

Prodelic and Adelic Κριτήρια

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1 Introduction

The Pyrrhonian sceptic seeks tranquillity. He hopes that it will be found by investigating, because investigation brings truth. He is dismayed to discover during the course of his investigations that truth is hard to come by; that for any reason one can find to believe a proposition, there is an equally cogent reason to disbelieve it. Faced with such equipollence, and being epistemically responsible, the sceptic must suspend judgment. However, upon suspending judgment, to his great surprise and delight, the sceptic finds he is tranquil; his anxiety over truth and value has evaporated in the face of equipollence.

One of the things the sceptic must investigate is how we come to have knowledge in the first place. By A.D. 200, there were many views circulating on this topic in the Hellenistic world. Many of these views centered on the notion that true propositions carried some identifying mark that would allow them to be picked out from false propositions, and that once you had picked out some of these, you could use these as a knowledge base upon which to found other claims. Such an identifying mark, or by extension, any feature of cognition that allowed one to pick out true propositions was called a *κριτήριον*, or criterion.

This paper is the first stage of a larger study on Sextus' investigation into the notion of a *κριτήριον*. His investigation constitutes a large portion of his corpus, and is in many ways a paradigmatic Pyrrhonian inquiry. But, as in much of Sextus, the investigation of the *κριτήριον* is plagued by apparent

inconsistencies and other sources of puzzlement and confusion. In the opening sections of his investigation, what I will often call ‘the introduction’ for purposes of this paper, we find such an inconsistency. It occurs while Sextus is attempting to give a classification scheme (what I will often call ‘the taxonomy’) that will structure his entire inquiry. For this reason, it is important to devote a substantial amount of space to wrestling with this inconsistency, so that we might have some chance of understanding what happens in the investigation itself.

In what follows, I will lay out the passages that give rise to the problem, survey some approaches to the problem, and propose my own solution. In conclusion, I will have some further things to say about how I think the taxonomy should be interpreted. Much of what happens in this paper will be an attempt to make certain ancient technical notions fit together at the seams; I will not have much to say about what these notions amount to intuitively, or in contemporary technical terms.

2 The Inconsistency in *M* vii.33

Let us then begin, in natural fashion, at the beginning. Sextus’ discussion of the κριτήριον opens his detailed treatise on Scepticism, *Against the Logicians* (hereafter *M*). Having sketched the general nature of Pyrrhonism in the *Outlines* (hereafter *PH*), he now sets about to apply sceptical techniques to specific pieces of dogma. Though there is some disagreement, he says, about how many proper parts philosophy has, most divide philosophy into three parts: physics, ethics, and logic. But however it is divided, any sceptical examination of Dogmatism should begin with logic, because “we must, before all else, possess trustworthy principles and methods for the discernment of truth” and “the logical branch is that which includes the theory of criteria and proofs.” [M, vii.24] Logic, as Sextus understands it, will include accounts of how we come to know things generally, whether we know those things by means of inference (proof) or by means of direct apprehension, either perceptual or intellectual (criteria). *What* we come to know will be largely things about nature (physics) or things about how we should act (ethics). Sextus continues:

Since it seems that what is evident [τὰ εναργῆ] is to be discovered [γνωρίζεσθαι] from itself [αὐτόθεν] through some criterion [διὰ κριτηρίου τινός], whereas what is non-manifest [τὰ ἄδηλα] must be traced out [ἐξιχνεύεσθαι] through signs and proofs, by means of a carrying-over [μετάβασιν] from what is evident, we shall investigate in order, first, whether there is some criterion for things that are come upon [προσπιπτόντων] from themselves, according to either the senses or the mind, and after this, whether there is a semiotic or apodeictic method concerning non-manifest things. [M, vii.25]

