

Genocide, Mass Killing, and Intractable Conflict

Roots, Evolution, Prevention, and Reconciliation

The twentieth century, as many commentators have noted, was a century of great mass violence in which many millions of people were killed. During the second half of the century, much of this violence was within states, between groups differing in ethnicity, religion, political ideology and agenda, and power and privilege. The Minorities at Risk study noted substantial decline in the number of new ethnically based protest campaigns and rebellions since 1992, as well as a decline in the intensity of the ongoing ones (Gurr, 2001). But in spite of this observation, mass violence was very substantial in the 1990s, as is shown by the cases of Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Angola, Sierra Leone and other places in Africa, violence in the Middle East, and elsewhere. One might predict that with continuous great changes in the world in technology, information systems, values, social organization, and political systems; with great differences between rich and poor; with **globalization**, overpopulation, aspirations by groups for greater rights or self-determination; and with an increase in fundamentalism, conflicts and violence between groups will be a significant problem in the new century (Staub, 1999a).

In view of this prediction, the prevention of mass violence and especially intractable conflicts, **genocides**, and mass killings becomes an essential task. Beyond creating great human suffering at one place, conflict and violence between groups often spill across borders, threatening the security of other nations as well as the moral status of the international community, which is frequently passive, even complicit, in cases when some nations support the perpetrators. Social scientists can greatly contribute to the understanding of the origins, dynamics, and consequences of mass violence. They can and must also develop conceptions for and engage in efforts to bring about their prevention.

Intergroup mass violence is a broad category, with many acts and processes involved (see, for example, Brass, 1996; Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). It refers to two or more groups harming each other: minimally, one group acting against another, or two groups acting against each other, with these acts claiming a large number of lives. Acts by individuals who injure, kill, and murder may be considered intergroup violence when the individuals act as group members.

The focus of this chapter is on intractable conflict and on genocide/mass killing. It is surprising, in view of the significant connections between these two phenomena, that there has been relatively little integration in studying them (Brown, 1995). We will attempt to provide connections between the two realms as we describe their origins, dynamics, cessation, and prevention. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, which is central to political psychology, we will identify influences that operate at the level of the system: structural conditions such as power arrangements and institutions, current social conditions, cultural factors, and particularly psychological dynamics involving beliefs, values, feelings, and motivations shared by group members. We will then consider the prevention of genocide and intractable conflict. We will especially focus on the role of bystander nations, and on healing and reconciliation after intractable conflict or genocide, which are important to prevent their recurrence.

▲ **Definitions and Central Concepts**

Intractable Conflict

Conflicts between ethnic, religious, or political groups, societies, or nations, which arise when their goals, intentions, values and/or actions are perceived as incompatible (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Mitchell, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994), are an integral part of intergroup relations. They are usually over tangible matters involving territory, material resources, and access to opportunity, power, and privilege (Gurr, 2001). But many of them also involve and may become primarily rooted in intangible issues or psychological forces such as values, ideals, identity mistrust or perceived threat from the other (Ross, 1993; Staub, 1989). Our concern here is with conflicts that are intense and involve mass violence, like those in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics, in Turkey between Turks and Kurds, in Rwanda between Hutus and Tutsis, in Kashmir, and in the Middle East. These are the kind of conflict that have been described as protracted (Azar, 1990; Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1988; Crighton & MacIver, 1990), as enduring rivalries (e.g., Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Huth & Russett, 1993; Mor & Maoz, 1999), and as deep rooted (e.g., Burton, 1987; Mitchell, 1981). They have also been called ethnopolitical conflict or warfare (Chirot & Seligman, 2001). We will call these conflicts intractable, meaning that they involve mass violence and have not yielded to resolution either by negotiation or the use of force. We view intractability as the end point of a dimension. Kriesberg (1993, 1998b) identified the first four elements described here that place conflicts on the intractable end of this dimension, and Bar-Tal (1998) added the three that follow.

