity, Fa, exists.

For example, *seated Socrates* is an accidental compound iff: Socrates is an individual substance such that

- (i) Socrates is accidentally seated; and
- (ii) it is simply because Socrates is seated that the entity, *seated Socrates*, exists.

(2) The F is an accidental compound iff: there is an individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally F; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is F that there exists the entity, the F.

For example, *the pale (one)* is an accidental compound iff: there is an individual substance,

s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally pale; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is pale that the entity, *the pale (one)*, exists.

(3) The FG is an accidental compound iff: there is an individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally F or accidentally G or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is F and s is G that the entity, the FG, exists.

For example, *the pale man* is an accidental compound iff: there is an individual substance,

s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally pale or accidentally a man or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is pale and s is a man that the entity, *the pale man*, exists.

Another example: *the musical pale (one)* is an accidental compound iff: there is an

individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally musical or s is accidentally pale or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is musical and pale that the entity, *musical pale (one)*, exists.

Lest you suppose that the second clause on the right-hand side of these biconditionals does no work, let me point out that it is the second clause of (1) that keeps Tiny Tim, the late entertainer, from counting as a kooky object, at least in this technical sense of ‘kooky object.’ I can myself testify from having seen Tiny Tim on the streets of New York City that he was anything but tiny. And it is the second clause of (3) that disqualifies the man with the martini, in Keith Donnellan’s famous example,<sup>9</sup> from counting as an accidental compound, since, as Donnellan tells us, he didn’t really have a martini in his hand anyway, although he was taken to have one.

Speaking of Donnellan, it is worthwhile noting that he distinguishes between what he calls an “attributive” use of a definite description and what he calls a “referential” use. In a very important way, Aristotle’s use of definite descriptions, it seems to me, falls somewhere between the two alternatives Donnellan identifies. Thus Aristotle seems to suppose that contextual cues and implicatures can fix a unique reference for ‘the F’ even

though there are several individuals or objects on hand that are actually F. Thus ‘The man has come to fix the xerox machine,’ like Aristotle’s ‘The man is seated’ might well be true and, in the context of utterance, ‘the man’ succeed in referring to Socrates or Sam Smith, even though there is no unique person on the scene who fits the description ‘man.’ In this respect, Aristotle’s use of definite descriptions is like Donnellan’s referential use.

On the other hand, Aristotle, unlike Donnellan, does **not** seem to envisage making a successful use of a definite description when the description isn’t even true of the person the speaker means to refer to, as in ‘The man with the martini is my friend,’ when what my friend has in his martini glass is only water. Aristotle thinks of a successful use of a definite description as using a description that is at least true of something really out there, even if it is only an accidental compound. In this respect his use of definite descriptions is like Donnellan’s attributive use. The implications of these points should certainly be followed up, especially in connection with puzzles like the masked man, but I cannot stop to do that here.

This last remark brings up the issue of time.<sup>10</sup> I want the verb ‘to be’ in the biconditionals I have formulated to be taken taken in the present tense, rather than understood timelessly. Of course, one could take those occurrences of ‘to be’ timelessly and then add in temporal variables (‘Fa is an accidental compound at t iff ...’etc) but doing that would at least complicate my presentation; perhaps it would raise additional issues as well. So I’ll stick with the present-tense reading.

You may be concerned about what ‘it is simply because’ amounts to in the second right-hand clause of (1), (2), and (3). I used to think it would have to express some notion

of necessity. But I don't find in Aristotle himself any backing for a modalized interpretation of the 'because' (*dioti*). I'm now inclined to say that all 'it is simply because Socrates is seated that the entity, Socrates, exists' assumes is this: The entity, seated Socrates, exists as long as, but only as long as, Socrates is seated.

