Preventing Violence and Terrorism and Promoting Positive Relations Between Dutch and Muslim Communities in Amsterdam

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Many Western European countries have seen increasing tension between local communities and immigrant groups, especially Muslims, with mutual grievances. These tensions have been more apparent and stronger since 9/11/2001. Intensified by further terrorist attacks, the war on terror, and the fear of terrorism, negative attitudes toward Muslim populations have been increasing. While relevant to many European countries, this article focuses on the conditions and relationships between groups in the Netherlands, particularly in Amsterdam. Drawing on past work on the roots and prevention of violence and reconciliation between groups and on field experience, the article offers proposals to prevent violence and support for terrorism and foster positive group relations, such as humanizing other groups, dialogue and other practices to promote inclusive in the place of destructive ideologies, psychological healing from past woundedness, promoting pluralism, contact between groups, and the exploration of shared history. School practices and relations between children is an aspect of these proposals. It is hoped that the proposals and the analyses they are based on can give rise to actions that will prevent violence and foster positive relations between groups in the Netherlands, and will be applied to other settings as well.

One consequence of terrorism and the war on terror has been an increase in previously existing tensions between the original national/ethnic groups and immigrant Muslim minorities in various European countries (Buijs & Rath, 2002). The 9/11/2001 attacks; U.S. responses like the war on terror; subsequent terrorist attacks, especially in Europe, and their psychological impact; and political and social reactions in response to these events have led to the intensification and forceful public expressions of negative attitudes and of concerns about future relations

1   between groups (Buijs & Rath, 2002; Cesari, 2002, 2003; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 1999).

The primary purpose of this article is to consider ways to help groups with problematic, hostile relations to resolve antagonism, reconcile, and develop peaceful,
5   harmonious relations. I will focus this analysis on the Netherlands, where there has been violence and substantial deterioration in the relationship between the ethnic Dutch and Muslim immigrant groups. The principles, analyses, and practices I propose, however, can be applied, with appropriate consideration of the specifics of the situation, to other countries as well.

10   In the Netherlands, the problems after 9/11 have been accentuated by politicians attacking—rather than constructively engaging with—Islam as a religion and with Muslim culture and social arrangements. The attacks already had started before 9/11 (Fortuyn, 1997). Subsequent events included the harsh critique by Hirsi Ali, a Somali immigrant of Muslim origin and a member of par-
15   liament from 2002 to 2006, about the treatment of women in Muslim families. She and Theo van Gogh created a television film, "Submission," that Muslims perceived as presenting them in an intensely negative light and in a blasphemous manner. Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim man, and the life of Hirsi Ali was threatened, followed by the burning of mosques, Muslim schools, and
20   churches (Caldwell, 2005).

Violence, especially terrorism, can be the result of social conditions and culture at a particular place at a particular time, or due to instigation and actions by outside groups. The assumption in this article is that when violence-producing conditions are present in a society, terrorism instigated from the outside is more likely. Vio-
25   lence between groups, and the psychological and social processes that lead to it, usually evolve. In the Netherlands, some underlying conditions for violence appear to exist, at least to a moderate degree, but the evolution is in its early stages.

This article focuses on developing policies and practices in countries with large Muslim minorities—particularly in the Netherlands—with the goal of improving
30   group relations and decreasing the likelihood of terrorism and violence from both inside and outside of the country. The approach in this article to overcoming antagonism and promoting reconciliation is based in part on the study of the roots of mass violence (Staub, 1989, 1996, 2003). The approach also has been developed and tested through interventions in field settings, such as Rwanda (Staub, 2006a;
35   Staub & Pearlman, 2006; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005). It is also informed by scholarship in genocide studies (Fein, 1979; Melson, 2003; Smith, 1999), and the study of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2002; Kelman & Fisher, 2003;   **Q1** Lederach, 1997).

The primary Muslim groups in Amsterdam are the Turks and Moroccans, and
40   their populations are increasing continually (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004). Antilleans and Surinamers, the two other major ethnic communities,   **Q2** come from former Dutch colonies, are primarily Christian, and are better

adapted to Dutch society. How can this mixed society be peaceful and grow in positive ways?

There are genuine issues and cultural differences between the ethnic Dutch and the Muslim immigrant groups, and the worldwide focus on terrorism enlarges the perception and meaning of these differences. My use of the term "culture" includes differences in religion, perceptions of and interpretations of events, customs and habits, and values and beliefs that are not based solely on the differences between the Muslim religion and the secular Christianity that characterizes the Netherlands, but also on different national/cultural and educational backgrounds (see also Cesari, 2003).

What are the current conditions and concerns of the ethnic Dutch and of Muslim immigrant groups? One of the concerns of the former is whether Islam is adaptable to their pluralistic, democratic culture.

ISSUES, CONCERNS AND GRIEVANCES: THE DUTCH

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Since 9/11, terrorism has been a primary concern, according to various reports (e.g., Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, 2004), the media, and public statements. An opinion poll in 2002 for the TV program *Twee Vandaag* by NIPO (http://www.lbr.nl/?node=1926) found that 60% Dutch respondents were afraid of violent acts by Muslim extremists, and almost 50% reported more negative views of Muslims than before. Since Theo van Gogh's murder, fear and negativity seemed to increase substantially.[1]

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The Dutch are also concerned with the high crime rates, especially by Moroccans, who are 15% of the population. Among young people, 61% of those who frequently commit crimes are Dutch, and 31% Moroccan; among adults, 41% Dutch, 22% Moroccan, and 19% Surinamese. Among hard-core young criminals, the percentage of Moroccans has been decreasing over the years, from 31% in 1996 to 22% in 2002 (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004, Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The public's perception of the Moroccan crime rate is probably greater than its actual level, due to other actions that disturb people, such as harassment by groups of teenage Moroccans (Germert & Fleisher, 2005) and criminal Moroccan youth gangs (Germert, 2004). These activities of young Moroccan males also create concern about the socialization of boys.

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Many Turkish and Moroccan men came to work in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, and planned to return home. Instead, they later brought their families and stayed. However, the jobs they came for disappeared. Without knowledge of

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[1]Looking at the media suggests this. So do conversations with people. After a talk in Amsterdam by the author on promoting positive relations between groups, one person, a social scientist, asked, Are we sitting on a powder keg?

