

Heidegger: *Being and Time* I.1

[Note: page numbers given below in parentheses go with the German edition,; they appear in the English translation in the margins.]

1. The Analysis of Dasein: We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. (42)
2. The Being of Dasein is in each case mine. (42)
3. Being is that which is an issue for every Dasein. (42)
4. The essence of Dasein lies in its "to be" (existence). (42)
5. Other beings besides Dasein have Being-present-at-hand, rather than existence. (42)
6. That Being which is an issue for Dasein is in each case mine. (42)
7. To beings present-at-hand, their being is a matter of indifference. (43)
8. Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic ("own" or "not own"). (43)
9. Average everydayness is specifically closest and best known to Dasein. (43-44)
10. Being is an issue for Dasein even in the mode of average everydayness, even, for example, in the mode of fleeing from it or forgetting it. (44)
11. Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of being; existentialia correspond to entities that are each of them a "who"; categories belong to those that are each a "what." (44-45)
12. It is misleading to think of an "I" or subject (substance) as immediately given. (46)
13. For Scheler, the person is (rightly) never to be thought of as a thing or substance. (47-48)
14. Nor does it help to think of our being as the sum of the Being of body, soul, and spirit – whether we say that man is a rational animal (48) or that man is something that reaches beyond himself (49) – since their nature has not yet been determined.
15. The analysis of Dasein is prior to anthropology, psychology, and biology. (50)
16. Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness. (51)

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17. Summary so far ["Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself . . . modally undifferentiated."] (53)
18. Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon. (53)
19. Yet it has in its structure these items:
 - 1) in-the-world/worldhood
 - 2) the "who"
 - 3) Being-in (53) (see also I.1, 50)
20. Being-in is not the containment of Being-present-at-hand. (54)
21. Being-in is an existentiale; it is the existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. (54)
22. "Being alongside" the world (being at home in the world) is never anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. (55)
23. Two entities present-at-hand in the world are worldless in themselves. (55)
24. The facticity of Dasein is such that its Being-in-the-world disperses itself into definite ways of Being-in that have concern as their kind of being. (56-57)
25. For Dasein to be is already to be-in-the-world. (57)
26. Up until now Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by the single exemplar – knowing the world. (59)
27. Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world. (60)
28. Phenomenological description has no privileged status as a mode of Being-in-the-world. (61-62)