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The Roots of Helping, Heroic Rescue and Resistance to and the Prevention of Mass Violence: Active Bystandership in Extreme Times and in Building Peaceful Societies

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Abstract

This chapter explores the personal characteristics of individuals, their immediate circumstances, the larger social situation, and how they join in shaping caring and helpful behavior. The active bystandership this chapter is concerned with includes saving the lives of endangered people as well as actions to inhibit the evolution of extreme violence against groups of people, such as genocide, mass killing, or terrorism. The chapter then considers ways to promote active bystandership to prevent violence between groups and develop peaceful societies. It describes work in Rwanda to help people gain an "experiential understanding" of the origins of group violence and avenues to prevention. It considers ways of humanizing the "other," healing from victimization, and the development of altruism born of suffering, generating moderate in place of extreme respect for authority, and developing constructive ideologies—visions of a future that can embrace all groups. The chapter then discusses the socialization of "inclusive caring" and moral courage. It considers positive values, and the notion of a "healing society," as part of the exploration of the evolution of harmony and peace.

Key Words: active bystandership, heroic rescue, prevention, constructive ideologies, healing, altruism born of suffering, evolution of violence, evolution of caring, inclusive caring, moral courage, experiential understanding

Active bystandership—a helpful, prosocial behavior—is of great importance both for individuals in need and for the improvement of society. In this chapter I will consider why people tend to remain passive when there is increasing hostility and violence against another group, usually a subgroup of their society, but also an opponent in a conflict. I will consider what leads some people to act under extreme conditions, such as a genocide taking place, to save lives, along with ways to increase resistance to increasing hostility and violence, promote preventive actions, and build peaceful societies. While changing the behavior of groups, cultures, institutions, and political systems normally requires the joint effort of many individuals, it is striking that even a single person can make a difference in whole systems, and even in the life of a society.

One example of this is Ron Ridehour. Ridehour was a soldier in Vietnam. He received basic training with other soldiers who were later at My Lai, where American soldiers, not finding enemy fighters, killed between 500 and 600 unarmed civilians—old men, women, and children. Having been told about this, Ridehour could not rest. In spite of the advice of his family that this was not his business, he wrote many letters to people in government, politics, and the media. This ultimately led to congressional hearings, newspaper reports, judicial proceedings, and engagement by the whole country, making other My Lais less likely. Another example is Joe Darby. On returning from leave, a fellow soldier at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq showed him the now famous photos of prisoner abuse. After struggling with his conscience, and consulting with

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others about a supposedly hypothetical matter, he slipped a disk with the photos under the door of a superior. He later came forward as the person who did so (Staub, 2011; Thalhammer et al., 2007). The uproar that followed made the continued abuse of prisoners, not only at Abu Ghraib, but also at other U.S. run prisons in Iraq, less likely.

On a smaller scale, single bystanders have had positive effects in many systems. A recent example I encountered was Lily Kruglak, a senior at Juniata College in Pennsylvania, who invited me to give a talk there to begin their genocide awareness week. She spent part of her junior year abroad in Rwanda, where she was immersed in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. She became deeply concerned with the prevention of genocide. On returning to her college she engaged faculty members, the administration, and other students to create a weeklong series of events. As part of it, over 200 students and faculty recreated the sequence of the events in the Rwandan genocide, acting as Hutu perpetrators, Tutsi victims, and bystanders, as well as Hutu victims such as the prime minister, who was assassinated on the day the genocide began, because it was believed that she would oppose it (des Forges, 1999). Kruglak's college is institutionalizing genocide awareness week. She graduated in 2011, and is going to Rwanda in 2012 with a couple of faculty members to do groundwork for the establishment of a program of study in Rwanda for students of her college.

I consider a bystander a witness, someone who is in a position to know what is happening, and is also in a position to take action (Staub, 2003). A passive bystander does not take action. An active bystander takes positive action to address a problem situation, a need, or to improve some state of affairs. Individuals as well as groups—a collection of individuals that make up a system, organization, or nation—can be passive or active bystanders.

Why a "position to know?" Because potential witnesses sometimes do all they can to avoid knowing, whether automatically or intentionally. For example, in one of our early emergency studies, a young man collapsed on the street as a passerby was approaching either on the same side or the other side of the street. Some people passing by on the other side, noticing the young man, immediately rushed over. Others hesitated and then either came over, or, by the time they might have decided to do so, others came to help. Some, looking and hesitating, slowly moved on, looking back occasionally. More striking than the results of our experimental

variations was the phenomenon that some passersby, after a single glance, looked away and never looked again. Some of these people turned off the street at the next corner (Staub and Baer, 1974).

When harmful societal processes are evolving, it can be quite easy for people both in that society and in the rest of the world who are in a position to know to avoid knowing. Usually, there is no compelling stimulus right in front of them. Within the country, the media can be prohibited from covering events, or they can give biased information justifying harmful actions. On the outside, information is often quite limited, since the media usually cover news to a very limited degree from obscure places—like Rwanda was before the 1994 genocide. While much can be learned from the Internet nowadays, to search for information requires already active motivation.

Intense violence against groups of people almost always evolves progressively. People learn by doing. Their own actions change individuals, institutions, the norms, standards, and morality of a society or a dominant group in it. The evolution is facilitated by the passivity of bystanders, both the witnesses within that society and in the outside world. There is usually only limited resistance in the course of increasing devaluation, hostility, discrimination, and violence against groups of people, whether it be a racial, religious, ethnic, or political subgroup of society that ultimately becomes the victim of extreme violence. There is usually little or no early response by outside groups and nations. Many internal and external bystanders may become complicit, going on with business as usual, cooperating and doing business with a dominant group or government in the course of the evolution of increasingly harmful actions against a targeted group. But when a genocide begins, when people are actually killed, a few people in the society become rescuers, endangering themselves, and often their families, to save lives (Staub, 1989, 2011).

We have learned a great deal in the last several decades about the influences that lead individuals to help others. Most of this knowledge is about individuals helping other individuals in a situation of direct, immediate need, and about people helping others when the danger to themselves is limited (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Some of it is about rescuers (Africa Rights, 2002; Fogelman & Wiener, 1985; Oliner and Oliner, 1998; Tec, 1986; Staub, 1989, 1997, 2011). A small amount is about outsiders, groups, or "bystander nations" as active bystanders (Staub,

2011; Thalhammer et al., 2007). To prevent genocide and other mass violence, and to create societies that make violence between groups unlikely and promote human welfare, requires many active bystanders, both internal and external: Leaders, educators and other professionals, the media, citizens, other governments. Heroic rescuers act in extreme times. One of the primary aims of this chapter is to consider how bystanders can be moved to act early, to prevent the evolution of increasing violence, to prevent "extreme times."

The aims of this chapter are:

• To discuss influences—personal characteristics, circumstances, and their combination—that lead people to help others, and especially how people become rescuers

• To briefly discuss the influences that lead to violence by groups against other groups and the forces that contribute to passivity by bystanders

• To consider principles and practices that can move witnesses/bystanders, members of a population including leaders, who are neither perpetrators nor chosen targets, as well as parties external to a group or society, to act early (a) to inhibit the evolution of increasing hostility and violence, and to prevent violence; and (b) to build harmonious, peaceful societies

• To consider socialization and experience that promote inclusive caring, altruism born of suffering, and moral courage—and thereby active bystandership

The Role of Personality and the Situation in Leading to Help/Rescue, Resistance and Prevention

It is a truism in psychology that behavior is a function of people's personality and the situation they are in. In recent social psychology, the focus has been on the situation as a primary influence on action, in particular on moral actions such as evil, goodness, helping, and heroic helping. The obedience to the experimenter in administering shocks in Stanley Milgram's (1974) obedience studies, the aggressive behavior of the guards in the Stanford prison study (Zimbardo, 2007), the influence of the presence of other bystanders affecting emergency helping in Latane & Darley's (1970) research have all been interpreted with a focus on the power of the situation.

Yes, situations can be powerful. But except for the most powerful of situations, they exert their influence through personal characteristics that give rise to the motivation for action. Personality and values also had a role in Milgram's study (Kohlberg & Candy, 1984), and it appeared to have a role in Zimbardo's work (Carnahan & McFarland, 2007). Most of the time circumstances exert differential influence on people as they activate relevant personal characteristics. This has to be true in complex life situations when out of many people a very few take action, or when someone acts in spite of seemingly powerful forces to inhibit action. This was the case for Joe Darby, Ron Ridehouer, as well as the German major who persuaded his superior not to destroy the village of LaChambon, whose inhabitants saved many lives (Hallie, 1979). For motivation to be expressed in action—and to some extent even to arise—people also need to have certain "supporting characteristics" (see below). Circumstances can also activate powerful social norms, or inclinations probably held by most people, such as responding to the need of a young child drowning in shallow water.

The Personal Origins of the Motivation to Help/Rescue, Resist, or Prevent Violence
Moral Values, Caring and Empathy

There seem to be two primary personal sources of the motivation for unselfish helping: Moral values such as justice, the rights of individuals, and the sanctity of life (*moral orientation*), and caring about others' welfare and feelings of empathy, or sympathy with people in distress or danger (*caring orientation*). In addition, fear of negative reactions by other people for not helping, adherence to community standards of behavior, the desire for approval and gain, and the intention to generate positive reciprocity can all motivate helpful behavior.