1   the Dutch language and with limited education and skills, immigrants—especially
Moroccan men—have been supported by the social welfare system. This is another
source of resentment.

Many Dutch are concerned also that the Muslim religion, with its traditions and
5   authoritarian attitude and practices, will undermine democracy and Dutch values,
such as individuality and openness, or even that Muslim nationalism will attempt
to change the political system. The subservient role of women in Muslim culture,
forced marriages, especially of underage girls, and honor killings, which have
been reported in other European countries, clash with Dutch—and European—
10   values (as well as laws). So does Muslim intolerance of free sexuality and homo-
sexuality (Scroggins, 2005).

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service report (2004) describes
threats posed by different types of radical Islam to a democratic legal order. Radi-
cal political Islam aims at political power. Radical-Islamic Puritanism aims to cre-
15   ate adherence to Islamic religious belief and practice and advocates isolation or
withdrawal from the West, while Muslim nationalism focuses more on being a
Muslim than on religion. Although the report briefly reviews counterstrategies and
ways to resist these threats, it does not discuss the extent to which these move-
ments are present or, more importantly, absent in current Dutch society, thereby al-
20   lowing the threat to loom large.

In summary, Dutch, and European, concerns include the subversion of the demo-
cratic state by incompatible theocratic values, beliefs, political aims, and practices;
incompatibility in everyday life due to different values and ways of life; a drain on
and threat to public resources and the quality of life by the economic needs and anti-
25   social behavior of Muslim immigrants; and terrorism. Some of the threats and con-
cerns I noted are real and material. Others are at least partly psychological, but the
perceptions and attitudes they represent powerfully can shape actions and thereby
material realities (see also Buijs & Rath, 2002). Along with these concerns, many
Dutch, including government officials, are concerned that their society is becoming
30   intolerant and inhospitable to Muslims and immigrant groups, and about the creation
or existence of a social environment that may radicalize Muslims.[2]

ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND GRIEVANCES: MUSLIM GROUPS

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Muslim concerns include lack of acceptance, prejudice, discrimination, hostility,
and restrictive immigration policies (de Konieg, 2005; Diversisteits-en
40   Integratiemonitor, 2004). They fear violence against them—not surprisingly since

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[2]This statement is based on discussions with many people in March 2005, including city officials in
Amsterdam.

in the 22 days following van Gogh's murder more than 800 apparently related incidents were reported by police, the large majority directed against Muslims, such as violence against Islamic schools and mosques, threats, intimidation, and verbal attacks (Tweede Kamer der Staten General, 2005).

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Because of the likely consequences to them, Muslims greatly fear terrorist attacks (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004). A significant issue for Muslim minorities is unemployment and problems in material existence—not having the knowledge and skills required to participate in the labor force. An important threat is the disruption of community, worldview, and identity due to dislocation and the changes required by adaptation. Muslims seem concerned that on the one hand they are expected to transform their identity as Muslims to be accepted as Dutch, and on the other hand that regardless of their level of adjustment, they will remain

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outsiders (Twee Vandaag poll by NIPO, 2003). As part of this adjustment, they face the difficulties of integration into a culture that has elements that strictly are prohibited by Islam, especially related to sexuality. There is also concern by some about their own cultural practices, however, especially related to the treatment of women (Scroggins, 2005).

THE EXTENT OF ADAPTABILITY OF ISLAM TO WESTERN CULTURES

Can the people in Western, democratic, liberal countries live harmoniously with Muslim minorities? For a long time, scholars have debated how fundamentalist, universal, and rigid Islam is, and how much it can adapt to specific contexts. Many Western scholars have claimed a core opposition between Islam and the West, a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 2005), a radical incompatibility between democracy, freedom, and individualism, and the theocracy and tradition guiding Islam. Mandaville (2005), for example, notes that radical Islam, such as Wahabism and its relatives, is dominant in Muslim countries and has strong advocates in Western immigrant groups.

Some scholars have described the vast majority of Muslims as moderates, however, not as extremists (Aslan, 2005). Many have been pointing to movements and ideas within Islam that indicate adaptability and change. There are many moderate views in Islam, which develop when there are contexts that support them. Ramadan (2004), a Swiss–Muslim philosopher, has been calling for a European Islam, with coexistence and civic participation, communities that concern themselves with the welfare of all members, and responsible relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. At a 2005 meeting in Austria, 160 Imams called for gender equality (Scroggins, 2005). New "solidarity citizenship" organizations are also signs of "transformation of Islam, in the Dutch context of life" (Vernooij, 2004, p. 14). The organizations promote shared goals by involving Muslims in volunteer work.

Wickham (2005) describes "revivalist" political organizations in a number of Sunni Muslim Arab states that advocate democratic elections, some even equating them with *shura,* the Islamic principle of consultation. They do reject practices that would allow the free commingling of men and women, however, including voting and running for elected office. They assume that this would create marital discord and divert women's attention from their responsibilities in the home. Wickham notes, however, that these movements have developed in Muslim societies, which contain and limit them. She sees signs of deepening reformist thinking, with an increasing number of opposition leaders supporting the principle of ijtihad, "the right of Muslims to reinterpret the sacred texts in light of new circumstances" and articulate new positions on "intellectual and political pluralism and the rights of women" (p. 3).

Many other authors point to adaptation by Muslim groups to specific contexts. Mason (2004) writes, "An Arab-Australian can be simultaneously loyal to his/her local soccer team, the Brazilian national soccer team, a specific political party within Australia, the Muslim community, the Palestinian community, and the wider Australian community, without any of these loyalties negating another" (p. 239). A small example of adaptation is that when in a school in the Netherlands girls were not allowed to wear headscarves, an Imam told their mothers that the girls could remove their scarves when entering school and put them back on when they leave—which is what the girls already were doing (de Koening, 2005). There is, however, the question of mutual adaptation—schools allowing students to wear headscarves.