To complete my sketch of the Aristotle's TKO I need to put in play the notion of accidental sameness (or sameness in the accidental sense of 'same'<sup>11</sup>). Jonathan Barnes once suggested that accidental sameness in Aristotle is just contingent, as opposed to necessary, identity.<sup>12</sup> On that view, to say that the man in the corner is only accidentally the same as Callias would be to say that the man in the corner and Callias are identical all right, but it is only a contingent fact that they are identical. For reasons in the literature on kooky objects,<sup>13</sup> this will not do. When Aristotle says that a is accidentally the same as b, he suggests that a is, in a way, not the same as b. Thus he says that if a is only accidentally the same as b, then a is not the same in being, or substance, or logos, as b. But contingently identical items (assuming that there are such things!) are in every way the same as what they are contingently identical with. What makes the identity contingent is just that it is a contingent fact about them that they are in every way the same. So Aristotle's accidental sameness is not contingent identity.

What then is accidental sameness? Here are my suggestions:

(4) a is accidentally the same as Fb iff: a is an individual substance such that

- (i) a is accidentally F; and
- (ii) it is simply because a is F that the entity, Fb, exists.

For example, Cicero is accidentally the same as *seated Tully* iff: Cicero is an individual

substance such that

- (i) Cicero is accidentally seated; and
- (iii) it is simply because Cicero is seated that the entity, *seated Tully*, exists.

(5) a is accidentally the same as the F iff a is an individual substance such that

- (i) a is accidentally F; and
- (ii) it is simply because a is F that the F exists.

For example, Socrates is accidentally the same as *the seated (one)* iff: Socrates is an

individual substance such that

- (i) Socrates is accidentally seated; and
- (ii) it is simply because Socrates is seated that the entity, *the seated (one)*, exists.

(6) The F is accidentally the same as the G iff: there is an individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally F or s is accidentally G or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is F that the entity, the F, exists and it is simply because s is G that the entity, the G, exists.

For example, *the seated (one)* is accidentally the same as *the wise (one)* iff: there is an

individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally seated or s is accidentally wise or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is seated that the entity, *the seated (one)*, exists and simply because s is wise that the entity, *the wise (one)*, exists.

Another example: *the seated (one)* is accidentally the same as *the man* iff: there is an

individual substance, s, such that

- (i) s is accidentally seated or s is accidentally a man or both; and
- (ii) it is simply because s is seated that the entity, *the seated (one)*, exists and also simply because s is a man the entity, *the man*, exists.

Before we dismiss the notion of accidental sameness as something too bizarre for serious consideration, it might be well to take note of a parallel notion once proposed, in a dialectical mood, by W.V. Quine. Quine suggested that the verb ‘is’ in the sentence, ‘The morning star is the evening star,’ might be taken to express a relation he called “congruence,” rather than real identity.<sup>14</sup> Congruence, it seems, would be at least a close relative of accidental sameness. Moreover, an Aristotelian should say that the morning star is accidentally the same as, but not identical with – that is, not the same in being as – the evening star.

## II.

One very important philosophical use to which Aristotle puts his TKO concerns applications of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Concerning identicals, Aristotle says, “. . . all that is predicated of the one should be predicated also of the other, and of whatever the one is a predicate, the other should be a predicate as well.” (152b25-28) Nicholas White formulates Aristotle’s principle this way:<sup>15</sup>

- (7) If  $A = B$ , then whatever holds of A holds of B too.

As Aristotle notes in connection with the notorious Puzzle of the Masked Man, (7) does seem to get us in trouble. The relevant facts are that, although Aristotle does not

know who the masked man is,<sup>16</sup> he does know who Coriscus is and Coriscus is the masked man. So Aristotle *does* know who the masked man is. So, since it holds of Coriscus that Aristotle knows who he is, it should also hold of the masked man that Aristotle knows who he is, even though, as we said at the beginning, it does *not* hold of the masked man that Aristotle knows who he is.