There are several important things to note about this passage. First, Sextus seems to delineate two ways of acquiring knowledge, a *direct* way, according to which we grasp self-evident truths, and an *indirect* way, according to which we come to know non-self-evident truths. Second, Sextus identifies two classes of known object, one for each kind of knowledge. Τὰ εναργῆ (sometimes also called πρόδηλα), or evident things, are, unsurprisingly, known directly, while τὰ ἄδηλα, or unclear things, are know indirectly. Henceforth, following Brunschwig [2, p. 230], I will call direct knowledge of τὰ εναργῆ or τὰ πρόδηλα *prodelic* knowledge, and indirect knowledge of τὰ ἄδηλα *adelic*. Third, Sextus uses language that suggests each way of knowing is carried out by means of some item or capacity whose function it is to yield the relevant sort of knowledge. We acquire direct knowledge through a κριτήριον, and we acquire indirect knowledge through signs and proofs.¹ This is a surprising symmetry to discover, since it is odd to think that direct knowledge is knowledge we acquire *by means* of anything. More baffling still is that what is known directly, evident things, are known *from themselves* [αὐτόθεν], yet through some κριτήριον. I would like to pass over this puzzle for now, as I will have more to say about it at a later stage of the larger study. Basically, whatever it is that causes us to grasp immediate truths can be a κριτήριον, even if that thing is the object of knowledge itself. Last, we should take note of the relationship between the two classes of object. τὰ ἄδηλα are known through signs and proofs, by some kind of transfer [μετάβασιν] (literally “taking with”) from τὰ εναργῆ. This means that acquiring direct

¹There are important differences between signs and proofs, but those differences will not be immediately relevant.

knowledge of evident things is a prerequisite for acquiring indirect knowledge of τὰ ἀδῆλα, and that knowledge of evident truths will be used, together with signs and proofs, to gain knowledge of τὰ ἀδῆλα.

We can produce on the basis of this text then a very general picture of what Sextus takes a κριτήριον to be. A κριτήριον is some means by which we acquire direct or immediate knowledge of self-evident truths. This knowledge can be acquired either by perceptual or intellectual means, so there are both perceptual and intellectual forms of direct knowledge. This knowledge then forms the basis for knowledge of things that are not self-evident, which we acquire by using directly-gained knowledge in proofs and inferences. There are some interesting nuances to the Greek here that help reinforce this picture. γνωρίζεσθαι, used to describe the kind of knowledge we have of evident things (here in the passive voice), can be understood as a kind of indicating or pointing out; so τὰ εναργῆ are indicated or pointed out by a κριτήριον. τὰ ἀδῆλα, on the other hand, must be ἐξιχνεύεσθαι, or “traced out” from what τὰ εναργῆ bring with them. This suggests that while evident things can be “seen” as a result of some indication given by a κριτήριον, knowledge of non-evident things requires a longer and perhaps more arduous process. In his second mention of direct knowledge at 25, Sextus claims that evident things are τῶν προσπιπτόντων: they are literally “things fallen upon.”

I need to clarify something before proceeding. Though Sextus has defined a κριτήριον as something that gives prodelic knowledge, he will frequently speak about some kinds of κριτήρια that are clearly adelic, most notably what he will call the ‘technical standards’. These are everyday standards of measurement like rulers, compasses, and weights. They are adelic insofar as they are epistemic intermediaries: we do not ‘see’ that a tree is three meters tall, or a pool six feet deep; we must use an intermediary standard to measure these things. Why then is Sextus happy to call these standards κριτήρια, when he has defined κριτήρια as things that yield prodelic knowledge?

By Sextus’ time, the the notion of a κριτήριον had acquired a conceptual legacy. For the Stoics, famously, the κριτήριον was the so-called cognitive impression, an impression that could not be false. If you were lucky enough to have one of these, you had knowledge. For the Epicureans, the κριτήριον was a paradigmatic truth, one that could be used to measure other truths by

virtue of its perfect verity. One of Sextus' tasks in the introductory section we are looking at is to define and classify the various senses of *κριτήριον* used by dogmatists, so that he can systematically investigate. Some conceptions of the *κριτήριον* have an adelic flavor, like the Epicurean one. These conceptions, I can only speculate, Sextus takes to be legitimate ones by some kind of analogy with prodelic *κριτήρια*.