While I discuss separately the influence of the situation, personal orientation and context are usually deeply intertwined in this influence. A family history of volunteering, membership in religious organizations, and civic participation all make volunteering more likely (see Dovidio et al., 2006; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). The groups people enter depend partly on who they are, but they in turn exert substantial influence. People enter terrorist groups often through relatives, friends, or acquaintances who are already members, and in the group, members exert powerful influence on each other (Sageman, 2004; Staub, 2011). Context is especially important in affecting passivity or action in complex situations involving societal events.

While there have been discussions of whether acting according to either moral values or caring feelings such as empathy are unselfish and true altruism, this is a definitional discussion, and not especially important for our purposes. It is true that people can feel distress about not living up to their moral values, and conversely feel good about doing so. They can likewise feel empathic distress seeing someone suffer, and empathic satisfaction in another's increased well-being. But apart from "personal distress," an empathy-like response that people can terminate by escaping from exposure to others' distress (Eisenberg et al., 2006), these enduring personal dispositions *can* motivate people to help without consideration of personal gain, material or emotional. And it is part of our nature to feel good after having helped if we possess such dispositions.

People with moral or caring orientations may consider how bad they will feel if they do not help, or how good they will feel if they do help. But since my primary concern here is whether witnesses to others' need will or will not become "active bystanders," this is a problem only if the resulting help is dictated by the needs of the helper, and therefore potentially unhelpful, rather than the needs of those who are to be helped. Since rescue, resistance, and preventive actions in the situations I am focusing on require committed, persistent action, it also matters whether these personal dispositions represent different potentials for these. The relationship of both types of "unselfish" dispositions to helping is apparent in the findings of laboratory research (see Dovidio et al., 2006; Hoffman, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Penner et al. 2005; Staub, 1978, 2003, 2005). They are also apparent in long-term, committed helping in real life, such as by Christian rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

Moral values represent commitment to principles. Caring feelings connect human beings to each other. Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that some rescuers were primarily motivated by moral values, such as justice, seeing what was done the Jews as unjust, others by empathy, often deciding to help after they saw cruel actions against Jews. However, certainly the same person can have a combination of these two orientations. Such a combined moral/caring orientation appears to be the source of powerful motivation to help.

PROSOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Such a combination seems represented in what I have called a prosocial value orientation. Prosocial orientation combines, as indicated by the measures used to assess it, concern about the welfare of other people, which is a likely source of empathy, a positive view of human beings, and a belief in and feelings of personal responsibility for others' welfare (see Staub, 1974, for a study using a set of previously existing measures, and Staub, 2003, and its Appendix, for a measure specifically developed to assess it). Empathy and sympathy are emotions that can change with shifting circumstances. They can also be ends in themselves, felt without giving rise to action. Moral values can be subverted by changes in their position in a hierarchy of values (see discussion at the end of the chapter). That a combination of beliefs, attitudes, and values that make up prosocial orientation is an important source of helping is consistent with the view and findings (Penner et al. 1995) that a combination of characteristics make up a prosocial personality and is associated with helpful action.

Responsibility has strong action implications. Staub (1974) found that people with a stronger prosocial value orientation provided more help to a person in physical distress. On hearing sounds of distress from another room, they were more likely to go into that room. If the distressed person came into the room where they were working on a task, they were likely to help more in both less effortful ways (such as accompanying the person to another room to rest, or calling a roommate to come and get a prescription filled) and in a more effortful way, by going to a pharmacy about 10 minutes away fill the prescription (at which point they were told that this was a study of helping). People with such an orientation were also more likely to help a person in psychological distress, or to a women upset about her fiancé breaking off their relationship and refusing to give an explanation (Feinberg, 1978; Grodman, 1979; see Staub, 1978, 1980). In another study using self report measures, people with strong prosocial value orientations reported more helping in a variety of ways (Staub, 2003). Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that rescuers from all around Europe had a stronger prosocial orientation, characterized in similar ways, than people in a control group who, under similar circumstances, did not rescue.

Prosocial value orientation was also positively related to constructive patriotism, negatively to blind patriotism (Schatz, Staub & Levine, 1999), and also negatively to aggression in boys (Spielman & Staub, 2000). Moral reasoning that focused on one's responsibility was also associated

with people stopping to administer shocks in Milgram's obedience studies (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Moral values, empathy, and prosocial orientation may have a role in people having strong negative feelings about harm-doers. The motivation of many rescuers included anger at the Nazis (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec, 1986). Resistance and prevention could also be motivated by negative reactions to harm-doers and their actions.

The role of responsibility has also been stressed by Latane and Darley's (1970) interpretation of their findings that diffusion of responsibility is one of the reasons that each person is less likely to help in an emergency when other bystanders are present, and by my interpretation of varied findings that circumstances that focus responsibility on a person make helping more likely (Staub, 1978). For example, first graders, when they were told that they are in charge in case anything happens while they are working on a task, were more likely to attempt to help in response to sounds of distress from an adjoining room (Staub, 1970a). Either circumstances or personal beliefs and associated feelings can focus responsibility on a person.

Inclusive Caring, Moral Courage and Spontaneous Helping

I will discuss in the section on socialization two personal orientations that make active bystandership more likely, especially in resisting and attempting to prevent the evolution of violence towards a subgroup of society, as well as building harmonious societies. One of them is *inclusive caring*, caring that expands beyond "us" to "them" (Staub, 2003, 2005, 2011). It is possible, and all too common, for children and adults to learn to care about the welfare of people who are part of their group, however that is defined, but to also learn to draw a line at the boundaries of the group so that their caring does not extend to other people. This is especially so in relations to members of groups that are devalued, seen in a negative light, the object of prejudice. Adults often teach children in both direct and implicit ways to not to care about such people. People are likely to vary a great deal in the extent they care about others' welfare, the extent their caring is inclusive, and what groups it extends to. Does it extend to all humanity, and are devalued groups included in their categorization of who is human? Morton Deutsch's notion of the scope of justice is relevant to my conception of inclusive caring: "The narrower one's conception of one's community, the narrower will be the scope of situations in which one's action will be governed by considerations of justice" (Deutsch, 1985, p. 37). I would add, the less will a person's moral consideration and caring expand to other people. The concepts of moral exclusion—and inclusion—are also relevant (Staub, 1989, 2011; Opotow, 2012).

Another important contributor to helping in the face of adverse conditions is *moral courage*, the courage to act on moral values and caring emotions in spite of potential negative consequences. Since the negative consequences can be disapproval, ostracism, and at times also physical harm, moral courage at times has to include physical courage.

"Supporting Characteristics" Relevant to Active Bystanderhip

There are a number of other individual characteristics that are important for motivation to be expressed in action, or even for motivation to arise. One of them is *competence*, both feelings of effectiveness and actual competence, such as the ability to swim to save a drowning person or to generate plans of action. The relationship between prosocial orientation and self-reported helping of varied kinds substantially increased when it was combined with people's belief that they have the capacity to influence others' welfare (Staub, 2003; see also Staub, 2005).

Role-taking capacity is another important characteristic related to helping (Eisenberg et al., 2006; Staub, 1979). It would be expected to relate to helping only if the motivational tendencies I described are present. Without the capacity to consider others' situation, needs, and feelings, and the potential impact of circumstances on them, the motivation to help would only be activated when the need is blatant. Or it may arise in response to inaccurate assessment of others' need, so that the behavioral response, if any, would not be helpful. The joining of role-taking with motivational dispositions would be especially important when situational cues are subtle and complex, as in the early stages of the evolution of violence in groups. Limited, low-intensity actions against a target group, such as mildly devaluative statements or discrimination that is not blatant, do not call attention to themselves. Noticing them, considering their impact on the targeted people, and the ability to foresee where they might lead—a kind of "societal role-taking"— would be required for action. The public education we conducted in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo to promote understanding the origins of group

violence, which I will describe below, can contribute to such role-taking.

People also greatly vary in their ability to judge and decide about the meaning of events. In an early study, people who were slow in reporting the movement of a light were also much slower and/or less likely to report that when they entered a room a man was taking his hand out of a lady's handbag and speedily left the room (Denner, 1968). Perhaps at times people resist engaging with events because deciding what they mean is difficult and conflictual for them.

It may be another aspect of decision making that made some people with *marginality in their community* more likely to become rescuers (London, 1970; Tec, 1986). This finding is sometimes questioned, based on the interpretation that it means that rescuers were disconnected from other people, which is not the case (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Marginality simply refers to people being different in some way—a Catholic in a Protestant community, having one parent from another country, having an unusual personality. One famous rescuer, Oscar Shindler, was marginal in that he was a German who lived in Czechoslovakia, and a Protestant who married a Catholic women from another village. Raoul Wallenberg, the Swede who saved many Jews in Hungary, was marginal in that he was a member of a poor branch of a very rich family (Staub, 1989, 1997).

Being different from others in a group can make people less identified with the group, and less embedded in the group's way of thinking. This makes it more possible to use a critical consciousness, to form independent judgments. In many European countries an existing and often deep-seated anti-Semitism (Fein, 1979) was freed from its constraints by the German persecution of Jews. Marginality, when combined with relevant motivational characteristics, could free people not to adopt and to go contrary to such group attitudes. A critical consciousness, or independent judgment, is essential for people to become active bystanders in the course of the evolution of increasing hostility and violence against a group.

The Influence of the Environment/ Circumstances in Leading to Passivity or Action
The Influence of Immediate Circumstances

Already embedded in the discussion above was the role of the situation. Latane and Darley's (1970) seminal research (and subsequent research)

on bystander behavior in emergencies identified many influences in the immediate situation. The number of people present reduces the likelihood of help by any one person. Presumably, one reason is diffusion of responsibility. Another is pluralistic ignorance—people not showing their feelings in public so that when they look around and see others unconcerned, they decide not to act, or even that there is no reason to act. Pairs of young children, who talk to each other when they hear sounds of distress, help more (Staub, 1970b). These are important inhibitors in societal processes, and in autocratic systems, when people don't exchange information about harmful actions against a devalued group.