(1) Intractable conflicts are *protracted*. They last at least a generation, with many confrontations over time that generate much hatred and ani-

mosity. (2) They are *violent*. Not only soldiers or armed antagonists but also civilians (including women and children) may be killed, property destroyed, refugees created, and atrocities committed. (3) They are perceived as *irreconcilable*. The parties view their goals as radically opposite, adhere to them without compromise, and prepare for continuation of the conflict. (4) They demand *extensive investment*. The parties in the conflict make vast military, economic, and psychological investments in order to cope successfully with the situation. (5) They are *total*. Intractable conflicts are perceived as being over existential goals and needs, both material and intangible, involving many domains of individual and group life such as territory, resources, employment, identity, values, or religion. (6) They are of a *zero-sum nature*. The parties are reluctant to shift their own goals, they negate their rival's goals, and do not see possible compromise. Therefore, each party considers a gain by another as a loss, and a loss by another as a gain, and tries therefore to inflict losses on the opponent and prevent any gain (Ordeshook, 1986). (7) They are *central*, in two senses: first, in the psychological life of the individual group members, who are constantly preoccupied with the conflict in their thoughts and feelings (for example, a person may never feel safe from harm), and second, in public life, in the media, in the leaders' articulations, in its salience in the public agenda and debates. Members of the group are constantly involved with the intractable conflict, and it serves as an important consideration in individual and group decision-making. Totality, zero-sum nature, violence, and longevity are especially important indicators of intractable conflict (Doyle & Sambani, 2000).

Prolonged conflict has an immense effect on the parties involved. It generates a culture and ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Ross, 1998), becomes imprinted in the collective memories of the societies involved (Fentress & Wickman, 1992; Halbwachs, 1992; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994), and is handed down through the generations, solidifying hostility and hatred and supporting the continuation of the conflict.

Genocide and Mass Killing

Genocide and/or mass killing may develop out of conflict, especially intractable conflict, as in the case of Rwanda. But it may be perpetrated without real conflict between groups, as in the case of the genocide against the Jews. Some of the processes described below, such as devaluation and scapegoating, can lead to the selection of a group as an ideological enemy, even when there is no real conflict.

Genocide is an attempt to eliminate a whole group of people, either directly by killing them, or indirectly by creating conditions that lead to their death or prevent reproduction (e.g., starvation or preventing births). The UN genocide convention considers genocide to be acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. The extermination of political groups was not included

under the genocide convention but can nonetheless be considered genocide, although it has also been referred to as *politicide* (Harff & Gurr, 1990).

The genocide convention refers to the destruction of a group "in part" as genocide. However, killing large numbers of people without the apparent intent to eliminate a whole group may best be regarded as *mass killing*. The motivation for mass killing may be similar to that for genocide (see below), but it may also be primarily to intimidate and establish dominance either over a subgroup of society, by eliminating its leadership or intimidating its members, or over a whole society. Mass killing may also be an aspect of intractable conflict. In mass killing, the specification of who is to be killed may be less precise than in genocide. The number of people killed may be relatively small or large. A great deal of scholarly effort has focused on the definition of genocide (see, for example, Bauer, 1984; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Dadrian, 1974; Dobkowski & Wallimann, 1992; Fein, 1993; Hirsch, 1995; Kressel, 2002; Lemkin, 1944) as well as on naming mass killings (e.g., *politicide*; *democide*—see Rummel, 1994). A simple but effective definition was provided by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990, p. 23): "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other authority intends to destroy the group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators." Consistent with our view, this definition includes political groups under the term *genocide* and both direct and indirect means of destruction.

One benefit of a precise definition might be that when violence against a group is defined as *genocide*, the international community, moved by the moral imperative of the genocide convention, would be more likely to act to stop the killings. But a precise definition may also mean less feeling of obligation to act in response to "mere" mass killing. This was dramatically shown in 1994, when the international community, including the United States, strongly resisted identifying the ongoing extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda as genocide, apparently to avoid the moral obligation to act (des Forges, 1999; Gourevich, 1998; Powers, 2001, 2002).