We will see that Sextus is quite careful, in most cases, to indicate when he is talking about true prodelic *κριτήρια* and adelic faux-*κριτήρια*. He even gives the adelic sense of *κριτήριον* its own category in his taxonomy at vii.33. For this reason, I will not devote any more space in this paper to making sense of how Sextus can speak of adelic *κριτήρια* in general. What is important for us to see is that logical *κριτήρια*, the kind to which dogmatic philosophers appeal to make knowledge claims, and the main subject of our investigation, is unqualifiedly prodelic. It is because Sextus seems to be so clear about this, and otherwise so careful not to mix his adelic and prodelic notions, that the problem we will see below is so alarming.

After his brief introduction to the *κριτήριον*, Sextus proceeds to give us more details concerning how the *κριτήριον* is understood by Dogmatists. I shall give this passage in its entirety, as understanding it will be crucial to what follows.

‘Κριτήριον’ seems to be said in three ways: generally, specifically, and most specifically. In the general way, [it is said] with respect to every measure of apprehension [πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως], and according to which way the thing that was indicated before [σημαινόμενον]² and the physical (or natural) [φυσικά] criteria are worthy of this name, such as sight, hearing, and taste; in the specific way [it is said] with respect to every technical measure of apprehension [πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικόν], and according to which way someone would say the cubit, the balance, the rule, and the compass to be criteria, insofar as they are technical, but [would say] in no wise sight, nor hearing, nor on the whole the general remainder of the sense faculties; but in the most specific way [it is said] with respect to every measure of apprehension

²The role of the participle *σημαινόμενον* is unclear. It is possible Sextus means to refer to something he said at vii.27. I will say something more about this below.

*of unclear matters*³ [ἄδηλου πράγματος], and according to which way the ordinary [βιωτικά] [measures] are no longer said to be criteria, but only logical [λογικά] [measures], and those which the dogmatists introduce toward the discovery of truth. [M, vii.31-33]

There has been a fair bit of discussion as to how to understand the details of this division, and examining some of that literature will factor in the task I undertake in the last section of this paper. More pressingly, we need to notice a troubling phrase in Sextus' description of the third and most specific sense in which κριτήριον can be taken: he says that the third sense of κριτήριον, and the one that will matter to him most for purposes of this enquiry, includes every measure of apprehension of *unclear things*. This is alarming because just a few paragraphs earlier, we were told that knowledge by logical κριτήριον would yield direct knowledge of *evident* things, and that unclear things could be known only indirectly, using knowledge we had already got by κριτήριον. Put another way, Sextus has, after leading us to believe that logical criteria give us prodelic knowledge, he has, at the key moment in his definition of logical criteria, claimed that they give us adelic knowledge.

I have already noted that the notion of a κριτήριον can be adelic when used to describe certain things. The problem here is that when used to describe epistemically foundational κριτήρια, which are supposed to be the kind the dogmatic philosophers use, κριτήριον should not have an adelic sense (at least according to the passage at vii.25). The dominant scholarly response to this problem has been to take Sextus to vacillate between a prodelic and an adelic conception of the λογικόν κριτήριον in his introduction to the inquiry, and to try to explain why he vacillates. I call these approaches *dualistic* responses. In the next section I will survey some of these, and then propose my own solution afterward. My solution will not be dualistic, in that I will try to show that Sextus retains a single prodelic conception of the λογικόν κριτήριον throughout the introduction, despite linguistic appearances.

3 Dualistic Responses

This section is not complete. I give only a brief summary of each view.

³My emphasis.