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According to Cesari (2002, 2003), Europeans do not understand the transformation created, especially in the younger generation, by living in Western, pluralistic cultures, as well as the differences due to national and cultural origin. Phalet and colleagues (2004) conducted a survey of 900 people in Rotterdam and found that while young Muslim adults strongly identify with Islam, their Islam is individualistic and pluralistic, allowing room for internal debate, tolerance, and friendships across group lines. This was true especially for survey participants with more educational background, especially females. Furthermore, Dutch participants estimated more discrimination against Muslims than Muslim participants saw against themselves, and the latter perceived discrimination as more structural and less personal.

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PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTING HOSTILITY AND VIOLENCE AND PROMOTING PEACEFUL GROUP RELATIONS

At this time, both Western nations and the Islamic world see themselves under attack. In the following I will make proposals, which are in part principles out of

which specific policies and practices can be developed. It is hoped that actions based on them will prevent the intensification of hostility and foster positive attitudes and peaceful relations. As background for the proposals there will be some discussion of the origins and prevention of violence and reconciliation. Understanding the influences leading to violence and avenues for their prevention can themselves bring about changes in people.

STARTING POINTS FOR VIOLENCE: INSTIGATING CONDITIONS

There are two frequent background conditions that are starting points for hostility and violence. One I call *difficult life conditions* in a society: economic problems, political confusion and disorganization, great societal changes, and the social chaos they create. Another is *conflict between groups,* whether over territory, or power, wealth, and privilege between dominant and subordinate groups, or for other reasons. Both types of instigating conditions profoundly frustrate basic human needs—for security, a positive identity, a feeling of effectiveness and control over important events, positive connections to other people, autonomy, and a comprehension of the world and of one's place in it. In response, people shift from an individual to a group identity, which fulfills some of these needs. As a group they scapegoat others, and turn to destructive ideologies that offer hope for the future but identify another, usually historically devalued group, as an enemy. Violence does not usually erupt; it evolves with progressive changes in individuals and society. An evolution of increasingly harmful actions can lead to mass killing by a dominant group, or to terrorism by a less powerful group (Richardson, 2006; Staub, 1989, 1996, 2003).

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DEVALUING VERSUS HUMANIZING THE "OTHER"

Human beings have a tendency to divide the world into "us," our group, our people, our nation, and "them," those outside the group (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Staub, 1989). Those on the outside easily and persistently are devalued and dehumanized. The roots of the devaluation may be varied: differences in physical features, knowledge, values, beliefs, or general culture; a lower status that arises from historical group differences; difficult life conditions that lead to scapegoating and the creation of ideological enemies; or justification for violence against a group (Staub, 1996). Once devaluation exists, it is maintained by literature, the media, the way people talk about the other, and by discrimination that is justified by further devaluation.

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Proposal 1. Humanizing the "other" is essential to overcome devaluation and the danger of violence.

To humanize Muslims, media projects should present the lives of Muslims in ways that make them understandable, as young and old individuals, families, a community and a culture, instead of A abstractions and stereotypes. Providing images of everyday lives, as well as cultural and psychological understanding—for example, what life is like for people who have left their home countries and have to negotiate differences in customs and religion—is important. Since devaluation is mutual, it is important to present side by side the lives of the Dutch and of Muslims from various national groups, with appropriate commentary. This can develop the capacity to take the other's perspective, to empathize, and can humanize each group in the eyes of the other. Informational programs about the importance of and ways to humanize groups and their members would be useful for members of the media and for community, religious, and political leaders in all groups.

Devaluation between groups is maintained in the Netherlands by limited contact, especially between Dutch people and the older generation of immigrants, and little knowledge by most Dutch of Islam (see Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004). The knowledge by many Muslims of the Dutch comes from television and public encounters. The media, leaders, and opinionmakers should help communities understand the concept of *devaluation:* It is possible to have a strongly negative view of a group without that view being based on reality or actual knowledge. Devaluation makes it easier to harm people. The more intense the devaluation, and the more it includes a view of the other as morally bad and as dangerous to "us," the greater the violent potential (Staub, 1989).

Those devalued tend to become angry and hostile. Muslim minorities may turn to a more fundamentalist Islam as a way of strengthening identity, in-group connections, and their understanding of reality and the world and their place in it. There can be mutual radicalization. In the Netherlands right-wing discussion groups on the Internet point to Muslims as the country's problem. The burning of mosques and Islamic schools after van Gogh's murder also indicates radicalization, with the burning of churches a response.

In the view of Rath and colleagues (1999), the prevailing opinion before 9/11 was "Muslims have an excessive tendency to cling together and resist becoming part of modern Dutch society … [and have] preference for traditional, i.e. non-democratic forms of political leadership. They do not treat women as equals to men, adhere to old fashioned views of bringing up children" and are susceptible to external, arch-conservative influence (pp. 11–12). Such attitudes have become more negative since this research (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004).

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Limited research shows that Muslims also devalue the Dutch, but to a lesser extent (Diversisteits- en Integratiemonitor, 2004). Muslim websites refer to the Dutch society and lifestyle as licentious and "perverted," while also expressing appreciation for liberal social policies. While the word "perverted" is apparently commonly used in Islam to describe practices such as liberal sexual behavior and homosexuality, such words have significant impact. Fortuyn (1997) was one of the early influential politicians who attacked Islam and Muslim culture after an Imam described homosexuality as a sexual disease. Fostering understanding of sensitivity to language may be an aspect of fostering humanization and cultural awareness.

Both Turks and Moroccans say, in responses to scenarios presented to them, that they would prefer to be integrated in society. However, Dutch participants believed that they would prefer separation, which the immigrants prefer least and which the Dutch like least (van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). Another study found that Dutch participants showed less prejudice toward immigrants who assimilate (identify with Dutch culture) than toward those who integrate (both adapt to Dutch culture and maintain their identification with their original group; van Oudenhoven, & Eisses, 1998).

Learning about the other's culture is one way to humanize the other. The Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor of 2004 describes an increase in cultural education. Fostering both knowledge of a culture and understanding of how that culture has evolved as a function of circumstances the group had faced and their adaptation to them can promote empathy and acceptance (Staub, 2002, 2003). Groups also can humanize the other by fostering awareness of *shared* needs, in part by understanding the lives of members of the other group. In Macedonia, journalists from different ethnic groups interviewed and wrote articles about families belonging to each group, which were printed in the newspapers of each of the ethnic groups (Manoff, 1996). Further, showing *variations* among people also can help to "individuate" the other, disconfirming group stereotypes.