An important reason to distinguish between genocide and mass killing would be to develop the best theory of the origins and prevention of each. However, the influences leading to them are usually similar. Genocide is often the outcome of an evolution, with mass killing a way station to it (Staub, 1989). For example, there were mass killings in decades preceding the genocides both in Turkey against the Armenians and in Rwanda against the Tutsis. While good theory can be the basis for assessing the conditions that predict the likelihood of group violence in a particular instance, the exact form of it is probably not possible to predict.

A number of scholars have offered categorizations of genocides. For example, Smith (1999) has proposed five types, with different primary motives: retributive (motivated by blaming victims and revenge), institutional (genocide that is routinized, part of conquest or warfare), utilitarian (its purpose some form of gain, as in the case of colonial domination), mo

nopolistic (to determine who will have power, who will rule) and ideological (the desire to create a perfect society, to eliminate all that is impure). Smith writes: "the most frequent source of genocide in the twentieth century has been the monopolization of power" (1999, p. 7). This is consistent with Fein's (1993) conclusion that demands by subordinate groups for greater rights and more resources have been the most frequent source of genocide since World War II. In such cases, genocide appears to grow out of conflict.

It is important to understand the driving forces behind a particular violent conflict, so that effective policy responses can be developed. But consistent with the preceding discussion, in our view it is best to develop a general conception of both origins and prevention, with careful application to specific instances. A general conception, combined with consideration of the specific elements of a situation, can best indicate which elements might be especially important in a particular instance.

▲ *The Origin, Dynamics, and Maintenance of Mass Violence*

On the basis of our own work (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000b, in press-a; Staub, 1989; 1996b; 1999a; in press-b; see also references) and the work of others (e.g., Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Dadrian, 1995; Fein, 1979, 1993; Harff & Gurr, 1988; Melson, 1992; Smith, 1999; see also Charny, 1999), we will describe societal conditions, psychological processes, and cultural elements that contribute to genocide, as well as mass killing and the usually mutual violence that is part of intractable conflict, referring to them as mass violence. The following analysis suggests a probabilistic conception: the more of the influences we describe are present and the greater their intensity, the more likely it is that extreme violence will occur.

Instigating Conditions and Basic Human Needs

Certain social conditions are frequent starting points. They have powerful psychological effects. They frustrate important needs, which eventually may give rise to psychological and societal processes that begin an evolution toward mass violence. It is primarily in the presence of predisposing cultural characteristics (see later section) that instigators are likely to have such effects.

Difficult Life Conditions

This is a summary term (Staub, 1989) to describe economic hardship, political tension and disorganization, and great and rapid social change that separately and especially in combination are potential starting points for processes that may lead to mass violence. These different social conditions

are grouped together because they can have similar psychological impact on individuals and as a result may generate similar social processes in groups.

As an example, difficult life conditions were greatly involved in bringing the Nazi party to power in Germany, the first phase of the genocidal process. Germany lost War World I, a peace treaty was imposed on Germany that reduced living standards and that Germans found humiliating, and there followed a revolution and system change, hyperinflation and depression, great internal political conflict, with private armies fighting against each other, and more (Craig, 1982; DeJonge, 1978; Staub, 1989). In Rwanda difficult life conditions and intractable conflict jointly exerted influence. There were severe economic problems, related to overpopulation and the substantial decline in the price of coffee and tin in world markets, Rwanda's primary exports. There were also deep political dissatisfaction and demands for change. There was also an intractable conflict between Hutus and Tutsis that turned into a civil war (des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 1999a).

Government or state failure has been described as a contributor to genocide (Melson, 1992; Harff and Gurr, 1990). A failing government means difficult life conditions, such as economic problems, or political disorganization and conflict that leaders are unable to manage. The failure impacts both the population and the leaders themselves. What may be regarded as government or state failure has preceded genocide in a number of instances, for example the Armenians in Turkey (Melson, 1992), Hitler coming to power in Germany, the Tutsis in Rwanda (des Forges, 1999).