Facing an emergency alone focuses responsibility on a person to help. Being in a leadership role in a group also focuses responsibility, and makes it more likely that the person will help (Myers, 2010). Roles are aspects of situations (but over time can shape personality). Having others nearby with relevant expertise, such as a doctor when someone seems to be ill, makes it less likely that people will help. In group situations many people tend to see leaders and public figures as responsible for taking action, making them less likely to act (Staub, 2011).

Other bystanders are an aspect of the situation, and bystanders greatly affect each other's behavior. The passivity of some bystanders makes others' passivity more likely (Latane & Darley, 1970). In Milgram's (1974) studies, others' words and actions substantially affected whether participants continued to administer shocks. In one of my studies (Staub, 1974), as two people were working together on a task, one of them, a confederate, said one of a variety of things when there was a crash and sounds of distress from another room, which greatly affected the behavior of the actual study participant. When she said, "I don't know what that is, perhaps it is another experiment, it probably doesn't have anything to do with us," 25 percent of the participants attempted to help. When she said, "that sounds bad, you should go in and check, I will go and find the person in charge." and left the room through another door, the other person went to check what happened 100 percent of the time. Bystanders can influence others by defining the meaning of a situation, and the appropriate action, focusing responsibility on others to act—and even by simply calling attention to a situation such as the persecution of some group.

When the situation exerts extreme power, everyone can be affected. Most of the time, however,

people's response depends on their personal dispositions. For example, the "bystander effect" is less likely, or does not happen, with people who have a feeling of personal responsibility to help (Schwartz and Clausen, 1970). Their values and beliefs are activated by others' need, and presumably focus responsibility on them even when others are present.

THE IMMEDIACY OF THE NEED, THE ACTIVATING POWER OF THE SITUATION

There are many different kinds of situations that require helpful actions or active bystandership. On one end of a dimension are situations that allow time for deliberation and slow, reflective decision making, such as volunteering (Dovidio et al., 2006; Penner et al., 2005) or taking action to improve conditions in a society. The need might be great, but the response need not be immediate. Even rescuers' decision to hide someone often allowed time for deliberation. At the other extreme are situations that require split-second decisions, such as a person jumping on train tracks to pull someone out of the way of an oncoming train, or someone rushing to catch a child falling out of a four-story window—both real actions. I have called such actions *spontaneous helping* (Staub, 1978) and proposed that people who help this way have the personal characteristics that can motivate helping, as well as supporting characteristics required to move from motivation to action. Given their readiness, in response to powerful activation, decision making is short-circuited, leading to immediate action.

An alternative view might be that people hold moral prototypes, such as caring, just, and brave prototypes (Walker, Frimer & Dunlop, 2010), and that these are associated with different behaviors, such as helping, moral courage, and heroism (Osswald, Greitmeyer, Fisher & Frey, 2010). The latter authors found that activating the just prototype led participants in a study to be more willing to volunteer for a discussion with imprisoned right-wing extremists, in their view an indication of moral courage. It is possible that a child falling out of a window activated for the helper the brave/heroic prototype, leading to brave action. In either case, there is a motivational disposition present, providing a form of readiness.

Many rescuers reported that they made instantaneous decisions to help. For example, Madame Trocme, the wife of the pastor Andre Trocme, in the French Hugenotte village LaChambon, reported that when the first refugee appeared at her door, she immediately invited this person to come in. However, Madame Trocme and other villages were to some degree prepared already, as they had engaged in a number of small acts of resistance to the Nazis (Staub, 1989). Subsequently, under the spiritual leadership of her husband, the villagers saved several thousand refugees, the majority children (Hallie, 1979).

But are such reports of instantaneous decisions accurate? People learn by doing and change as a result of their actions not only in the negative but also in the positive direction (Eisenberg et al., 2006; Staub, 1979, 2003; Whiting and Whiting, 1966). They are likely to come to value even more the welfare of people they have helped, and over time probably also the welfare of people in general. They come to see themselves as helpful people (Grusec et al., 1978). This is especially the case when they have helped people for a long time at great cost and facing great danger, and when afterwards they are honored for their actions (although sometimes they are ostracized). When rescuers are interviewed about their actions many years later, they are probably quite different from the already caring people they were many years before.

Still, with many rescuers reporting such instantaneous decisions, they cannot be discounted. Possibly speedy decisions were made more likely as people were exposed to someone facing great danger, while the threat to themselves, however significant, was at least temporarily in the background. Moreover, inviting a person into the house, and other such initial acts, may have been only the first steps toward making the actual commitment to rescue.

Some heroism requires immediate *physical bravery*, but not moral courage. Nobody is likely to oppose a person trying to catch a child or someone drowning in the river. Other actions, such as rescue, require both, if they involve acting contrary to current community standards. Early opposition to the evolution of violence against a group requires mainly moral courage. At a later time, as leaders and their followers develop increasing commitment to violence, it requires both moral and physical courage.

The Impact of the Larger Social Situation and Its Interaction With Culture: The Origins of Group Violence and Passivity

Even in directly facing someone's need—a person having an accident, a sudden illness—people are affected by the larger social context. The values

of the community or society they live in, the level of crime in a society which may make them concerned that someone appearing to need help is a ploy (Staub and Baer, 1974), the seeming ethnicity or race of the person and society's attitude toward that group, and many other aspects of the "larger situation" affect helping.

In a society moving toward or engaging in violence against a subgroup of society or another group, there are powerful social forces that can inhibit resistance and opposition. The starting points for great violence between groups, such as genocide, mass killing, or even terrorism, are usually one of two kinds of "instigating conditions." (The brief description of the origins of group violence that follows is based on Staub 1989 and Staub 2011). First, it can be difficult life conditions in a society: economic deterioration, great political upheavals and confusion, great and speedy social changes, or a combination of these. Second, it can be persistent and seemingly intractable and violent conflict with another group. Both of these frustrate basic psychological needs in large groups of people, for security, a positive identity, feelings of effectiveness and control over important events, positive connection to other human beings, and an understanding of the world and of one's place in it.

Feeling vulnerable, the group becomes especially important for people, intensifying their identification with it, or if their group does no address their needs, with some other, usually ideological, group. As part of a group they scapegoat another group for life problems or blame the other for the conflict. They help create or adopt ideologies that provide hope, such as nationalism, racial superiority and a world ruled by the superior race (themselves), purity, total social equality, or others. These ideologies are destructive in that they identify enemies who stand in the way of its fulfillment. Scapegoating and the creation of and pursuit of destructive ideologies are group processes that satisfy basic needs—but do so destructively. (For the theory of basic needs, derived and modified from Maslow's (1971) theory, see Staub, 1989, 2011, and especially 2003). In protracted, violent conflict between groups, each side comes to see itself as right and moral, the other side as responsible for the continuation of the conflict and immoral.

As the group turns against the scapegoat or ideological enemy, an evolution of increasing hostility and violence can begin, steps along a "continuum of destruction." As individuals and the group engage in harmful actions, they "learn by doing"

and change in ways that make greater violence easier and more likely. They justify their actions by further devaluing people they harm. They habituate to each level of harm-doing. Moral disengagement can also make harmful actions more possible (Bandura, 1999). This can be followed by the exclusion of a group from the moral realm (Fein, 1979; Opotow, 1990, p. 212; Staub, 1989), and then by moral transformation, facilitated both by learning by doing, and the "higher" ideals of an ideology that make killing the people in the targeted group the right thing to do (Staub, 1989, 2011).

The existence of certain cultural characteristics and political conditions in a society makes the evolution of violence more likely. These characteristics and conditions also create a "cultural tilt" in bystanders, making bystander action less likely. One of them is a history of devaluation that "preselects" a group as the scapegoat or ideological enemy. In difficult times, when people very much need their group, they will be less likely to oppose their group for the sake of people who they have learned to see in a negative light. Another is past victimization of the group or other great group trauma that makes members of the group feel vulnerable and the world seem dangerous. This can lead to unnecessary "defensive violence" in response to a new threat, and it also makes it less likely that people oppose their group for the sake of an "other." Overly strong respect for authority, often accompanied by the absence of pluralism and an autocratic system, is another characteristic that makes it less likely that people think for themselves, and that they resist harmful leadership and oppose harmful group processes.

Witnesses or bystanders need their group in such difficult times for the fulfillment of basic needs. As they remain passive, they distance themselves from victims, thereby reducing their empathic suffering. They also need to justify their passivity; like perpetrators, bystanders tend to do this by increasing devaluation of the victims. All this makes opposition difficult and increasingly unlikely. Perpetrators interpret the passivity of bystanders as affirmation. In the case of protracted, violent conflict, the evolution is furthered by reciprocal violence.

Leaders and elites that become a vanguard propagating scapegoating and destructive ideologies, their followers, and passive bystanders all contribute to the unfolding of the evolution of increasing violence. Prevention requires active bystanders, both to resist influences that lead to violence and to promote positive processes. It requires constructive

responses to instigating conditions (e.g., generating a constructive ideology), as well as addressing the cultural characteristics that make violence probable.