DESTRUCTIVE IDEOLOGY VERSUS A CONSTRUCTIVE, SHARED VISION OF A HOPEFUL FUTURE

One of the most important influences leading to violence between groups, including terrorism, is a "destructive ideology." In the presence of difficult life conditions or group conflict, people often create or turn to an ideology, a vision of how to live life, of relationships between groups, and individuals within groups. In Nazi Germany, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Argentina during the disappearances (Staub, 1989), or Rwanda in the form of "Hutu power" (Des Forges, 1999; Staub, 2003), visions of "better" futures have been created. These visions or ideologies were destructive, however, in that some group was defined as an enemy that stands in the way of the ideology's fulfillment.

Proposal 2. The Dutch and Muslim leaders and communities should engage in dialogue aimed at creating a constructive, inclusive ideology that includes mutual understanding, accommodation, and a shared vision of a good society to which all groups can contribute and help create.

This should involve exploration of values, beliefs, and customs, acknowledging and engaging with differences, while considering accommodation, common ground, and the aim of developing positive social arrangements that encompass all groups. This might be done in living rooms, public meetings, or on the radio and television. The involvement of religious leaders of the Muslim communities in such dialogue is crucial, since they have substantial influence in opening (or closing) minds to new perspectives. Political leaders and the media have somewhat similar power on the Dutch side. Involvement in such a societal process can empower people and change attitudes toward the other group. Given each group's limited knowledge of the other, providing each group with basic descriptive information about the other would be valuable preparation for dialogue.

Muslim groups facing difficult life conditions or group conflict can turn to their already existing ideology, Islam, which is likely to become more extreme or fundamentalist in nature. In the face of adversity, being part of a Muslim community provides security, identity, connection and a familiar world view. Those outside the group then increasingly are seen as enemies of the ideal way of life described by Islam. The Dutch facing adversity—great societal changes and the possibility of terrorism—also can shift from being individuals to becoming more "Dutch" and more negative toward minority groups. Threat to the group is a powerful predictor of hostility to minority groups (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).

In difficult or confusing times it is important to create an inclusive vision of a better future that all groups can work together to fulfill. The creation of such a vision requires exploration and dialogue among all groups. In the Netherlands, historically there has been social organization in "pillars," different groups having their own identity, culture, religious denomination, and educational system. Among other problems, however, it has contributed to separation between groups and has been changed to a "civic integration" policy in the 1990s (Joppke, 2004).

A shared, inclusive ideology can be created only through engagement and empathetic dialogue. In the course of dialogue, differences about core values and identities are likely to emerge. The Dutch may learn that Muslim practices are adaptable to historical developments and current circumstances (see previous discussion), however, and may in turn be influenced by collectivist group values. Muslims may be influenced by Western values of equality and freedom, even with regard to the treatment of women. Extreme ideological groups from both sides will be threatened by engagement and the easing of ideological differences. But dialogue can help people in the middle from moving toward the extreme, and create a

shared vision for society. As part of the dialogue, aspects of Muslim religion that are hostile to outsiders or that terrorists have used to ferment hostility and violence ought to be contrasted with other elements within Islam. Islamic teaching on love and tolerance, the tolerance inherent in democratic ideals, and caring for a shared community can be among the building blocks of a shared ideology.

PAST VICTIMIZATION AND HEALING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WOUNDS

People who have been victimized or in other ways traumatized often carry deep psychological wounds. They tend to feel vulnerable, have a diminished sense of self, distrust people and see people and the world as dangerous. When they experience new threat, they may feel the need to use force to defend themselves, thereby becoming perpetrators (Staub, 1998; Staub & Pearlman, 2006). Members of minority groups who left their own countries, especially victims of political violence, are likely to carry such psychological wounds. Devaluation, discrimination, and disruptions of family or community add to their woundedness.

> **Proposal 3. Facilitate psychological healing to prevent the negative consequences of painful past experiences.**
> *Offer people who have immigrated to the Netherlands opportunities to tell their stories in an empathic context, including stories of dislocation, discrimination, and experiences of victimization before they immigrated. This can done be in community meetings, as well as in the media. Engagement with their own and others' stories can help people heal and connect with one another, and can humanize members of a group in the eyes of other communities. It is important also to provide opportunities for people in the ethnic Dutch community, especially young people, to talk about their painful experiences. In schools, children can read, write, and discuss stories about painful experiences, both fictional and autobiographical. This should not be a special activity, but part of the normal functioning of schools—which requires teacher training.*

Healing from past wounds, or psychological recovery, can help people differentiate between past and present, and help them reconnect with and trust people more. One way to heal is to engage with, rather than avoid, the memories of painful past experiences, by telling one's story while others respond empathetically or by hearing others share similar painful or difficult experiences (Herman, 1992; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995; Staub et al., 2005).

People belonging to majority groups also can be psychologically wounded. Many members of racist right-wing groups in the United States are young people,

mostly men, who come from difficult—poor and abusive—backgrounds (Ezekiel, 1995, 2002). They are desperately in need of connection with other people and of a world view that helps them make sense of their life experiences. The right-wing groups they join, with their ideologies of superiority, strengthen their identity, give them meaning and connection, and provide a reassuring comprehension of reality. These groups fulfill basic needs, but in destructive ways, turning people against others. While their membership is limited, extreme right groups do exist in the Netherlands, with busy Internet traffic. Helping people with such backgrounds heal and find constructive communities and world views would make it less likely that they turn to right-wing extremism.

MODERATING RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY
AND INCREASING OF PLURALISM

A culture promoting very strong respect for authority is another contributor to violence (Staub, 1989, 2006a). Being accustomed to guidance by authorities, people find it challenging to stand on their own in difficult times. They tend to turn to and follow leaders, especially leaders who help them fulfill basic psychological needs. There is much concern in Western societies about the "authority orientation" in Muslim cultures (Nisbett-Larkin, 2005). A related contributor to violence by groups against other groups is the absence of pluralism. Genuine pluralism moderates respect for authority.