Basic Human Needs

Difficult life conditions frustrate fundamental psychological needs. These needs are universal, although their exact form is shaped by culture, by the socialization of individuals and life experience in particular groups (Staub, 1989, 1996b, 1999b, 2001b, in press-b; see also Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990). One basic need is the need for security, to feel that oneself, one's family, important others, one's whole group are safe from physical as well as psychological harm and that they will have food, shelter, and other basic necessities for survival. Another basic need is for a positive identity, for oneself and, to the extent that one is dependent on or identifies with one's group, for the group as well. Still another is the need for a feeling of effectiveness and control, the ability to protect oneself and one's family and group from harm and to achieve important goals. Another need is for connection to other individuals, as well as a community or group. A less evident basic need is for a comprehension of reality that makes the world and one's own place in it understandable. Finally, people also have spiritual needs, for meaning and for transcendence, to go beyond themselves, which can be deeply frustrated by difficulties of life and violence.

Difficult life conditions make people feel insecure, ineffective, and not in control, with their sense of self diminished. People tend to focus on

themselves when life is difficult and feel disconnected from others at a time when they most need connection and support. Life problems, societal disorganization, and change generate challenge to traditional worldviews and frustrate the need for comprehension of reality.

Basic needs have an imperative quality. They demand satisfaction. If they cannot be fulfilled constructively, they will often be fulfilled destructively. That is, they may then be fulfilled at the cost of other people, or even at the cost of oneself, when fulfilling one need ends up frustrating another need. For example, needs for security, for effectiveness and control, and for maintaining a positive identity can lead to actions that bring forth reactions that lessen security (Staub, 1996b, in press-b). Instigators can give rise to social psychological processes in groups of people and to the evolution of societal beliefs that help fulfill basic needs but at the same time move the group toward turning against another group or, when there is already group conflict, intensify antagonism.

Conflict Between Groups

Conflicts can become violent and/or intractable with significant violence and can ultimately evolve into genocide. In an intractable conflict, a group considers its goals as of existential importance and views the other group as preventing their achievement (see Williams, 1994). The gap between conflicting goals is viewed as immense, not possible to resolve through compromise. Such perception may be generated speedily (see also Coleman, 2000) by words (statements about intentions or demands) or actions (embargo or attack).

But intractable conflicts may also evolve slowly through ideas that define the goals and interests of the two groups as contradictory (seeing one's group as exploited, discriminated against, or deserving self-determination or independence), as in the case of conflict between Palestinians and Israelis or in South Africa. The ideas (the epistemic basis to the conflict) may be initiated by a small group of people. They may lead to protest (Staub and Rosenthal, 1994) and then to violent actions to achieve group goals. The actions threaten the interests and security of the other group and create violent responses. Conceptualizations of the conflict or ideologies (see below) develop justifications and rationales but also further motivation for action. Group members become widely mobilized and committed to group goals.

An intractable conflict may begin with small-scale violence that claims life. Loss of life in a conflict has great emotional meaning, often being viewed as a result of the other group violating a fundamental moral code. The suffering caused by the violence is perceived as a collective issue, and the group takes the responsibility to treat and compensate the victims, to prevent the recurrence of physical violence, and to take revenge for it (Bart-Tal, in press-a; Frijda, 1994). Thus violent actions and retributions create

an escalating cycle. Over time one or both parties may lose all moral restraint. As conflicts become violent and as violence intensifies, the evolution may lead to war (Goertz & Diehl, 1993), to one-sided or mutual mass killing, or to genocide. Such violence, in turn, adds to the intractability of the conflict.

War increases the likelihood of genocide. The genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda took place in the context of a civil war, although during a cease-fire after seemingly successful peace negotiations (Des Forges, 1999; Staub, 1999a). Genocide may take place not against the enemy in the war but against a deeply devalued group or ideological enemy, as in the case of the Holocaust, which took place during World War II, and the genocide of the Armenians during World War I. War may provide a cover for such violence, the violence of war may lessen inhibitions, and the frustration of basic needs in war may add to the motivational base out of which genocide arises.