The influences and processes I just described make the passivity of "internal bystanders" understandable, even if not acceptable. But "external bystanders," outside groups or nations, have also usually remained passive. Nations have not considered themselves as moral agents. They have tended to focus on their national interests, including commercial interests, and this often leads to complicity in continued business relations with an increasingly violent government. In addition, international conventions and "laws" of noninterference in other countries' affairs have been supporting, even demanding, inaction. These conventions have been changing, but the tendency to blame victims, preoccupation with one's own interests and affairs, and only slowly evolving international conventions without enforcement mechanisms remain powerful hindrances to constructive bystandership by nations. While the UN General Assembly passed "Responsibility to Protect," a resolution that proclaims that if nations don't protect their citizens it is the responsibility of the international community to do so, it has no enforcement mechanisms.

Personal Goal Theory:
Personality-Situation Interaction Revisited

A society moving toward violence against a group represents a powerful situation. Still, personal goal theory may help us better understand why even people with strong moral/caring orientations remain passive (Staub, 1978, 1980, 2011). According to the theory, every person has values, and related goals, which they can arrange in a hierarchy according to their importance. However, this is not a stable hierarchy. Particular circumstances can have strong activating potentials for particular values and goals. Under their influence, these values and goals move higher in the hierarchy, thereby lessening the influence of other values and goals. Values of caring and morality can lose their power when circumstances activate and move to dominance other values.

In a study relevant to personal goal theory, each participant, while working on a task, was exposed to the psychological distress of another person working next to them. The distress was due to a boyfriend/fiancée breaking off the relationship

without any willingness to talk about the reason for it. This happened either the day before (high need), or a year earlier (low need). Participants with strong prosocial values and weak achievement values responded when the need was strong by stopping to work on the task and paying attention to this other person as she described her distressing experience. These participants also liked this person and were interested in continued interaction with her.

People with strong achievement values and weak prosocial values, when the other person's need was high, continued to work on the task, while they also talked a substantial amount. They paid limited attention to the person in distress. Talking a great deal to a highly distressed person who is trying to tell her story, while continuing with one's ongoing activities, does not seem especially helpful. Perhaps because it interfered with their work on the task, they liked the distressed person less and believed less that her distress was genuine. People with such a combination of values also talked a substantial amount to the person is need when this person's distress was limited. In both conditions their achievement motivation was apparently dominant, leading them to focus on their task (Feinberg, 1978; see Staub 1980). Possibly event their talking to the distressed person was motivated by wanting to do well

According to the theory, moral and nonmoral values and goals form a single hierarchy. Nonmoral values can be dominant over moral ones in some people's hierarchy. Achievement, or advance in one's career, can be more important to some people than moral values, or can become dominant under particular activating conditions.

Relevant to how values that lead to immoral actions can become dominant is the concept of *moral equilibration.* "Facing a conflict between a non-moral motive and a moral value, a person may reduce the conflict by . . . a shift to a different moral value or principle. For example, the moral principles that prohibit killing or harming other human beings are replaced by the principle of 'social good,' defined (by Nazis) as protection of the German nation from internal subversion or genetic contamination by Jews. Or loyalty and obedience to authority may become the relevant moral principles. . . . . Although this can happen consciously, moral equilibration often occurs without awareness. . . . A preconscious or unconscious equilibration circumvents moral conflict. As people progress along a continuum of destruction, moral

equilibration becomes more automatic" (Staub, 1989, p.147).

Research findings by Leidner and Castano (2012) on *morality shifting* support the above conceptions. They found that when Americans read about atrocities committed by members of their group, U.S. soldiers, they shift in their "moral foundations." They focus on principles of loyalty and authority, rather than the normally prevalent focus on harm and fairness. This does not happen when they read about atrocities committed by members of another group, such as Australian soldiers. This shift is demonstrated only by people who glorify their group. The authors see such a shift as an automatic response to a threat to identity and to one's moral status as a member of one's group. In terms of personal goal theory, members of one's group engaging in immoral acts activates and raises in the hierarchy values of loyalty and authority over genuinely moral values, which in turn can lead to justification of the immoral acts. Such value shifts can make active bystandership to oppose harmful practices or to promote peace and harmony less likely.

These processes are relevant to every potential helping situation, but they may be especially powerful in complex, multidimensional situations in the real world. Like everyone else, people in leadership positions, such as government officials, are affected both by the immediate situation they face and their overall context. Their context can elevate loyalty to a policy, an ideology, or a leader over moral and caring values, and shape perceptions and actions. A relevant case is described by Power (2002), as she details the struggles of Peter Galbraith, a government official active in Iraq at the time of the Iraq-Iran war, to reach a judgment about ongoing events.

The United States was supporting Iraq in the war both materially and diplomatically, even as Saddam Hussein's military was using chemical weapons both against Iran and against Kurdish villages within Iraq. In this context it was a great challenge to come to the judgment that—contrary to Iraq's claims that the chemical weapons were used by Iran, and Washington's disinclination to acknowledge the truth—it was Iraq doing this. The training of leaders, for example, as in the projects in Rwanda I will describe later, may help promote "accurate" judgment, by creating awareness of how their context can automatically shift their values, perceptions, and actions.

Promoting Early Action in the Service of Prevention, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding

How can active bystandership be generated that begins early, so that it prevents the evolution of violence? There are a variety of influences that can move people to preventive actions. They include the following: Coming to know and understand the influences that lead to violence; humanizing previously devalued groups; generating constructive ideologies that join people to work for shared goals; healing from past group victimization, from the trauma and persistent psychological and cultural wounds that result from violence; and promoting moderate respect for authority, respect that is contingent on the actions of authorities more than on their position. Just as multiple influences give rise to violence, the more positive influences are present, the more likely they are to move individuals and groups to constructive action.

Understanding the Origins, Impact, and Prevention of Mass Violence

Members of a society, including leaders, don't usually know what leads to genocide or mass killing, or why conflict is intractable and cannot be resolved. In Rwanda, after the genocide was stopped, the most common explanations of it were "bad leaders" and "ignorance." Learning about the influences that lead to group violence can create awareness of the importance of early events in its evolution, and thereby give rise to motivation for action. Understanding can also shift motivation, for example, by realizing that groups become the targets of violence not because they are objectively "bad," but because of long-standing negative views of them that are part of a culture or society.

In our work in Rwanda, my associates and I have conducted trainings—workshops or seminars—about the origins of violence and its traumatic impact. After the first training we also included exploration of avenues to healing and reconciliation. We did this with varied groups: members of local organizations that worked with groups in the community, members of the media, high-level national leaders, community leaders, and members of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission—a government organization that was responsible for promoting reconciliation in Rwanda. The groups ranged from about 25 to over 60 participants.

We evaluated the impact of the first training qualitatively, as well as experimentally "once removed" on members of newly created community groups that were led by facilitators we trained. In comparison to control groups, people in these community groups showed a variety of lasting effects 2 months after the end of the training they received. They had lower trauma symptoms; Tutsis and Hutus had more positive attitudes toward each other; they felt empowered, believing that if they understood how violence comes about they can act to prevent it; and they expressed "conditional forgiveness" (Staub et al., 2005; see also Staub et al., 2010). Varied aspects of our procedure seemed to contribute to these effects. First, the information about origins was central. Second, examples we used of instances of mass violence around the world, showing Rwandans' common fate with other people, appeared to affirm the participants' own humanity. Third, participants were asked to apply the conception to Rwanda, which seemed to create, beyond knowledge, an "experiential understanding." Fourth, Hutus and Tutsis engaging with each other in discussing the conception of origins and applying them to their own situation was an important form of contact (see below).

To expand the impact of this work, we developed educational radio programs, both radio dramas and informational programs. A radio drama about conflict between two villages, *Musekeweya* (*New Dawn*), began to broadcast in Rwanda in 2004 and is still ongoing. It presents instigating conditions for conflict, the role of a leader and followers, as well as attempts by positive bystanders to prevent hostility and violence, an attack by one village on another, retaliation, and continued hostility. It has a love story, a village fool/wise man, and many other aspects of entertainment education. Progressively, over years of broadcasting, the story moves to reconciliation between the two villages. Then the villages join to prevent violence in response to new threats in the region. Embedded in the story is information about the origins of genocide and other mass violence, prevention, and reconciliation, guided by "communication messages" derived from research and theory about group violence (see Staub, 1989, 1996, 2003, 2001), as well as about trauma and healing (Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995; Saakvitne et al., 2000; Staub, 1998, 2011).

An experimental evaluation (with complex procedures, since the radio drama was broadcast in the whole country and soon became highly popular) showed a variety of positive effects (Paluck, 2009,

Staub and Pearlman, 2009; Staub, 2011). In comparison to six control groups in which participants listened to a different radio drama, participants in six groups who listened to the radio drama for a year expressed more empathy with varied groups—survivors of the Rwandan genocide, perpetrators, bystanders. They said they would say what they believed, and contrary to members of the control groups, actually did so. They showed more independence of authority (see later). They reported more reconciliation behaviors, engaging with members of the other group, in contrast to people in the control group who advocated reconciliation but did not personally engage as much in such actions.

Some of the findings show more positive bystandership by participants, others suggest that people exposed to these influences would have greater readiness for active bystandership. The finding in the first study of more positive attitudes by Hutus and Tutsis toward each other shows that our procedures contributed to the next element I will discuss as an important contributor to positive bystandership, humanizing devalued others. The lessened trauma in our first study, and some trauma-related findings in the second study, also show the positive influence of these procedures with regard to another important element, healing. (For a detailed description of these projects and the findings of the evaluation research, see Staub, 2011).

