Philosophy of Science 784: Chance
Christopher Meacham
- Syllabus
- Hajek and Hoefer, Chance
- Strevens, Probability and Chance
- Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
- Lewis, Humean Supervenience Debugged
- Notes: Lewis' Metaphysical Account of Chance
- Meacham, The Meta-Reversibility Objection
- Strevens, Inferring Probabilities from Symmetries
- Loewer, Determinism and Chance
- Schaffer, Deterministic Chances?
- Maudlin, Three Measurement Problems
- Skyrms, Pragmatics and Empiricism, Chapter 3
- Arntzenius, Two Possible Objections to Subjectivism
- Arntzenius, Can Subjectivism About Probabilities Really Work?
- Hajek, 15 Arguments Against Finite Frequentism
- Hajek, The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too
- Eagle, 21 Arguments Against Propensity Theories
- Hall, Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance
- Schaffer, Principled Chances
- Meacham, Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance
- Strevens, Objective Probability as a Guide to the World
- Vranas, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too
- Meacham, The New Orthodoxy About Chance
- Strevens, Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?
- Maudlin, What Could Be Objective About Probabilities?
- Hoefer, The Third Way on Objective Probability