The preceding discussion primarily describes the nature and dynamics of intractable conflict. Its origins, and the conditions under which it is likely to lead to intense violence, will be further identified hereafter. One of them is a vital conflict of interest that is difficult to resolve. This may be partly for material reasons: territory needed by both parties for living space; scarce water supply needed by both groups; entrenched differences in power, wealth, and opportunity. It is also for psychological reasons: the territory being seen as part of the group's identity; worldviews or legitimizing ideology, claiming that the power differences are right (Sidanius & Tratto, 1998); a history of devaluation and fear of the other; hopelessness about the resolution of conflict by peaceful means; and evolving ideology and group beliefs that intensify enmity.

Frequently, conflict and difficult life conditions operate together. Structural conflict, such as inequalities in a society, may not be perceived as unjust and may not lead to action until life conditions contribute to the difficulties of life and intensify the experience of relative deprivation of an already less privileged group (Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney, & Vayrynen, 1999). Alternately, intractable conflicts create difficulties in life conditions. They are by their nature stressful, threatening, create uncertainty, and demand large economic and military investments (Bar-Tal, 1998). They make it difficult to fulfill basic needs, like the needs for security, positive identity and comprehension of reality (see Burton, 1990; Lederer, 1980; Kelman, 1990; Staub, 1989, 1999a, 1999b, in press-11).

Self-interest

Self-interest, or greed, can also lead to mass violence, even when the interests of one group, as historically defined, have not been in conflict with those of another group. However, one group now wants something that another group possesses. The want often expresses greed rather than need. A common historical instance is warfare for the sake of conquest. Self-interest has

often entered in the mass killing or genocide of indigenous groups. The dominant group may want the territory on which an indigenous group lives, without historical claim to the territory, either as living space or for economic development (Hitchcock & Tvedt, 1997). When European conquerors arrived in the Americas, the "conflict" consisted of the Europeans wanting what Native Americans possessed, such as gold or territory.

Psychological and Societal Processes and Cultural Characteristics That Contribute to Mass Violence

Persistent, difficult life conditions and persistent conflicts frustrate the fulfillment of basic needs (Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990; Lederer, 1980; Staub, 1989, 1996b, 1999b, in press-b). They give rise to shared psychological reactions and social processes in response to them, such as increased identification with a group, scapegoating and the creation of destructive ideologies, described below. These serve, in part, to fulfill basic needs, but may turn the group to use violence against another group. This is especially likely when societal or group culture has certain characteristics, which we will describe. The instigating conditions and cultural characteristics join in giving rise to violence-generating psychological and social processes.

Strong Identification with a Group

Instigating conditions make it difficult for people to stand on their own and to face the problems they encounter as individuals. People tend to shift away from an individual identity that has become burdensome, as they are unable to provide for themselves and their families or are confused by the political and social chaos around them or are threatened by the conflict with the other group (Kecmanovic, 1996; Staub, 2001b; Worchel, 1999). They turn to an ideological movement for identity, like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or increase their identification with an ethnic, political, or religious group they have previously been members of. Rather than being individuals, they become Nazis or communists, or more German, Serb, Hutu, Israeli, or Palestinian than they have been before (see also chapter 15). In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, people in the United States became more American. This strengthens identity and connection, provides some feeling of security, and helps fulfill the other basic needs as well. Then, as social identity theorists have suggested (Tajfel, 1978, 1981), individuals elevate their group, initially by psychologically diminishing the other through devaluation, and ultimately by harming the other (see Crighton & Maclver, 1000).

Scapegoating

Blaming the other group for life problems is a common psychological response that turns a group against another. Over time it becomes a societal

or group belief that the other is at fault. Believing that one is not responsible for economic and other difficulties of life strengthens individual identity, creates connection, since such blaming is a group process, and helps people gain a comprehension of current reality. The Germans blamed the Jews for the loss of World War I. The Nazis added to this by blaming them for the threat of communism, as well as any and all problems that affected Germans (Craig, 1982; DeJong, 1978). Hutus blamed Tutsis for economic and political problems in Rwanda, as well as for the civil war (des Forges, 1999; Staub, 1999a). When conflict leads to mutual harm-doing, it is common for each group to blame the other and not to acknowledge or even be aware of its own contribution.