Humanizing the "Other"

A history of devaluation of a subgroup of society makes it probable that the group will be selected as a scapegoat and/or the ideological enemy in difficult times. As harmful actions begin and intensify, they are justified by increased devaluation, moral exclusion, and in the end by *moral transformation* that can even make killing all members of a group the right thing to do. A similar but mutual process can take place in the course of increasingly violent conflict between two groups (Staub, 2011). Humanizing members of the other group, developing more positive attitudes toward them, ideally before violence begins, can help prevent violence. Seeing others as human beings, with hopes, need and aspirations similar to one's own also makes active bystandership in the service of prevention more likely.

We can humanize other people by what we say about them. Words have great power, and most people learn to devalue others through words about

them and negative images of them, rather than direct experience. But words and images can also work in a positive direction. In providing a positive image of already devalued others, it seems best to base this on real information about the group and real actions by them, such as talking about Hutus who endangered themselves to save the lives of Tutsis during the genocide (Africa Right, 2002). Another example is what journalists from varied ethnic groups did in Macedonia. They jointly interviewed families from different ethnic groups and published articles in the newspapers of the various groups showing similarity in everyday lives, concerns, and strivings (Burg, 1997).

However, the media often dehumanize members of some groups, thereby contributing to violence. In Rwanda, the media, both newspapers and especially radio, relentlessly advocated against Tutsis (des Forges, 1999). In Amsterdam, relations between the Dutch and Muslim immigrants had started to deteriorate before 9/11. It deteriorated greatly after 9/11 and after terrorist attacks in Europe carried out by Muslims. The killing of a Dutch journalist and filmmaker by a Muslim man in 2004 because of a film he made about the treatment of women in Muslim societies resulted, in a normally peaceful society, in the burning down of mosques, Muslim schools, and churches (Staub, 2007). In 2005 a major newspaper had a full-page picture of a women government minister and an Imam, the minister reaching out to shake the Imam's hand, but the Imam holding his hand back. The subscript by the newspaper was about the disrespect he showed, not the minister's disrespect of his religion, which prohibited him from shaking a women's hand (Staub, 2011). The power of the media and of leaders is great in increasing the devaluation of members of other groups, or extending respect to them and humanizing them.

Positive images, such as symbolic actions by leaders, can make a difference. Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands in front of the White House was a powerful image. However, only concentrated action in varied realms can humanize the other. Such an action will have limited effect if, as it was the case in both countries but especially among the Palestinians, children are still taught highly negative images of the other group.

As both social psychologists (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and people working in real-life settings (Chirot & McCauley, 2006; Varshney, 2002) have found, contact between people is a potentially highly important avenue to coming

to see the humanity of the other. While varied conditions of successful contact have been specified (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), probably the two most important ones are (1) deep rather than limited and superficial engagement, and (2) that contact be successful in leading to some positive outcome. The positive outcomes can range from personally satisfying interactions to success in achieving the goals of joint efforts. Dialogue between members of hostile groups can be a valuable form of contact (Staub, 2011). Some research even shows that deep engagement in a positive imaginary interaction with a person belonging to a different group—for example, on a train discussing a book—improves attitudes toward that group (Crisp & Turner, 2009). Imaginary encounters may also be effective starting points for real interaction.

Societies also humanize subgroups if they create constructive ideologies, visions, and practices that embrace all groups, and if they provide equal rights and equal access to the public domain. This makes it possible for members of all groups to express their beliefs, values, and concerns as part of public discussion, and to speak (be active bystanders) in their own behalf.

Creating Constructive Ideologies

Ideologies—visions of social arrangements and human relations—can give people hope in difficult times. They can replace an understanding of reality that people feel were disconfirmed by difficult life conditions or persistent conflict. The visions people adopt often do not address the real problems the group faces, but elevate the group, or call forth unrealistic ideals and aspirations, while identifying enemies who stand in the way. Being part of an ideological group or movement can fulfill basic needs for security, identity, effectiveness, and connection, but they do so destructively because they lead to turning against supposed enemies, and often ultimately lead to harm to the group itself (Staub, 1989, 2011).

Constructive ideologies are inclusive, and while they embrace ideals, they also address existing realities. By including all groups in a society in their aims, they humanize each group (Staub, 2011). The work programs in the United States at the time of the Great Depression helped improve the material lives of many people (Alter, 2006). But they also expressed the ideal that everybody belonged to the national community. Israelis and Palestinians could develop a vision of an economic community

that would promote peace not only between them, but also in the region.

Seemingly positive ideologies can be problematic, depending on how they are used. In Rwanda the power is in the hands of the Tutsi minority, led by those who fought against the Hutus and stopped the genocide. The government proclaimed an ideology of unity: there are no Hutus and Tutsis, this division was created by colonial powers, we are all Rwandans (Staub, 2011). It is true that differentiation between Tutsis and Hutus was greatly enhanced by the Belgians as a colonial power (des Forges, 1999). But the differences have been longstanding (Mamdani, 2001), and they remain deep-seated after the genocide. The government has aimed to eliminate discrimination and thereby group divisions. But proclaiming unity and making it difficult for people to talk about issues between the groups, and even passing laws that punish vaguely defined divisionist speech and genocidal ideology, interferes with processes of reconciliation (Staub, 2011). It would be constructive to foster rather than dictate unity, and to allow people to identify themselves as Rwandans, but also as Hutus or Tutsis, to hold "dual identities" (Dovidio et al., 2009).

Generating and promoting positive ideologies requires active bystandership. In turn, they can generate more active bystandership. We human beings are greatly affected by ideas, and especially ideas that express ideals, the possibility of betterment of community and life (Staub, 2011). Individuals can work on generating social movements involving positive ideals by simply talking to other persons; by promoting them in their churches, Rotary groups, or other civic organizations; by advocating them in the media or on the Internet. By supporting each other in such efforts, people can maintain commitment and persistence.

Healing From Psychological Woundedness, and Altruism Born of Suffering

People who have been victimized, whether as individuals or as members of a group, tend to feel vulnerable and see the world as dangerous. Under conditions of new threat, whether by difficult life conditions or another group, they are more likely to feel the need to forcefully defend themselves, even if this is not necessary. Using unnecessary force, they become perpetrators (see Mamdani, 2001; Staub, 1998, 2011). Healing from past victimization makes this less likely. Healing can also make it less likely that past victimization or trauma

becomes a "chosen trauma," a persistent focus for individuals or groups (Volkan, 2001), an important part of their identity and culture, shaping their perception of and responses to events (Staub, 2011).

There has been substantial recent research in psychology on "victim consciousness" (see Vollhardt, 2012, for a review), the representations of past victimization in beliefs held by members of a group. Survivors of violence and their descendents can have varied types of victim beliefs, which have important correlates. The more Israelis believed that their group has suffered injustice and is vulnerable, the more they endorsed aggressive policies toward Palestinians (Maoz and Eidelson, 2007). "Competitive victimhood," the belief that one's group suffered more than one's opponent, was associated with less forgiveness in Chile and Northern Ireland (Noor et al., 2008).

Leaders who instigate hostility may simply be intent on gaining followers (Allport, 1954), but they may also be affected by their group's (or their own) past traumas. In addition to victims and survivors, perpetrators, especially people who kill (McNair, 2002), even if they do so a soldiers (Maguen et al., 2009), are also traumatized. Even passive bystanders can become psychologically wounded. At the very least, perpetrators and bystanders will have undergone transformations in personality, such as changes in moral orientations and reduction in empathy.

How can groups of people heal? Since the violence that is the focus of this chapter is perpetrated by groups, and people are victimized in groups, group approaches to healing are likely to be most effective. People can engage with their traumas in small groups, supporting each other (Herman, 1992). Guiding them using a RICH approach (Saakvitne et al., 2000) may be helpful. The RICH approach consists of Respect, meaning in part to grant people control over what they talk about and respond with empathy and support; Information, such as information about how the violence comes about and its impact; building Connections among people and reconnection in the community; and Hope, strengthening spirituality and hope about the future.

In societies where, as a result of extreme violence, just about everyone is wounded—like Rwanda—promoting person-to-person empathic engagement can help. In our educational radio dramas we show people recognizing behaviors that are signs of trauma, and engaging with each other, telling their stories and empathically responding

(see Staub, 2011). Testimonials by people about their experiences, talking about them in supportive groups, and commemorations can be useful approaches to healing. Commemorations will be most beneficial if, in addition to helping people engage with loss and grief, which by itself can sustain trauma, they also introduce a vision of a better future that generates hope, as well as a shared future if previously hostile groups continue to live together (Staub, 2011).

As people begin to heal, they are more able to focus on others' experiences, and to become active bystanders in relation to the need and distress of others. Healing can contribute to *altruism born of suffering* (*ABS*) (Staub, 2003, 2005). This concept refers to the phenomenon that, contrary to the commonly held view that victimized people become aggressive or dysfunctional, many people who have been victimized or suffered for other reasons appear to want to help others and prevent others' suffering. Surprisingly, perhaps, in one study, people who previously reported that they have been harmed, either as individuals, as members of a particular group, or in natural disasters, were more helpful than people who have reported no suffering (Vollhardt & Staub, 2011). They expressed more concern, empathy, and feelings of responsibility to help people

who have suffered from the tsunami in Asia in 2004, and volunteered more to collect donations for them.

Previous theory (Staub, 2005) and analysis of a substantial body of research that had incidental findings relevant to altruism born of suffering (Staub & Vollhardt, 2008), suggested experiences that help transform victimization or other suffering into altruism. They include having been helped at the time by someone, having been able to help oneself or others at that time, support and care by people after suffering (or before, in the course of socialization and development), healing experiences, and having began to help others, which then leads to learning by doing and further helping (Staub, 2005, in press; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; see Figure 33.1). Helping at a time of victimization or other suffering can both protect people and show them that there is caring in the world, thereby contributing to altruism born of suffering.