> **Proposal 4**. *Enhancing pluralism and moderating respect for authority are important in inhibiting the evolution toward hostility and violence.*
>
> *To enhance pluralism, provide outlets for leaders and members of minority groups in the Netherlands to express the needs, concerns, and perspectives of their communities. Provide access to media and encourage community and political participation and dialogue. Look for and develop young community/political leaders in immigrant Muslim groups, through leadership seminars and invitations to participate in political activities. Dialogue may also help moderate authority, as people find their own voice and develop their own views (which may promote respect for authority based not on position, but on merit).*

As the U.S. example after 9/11 indicates, people in a secular culture with generally moderate respect for authority also can show strong respect for authority in response to difficulties of life, especially threat to the group. People can turn to strong leaders who promise protection, offer people ways to feel effective and in control, strengthen the group's identity, and provide a clear vision in the midst of confusion. All of this can be destructive, however, if the actions of the group do not

address the actual causes of the problem, the clarity does not reflect actual reality, and the solutions offered by leaders generate hostility and violence between groups. It is important, therefore, to make people aware of the potential dangers of very strong respect for authority, in a way that is respectful of a culture that values authority.

Pluralism, which moderates respect for authority, has at least two components: the existence in society and the possibility to express a wide range of beliefs and values, and participation by all segments of society in public discourse. The first component of pluralism is strong in the Netherlands. Subgroups of society differ substantially, however, in their participation in the public domain. Muslim participation is limited and decreasing in local elections, particularly in Amsterdam, while increasing among Turks in Rotterdam with Turkish candidates for council seats (Tillie & Slijper, 2005). Pluralism can be furthered by promoting Muslim participation in public discussion and political life. This can start with dialogue (Kelman & Fisher, 2003), which gives people a voice and a constructive way to engage with one another's values, ways of life, and culture.

JUSTICE AND ACCULTURATION

Conflict between dominant and subordinate groups in a society has been a primary source of violence (Fein, 1993). Another source has been the perception by a group that their identity is being denied, leading to nationalism and a desire to establish their separate identity (Chirot & Seligman, 2001). The two are connected, in that the desire for a separate identity often arises out of the perception of injustice. Acculturation is defined here as the immigrants' absorption of and accommodation to their new society. In contrast to Turkish immigrants, for example, there has been only limited business initiative in the Moroccan community, which has therefore provided less work opportunity for Moroccans. Young people in immigrant minority groups in Amsterdam, especially Moroccans, have had less schooling and much lower rates of high school attendance. This situation has been improving, but there are still substantial group differences (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004).

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> *Proposal 5. Societal actions to address unfair social practices are important in promoting positive relations. Facilitating the acculturation of Muslim minorities in both work and personal realms also is essential to reducing group differences and increasing social justice.*
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> *Rebuilding internal community, better connections to the larger community, and empowerment through engagement in socially constructive and personally meaningful activities can fulfill basic needs, shape positive and integrated identities, promote social justice, and reduce antisocial behavior.*

1   *To facilitate acculturation and lessen alienation and antisocial behavior, it*
     is important for schools to promote academic and societal participation—to
     provide young people with language and job training, opportunities for work
     and participation in positive group activities. Training young people in en-
5   *trepreneurship would also be helpful for personal and community empower-*
     ment.

     Moving to a different country with a different majority religion, and leaving
     friends, extended family, and often even the nuclear family behind is difficult and
10   creates structural and emotional upheaval in people's lives. Many Moroccan men,
     only after being occasional visitors to their wives and children in Morocco for
     many years, brought their families to the Netherlands. Especially for people from a
     collectivist culture, the disruption of community adds greatly to their psychologi-
     cal dislocation. Many adults did not learn the language, and often children spoke
15   for the family. Fathers, traditionally the source of unquestioned authority, have
     been diminished by their inability to influence events that affect their families (de
     Konieg, 2005; Germert & Fleisher, 2005).   **Q20**
     Members of the second generation are to some degree acculturated, creating
     further separation from their elders, but they are not effectively integrated into
20   the larger society. The combination of coming from a collectivist, religious soci-
     ety, disconnection from their own community, and lack of integration makes the
     individuation process that is part of growing up highly complicated, especially
     for boys (Erikson, 1963). Some search for identity and connection by exploring
     the meaning of religion in their present life context (de Konieg, 2005), while   **Q21**
25   others, especially Moroccan boys, turn to informal youth groups for identity and
     connection. Some of these groups are aggressive, intimidate people, or engage in
     crime (Germert, 1999, 2004; Germert & Fleisher, 2005). These young men are
     considered Moroccans within the Netherlands, but are strangers when they go to
     Morocco (Stern, personal communication, 2005). They feel alienated, disres-
30   pected, and humiliated. Their activities on the streets and in gangs, disapproved
     at home, further disconnect them from their families. Rather than trying to dis-
     perse gangs, which serve useful psychological functions, however, efforts should
     be made to transform them into "prosocial gangs" (Goldstein & Soriano, 1994)
     that engage in constructive business activities, rather than intimidation and
35   crime.
     On the basis of 150 interviews in Kuwait after its liberation from the invasion by
     Iraq, Volkan (2004) writes about fathers who were humiliated by Iraqi solders.
     They did not talk about it to their children, but distanced themselves in an effort to
     hide or deny their sense of shame. "Frustrated by the distant and humiliated fathers
40   who would not talk to their sons about the traumas of the invasion, they (the sons)
     linked themselves together and expressed their frustration in gangs." (p. 83). The
     experience of Moroccan boys in relation to their fathers may be similar. Groups of

other youths provide them with the connection and identity so badly needed during that time of development (Germert, 2004).

Fostering a strong internal community, including strengthening family life, would be constructive. Such communities are less negatively affected by a larger culture that diminishes them (Tajfel, 1982). Moroccans in particular have relatively few internal organizations, especially nonreligious ones. While Islamic identity remains strong, there is limited religious participation, in terms of visits to mosques and membership in religious organization throughout the Netherlands and Europe in general (Cesari, 2003; Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004). Connections to the outside community, through integration at work and in schools, effective participation in the labor market, and political participation are also important. The knowledge of the larger culture and "bicultural competence," the capacity to engage with both groups, is important (Staub, 1996).