Aristotle's way out of the Puzzle of the Masked Man (see, e.g., 179a37ff) is to make clear that (7) requires true identity, that is, sameness in being, whereas

(8) the masked man is the same [person] as Coriscus

is false unless the sameness it reports is taken to be merely *accidental sameness*. Thus the fact that Coriscus is the masked man gives us insufficient reason to conclude that, since it holds of Coriscus that Aristotle knows who he is, so it therefore also holds of the masked man that Aristotle knows who he is.

Here is Williams's account of what is happening here;

“Octavian is the same as Augustus” would be taken by Aristotle as asserting identity in being or substance, as would “A square is the same as an equilateral rectangle.” But “the hooded man is my father” would assert merely accidental identity – sameness in substratum – and would not provide a license for *substituting* [emphasis mine] “the hooded man” for “my father” without change of truth value in any context. As in Russell's theory, so in Aristotle's, the obstacle to substitution is explicable in terms of the logic of definite descriptions. (64)

Williams's idea seems to be that, although there really are no such things as kooky objects, there are indeed accidental descriptions of "straight" objects. It isn't, then, that 'the masked man' picks out an object distinct from Coriscus, of whom it fails to hold that Aristotle knows who he is. It is rather that, in a suitable context, 'the masked man' has the logical force of a sentence, or clause, rather than the simple referential force of a proper name. Because 'the masked man' has this different logical force, it is not freely substitutable in all contexts salva veritate. That, Williams seems to think, is all we need say about the Puzzle of the Masked Man; and that, he supposes, is why we should take TKO to be about language rather than about ontology.

### III.

Ockham's Razor seems to give us a confirming reason for thinking that TKO had better be just about words, and not about persons or things. For surely TKO multiplies things well beyond anything that one could honestly call necessity.

In fact, the case for claiming that Aristotle's theory, taken neat, is an ontological extravagance is more difficult to prove than we might at first realize. Thus one might have supposed that, if Coriscus is a man, and the masked man is a man, and Coriscus is not identical with the masked man, then Coriscus and the masked man together add up to two men. But there is every reason to suppose that Aristotle would reject that inference. Coriscus is, after all, accidentally the same as the masked man, even accidentally the same man. Accidental sameness, we learned in *Topics A7*, is a variety of numerical sameness. So Aristotle's TKO does not have the unwanted consequence that there are more men (or more squirrels, or trees, or statues) than we might otherwise have thought.

Still, since, according to Aristotle, Coriscus and the masked man are not identical, they must be two objects, must they not?

I don't think so. Since accidental sameness is a variety of numerical sameness, Aristotle must suppose that there is no genuine count noun under which we can count Coriscus and the masked man as two things, rather than one. The point is not that Aristotle has no word as general in its application as the English words, 'thing' and 'object.' He does have such a word – 'pragma.' But he does not recognize 'pragma' as a count noun. For Aristotle there would be no determinate answer to the question, 'How many things are there in my study?' – that is, no number,  $n$ , such that there are exactly  $n$  things in my study and not  $n + 1$ , or merely  $n - 1$ .

Thus, although there is admittedly an air of ontological extravagance about talk of how the masked man perishes when Coriscus takes off his mask, that air of extravagance is quite as ephemeral as the kooky object itself. The charge of ontological extravagance does little to buttress thesis (T).

#### IV.

Still, for all I have yet said, Williams can go on insisting that puzzles of the Masked-Man variety are really about language, and not about persons or things at all. Thus he can simply deny that it is really true of that person, the masked man, that Aristotle fails to know who he is, just because he fails to recognize him behind the mask. The puzzle, he can say, is just a formal one. It concerns whether we can substitute 'Coriscus' for 'the masked man' in the sentence, 'Aristotle doesn't know who the masked man is.' Williams want Aristotle to say, "No, we can't," not on the ground that 'Coriscus'

and ‘the masked man’ pick out different objects, but rather on the ground that one of these expressions has a different logical force from that of the other.