Ideologies and Societal Beliefs

A seemingly universal effect of instigating conditions is the adoption or creation of an ideology (Cash, 1996; Galtung, 1990; Staub, 1989, 1999a). Ideologies are defined here as visions of ideal societal arrangement. People need positive visions in difficult times, but the ideologies that are precursors to group violence are destructive in that they identify enemies who stand in the way of the ideology's fulfillment. Such ideologies seem always to be present in genocide. Sometimes the vision describes an ideal arrangement for all humanity, such as communism, a "better world ideology" (Staub, 1989). The Cambodian communists, the Khmer Rouge, were guided by a belief in total societal equality (Staub, 1989). At other times it is nationalistic, in the sense of the desire to create one's own state or, more often in the case of genocide, to enhance its power, prestige, or purity. The Young Turks, the organizers of the genocide against the Armenians (Staub, 1989), had a vision of Turkey's renewed greatness. Often the ideology includes elements of both, as in the case of the Nazi ideology with its vision of racial purity as well as more living space for Germany (Hilberg, 1961).

Powerful groups often protect their power and privilege by developing a worldview or ideology—a legitimizing ideology (Sidanius & Pratto, 1998) or belief in comparative superiority (Gurr, 2001)—that makes it right for them to have power and privilege. As they act against the demands of a subordinate group, they are defending not only their privilege but also their worldview (Staub, 1989). Ideologies of development have been used to claim the land of and justify harmful actions against indigenous populations (Hitchcock and Twedt, 1997).

Ideologies are a form of societal beliefs. Societal beliefs, which develop in every society (Bar-Tal, 2000b), can provide building blocks for destructive ideologies. German anti-Semitism and desire for expansion were incorporated into the Nazi ideology. Societal beliefs are beliefs shared by members of a society on topics and issues that are of special concern for the society: goals, myths, collective memory, self-image, views of other groups, and so on. They contribute to the sense of uniqueness of the group (Bar-Tal,

2000b) and serve to make sense of as well as to create a shared reality (see also Mannheim, 1952). They establish commonality of perceptions, norms, and values, as well as foster interdependence and coordination of social activities. They also create collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal, 2001; Kemper, 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1994), serve as a basis for group members' identity, and provide direction and goals for individual and group behavior (Bar-Tal & Oren, 2000). Central societal beliefs represent a societal ethos (Bar-Tal, 2000b), a coherent picture of the society that guides choices made by individuals, explains and justifies decisions by leaders, and imparts legitimacy to the social system (see concepts of political culture, Almond & Verba, 1963, and cultural climate, Gamson, 1988).

A History of Devaluation

Intense hostility and violence between groups may not be possible, intractable conflict is not likely to evolve, without a sharp differentiation between "us and them" and intense devaluation of "them." Varied concepts have been used to describe devaluation, and a number of distinctions have been made among its types. One scholar, while acknowledging the contribution of societal problems (difficult life conditions in our terminology) in Germany, has suggested that a special form of devaluation, eliminationist anti-Semitism, was *the* cause of the Holocaust (Goldhagen, 1996).

Profound devaluation is present in all genocides. Intense devaluation is especially likely to contribute to genocide if the devalued group does relatively well in terms of material well-being and status, as was the case with Armenians in Turkey, Jews in Germany, and Tutsis in Rwanda, their relative well-being intensifying hostility in the face of instigating conditions (Staub, 1989, 1996b, 1999a). However, while devaluation is centrally important, it is one of a variety of conditions in the generation of genocide, as well as in making a conflict intractable.