Groups of people who have suffered can also show altruism born of suffering. This is very important, since active bystandership by groups is usually required to effectively help other groups in need or danger. Constructive or inclusive victim beliefs, in contrast to exclusive victims beliefs that focus on the suffering of one's own group (Vollhardt, 2009),

Suffering + Experiences promoting psychological change → Psychological processes → Altruism born of suffering


Fig. 33.1 Experiences and Psychological Changes Leading to Altruism Born of Suffering.*
From Figure 1, Staub and Vollhardt, 2008.

may contribute to ABS. Brysk and Wehrenfennig (2010) viewed linking their group's suffering to suffering by leaders and intellectuals as important. They noted that American Jews were highly active both in the civil rights movements and in attempting to stop the violence in Darfur. The Japanese American Citizens' League, which combated discrimination against Japanese people and brought about the recognition of their interment during World War II, and compensation for it, challenged the legality of illicit detention of Arab Americans after 9/11.

As with individuals, so with groups, learning by doing can move them to increasing and persistent positive bystanderhip. For example, the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo in Argentina first demonstrated after their children's disappearance, but later their concern expanded to others in Argentine and beyond (Burchianti, 2004). Helping others can increase caring for those one has helped, develop into empathy and feelings of responsibility for others' welfare in general, and become an important aspect of one's self-concept or identity (Staub, 2011).

Promoting Moderate Respect for Authority and Pluralism

One of the contributors to mass violence is overly strong respect for authority in a society. This makes people seek leaders in difficult times, and it follow them even if they are destructive. Promoting more moderate respect for authority is a way of increasing independence in decision making and judgment, as well as active bystandership in resisting destructive leadership.

In Rwanda, people in six groups who listened for a year to the radio drama *Musekeweya* received a tape recorder and tapes of the first year's programs at a party after their last meeting. They discussed who will be in charge of these and decided that it will be the group or a member of it. People in each of six control groups, who listened to an alternative radio drama, on the suggestion of the first person who spoke, decided to hand the material to the head person in the village. In a society where people avoid controversy, those who listened to the educational radio drama also were more truthful about their beliefs, as indicated in a private interview, in talking to members of a focus group (Paluck, 2009; Staub, 2011; Staub & Pearlman, 2009).

Active bystandership is more likely in a pluralistic society, in which many views can be expressed. In such a society people are more likely to use their critical consciousness to evaluate events, rather than uncritically accept leaders' guidance. In many societies schools and homes are authoritarian. Children are not encouraged to express their views. Giving children a voice can contribute to independent judgment and active bystandership.

Socialization for Inclusive Caring in the Home and Schools

An important aspect of active bystandership is caring for and altruistic helping of people beyond family, friends, and the groups one belongs to. But socialization tends to focus on caring about familiar others. The line children and adults draw between "us" and "them" can be natural, the result of our tendency to categorize and have different affective orientation to people we are more or less connected to. But socialization often teaches children to exclude "them," especially members of devalued groups, from the realm of those who should be cared about. This is done both in subtle and at times unintentional ways, by the manner in which adults talk about and respond to members of such groups, and through intentional instruction. Groups also imbue children and adults with hostility and aggression toward some others. How can caring be expanded to other groups, and ideally to all human beings? A special challenge is to expand caring and active bystandership so that it will be present even under highly challenging life conditions, or in the presence of conflict with another group. This would make the unfolding or evolution of increasing hostility and violence less likely.

The earlier discussion of "humanizing the other," through words and contact, is relevant to socialization. One method of creating contact in schools has been through cooperative learning. In one procedure, six children from different groups, White and minority children, worked together. To accomplish their task, each had to learn some material and teach it to the others (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978). In the course of being both teachers and learners, children were drawn into significant engagement with each other. This and other cooperative learning procedures have led to more positive interaction between White and minority children and improved the academic performance of minority children.

Fostering Caring and Inclusive Caring

There are some core elements of socialization that promote caring for and altruistic action on behalf of others (See Eisenberg et al, 2006; Staub,

1979, 2003, 2005). Warmth, affection, and nurturance by important adults generate a positive view of and feelings for other people. Positive guidance, values, and rules derived from them can guide children to caring and helping. Warmth and guidance by reasoning combined with firm but not punitive control, what Baumrind (1975) called "authoritative parenting," can lead children to behave according to essential rules that express positive values. Such a combination of practices and influences is associated with prosocial behavior (Hastings et al., 2000).

An important form of reasoning is pointing out to children the consequences of their actions on others, what Martin Hoffman called "induction" (Hoffman, 2000), both the harmful consequences of negative acts, as wells as the benefits of helpful acts (Staub, 1979). The example of caring and helpful models is important. Warm, nurturing, empathic parents who provide positive guidance as well as examples of caring and helping are most likely to have helpful children (Eisenberg et al, 2006; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 2003, 2005).

A further important element is learning by doing, guiding children to engage in positive behavior and the experiential learning that results from this (Eisenberg et al., 2006; Staub, 1979; Whiting & Whiting, 1969). Children who were guided to engage in helpful behavior were later more helpful than children who engaged in an alternative activity. Older children teaching younger children, children making toys for poor hospitalized children, and combining helping with induction have all increased helping by children at a later time (Staub, 1979, 2003). Volunteering was associated with prosocial values, attitudes, and identities in adolescents, and later with prosocial behavior as adults (for reviews, see Dovidio et al., 2006; Penner et al., 2005). Helping increases concern and caring for those one has helped, and leads to perception of oneself as a helpful person (Grusec et al., 1978; Staub, 1979, 1989, 2003).

Research on rescuers has found that as they engage in helping, commitment deepens. Rescuers who initially agreed to help in a limited way became more engaged. They may have initially agreed to hide some people for a few days, but then ended up hiding them for years, at times taking in additional people. Some of those who succeeded in moving people to a safer place initiated helping more people. Some rescuers who at first agreed to help a Jew who was a former friend or associate, or whom they were asked to help by intermediaries, then decided to help others who were strangers (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 1989, 1997).

Through learning by doing, concern can also expand from one group to other groups and to all humanity. At the time of the disappearances in Argentina, the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo demonstrated, marching every day in the centrally located Plaza del Mayo in Buenos Aires. In spite of intimidation, harassment, and even abduction, they continued to protest the disappearance of their children. Over time their concern expanded to include other disappeared people, then people who were persecuted and victimized outside Argentina, and later to justice and the well-being of people in Argentina (Burchianti, 2004).

Many rescuers were socialized in a way that was consistent with the socialization process described above as important in developing altruism. They received more love and affection and positive guidance than did others who were in similar situations but did not help. They had parents who, in cultures where physical punishment was common, used explanation instead.

They were exposed to helpful models, often parents who embodied and expressed humane values in their actions. Many of them had parents who engaged more in interaction with and maintained positive social relations with people outside their own group, including Jews. They also heard their parents make fewer negative statements, if any, about Jews—a group devalued in Germany and in other European countries even before they were occupied by or under the influence of Nazi Germany (Fein, 1979)—than did people in a control group who were in similar position to help but did not do so (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

Structures that facilitate positive contact are especially important in developing positive attitudes that are essential bases for inclusive caring. School and work provide natural opportunities for deep engagement. Varshney (2002) compared three cities in India in which there was violence between Hindus and Muslims following instigating conditions and three cities without violence. In the cities without violence, there were chambers of commerce and other institutions in which Hindus and Muslims closely worked together. In response to the instigating conditions, they joined in exerting influence on the community, as well as on politicians to stop them from making inflammatory statements, at times threatening to publicly speak out against them if they instigated violence.

In sum, inclusive caring is the extension of caring to "others," ideally to all human beings. It can be developed through words and images that humanize all people, through the example of models who show caring for people regardless of their group membership, through one's own experience of connection to varied people, and through learning by doing. Guiding children (and adults) to engage in helpful action toward people outside their group can be a powerful avenue to inclusive caring.

Common Ingroup Identities and Inclusive Caring

Gaertner and Dovidio have been advocating "common ingroup identity" as an avenue to expand caring to outgroups (Gaertner & Dovido, 2000; Dovido et al, 2009). They see contact as one of the practices that can lead people to "recategorize" others, to see their own and the other group as part of a single, superordinate group. This creates more positive attitudes toward that group, increases help for its members, and can contribute to reconciliation after violence (Dovidio et al. 2009). However, when there is strong hostility, creating and maintaining such common identities is difficult (Staub, 2011). Marilyn Brewer's "optimal distinctiveness" theory suggests, moreover, that people want to both assimilate to and differentiate from others. Emphasizing similarities, such as common university membership of math and humanities students, has intensified negative attitudes, perhaps as a way of reaffirming distinctiveness (Dovidio et al., 2009).

In fostering a common group identity it is important therefore to acknowledge and recognize the nature, characteristics, and differences between the groups involved. Dovidio et al. (2009) addressed this issue by proposing a "dual-identity model," emphasizing both a common identity and separate subgroup identities. This makes a great deal of sense. In the United States, people who hold dual identities (e.g. Korean Americans and Americans) have more positive attitudes toward members of other racial and ethnic groups. However, dual identities are more challenging to create when people have entrenched identities, such as bankers involved in a merger, or members of blended families (Dovidio et al., 2009). It is also challenging when members of dominant groups want minorities to meld into the majority. Muslims in the Netherlands express the desire to have a dual identity, while the Dutch want them to assimilate and have a Dutch identity (Staub, 2007). The situation is probably similar in other European countries. In France, in particular, minorities are expected to become French.