3.1 Heintz

Heintz [3, p. 85] treats what Sextus says at 33 as a momentary aberration. Sextus clearly has a prodelic conception of logical *κριτήρια* at 25, and he seems to return to it again at 34, when he gives a further subdivision of logical *κριτήρια* (see the passage on page 13 below). His view is that while there *is* a second conception of *κριτήρια* at work in 33, Sextus is consistently dedicated to only one, the prodelic one, everywhere else. Heintz's claim depends largely for its plausibility on his views about how to interpret the structure of the taxonomy. I discuss his view on that topic, and objections to it, below.

3.2 Striker

Striker [4, p. 106] interestingly argues that Sextus is periodically substituting sceptical vocabulary for dogmatic vocabulary. The Pyrrhonist will claim, after he finishes his investigations, that there are no sources of prodelic knowledge. What dogmatists claim to be evident, and thus to be sources of prodelic knowledge, the sceptic will see as unclear, as instances *τὰ ἀδήλα*. In fact, the characteristic charge the sceptic makes against the dogmatist is that he makes claims about unclear matters [PH, i.200]. So when Sextus calls logical *κριτήρια* adelic, he is slipping into his sceptical vocabulary.

3.3 Brunschwig

Brunschwig [2, pp. 241-243] claims that the conceptual legacy that Sextus has inherited renders his attempt to codify usage of *κριτήριον* fundamentally dualistic.

4 A Unified Conception

I would now like to suggest that there is a plausible way of reading the text that avoids attributing to Sextus the vacillation we saw in the preceding accounts. Let me start by pointing out an additional useful passage of text, which occurs a few paragraphs before Sextus gives us his taxonomy at vii.31.

It would indeed be shocking⁴ if, while spending the utmost pains in investigating the external criteria – such as rules as compasses, weights and scales – we should neglect the criterion within us, itself the accepted test of those very [external] things. [M, vii.27]

I now want to piece together a general picture of this part of the introduction based on the three texts we have looked at in detail so far, vii.25, vii.27, and vii.31-33. In 27, Sextus draws our attention to at least two kinds of κριτήριον, what I will call the *internal* and *external* κριτήρια. It is very tempting to think that the internal κριτήριον is none other than the λογικόν κριτήριον we later get in the taxonomy. Sextus clearly thinks this internal κριτήριον should be the focal point of the following inquiry (that is why it would be unfortunate to fail to investigate it), and moreover, this internal κριτήριον seems to provide some kind of foundational knowledge, much like the κριτήριον mentioned in 25, and it is this foundational κριτήριον that is meant to be the subject of the inquiry.

We can also see that at least some of the so-called external κριτήρια will correspond to the technical standards of measure included in the specific division of 31-33: rules and compasses are explicitly mentioned in each passage, and the cubits and balance of 32 surely fall under the weights and scales of 27.

Lastly, we see that there is a dependence relation between the external and internal κριτήρια. Sextus suggests that the knowledge we gain by the external κριτήρια will in some way depend on the knowledge gained by the internal κριτήριον. Now we have seen a dependence like this once before, in 25. There, Sextus claimed that adelic knowledge depended on prodelic knowledge, which we gained by using a λογικόν κριτήριον.

So let us put all this together. I want to treat the internal κριτήριον as equivalent to the λογικόν κριτήριον that is supposed to be the focus of the inquiry, supposed to be the foundation for adelic knowledge, and supposed itself to consist in prodelic knowledge. Since in M^5 , this kind of κριτήριον is the only kind included in the most specific sense [ιδιαιτάτα] of κριτήριον, then

⁴Σχέτλιον – literally “cruel.” Cruel to the thorough sceptic, I suppose, who must investigate everything in hopes of finding either truth or tranquility.