The differentiation between "us" and "them" (Tajfel, 1978; Brewer & Campbell, 1976) and ethnocentrism, the tendency to accept the ingroup and reject the outgroup (Sumner 1906), are common human tendencies (see also chapter 16). Ethnocentrism is one basis for the devaluation of another group and for its exclusion from the normal human community (Bar-Tal, 1990; Brewer, 1970). Devaluation of another group can become part of a group's culture in response to a variety of situations: due to the differentness of the other; a group becoming more powerful and using and exploiting the other, which has to be justified; a group intent to create a separate identity, a likely source of Christian anti-Semitism as Christians separated themselves from their Jewish origins; difficult life conditions leading to scapegoating; or conflict between groups (Staub, 1989, 1996b; Wistrich, 1999).

Bar-Tal (1980, 1990) has described *delegitimization* as an extreme form of devaluation. It is an extreme negative categorization of a group, in five

ways: *dehumanization* (e.g., savage, primitive, monster), *outcasting* (e.g., murderers, thieves, psychopaths), *trait characterization* (e.g., aggressors, idiots, parasites), use of *political labels* (e.g., Nazis, fascists, communists), and use of *group comparison* (e.g., Vandals or Huns). In essence, delegitimization suggests that a group violates basic human norms and values and denies its humanity, which allows violence against them (see also Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 1973; Opatow, 1900; Staub, 1989, 1990).

Indigenous groups have frequently been the object of extreme devaluation (Almaguer, 1994; Beuf, 1977; Forbes, 1964), because of differentness, justification of exploitation and bad treatment, and so on. The devaluation has made them easy targets for violence, including violence motivated by self-interest. Often the names of despised animals have been applied to them. Familiar examples include Native Americans in the United States (Almaguer, 1004; Beuf, 1977; Staub, 2000a) and in the Americas in general and black people in South Africa, where apartheid was justified by seeing black people as primitive, inferior, savage, and backward (Cornevin, 1980; Lever, 1978).

Devaluation, and labeling of an adversary group, play an essential function in intractable conflict (see Kelman 1997; Rieber, 1991). They help explain to group members why the conflict erupted, why it still continues, and why it is violent. They justify the violence and destruction inflicted on the rival group (Bar-Tal, 1990). Cecil (1993) and Hunter, Stringer, and Watson (1991) showed mutual delegitimization of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, and Bar-Tal and Teichman (in press) Arab delegitimization in the Israeli society.

In cases of intractable conflict, the other often comes to be seen as a mortal enemy and the identity of one's own group as partly defined by its enmity to the other. Staub has called this an ideology of antagonism. This creates the zero-sum psychology described earlier, in which a loss to the other is seen as gain to the self. The ideal vision of the world is one without the group that is identified as the enemy. Hutu power, a movement in Rwanda with a "Ten Commandments" that called for violent action against Tutsis, exemplifies such an ideology of antagonism (des Forges, 1999; Staub, 1999a).

Past Victimization and Collective Memory

Groups that have suffered great trauma, especially great harm and violence inflicted on them, are deeply affected (Montville, 1993; Staub, 1998a). Since individual identity is deeply rooted in group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Bar-Tal and Staub, 1997), this is true not only of direct survivors but also of members of groups who have not been physically present at the violent events (Staub, 1998a). Trauma, and especially intense victimization, diminishes people. Even if they consciously know that they are not at fault, at some level they tend to feel that something must be

wrong with them as individuals (Herman, 1992; Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995) or as members of groups (Staub, 1998a; Staub & Pearlman, 2001). Otherwise, how could such horrible things been done to them? Their self-worth is diminished, their feeling of vulnerability is greatly enhanced, people and the world look dangerous. Their sense of security in the world and trust in people, especially in other groups, is greatly impaired.

As a result, groups that have suffered severe persecution and violence and carry unhealed wounds are more likely to become perpetrators under certain conditions. When they face conflict, whether continuing conflict with the group that has inflicted violence on them or new conflict with another group, they focus on their own needs and have difficulty considering the needs of the other. Since threat and danger look greater to them, they are likely to react more intensely than is required by circumstance. They may strike out to defend themselves, even when self-defense is not necessary. Through such a process they may become perpetrators (Staub, 1998a). Or by their actions they may contribute to the development and escalation of intractable conflict and thus to vicious cycles of violence. The woundedness of Jews as well as Palestinians is likely to have contributed to the ongoing cycles of violence between them.