To accept thesis (T) so easily, however, would be to ignore a wealth of related puzzles, as well as the strength and attractiveness of Aristotle’s TKO in its original, “ontological,” form. To see this, consider a more action-packed version of the Masked Man. Such a version is to be found near the end of the medieval epic, *Yvain*, or *The Knight of the Lion*, by Chretien de Troyes.

In the episode I have in mind,<sup>17</sup> the knight, Sir Gawain, clad in full armor, encounters his very best friend, Yvain, also dressed in armor. Neither recognizes the other. Worse, each takes the other for the hated enemy. There follows a fierce battle. (Eventually, I should add, the two knights exhaust each other, call a truce, take off their masks, and recognize each other.)

Chretien does not describe the suits of armor these two knights wear. But we can suppose that, whereas Yvain’s armor was shining, Gawain’s was rusty. Then

(9) Gawain wants to kill the knight in shining armor.

But

(10) Yvain is [the same person as] the knight in shining armor.

And

(11) It is not the case that Gawain wants to kill Yvain.

How can this be? Aristotle’s answer is clear. What Gawain wants to kill is the accidental unity, the knight in shining armor. He wouldn’t want to kill that particular

accidental unity if he knew it were accidentally the same as Yvain, since to kill that particular kooky object would include killing his very best friend, Yvain. But it is coherent for him to want to kill the one, all the while not wanting to kill the other, because he does not realize each is accidentally the same as the other.

If we were to insist, as Williams would want us to, that this puzzle, too, be treated as a formal one, and not a material one, we should presumably want to understand (7) as equivalent to something like this:

(12) Gawain wants this to be true: ‘I kill the knight in shining armor.’

Because of the quotational context, one could not infer, from (12) and (10), that

(13) Gawain wants this to be true: ‘I kill Yvain.’

There are, however, at least two problems with this formal treatment of the puzzle. First, (12), unlike (9), mentions an English sentence, and so is not equivalent to (9). Of course we could get rid of the mentioned sentence in favor of some other way to preserve referential opacity, as, for example, by saying, “Gawain wants it to be the case that he kills the knight in shining armor. However, a second problem would remain. It is the problem that (12) does not license the inference to

(14) There is someone whom Gawain wants to kill.

Yet (14) is surely true, as the fierce battle amply demonstrates.

Chretien makes clear that there is a knight whom Gawain loves, namely, Yvain, and there is a knight whom Yvain loves, namely, Gawain. But there is also a knight whom Gawain hates and wants to kill, who is, in fact, Yvain in shining armor; and there is a knight whom Yvain hates and wants to kill, namely, Gawain in rusty armor. Chretien puts it this way:

Clearly, as anyone could see,  
 They were ready to attack each other,  
 Lances high and ready,  
 Prepared to slash at each other,  
 To do all the damage they could,  
 And nothing held back. (ll. 6082-87)

Chretien's puzzle is thus not simply a puzzle about singular referring expressions. It is a problem about the persons who are the objects of these two knights' fierce hatred and undying love – the person each is so obviously trying to kill and the person each would not harm for the whole world. There is a person, x, whom Gawain is trying fiercely to kill; there is also a person, y, whom Gawain truly loves. There is also a person, z, whom Yvain is trying equally desperately to kill, and there is also a person, w, whom Yvain genuinely loves. Yet there are only two persons in all. How can this be?

Of course, in wanting to kill the knight in shining armor Gawain does not, as Marc Cohen once pointed out to me, simply want to bring it about that this kooky object perishes. No, in wanting to kill the knight in shining armor Gawain does not have a wish that would be satisfied by Yvain's simply taking off his armor (though, in the event, that

turns out to be a most happy outcome for all concerned, not least of all, for Gawain himself.

What Gawain wants is blood. In wanting to kill the knight in shining armor he wants nothing less than for the life functions of the knight in shining armor to cease—for his heart to stop beating and for his lungs to stop expanding and contracting. What he does not realize is that the only way that can happen is for Yvain's vital functions to cease.