⁵As we shall see below, *PH* gives us a slightly different reading.

we will get a threefold identity amongst internal/λογικά/ἰδιαιτάτα. Further, we get a partial identity⁶ between κριτήρια in the second, specific sense, and external κριτήρια. Given that knowledge by prodelic λογικά is a prerequisite for adelic knowledge, and that knowledge by λογικά is also a prerequisite for knowledge by external κριτήριον, it is very tempting to claim that knowledge by an external κριτήριον is adelic knowledge. Never one to miss out on a good time, I am going to yield to the temptation. A little reflection reveals that knowledge by external κριτήρια, at least by the ones Sextus explicitly mentions, look very adelic indeed. It is non self-evident that a tree is three meters tall, or that a pool is six feet deep. In order to discover this, we must employ some intermediary, some standard of measurement.

If this is the case, we can say that the knowledge by the the internal/λογικά/ἰδιαιτάτα κριτήρια is necessary for knowledge by at least some of the kinds of κριτήρια thought to be part of the general (which sense, recall, includes every kind of κριτήριον) and specific senses. This is the case because, as we know, all adelic knowledge depends on some prodelic knowledge, and by hypothesis, λογικά are prodelic. So now, on the brink of solution, our crisis appears even more acute. It seems that in order to make 33 consistent with 25 and 27, it is imperative that the ἰδιαιτάτα be prodelic. And yet Sextus says they are measures of apprehension of ἀδήλου πράγματος.

Notice that Sextus does not affix a similar qualifier to either of the other classes of κριτήριον. The door is open to us, accordingly, to think that by describing the ἰδιαιτάτα as measures of ἀδήλου πράγματος, Sextus means to create a contrast between the latter class and the former two classes. What could this contrast be?

If what I've said about 27 is correct, Sextus takes the specific class, and ipso facto, the general class, to contain adelic κριτήρια. So two alternatives are open to us: either (i) Sextus did not mean to contrast the third class with the other two by adding ἀδήλου πράγματος, and if he did not, it is strange he would have noted that the third class concerned τὰ ἀδήλα while taking that same information for granted when describing the first two classes; or (ii) Sextus did intend to create a contrast, and is telling us that something is true of this third class that is not true of the previous two. But if this is the

⁶See the final section of the paper to see why I am hesitant to claim a complete identity.

case, it would be odd if what the third class *did not* have in common with the other two was that it was adelic, since both of those classes were also supposed to be adelic.

I want to suggest that Sextus is indeed contrasting the third class with the other two in 31-33, and in the following way. On the one hand, while the first two classes contain adelic *κριτήρια*, knowledge by those *κριτήρια* is not a prerequisite for knowledge of τὰ ἀδήλα in general. On the other hand, knowledge by *κριτήρια* in the third class *is* a prerequisite for adelic knowledge in general. Although Sextus' use of language is misleading and unfortunate, I suggest that when he says *ἰδιαιτάτα* are standards of measure of unclear things, he is pointing out, not that these *κριτήρια* *yield* adelic knowledge, but that, unlike the ones in the other two classes, these *κριτήρια* are *prerequisites* for adelic knowledge. Now while this is not the most natural reading of the genitive construction ἀδήλου πράγματος, the syntax will allow this interpretation, and at least as readily (but probably no more readily) than the English translation using 'of'.

A quick clarification: obviously, prodelic λογικόν will be in the first class, since that class encompasses all *κριτήρια*. But the first class will also contain adelic *κριτήρια*, for the same reason. What I am suggesting is that, if the specific difference of the third class is expressed by ἀδήλου πράγματος, this expression would not informatively be used of the first class as well, since it contains prodelic and adelic *κριτήρια*.

I said a moment ago that the reading I suggest is not the most natural way to read the text. So why read it this way? I think this reading is no more *unnatural* than Striker's reading, and avoids the difficulties of her view. In my reading we attribute to Sextus an unusual, but admissible, use of language; in return we avoid making any systematic substitutions (Striker), we avoid saying Sextus had a momentary lapse (Heintz), and we avoid saying Sextus was systematically ambiguous (Brunschwig). In fact, while all the previous scholars take there to be present in Sextus' description of the λογικά two competing notions of *κριτήριον*, which we must somehow show to be non-contradictory, my reading removes even the appearance of contradiction, showing that Sextus uses a uniform notion of *κριτήριον* in all three of the relevant passages.