Q22

PASSIVE VERSUS ACTIVE BYSTANDERS

Witnesses who are in a position to act have great potential power to either facilitate or prevent the evolution of violence (Staub, 1989, 2002, 2003). Passivity by witnesses or bystanders has a powerful role in allowing the development of negative attitudes and actions. Both perpetrators and bystanders interpret passivity as acceptance or even approval. When bystanders indicate by their words or actions that action is needed, however, other people are more likely to act. This has been found both in real-life situations (Hallie, 1979; Staub, 2003) and in laboratory research (Staub, 1974).

Q23

> *Proposal 6. Promoting active, positive bystandership by all segments of the population—leaders, the media, community organizations, individual citizens—makes the evolution of hostility and violence less likely. Every person, or organization, can be active in fostering constructive engagement by others.*
>
> *Since active bystanders can have powerful influence, political and community leaders and the media can promote constructive processes by speaking out in opposition to devaluation and verbal and physical attacks. They also can make citizens aware of the influence they can exert by speaking out to counteract negative attitudes and actions and promote positive ones. Citizens and community groups can, in turn, call upon leaders to engage in constructive actions. Educational workshops and media projects about why people remain passive, about the power of bystanders, and about constructive methods of active bystandership could increase positive bystandership.*

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1   Both politicians and the media have become very vocal in attacks on Muslims or Islam. As negative statements about another group increase, some people join in the attacks because of personal inclinations that shifting norms allow expression, others because of political interest, still others because attention now focuses on
5   what is different and problematic about the "other." Unfortunately, as a society increasingly turns against a devalued group, it becomes increasingly less likely that members of the society will have the motivation and moral courage to speak out in opposition to their own group (Staub, 1989, 2003). Correspondingly, as a minority group increasingly moves toward a radical ideology, its members are less likely to
10 be active bystanders to limit this evolution.

Such evolution of mutual hostility so far has been limited in the Netherlands—and Europe in general (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004). To increase the likelihood of active bystandership, however, it is important to foster moral values, empathy, sympathy, and caring about the welfare of people outside
15 one's narrowly defined group. This, combined with experiences that give people a voice and confidence in their values and views, can foster the moral courage to act despite opposition by important others and potential ostracism or danger to oneself (Staub, 2005).

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THE ABSENCE OF CONTACT
AND PROMOTING DEEP CONTACT

The absence of contact between groups makes differentiation between "us" and
25 "them" and the devaluation of the other more likely. Contact between members of different groups has been found by social psychologists to be an important avenue to overcoming devaluation, prejudice, and hostility (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Proposal 7. It is important to foster deep contact (significant engagement)
30 *between people across group lines as an avenue to overcoming devaluative*
stereotypes and hostility.

To create deep contact, promote physical integration—in housing, in the workplace, and in the schools. Provide information that motivates people in authority to create integrated teams in the workplace working on shared
35 *goals. To enhance the effectiveness of contact, develop mutual cultural knowledge and awareness, through workshops and other educational avenues. Expose school personnel to information and training in cooperative teaching and learning techniques that promote deep engagement between students from different groups. Help parents understand the mutual benefits*
40 *of cross-cutting relations between children in schools. Work to create, over time, equal quality schools, in terms of teaching competence and a positive environment. Parents' motivation to send children to integrated schools may*

be greatly enhanced if children going to such schools do well educationally.   1
Develop stable structures in which Dutch and Muslim students and adults
can engage in joint activities, such as sports teams, cultural events, and edu-
cational, community, and business projects.

5

With differences in culture, hostility between groups in the larger context in the
world of terrorism, and the war on terror, the conditions are present for a flare-up of
(mutual) hostility in the Netherlands and other European countries. Segregation
makes this more likely.

Theory and research have specified a variety of conditions that make *contact* ef-   10
fective as a means of overcoming prejudice. Superficial contact does not help
(Stroebe, Lenkert, & Jonas, 1988). Opportunities for interaction are important.
The more equal the role of interacting individuals, the more authorities support
their interaction, and the more they share goals that are superordinate to their sepa-
rate and conflicting goals, the more likely that contact will have positive effects   15
(Allport, 1954; Cook, 1970; Pettigrew, 1998; Sherif et al., 1961). Cross-group
friendships are especially valuable in changing perceptions of and attitudes toward
the other group (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). Anxiety inhibits engagement with mem-
bers of a devalued group. Experience in interaction can help overcome anxiety
about who the other is, what the other might do, and how to interact with the other.   20

The conditions in Amsterdam that would provide significant contact between the
Dutch and Muslim communities are limited. In recent years there has been some in-
crease in segregation in neighborhoods, as more people who are not ethnic Dutch
move to the outskirts of the city. Also, there are many relatively segregated schools.
Due to housing segregation, almost half of the Dutch population has a White school   25
nearby, but only about 10% of Turk and Moroccan students have access to a similar
school (Diversisteits-en Integratiemonitor, 2004).

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Physical integration creates opportunity for contact. But research with children
in schools following desegregation in the United States found that White and
Black children interacted little with one another. Black children had low self-es-   30
teem and did not perform academically according to their potentials. Cooperative
learning procedures were introduced in which, for example, each child had to learn
some material and teach it to the other children. Thus children were working on
shared goals, with each child both a learner and a teacher (Aronson, Stephan,
Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978). Cooperative learning procedures led to improved   35
academic performance and self-esteem by minority children, less prejudice, and
more interaction between White and minority children. They did not reduce the ac-
ademic performance of White children.

Education about the other's culture can make contact more effective. In U.S.
schools, White teachers found it insulting when Mexican American children did   40
what their culture taught them, to look down when the teacher was speaking to
them, especially when they were reprimanded (Staub, 1996). In the Netherlands,

reports by Moroccan parents and self-reports by youth indicated less problem be-
havior by youth than that reported by Dutch or Turkish parents and youth, but
teachers reported more problem behaviors by Moroccan youth. Possibly differ-
ences in culture and expectations have a role in this (Stevens, Pels, Vollebergh, &
Crunen, 2003). Teachers, parents, and children all may be helped by education
about differences in culture and expectations.