Aristotle's TKO gives us, I think, an attractive solution to this puzzle. The solution competes well, I think, with current solutions to this sort of puzzle.

Compare, for example, Nathan Salmon's use of the idea of a "guise" in his *Frege's Puzzle*.<sup>18</sup> Salmon's suggestion is that it is a person or thing under some guise, or *qua* something or other, that we have an attitude toward. "The ordinary and familiar notion of *A loving B*," Salmon writes, "may then be identified with the existential notion of *A loving B in some way or other, or under some guise or other, or qua something or other.*" (105) An Aristotelian kooky object, we could say, is a straight person or thing cloaked in a Salmonian guise. But, instead of countenancing such cloaked objects as distinct entities, Salmon has us turn the two-place relation, 'a loves b,' into the three-place relation, 'a loves b under g.' In this case, '*a* wants to kill *b*' would presumably go into '*a* wants to kill *b* under *g*.' Thus we have to add guises to our ontology and they, I submit, are no less weird or ephemeral than Aristotle's kooky objects.<sup>19</sup>

According to Aristotle there are, in toto, only two persons here because *x* is accidentally the same as *y* (but not the same as *z* or *w*) and *z* is accidentally the same as *w* (but not the same as *x* or *y*) and accidental sameness is a type of numerical sameness. By

contrast, no formal “re-interpretation” of Aristotle’s TKO would leave us with any very good thing to say about Chretien’s Masked Men. In this respect, then, the original, “ontological,” version of the TKO is superior to the purely linguistic version Williams would have us substitute for it.

I conclude that it would **not** have been better if Aristotle had offered his TKO simply as an account of singular referring expressions. Thesis (T) is false.

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<sup>1</sup> See his “Accidental Sameness in Aristotle,” *Philosophical Studies* 42 (1982), 1-36, and his *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, esp. 83-140.

<sup>2</sup> Gareth B. Matthews, “Accidental Unities,” *Language and Logos*, M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 223-40.

<sup>3</sup> See *Sophistical Refutations* 24.

<sup>4</sup> The puzzle about change at 1026b19ff is discussed in Alan Code, “Aristotle’s Response to Quine’s Objections to Modal Logic,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 5 (1976), 159-86, and in Matthews, *op.cit.*, 236-37.

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophical Review* 94 (1985), 63-80.

<sup>6</sup> Lewis, 96-7n.

<sup>7</sup> White (1986), 478.

<sup>8</sup> Lewis, 95.

<sup>9</sup> “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” *Philosophical Review* 75 (1966), 281-304.

<sup>10</sup> As Marc Cohen has insisted to me.

<sup>11</sup> For stylistic reasons I sue ‘accidental sameness,’ instead of ‘sameness in the accidental sense of ‘same,’ throughout this paper. However, the more awkward expression is probably closer to Aristotle’s intention. (Cf. Gareth B. Matthews, “Senses and Kinds,” *Journal of Philosophy* 69 (1972), 149-57.)

<sup>12</sup> Review of Edwin Hartman, *Substance, Body and Soul*, in *Philosophical Books* 20 (1979), 59.

<sup>13</sup> See Matthews, “Accidental Unities,” 228-89, and Nicholas White, “Identity, Modal Individuation, and Matter in Aristotle,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 11 (1986), 477.

<sup>14</sup> “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic,” *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 12 (1947), 43-48.

<sup>15</sup> White, *op. cit.*, 476.

<sup>16</sup> In the interest of brevity, I am helping myself to the locution, ‘x knows who y is,’ which is not a literal translation of Aristotle’s Greek. In a more extensive discussion, I could, I think, justify this shortcut.

<sup>17</sup> New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 179-88.

<sup>18</sup> Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986

<sup>19</sup> Other relevant discussions would include Mark Richard, *Propositional Attitudes*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, and, of course, the challenging and pioneering work on “guise theory” by Hector-Neri Castañeda. See, for example, Castañeda’s *Thinking, Language, and Experience*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, especially Part III.