In the next section, I want to return to the issue of how to understand the structure of the taxonomy in 31-33. There we will find some confirmation for the reading I have just given.

5 φυσικά, τεχνικά, λογικά

It will be useful to see how my account will harmonize with the details of Sextus' taxonomy. So let us look at several ways this taxonomy can be understood.

Let us begin with what we know for sure. Sextus tells us that every measure of apprehension will be included in the κοινῶς, or general sense, and explicitly mentions the φυσικά, or natural criteria, which include the faculties of sense. Since this category is intended to be comprehensive, I take it to be safe to count technical standards of measure [τεχνικά] and the λογικά amongst the members of this class.

Sextus also explicitly claims that the specific class, or ἰδίως, will *include* τεχνικά like the compass and ruler, but *exclude* the sense faculties. Moreover, Sextus suggests that the reason the sense faculties are excluded from this class is that they are naturally constituted [ἔχοντα τὴν κατασκευὴν φυσικῆν]. This suggests that no φυσικά (should there be any beyond sense-faculties) will be in the ἰδίως class.

Lastly, Sextus tells us that the “ordinary standards” [βιωτικά] are not included in the last, most specific class [ἰδιαιτάτα]. He does not say, here at least, what the ordinary standards are. He does say that these standards are “no longer” [οὐκέτι] said to be κριτήρια, which suggests that at some point earlier, like during the preceding paragraph perhaps, these ordinary things were called κριτήρια. So we might conclude that the ordinary standards are the φυσικά and the τεχνικά. This would mean that the taxonomy proceeds in a classic and predictable fashion: begin with the most comprehensive class, and contract to more specific classes by eliminating some proper subclasses. Each contraction will yield a smaller class that contains some, but not all, of the members of the previous class.

Unfortunately, things are not so easy. Brunschwig has argued [2, pp. 236-237], and I will argue, that the 31-33 taxonomy does not have this clas-

sic structure. Our arguments, however will be different from one another. Before looking at those arguments, let us take note of a few more reasons that support a classic-structure view. First, Sextus' language strongly suggests such a structure: κοινῶς, ἰδίως, ἰδιαίτατα (“general”, “specific”, “most specific”). Second, the first division of classes, the division into general and specific, is a move from class to proper subclass, so that leads us to think the next division will be as well. Last, and here we face a frustrating textual complication, in the parallel account of the κριτήριον Sextus gives at *PH* ii.15, we find the expression πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ἀδήλου πραγματος used to describe the most specific class. Sextus seems to have added to the expression “every measure of apprehension of unclear matter” found in *M* the word “technical”. This strongly suggests that the final ἰδιαίτατα class is meant to be a proper subclass of the ἰδίως class. The λογικά, it would seem, are the non-ordinary, but still technical, standards.

Heintz [3, pp. 83-86] finds this evidence convincing, and thus claims that the correct way to read the taxonomy is the the *PH* way. Brunschwig, however, claims that this raises more problems than it solves, and that we should instead excise τεχνικόν from the *PH* text. First, he claims that, in order to have perfect hierarchical structure, what is excluded from ἰδιαίτατα “must form the exact surplus” of the ἰδίως class over the ἰδιαίτατα. What is excluded from the final class are the ordinary standards, the βιωτικά. Let us assume that these standards are, at least, ordinary standards of measurement, like the compass and the ruler. If the βιωτικά are exhausted by such standards, they do indeed form the exact surplus of ἰδίως over ἰδιαίτατα.