The great value of stable structures in which people interact across group lines
and through which they develop cross-cutting identities has been shown in a study
in India of three cities in which significant Hindu–Muslim violence occurred when
instigating conditions were present, and three cities that remained calm (Varshney,
2002). In the latter cities there were significant institutions that included both Hin-
dus and Muslims. Their members, respected people in the community, were com-
mitted to these institutions. They organized themselves to control and combat ru-
mors as they arose, and to engage with politicians and inhibit them from making
speeches that inflame tensions—even threatening to publicly speak out against
them.

TRUTH, THE CREATION OF A SHARED HISTORY AND A SHARED FUTURE

Groups that have experienced some combination of hostility, conflict, or vio-
lence—whether mutual or one-sided—usually have different versions of what has
happened and why. They tend to blame one another, which makes renewed hostil-
ity and conflict more likely (Staub, 2006a).

> ***Proposition 8. Develop a mutually acceptable, shared history of the rela-
> tions between groups. Conflicting views of history can give rise to actual
> conflict, while a shared view can promote peaceful relations.***

Truth is important in promoting reconciliation in pre- and postconflict
settings (Proceedings of the Stockholm International Forum, 2000). Some
important aspects of truth are the specification of what has happened, the ac-
knowledgment by groups of their own harmful actions, and correcting
misperceptions. The Dutch might believe that Islam is monolithic, without
flexibility and variation (Buijs & Rath, 2002), and that Muslims in the Neth-
erlands want to remain separate from the mainstream society (van
Oudenhoven et al., 1998). Among Muslim misperceptions may be exagger-
ated beliefs about Dutch people living in ways that Islam regards as unac-
ceptable.

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Since groups and their members tend to deny responsibility for their own vio-
lent actions, the creation of a mutually acceptable history is usually extremely dif-

ficult (Staub, in press; Staub & Pearlman, 2006). In the Netherlands and parts of Europe it should be easier to create a shared narrative of the past, since the groups have not severely harmed each other. Some groups, like the Germans and Czechs, have set up commissions to address their shared history, usually some time after the violence occurred (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003).

The truth and creation of a shared history would be well served by an empathic description and exploration of the lives of members of the groups involved, possibly including the history of Muslim immigration and the evolution of Muslims' relationship to their new country and to its Dutch inhabitants. Such a history might describe how the immigrants were first welcomed as workers, how the economy changed, leading to unemployment and reliance on the welfare system. It might consider the impact of all this on individual immigrants, their families and communities, as well as on Dutch society. A shared history might identify the extent to which there has been devaluation, discrimination, and social exclusion, as well as self-exclusion by immigrants; the extent to which members of minority groups engage in antisocial activities; and any history of violence between the groups.

The ideal approach to such an exploration would be an "understanding roots" perspective (see below), with an empathic exploration of the influences leading to negative attitudes and actions, and the use of the resulting understanding to guide change. A shared narrative would be a valuable underpinning for and contribution to creating an inclusive, constructive vision of the future that was discussed in the section on ideology.

UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS AND EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE AND PEACEMAKING

Our work in Rwanda strongly has suggested the powerful impact on people of understanding the origins of their genocide (Staub et al., 2005; Staub, 2006; Staub & Pearlman, 2006). We found that presenting information about the influences that usually lead to group violence and genocide, with examples from other genocides, and having Rwandans apply their understanding to their own genocide, made Rwandan survivors feel humanized. What happened to them was not the result of incomprehensible evil or God's will, but of understandable, even if tragic, human social and psychological processes. This information helped reduce trauma symptoms and created a more positive orientation toward the other group in both Tutsi survivors and Hutus who were themselves not perpetrators. Many participants also commented that understanding how violence originates can lead to action to prevent it.

Proposal 9. Identifying influences that lead to violence, the extent they are present in the Netherlands and other European countries, and under-

standing why they lead to violence, can motivate actions to prevent vio-
lence and build peaceful relations (Beaman et al., 1978; Staub, 2006a).

The central influences in the Netherlands include many factors already
discussed: mutual devaluation; the woundedness and humiliation of immi-
grant groups; reactions of the Dutch to antisocial behavior, social depend-
ence, and the perceived incompatibility in values; and fear by the Dutch of
terrorism and the subversion of democracy. Important aspects of under-
standing are the principles of psychological and behavioral evolution—of
destructiveness and helpfulness. Individuals and groups change as a result
of their actions (learning by doing). Actions that create limited harm make it
easier to do greater harm and more difficult for bystanders to take action.

Through workshops, media projects, lectures, and other public events, in-
formation should be presented to help politicians, leaders of institutions like
churches and schools, the media itself, and the public in general to develop
understanding of the psychology of group relations—specifically the psy-
chological, cultural, and social influences that generate hostility and lead to
violence. Also present information about actions required to diminish hostil-
ity, prevent violence, and empower active bystandership and thereby pro-
mote an evolution of positive group relations.

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The behavior of members of a group can change if they understand that perpe-
trators justify their actions by further devaluing those they harm (Lerner, 1980).
Passive bystanders also devalue victims. They have a strong need to distance them-
selves from, and a tendency to blame those who suffer, so as to avoid feeling guilty
(Staub, 1989). Societal norms, standards, and institutions, such as the media,
schools, the police, and the government, all change in relation to an increasingly
victimized group. Sometimes new institutions are created that serve persecution,
an eventuality that must be counteracted (Staub, 1989, 2003).

Understanding the roots of violence has both emotional and behavioral conse-
quences. For example, understanding that negative images about Muslims in the me-
dia can contribute to the evolution of increasing violence might create more respon-
sible reporting and efforts to humanize rather than devalue Muslims. The public
acquiring such understanding might lead to holding the media more accountable.

RAISING INCLUSIVELY CARING CHILDREN AND
ALTRUISM BORN OF SUFFERING

Children in many places engage in bullying (Olweus, 1993), often directed at chil-
dren from devalued groups. For harmonious relations in a society it is important
that children do not exclude those outside their group from the realm of caring
(Staub, 2003, 2005). For children to care about others, including others who do not

belong to their ethnic or religious groups, requires love, affection, guidance, the
example of caring by adults, and the involvement of the children in helpful actions
(Eisenberg, 1992; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 1979,
2005, 2006b).