Developing *layered identities* may help. A layered identity comprises a personal identity, one or more subgroup identities, an identity as part of a nation (e.g., Serbs, Bosniaks—Bosnian Muslims—and Croats as Bosnians), and an identity as a human being, like all other human beings. An even further extension of identity that fits the spirit of our times and the environmental threats to the earth might be an identity as inhabitant of the planet and part of the larger universe. Such multiple or layered identities make it less likely that when a society faces difficult times people shift from their individual identity to an identity as a member of a subgroup of society—and turn against other subgroups. This is often one of the first consequences of instigating conditions for group violence (Staub, 1989, 2011).

Very strong identification with one's group tends to contribute to violence and makes forgiveness and reconciliation less likely (Cairns et al., 2005). Unfortunately, many groups have what may be called "walled off" identities, such as groups that intensely devalue each other, or are in protracted conflict, or carry ideologies of antagonisms (Staub, 2011). Developing common ingroup identities, or dual identities, or layered identities would be a substantial challenge for them. While the concepts of inclusive caring and common ingroup identity overlap, the tendency to differentiate ingroups and outgroups is strong. Developing caring for people even if they are seen as members of other groups may be psychologically more possible.

A member of a large group that was walking for peace from North America to various points in South America, and all the way to South Africa (taking boats across waters, of course) reports that all along there was conflict between White and Black Americans. They clearly differentiated themselves, continued to spend time with members of their group, and could not resolve their conflicts. They also clearly cared about each other and were united in their vision for peace. Moreover, while there continued to be a need to resolve conflicts all along the journey related not only to race but also culture, many members, including black and white Americans, did form alliances and positive relationships (Bullock, personal communication, September 21, 2011). Research is needed to differentiate between inclusive caring and common

identities, and to explore their origins and correlates in socialization, experience, and personal disposition.

Morality, Moral Courage and Heroism: Determinants and socialization

I have been using "active bystandership" to refer to positive actions on behalf of individuals or groups. Without moral courage, people will oppose their group, or influential segments of it, as it embarks on an evolution to violence. But before we consider the roots of moral courage, is it important to ask what is moral, and when is courage moral? Young Nazis in the early days of Hitler's party, the National Socialist Party, believing in its vision and their leader, courageously followed Hitler in spite of opposition and, at times, ridicule (Merkl, 1980). Hitler had already advocated extreme views, and his followers were brutal with opponents. Were the young Nazis morally courageous? Not according to my definition of morality as "principles, values, emotional orientations and practices that maintain or promote human welfare" (Staub, 2012, p. 381; see also Staub, 2011).

Until recently there was little research on moral courage and heroic helping in psychology, other than the research on rescuers, but these topics, together with morality itself, have recently become of interest (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012; Skitka, 2012; Zimbardo, 2007). The meaning of morality in some of these current approaches is different from my definition and from earlier approaches. In Kohlberg's (1976) theory of moral reasoning, justice and the sanctity of human life were regarded as the truly moral principles. In my perspective, morality is also based on emotions that connect people to each other, such as empathy, and on responsibility in feelings and beliefs.

In one recent approach to morality, Haidt and his associates proposed "five innate psychological 'foundations' on which cultures construct widely divergent moral systems: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity" (Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 15). Applying their conception to the matter of evil, while they agree with others that the "prototypes of evil acts are acts of cruelty and violence and would even agree that these are the most important kinds of evil acts to understand" (p. 17), their theory suggests that perceptions of evil may be based on other concerns as well. They also argue that "evil is something that threatens to hurt, oppress, betray, subvert

contaminate, or otherwise profane something that is held sacred" (p. 17) not just by an individual but a group. They note that each foundation can be used to support the sacralization or demonization of varied objects. Sacred values are values that go beyond or are independent of practical utility, and that do not accept trade-off, and cannot be let go for material gain (see Tetlock et al., 2000).

On the foundations of authority and loyalty, immoral societies and practices can be built. As I have noted, overly strong respect for authority is a cultural characteristic that contributes to the likelihood of group violence. Values can be sacred, but not moral, certainly when looked at from the outside by disinterested parties. For example, blood feuds were deeply set in the culture of many societies. In Serbia, spirals of killings could continue through the generations (Grille, 2005), with mutual killing apparently a sacred value and regarded as a moral obligation. Graham and Haidt (2012) also noted that the sacralization of values can lead to violence.

Even though psychologists deal with what is, with how people think, feel, and behave, not every value that a society holds and considers moral can be accepted as moral. Cultural or individual relativity is acceptable only within bounds derived from universal considerations of morality. In one of my large classes at the very beginning of a semester, students argued that a mother spanking a young child, in essence to protect her life, since the child once again ran out into a busy street in front of their house, was wrong. Spanking is always wrong. They also uniformly argued that one cannot judge the actions of Nazi Germany, because they had their own culture and value systems.

A recent empirical approach to moral courage focuses on the strength of moral convictions (Skitka, 2012). Stronger moral convictions lead to greater independence of authority—in judging right or wrong, or in expressing trust in authority, for example. They also lead to greater willingness to express opinions contrary to a majority, such as when a person holds a moral conviction that torture is wrong and knows that others believe that torture is acceptable in the interrogation of terrorists. These findings suggest the influence of moral courage, as measured by the strength of moral convictions.

Similarly to Graham and Haidt (2012), Skitka (2012) notes that moral convictions can be for harmful causes. In fact, perpetrators of mass killing and genocide often believe that, following their

ideology, they are acting for a higher morality that necessitates killing. My focus is on promoting moral courage, where *morality* is defined by standards of justice, fairness, and human welfare, as seen by disinterested observers.

Moral courage can lead to heroism. But not all heroism requires moral courage. Endangering oneself to save another's life is heroic, but it is usually socially valued and does not require moral courage. One study (Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010) looked at personality constellations of caring individuals (people who received the Caring Canadian Award for volunteering and serving the community in varied capacities), and brave individuals (people who received the Canadian Medal of Bravery for risking their lives to save others). The clusters or personality constellations of caring people differed from those in a control group, while the cluster of personal characteristics of brave individuals did not differ from those in the control group. The authors suggest that, perhaps, such bravery is primarily the result of the situation.

However, the authors measured only one personal orientation directly relevant to helping, moral reasoning. They did not measure empathy, moral values that might be connected to helping, or prosocial orientation/responsibility for others' welfare. Moreover, the highest moral stages may not be most related to courageous helping. Kohlberg and Candee found (1984) that people whose reasoning focused on responsibility (at that time Stage 4), were most likely to refuse to continue to administer shocks in the Milgram obedience studies. However, since such refusal required resisting the demands of the person in charge of the experiment, it required moral courage more than bravery.

Several socialization practices, beyond those that promote inclusive caring, might develop moral courage. One of them is to help children develop and use their "voice," to include them in discussions of values and rules to live by in the home and in school, and in decision making about rules. Another is that parents, as long as the danger to them is not substantial, not discourage, but encourage their children to express their values in courageous action, for example, to support a school mate who is bullied. Having confidence in one's beliefs and the ability to express them, and learning by doing are both likely to contribute to moral courage (Staub, 2005), and even to heroic action. Research is needed both to identify the differences between moral courage and heroism, and to explore their roots in socialization and experience.

An additional useful practice (Franco, Blau & Zimbardo, 2011; Zimbardo, 2007) may be to help enlarge children's heroic imagination, primarily through the example of heroic people. Moral courage in the perspective of these authors is one form of heroism (but see for a discussion of the difference between the two Staub, in press-a). The example of moral commitment and courage by parents may be especially important. Rosenhan (1970) found that participants in the civil rights movement, where participation in sit-ins at lunch counters in the South, in demonstrations, and other actions required great courage, tended to have parents who engaged in committed actions, ranging from demonstrations to fighting in the Spanish civil war. When relations with parents were good, the civil rights activists had strong commitment, expressed in persistent actions. When relations were ambivalent, their participation was limited.

Moral courage requires going against prevailing norms or values, sometimes of individuals, often of the authorities and the system. Actions that are commonly regarded as heroic usually involve physical danger, and are often supported and admired by the community. Moral courage can become heroic, however, when it involves significant physical danger or potential violence against oneself (See Staub, in press-a). Temperamental characteristics that contribute to action tendencies may contribute to the potential for heroism, and to morally courageous action that is heroic. Experience, however, can shape temperament, its expressions, and action tendencies.

Application to the United States

The material in this chapter is relevant to most countries. Many countries have internal divisions and disharmony—potentially violence-generating conditions. Even if these don't reach the level that would lead to intense violence between subgroups, at times because there are mitigating conditions, they interfere with the fulfillment of basic needs and reduce satisfaction in life. I briefly consider here conditions that create disharmony in the United States and could contribute to violence.

In the United States there has been economic deterioration, especially after the financial crisis of 2007, with decline in wages, unemployment, and huge government debt. Political processes, however, increasingly limit assistance for people in need. Economic deterioration, more than poverty

itself, represents a difficult life condition (Harff, 2003; Staub, 2011). Its severity in the United States has not been as great as it usually is in societies that move toward mass violence. But there is also political chaos and disorganization, a gridlock in which the political parties and groups are so at odds with each other that they cannot create positive social policies. There have been substantial societal and cultural changes, such as increasing opposition to government, increased presence of religion in public life, changes in the kind of work available to people and the skills needed for jobs in which people can make a living, and a great increase in access to, the use of, and the production of information. There has also been a lessening of a sense of community, of people caring about each other.