But, Brunschwig claims, there is more to the βιωτικά than ordinary technical standards of measurement. At *PH* i.23-24, Sextus gives us an explanation of what he means when he speaks of βιωτικά. The Pyrrhonian, in the absence of belief, must live according to βιωτικά, or the ordinary rules of life. One part of doing this, he says, lies in the following the guidance of nature. The guidance of nature, in turn, is “that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought.” In other words, we live according to βιωτικά when we judge in accordance with φυσικά (since sense faculties are amongst the φυσικά κριτήρια).

If this is true, Brunschwig argues, since φυσικά are not included in ἰδίως,

but are amongst the βιωτικά, the βιωτικά do not form the exact surplus of ἰδίως over ἰδιαιτάτα.

This does not seem to me to be a good argument. I see no reason to think that βιωτικά must form an exact surplus. As long as βιωτικά include what Sextus wants to exclude from the third class, the τεχνικά, it does not seem to matter what else they consist of. Moreover, I am not convinced that what Sextus says about βιωτικά at *PH* i.24 is relevant to the passages under discussion. In *PH*, Sextus is defining βιωτικά as a technical notion. There he is speaking as a sceptic who has arrived at ἐποχή and must, in the absence of belief, find a way to live. Following nature's guidance is part of the solution to that problem. At *M* vii.33, however, Sextus is about to *undertake* a sceptical investigation; he is subjecting technical notions of dogmatic philosophers to scrutiny. It is not clear that this is a context in which adhering to a technical sense of βιωτικά would be particularly useful. βιωτικά, appropriately enough, was a rather ordinary Greek word. It would not be surprising to find Sextus using it in its ordinary, non-technical sense in contexts where the technical sense was unnecessary. Accordingly, it does not seem to me that we should feel bound to accept Sextus' technical definition of βιωτικά here, unless it can be shown that there was some good reason he would have needed to use it.

I think, however, that there are other reasons to believe that Heintz is wrong about the structure of the taxonomy. The first reason concerns the *further subdivision* Sextus makes of the ἰδιαιτάτα at vii.34-37.

One may, however, subdivide this logical criterion as well, by calling one form of it that of the agent, another the instrument, and a third the application and use. The agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument sense-perception, and the third form of criterion the application of the sense impression.

I cannot discuss this subdivision much here. Though some have tried to understand this division as a further class-to-subclass division, I think it is very hard to make sense of the passage in these terms. So if we thought that the class-to-subclass division of κοινῶς into ἰδίως was a reason to think that the division of ἰδίως into ἰδιαιτάτα would be of the same kind, the subdivision Sextus makes of ἰδιαιτάτα should give us pause. We now have one clear case of

classic descending division, and one clear case (by hypothesis) of non-classic division. There is then no reason to assume, on the basis of similarity, that the remaining case is of either kind.

Now while I have objected to Brunschwig's argument, I agree with his conclusion that *ἰδιότητα* is not a proper sub-class of *ἰδίως*. Here is my argument. I want to take Sextus' description of (what I have taken to be) *λογικά* at face value. He says at 24 that prodelic *κριτήρια* will include criteria "of things directly perceived either by sense or by thought." Moreover, as we just saw, his subdivision of *λογικά* at 34 includes sense faculties and their applications. This means, unless further qualified, that *λογικά* include *φυσικά*, since the latter include, or are identical to, the sense faculties (according to 31).

But wait a minute. How can that be? Surely *φυσικά* are not the sort of thing that can be *λογικά*. Surely it is against the spirit, if not the letter, of Sextus to claim that they are. And what about the *βιωτικά*? If *φυσικά* are *βιωτικά* then they cannot be also *λογικά*, because Sextus explicitly excludes *βιωτικά* from the final class at 33.