Past victimization of a group can lead to self-perception as a victim (Mack, 1990). Groups encode important experiences, especially extensive suffering, in their collective memory, which can maintain a sense of woundedness and past injustice through generations (Halbwachs, 1992; Conner-ton, 1989). Volkan (1997) suggests that groups tend to focus on a chosen trauma, that becomes an important guide for future acts. Serb violence in the course of the breakdown of Yugoslavia is one example of the role of past victimization and collective memory (see Glenny, 1992; Denich, 1994).

The traumatic collective memories are used to provide interpretation for and meaning to contemporary events and experiences (Conner-ton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992; Kammen, 1991). In addition to insecurity, they can give rise to undue self-reliance, disregard of international rules, and violence as self-defense (Krystal, 1968; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rime, 1997). In extreme cases, past experiences may give rise to a siege mentality, a core societal belief that other groups have negative intentions toward the group, which stands alone in a hostile world (see Bar-Tal, 2000b). Russian society following the international intervention in a domestic war after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (Kennan, 1960) and Israeli society in the wake of anti-Semitism, the Holocaust (Liebman, 1978; Stein, 1978), and early Arab attacks seem examples of societies with such siege mentalities.

Strong Respect for Authority

For society to exist, there has to be respect for institutions and people in authority. But societies vary in their orientation to authority. Very strong respect for authority adds to the cultural potential for genocide (Staub,

1989; Kressel, 2002). People accustomed to follow seem to find it more difficult to stand on their own in the face of life problems or group conflict. They are likely to be more affected by them and to respond more by looking for leaders to follow and obey and by giving themselves over to a group. They are also less likely to oppose immoral, destructive policies and practices, allowing the evolution of violence to unfold. Finally, they are more likely to obey direct orders by authorities to harm others (Milgram, 1974).

Strong respect for authority may be part of the culture, and may be embodied in the hierarchical nature of institutions. For example, in Rwanda, authorities were appointed at many levels of society, starting with a small group of families in each village. The tradition of obedience to these authorities was an important reason for the participation by many members of the population in the killings during the genocide of 1994. People were ordered to kill at times as a form of customary communal labor (des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 1999a).

Monolithic, Nondemocratic Societies

The acceptance of varied beliefs, the free expression of views and public engagement with issues, and the access of all groups to the public domain makes it probable that there will be opposition to policies and actions that harm some group (Staub, 1989). This makes an evolution toward mass killing or genocide less likely. Pluralism also makes the transformation of conflict from one that is seemingly resolvable to one that is intractable less likely. Moreover, in repressive societies that are also traditional, great culture changes are especially difficult to integrate, thus frustrating basic needs (Staub, in press-3).

Research on democratic and nondemocratic societies has found that democracies are unlikely to engage in mass violence against a subgroup of their own population (Rummel, 1994, 1997). The greatest mass killings of the twentieth century have taken place in totalitarian societies, such as communist countries and Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent in less restrictive, authoritarian societies. According to Rummel (1994, 1999; see also Charny, 1999; Itilisuk & Wong, 2002), the more absolute the power of a government and the elite associated with it, the more likely it is to engage in what he calls *democide*, the killing of masses of people in war, mass killing, or genocide. There are many reasons for this; one is that in such societies attempts to redress grievances often lead to violent responses. Mass killing and genocide are least likely in *mature* democracies (Staub, 1999a), with pluralistic cultures, and institutions of civic society that help maintain fully democratic systems. Weimar Germany, where this was not the case, collapsed in the face of intensely difficult life conditions. In Colombia, where democracy is shallow, there has been great violence between different segments of society. In Argentina, where elected governments were regularly replaced by the military, and differences between rich and poor were ex-