While there are intense political differences, in contrast to societies in which one group is moving toward violence against another, these political differences are not one-dimensional. As of September 2011, there is no clearly defined group pitted against another group. There are political liberals, conservatives, groups on the extreme right, some small extreme right-wing militant groups that are arming themselves, people in the middle, libertarians who want very little government, and people who are disenchanted and don't know where to turn. In addition, laws protecting individual rights are well established in the United States, even if in practice there are significant differences in the ways members of different groups are treated—in the justice system, for example. Differential treatment takes place through relatively subtle processes, rather than blatant devaluation, discrimination, and persecution. There is hostility and some violence against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent wars— on terror, in Iraq, and Afghanistan—but no systematic program of devaluation or harm-doing. While there are no discernable steps along a continuum of destruction, disharmony in the society is at a very high level. The high level of violence between individuals that has existed for a long time in the United States also represents a form of disharmony.

One of the contributors to mass violence, in addition to those mentioned before, is a high, elevated group or societal self-concept that is disconfirmed by events (Staub, 1989; see also Baumeister, 1997). People in the United States, both citizens and leaders, clearly hold such a view. It is represented in beliefs of U.S. "exceptionalism," pride in superpower status (Lifton, 2003), and a very high level of patriotism expressed in public by the oft-repeated statement that theUnited States is the best country in the world. Difficult life conditions, internal chaos, and lessening of influence, relative power, and respect in the world frustrate such beliefs. Leaders and the people wanting to reaffirm such a view of superiority, in their own and in others' eyes, is a potential danger, since the use of force is a relatively speedy way to do so.

Future Directions in Promoting Harmonious, Peaceful Societies

There is disharmony in many societies. What would lead to the development of harmonious societies that are peaceful, both internally and in their relations to the rest of the world? Practices such as humanizing all members of society, creating constructive ideologies, and the positive socialization of children contribute to harmony and peace and to active bystandership for improving society.

Promoting certain values and societal institutions contributes to harmony. A prime value in many industrialized societies, spreading around the world, is material wealth. Connected to this are values of competition and winning. If values representing basic human needs and their constructive fulfillment gain prominence, social life will be more harmonious. This means valuing security gained through positive relations; valuing effectiveness that does not harm others; valuing connection to other people, community and society; gaining positive self-esteem and growing as individuals by positive means; having autonomy—the capacity for choice and initiative—as society makes meaningful choices possible for everyone; and creating and holding a hopeful vision of the world. Such values can only be developed and maintained if institutions are shaped or created to function according to them. Differences between groups in power and wealth—or, simply put, inequality—has been a major source of conflict and mass violence (Fein, 1993). Institutions that express these positive values would limit inequality and provide access to opportunity for everyone.

How can such valued be strengthened? Individuals can advocate them in words and action, engaging with their neighbors, and with people in their religious and civic organizations. They can do so in conversations, through dialogue, creating committees in schools, churches, Rotary clubs, offices and factories that promote them, through the media, and as candidates for political office. Like our programs in Africa on reconciliation, public education programs on television, radio,

and other venues can present information and create understanding of how peace and harmony can be promoted, as well as their impact on the lives of individuals. Like harmful societal processes, positive processes evolve gradually. Over time, essential institutions of a society can be transformed, including justice, police, corporations, schools, and political institutions.

Another contributor to harmony and peace would be to create "healing societies." In addition to group traumas, there are many sources of individual trauma. Many children are physically or sexually abused. In the United States, 3 million children are reported to Child Protective Service for abuse and neglect each year (van der Kolk, 2009). More are likely to be abused, and many more emotionally neglected, which research indicates can lead to even greater harm in a child's development than physical abuse. We suffer sudden traumatic losses when loved ones die in car and plane crashes or of heart attacks. We suffer "life injuries" of many kinds—when we are children and a beloved friend moves to the other side of the country, when parents divorce, when we suffer significant rejection or betrayal.

Creating a society in which there are natural processes that help people deal with their losses and pain would contribute to altruism born of suffering, a sense of community, and harmony. In our educational radio programs in Rwanda, we promote, through the example of drama characters, people recognizing others' trauma and responding to teach others with empathy and support (Staub, 2011). Both responding as active bystanders at the time when people suffer—whether from victimization, loss, or life injury—and providing support afterwards contribute to altruism born of suffering (Staub and Vollhardt, 2008). This can be as simple as neighbors recognizing that the home situation of a child is difficult and showing interest in the child, as was the case with one of my friends. Another value change would be to make the need to heal understandable and healing activities widely acceptable. Groups that promote healing and provide community could be developed in all segments of society.

Training Leaders, Training Active Bystanders

Constructive leaders have certain personal characteristics, such as complex thinking, empathy, and a readiness for reconciliation, as in the cases of Abraham Lincoln and Nelson Mandela (Lieberfeld,

2009). The selection of leaders is important. But to some degree such characteristics, and other important ones, may be facilitated by training. Knowledge, understanding, skills, and even empathy and moral courage are possible to promote.

With national leaders in Rwanda, we worked on developing understanding of the origins of genocide and avenues to prevention and reconciliation, as described earlier. We also engaged leaders in exercises, such as having them consider, in small groups, on the basis of the material in the training, whether national policies they were just introduced were likely to contribute to or inhibit hostility and violence (Staub, 2011; Staub et al., 2010). They then discussed their "findings" in the larger group. In another approach (Wolpe & McDonald, 2008), Hutu and Tutsi leaders in Burundi spent time together to gain comfort with each other and develop skills in engaging and negotiating with each other.

I developed a training curriculum in collaboration with a local mediation organization to train active bystanders in schools to prevent harassment, harmful acts, and bullying by students of each other. In its first use, we trained 8th and 10th grade students, and adults, to work in pairs as trainers. They then trained over six hundred 8th- and 10th-grade students. The training included information about the inhibitors of active bystandership; about how bystanders can exert influence on other bystanders by defining the meaning of an event and appropriate actions, thereby recruiting them as allies; practicing varied types of interventions, such as empathic support for victims, removing victims from the situation, and attempting to stop harm-doers in nonconfrontational ways; exploration of when knowledge of active bystandership can be used in other settings and when it may be too dangerous to use; and more. The first time the training was used, even while working out various issues in its use, there was a 20 percent decrease in harm-doing in two experimental schools from before to after the training (about a half a year interval), with no change in two control schools (Staub, in press a). This training can be adapted to many realms such as commercial organizations, government leadership groups, and other settings. Table 33.1 shows influences that can lead a person to be an active bystander in varied settings.

Conclusions

It is imperative to act early to prevent violence between groups. Early actions can promote positive

Table 33.1 How Individuals Can Become Active Bystanders—Internal or External*

Learning about inhibitors of action to counteract their influence
- Individuals, the media, and leaders show no concern and act as if there were no problems (creating pluralistic ignorance and the perception that nothing is wrong)
- Diffusion of responsibility: Since there are many potential actors, each thinks that others can take action or that influential individuals would or should, and all remain passive
- Concern about others' disapproval if one takes action
- Other costs: effort, time, stress, and danger
- Other people defining the meaning of events as requiring no action, or that there are good reasons for the hostility and violence against a group and opposing them is wrong
- Preoccupation with one's own goals and needs, especially in difficult times (An examination of these can provide perspective, activate moral values and caring, and shift concern to the great danger for victimized people)

Cultivating personal inclinations that make action likely
- (Inclusive) caring about others' welfare
- Empathy, sympathy, feelings of personal responsibility, and moral values (justice, the sanctity of human life)
- Resistance to the substitution of other values, such as obedience and loyalty to leaders and one's group regardless of their actions, for essential moral values
- An independent perspective/judgment, a critical consciousness in evaluating events, including the words and actions of leaders and other authorities
- Moral courage, the willingness and capacity to act out of caring or according to one's values, in spite of potential opposition and negative consequences
- Feelings of effectiveness, whether due to skills or confidence in one's ability to develop and execute plans of action, or support by others
- The knowledge of social norms that guide helpful action, but not being bound by norms that inhibit action (e.g., in some societies, standing out, or being too visible)

Prior actions that can develop positive active bystandership
- Collecting information about significant events—from national and international media, the Internet, and other sources
- Resisting alignment with or joining groups that can subvert one's values
- Initiating conversations and expressing concerns that may lead to a shared definition of the meaning of events—shared concerns and actions
- Engaging in limited actions at first
- Developing flexible plans and strategies of action
- Collecting information about and joining communities, organizations, or small groups that share concerns and are engaged in action
- Initiating individual and group activities; promoting active bystandership by others

* Reproduced from Table 18.1 in Staub, 2011, *Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict and Terrorism*.

attitudes toward everyone, help people join to work for shared goals, and create constructive ideologies that embrace all groups and motivate their members to work for their fulfillment. As a society adopts and lives by caring values, as individuals respond to each others' woundedness and needs, and as institutions and a system help people fulfill their basic material and psychological needs constructively, violence becomes unlikely.

All this requires committed action by many people. In this contemporary world, with its cacophony of voices, in countries like the United States and many others, where there are so many conflicting views and interests, it is easy to be discouraged and remain passive. But beliefs, values, practices, and institutions can and do change. Committed, persistent, and "courageous" actions (Thalhammer et al., 2007; Staub, 2011) are more likely when there is a network of actors and supporters—individuals, organizations, nations. There can be *successful* Arab Springs of many forms, social movements that transform values and institutions and create harmonious societies.

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