First, recall that the *κριτήριον* par excellence, and surely one Sextus wants as his target, is the Stoic cognitive impression. Though this impression need not be sensory, most discussion of it took its paradigm cases to be sensory. Second, in addition to what I have already said about applying Sextus' definition of *βιωτικά*, I will say this. When Sextus defines *βιωτικά*, he, speaking as a sceptic, has already rejected all notions of *κριτήρια* as being sources of knowledge. So for him, qua sceptic, no *φυσικά* could be *λογικά*, because there are no *λογικά*. But in the texts that concern us, Sextus is not, initially, speaking as a sceptic, but speaking rather on behalf of the dogmatic. He is attempting to establish what a *κριτήριον* is first, so that he may investigate. It would be both surprising and inappropriate if Sextus, here, rejected the notion that *φυσικά* could be *λογικά*, because many brands of dogmatist do in fact think that *ἰδίως* are *λογικά*.

Now, if *φυσικά* are *λογικά*, then *λογικά* cannot be a proper subset of the technical measures of *ἰδίως*. Sextus has explicitly ruled out that any *φυσικά* are a part of this class. That means that *ἰδίως* and *ἰδιότητα* are disjoint, as Brunschwig would like, but unlike Brunschwig, I make *κοινῶς* intersect with

ἰδιότητα. A comparison of the the three views, Heintz's, Brunschwig's, and my own, can be found below in Figure 1.⁷

A few final things to note about the taxonomy: though relying heavily on the definition of βιωτικά at *PH* to motivate his view, Brunschwig chooses to say nothing about to explain how φυσικά can be both λογικά (as they apparently are) and βιωτικά. By making what seems to me to be a motivated restriction of Sextus' definition of βιωτικά, I can account for many of the oddities of the taxonomy. Moreover, my view of the taxonomy harmonizes nicely with much of what I argued earlier. For example, recall the internal/external distinction from 27. There Sextus claimed that the external criteria, which he explicitly says are the technical standards like cubits, epistemically depend on the internal criterion, which I take to be some λογικόν. I have suggested that the reason for this dependence is that the external criteria are adelic, while the internal criteria are prodelic (and we know from 25 that adelic knowledge depends on prodelic knowledge). If ἰδίως consists exclusively of adelic τεχνικά, then we get a nice parallel between the adelic-external/prodelic-internal dichotomy, and the ἰδίως/ἰδιότητα division. Mind you, 27 does not require this (λογικά could still epistemically underwrite external criteria even if they were both in some sense "technical" and hence a part of ἰδίως), but the tidiness of it is preferable, if it can be gained without doing violence to the text.

I should also note that I have no views at present as to whether or not sense faculties exhaust the class of φυσικά. If there are some φυσικά that are not λογικά, nothing I've said is affected, as far as I can tell. Those φυσικά will be adelic, and part of the class of external criteria. None of those φυσικά will be a part of ἰδίως, and some of them, the prodelic ones, will be a part of ἰδιότητα.

I close with a chart illustrating a (nearly) comprehensive view of the categories I've discussed herein.

⁷The illustration of Heintz and Brunschwig come from Brunschwig's paper, [2, pp. 236-237]. The third illustration, obviously, is my own addition.




Figure 1: Variant Taxonomies for *M* vii.31-33

Kind of κριτήριο	Includes at Least	Kind of Knowledge Yielded	vii.27 Class
φυσικά	sense faculties	prodelic adelic(?)	internal external
τεχνικά	technical measures	adelic	external
λογικά	<i>whatever</i> yields prodelic knowledge	prodelic	internal

Figure 2: Partial Overview

Primary sources

- [PH] Sextus Empiricus. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press), 1933. Greek text and transl. by R. G. Bury.
- [M] Sextus Empiricus. *Adversus Mathematicos*. Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press), 1935. Greek text and transl. by R. G. Bury.

Secondary sources

- [1] J. Brunschwig. *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
- [2] J. Brunschwig. Sextus Empiricus on the κριτήριο: The Sceptic as Conceptual Legatee. In *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* [1].
- [3] W. Heintz. *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus*. Halle, 1932.
- [4] G. Striker. Κριτήριο τῆς Ἀληθείας. In *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.