Proposal 10. It is crucial to develop inclusive caring in children as an aspect of long-term peacebuilding. This means caring that extends beyond the boundaries of their own group, however that group is defined, and specifically caring about members of other groups in their society, including previously hostile groups. In addition, especially for children who are members of groups that have suffered from victimization and other trauma, it is important to facilitate "altruism born of suffering" (Staub, 2003, 2005).

To facilitate the development of caring, provide school personnel training in creating "caring classrooms" that promote both positive interaction with and connections between teachers and students and among students, as well as other experiences that develop caring (Staub, 2003, pp. 267–289). Involve students in developing rules for the classroom, which, in addition to increasing adherence, can empower them and contribute to moral courage to be active bystanders when their peers engage in harmful actions (Staub, 2005). Enhance teacher effectiveness in these realms, for example, by helping teachers gain awareness of their attitudes toward children from various groups and toward sharing authority. Involve parents in school life and provide them some training in ways of raising children that is consistent with the principles of "caring schools." The schools provide a natural milieu for engaging parents and helping them acculturate in the realm of child rearing. While minority parents do not always easily engage with schools (at least in the United States), parents can be involved through their interest in their children's art, performances, and well-being.

In addition, the school curriculum can include material that humanizes all groups and thereby fosters inclusive caring. It also can engage children with their own painful experiences, provide support for them, and thereby promote altruism born of suffering.

Research on altruism has focused on positive roots, such as love and good guidance, while research with people who have been victimized or who have endured harsh treatment or other painful experience as children has pointed to its connection with aggressiveness (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990; Gilligan, 1996; Rhodes, 1999; Widom, 1989a, 1989b) or psychological problems (McCann & Pearlman, 1990; Herman, 1992). Case studies (O'Connell Higgins, 1994) and observations, however, indicate that some people who have suffered become helpful, caring people ("altruism born of suffering"; Staub, 2003, 2005). Participants in a study who have

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suffered from either victimization in their homes or political violence against their group were more empathic, felt more responsible to help, and were more willing to volunteer to collect money for victims of the Tsunami.

As this article has suggested, many Muslim immigrants, and some members of the Dutch population, were likely to have had significant experiences of suffering. The same is likely to be true of groups in other European countries. Groups' relations can be improved by providing sufferers with experiences that foster altruism born of suffering, including opportunities for healing, support, and information that help them understand their experiences (Staub, 2006; Staub & Vollhardt, 2006).

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THE ROLE OF LEADERS

Under difficult life conditions, or in the presence of conflict, leaders often emerge who propagate scapegoating and promote destructive ideologies. Groups turn to such leaders because they offer speedy solutions, if not by resolving real problems, at least by addressing frustrated psychological needs for identity and comprehension of reality. While violence between groups arises out of societal processes, such leaders are in the vanguard of facilitating the evolution of increasing hostility and violence (Staub, 2006b).

> *Proposal 11. Provide training to political, civic, and religious leaders that helps them lead their group to engage constructively with the other group. Develop understanding of the roots of hostility, violence, and peacemaking, including awareness of how past victimization and trauma and current adverse social conditions affect members of both groups, as well as themselves as leaders (Staub & Pearlman, 2006).*

On the Dutch side, constructive leaders can help the group deal with anxiety about terrorism and the differences between the Dutch and Muslim communities by engaging with those complexities through dialogue and problem solving. In response to attacks on culture and religion, Muslim leaders can, instead of helping people "escape" from the difficulties and challenges of their lives by turning to extreme Islamic fundamentalism, help them engage with the Dutch and work on creating a shared vision of life together.

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IMPLEMENTING PROPOSALS

The proposals in this article, even as they are expanded through some specific ideas for implementation, are statements of principles. They require translation

into everyday realities and a great deal of elaboration in their application through specific projects (Staub & Pearlman, 2007).

As many of the proposals suggest, it is of great importance for all communities involved to participate in deciding about and developing specific programs. The concepts of contact, dialogue, truth, and shared history all point strongly to the value of such joint work in prevention of hostility and violence, healing, reconciliation, and peacemaking. One group creating a project may draw on "truth" that is unacceptable to the other group, or offer an understanding of the other group that is at variance with the self-understanding of that group. Even if programs are created that do not directly touch on the history and relations of the groups, joint engagement increases sensitivity to each group's concerns and their representation in the programs. It also empowers the less powerful group.

CONCLUSION

A conservative, fundamentalist orientation, which focuses on rigid adherence to rules, is widespread in contemporary Islam. But a number of voices describe changes within Islam. Some describe the original message of Islam as "equalitarian, inclusive, progressive and liberating" (Rodenback, 2005, p. 10; see also Aslan, 2005).

Both historically (Armstrong, 2000) and today there are debates about what forms Islam should take. There are reports of intense discussions among Muslims on the Internet on many issues, including how Muslim minorities should engage with and adapt to the societies in which they live. A number of authors have argued that the forms religion in general, and Islam in particular, take are a product of the historical period and particular societal context. Aslan (2005) argues that there is an internal struggle to define what Islam will be, to define the Islamic Reformation that is already underway in the Muslim world. He believes that the conflicts are internal and the debate must be internal.

Living together in the same societies makes the local ethnic groups in European countries much more than witnesses or bystanders to an internal process in Islam. They are concerned, involved parties. The European countries are in a powerful position to affect the internal process within Islam, at least European Islam. Acceptance, dialogue, and the opportunity to be part of one's adopted country are crucial. The relations that evolve between Muslim minorities and local ethnic groups will shape both Islam and the nature of these societies. The proposals in this article aim to identify policies and practices that help fulfill the basic psychological needs of people, help develop constructive relationships that make violence, including terrorism, less likely, and help develop societies in which different groups can live harmoniously and be enriched by one another. These long-term efforts require commitment and persistence.

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In 2005 the administrators of the city of Amsterdam invited me to develop and present proposals to help prevent terrorism and violence and improve group relations in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, and to write a paper describing the proposals and their background. This article is a briefer, revised version of that paper.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Q37

Biographical note to come.

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